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P R E F A C E 
The present study is an attempt both to analyse and 
illustrate the financial and economic implications of the 
intergovernmental relations in unitary and federal polities. 
The investigation is confined to the baneful or conflicting 
impact of the various interrelationships. 
The Prologue clarifies certain basic notions and trends 
and summarizes the writer's views. Part One on Inequities, 
deals, in the first chapter, with fiscal inequities and 
inequalities and in the second chapter, with overlapping and 
multiple taxation. 
Part Two on Inadequacies, is composed of two chapters. 
The first tackles the tax revenue deficiencies of the junior 
authorities. The second chapter expounds the conflicts which 
are prone to arise between local and national financial 
policies. 
Part Three on Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination, is 
also an epilogue. It sets out diversemeans of inter -local and 
notably central -local financial co- ordination. Various 
proposals are made. 
The writer owes an invaluable debt to Doctor Mary Rankin, 
Reader in Economics in Edinburgh University, for her precious 
guidance, suggestions and encouragement which made this thesis 
possible. 
Saad Maher Hamza. 
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National Government, Central Government and Supreme Authority 
all designate the top authority. 
State: this term is generally avoided in the sense of country. 
It is preferably confined to the intermediate authorities 
in certain federal polities, for instance, the U.S.A. and 
Australia. 
Province: the counterpart of "state" in other federations, 
such as Canada. 
Overlying Authority: any upper authority. Sometimes denotes 
the central government. 
Major Authority: a larger unit within the same country, for 
example, province or state. 
Intermediate Authority: the authorities between the national 
government and the lowest localities. 
Secondary Authority, Tertiary Authority: purpose to larger 
and smaller units respectively. 
Local Authority: the following terms denote, in a general way, 
all subdivisions of a country, whether unitary or federal, 
unless otherwise specified or easily understood: 
Local unit, local area, locality, junior authority, 
minor authority, underlying authority, subordinate unit 
of government, lower laver or tier of government. 
Co- locality: a local unit of the same category within the same 
country. 
2. 
Intra -Local: within the same local unit, confined to it. 
Inter -local: inter -area (or inter -areal): between the local 
units per se. 
Central -local, National- local: between the central 
government and the subordinate units. 
Intergovernmental: between the various levels of authorities 
within the same country. 
Monotaxing Authority: a local unit having the power to impose 
only one type of tax. 
Pluritaxing Authority: a local unit having the power to levy 
several taxes. 
Monotaxing Capacity, Pluritaxing Capacity: the fiscal capacity 
of resorting to one or several imposts. 
Under -endowed, Under -privileged Area or Locality: a local unit 
with low per capita wealth and income and hence a low 
fiscal potential. 
Cosmopolitan Income, Inter -local Income, sometimes Pan -locality 
Income: income, personal or corporate, originating in 
several local units. 
Extra -local Income: income originating outside the local unit. 
Domestic Income: income arising within the local unit. 
Income Partition: the splitting out or parcelling out of 
income due to separate taxation by type of income or by 
different minor authorities. 
3. 
Upper, High (or low)- Income recipient, income receiver, income 
earner, income group, income bracket: these terms are 
preferred to rich (or poor) people. 
P R O L O G U E 





Various historical, political and socio- economic factors 
are responsible for the apportionment of financial powers 
between senior and junior authorities within the same national 
boundaries. The fiscal intergovernmental relations vary from 
country to country, and within the same country, change from 
time to time. 
A brief sketch is given, in this prologue, of the main 
patterns of financial inter -relationships and the 
centripetal forces at work. The various concomitant problems 
are succinctly set out. 
3. 
I. UNIT¡,RY COUNTRIES. 
In the Middle Ages, the various regions and boroughs were 
separate entities with inherent powers rather than delegated 
powers. The State was more of a superstructure above the local 
governments. In fact, civil rights, individual social and 
economic standing were derived from membership in the local 
association of public law, such as the county, borough, 
corporation or guild. 
Furthermore, the lack of transport facilities, the 
primitive stage the economy and other factors militated in 
favour of autonomous regions and city- states. A foreigner was 
one belonging to another borough. 
Nations came into being gradually. The fights waged with 
powerful neighbours, the improvement in communications, the 
marked progress achieved in the cultural and economic domains 
fostered nation -formation. 
Thus the minor governments had many of their 
responsibilities integrated in the national polity. However, 
they resisted the "subordination" to the "centre" in sundry 
fields. The local communities were not bent on relinquishing 
various "rights" of which they were so jealous. They strove 
to stem metropolitan interference and to manage their own 
4. 
affairs in such matters as taxation, expenditure, the 
regulation of domestic industries and trade and the discharge 
of sundry ancillary services. 
The strife between overlying and underlying authorities 
thus ushered in varying patterns of local finances responding 
to the amount of control secured by each tier. In some caseg, 
the minor authorities enjoyed a substantial share of home rule. 
In other cases, the central government was successful in 
wielding overwhelming power "for the sake of national unity." 
England enjoyed much local government responsibility 
thanks to the smooth development of its political institutions. 
Conversely, France has a long tradition of central government 
which attained its apex, during the Ancien Régime, under Louis 
XV, and was pursued by the Great Revolution whose ideal was to 
make France "une et indivisible." 
The apportionment of financial and economic powers 
between major and minor governments has little significance 
under conditions of primitive economy or laisser- faire. 
However, as soon as economics become a prominent preoccupation 
of individuals and /or authorities, the implications of 
intergovernmental political and fiscal relations acquire 
crucial importance. 
Apart from federal countries, discussed below, it is 
possible to distinguish "strong local government democracies" 
where local finances would constitute at least one third of 
5. 
total finances, "weak local government democracies" where 
local finances would not exceed one fifth of total finances(1) 
and "totalitarian states" where local responsibility 
disappears actually or virtually. 
Strong local government democracy is a feature of Anglo- 
Saxon and Scandinavian traditions. It involves the right of 
the local voters to elect their local officers through whom 
they control their own affairs and adapt central government 
laws to the conditions of the local community. In fact, in 
"Local Self -Government ", the local councils are not 
subordinate to the executive to the same extent as in "Local 
State Government ".(2) 
England affords a good illustration of local self - 
government. The local elections need no confirmation by the 
central government which, moreover, cannot dissolve the local 
bodies as often occurs in other countries. The local councils 
are presided over by elected persons. In consequence, there 
is a substantial degree of responsibility reflected in the 
(1) Hicks, U.K. : "The Grant Provisions of the Local 
Government Bill ". 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of 
Statistics. February, 1948. pp.33 -34. 
(2) Harris, Montagu : "Comparative Local Government ". 
London, 1948. 
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financial field. The local bodies frame their budgets, on 
both revenue and expenditure sides with comparatively more 
freedom and relatively less control from the centre.(1) 
In the second category of weak local government, various 
degrees of deconcentration are noticeable with corresponding 
patterns of central -local fiscal interrelationships. The 
latter have a point in common, namely the absence of local 
initiative owing to the subjection of the local councils to an 
executive, in sum the hegemony of the metropolis. These 
conditions justify, in French terminology, the use of the 
definition "deconcentration" as opposed to t ?decentralisation!T.(2) 
The French practice of the prefectorial system provides 
considerable instruction in connection with weak local 
government. The Prefect is a nominee of the government of the 
day and his office is political. In consequence, he is the 
local agent of the supreme authority and the "tuteur" of the 
department. As such, he is expected to enforce central 
policy. The prefect wields wide powers, dominates the local 
(1) Local Government in Europe. Edited by Anderson, William. 
New York, 1939. 
On England, see also: 
Finer, Herman : "English Local Government ". London, 1950. 
Robson, William A. : "The Development of Local Government ". 
London, 1948. 
Smellie, K.B. : "A History of Local Government ". London,1946. 
(2) Eisenmann, "Centralisation et Décentralisation ". 
Paris, 1948. 
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councils and can even suspend them thus reducing them to mere 
advisory bodies. Local budgets are subject to the approval of 
the prefect, or his deputy, who may insert certain items of 
expenditure required by law (i.e. inscriptions d'office) and 
can have extra taxes imposed.(1) 
Extreme centralization is a characteristic of totalitarian 
regimes and rigidly planned economies. In Fascist Italy, the 
"consulta ", or local councils were under the direct control of 
the Podesta. The latter was both communal administrator and 
officer of the government and assumed complete administrative 
and legislative responsibility. The members of the local 
bodies were centrally- appointed and their activities 
centrally- controlled. In fact, Fascism implied a denial of 
the elective principle, the preponderance of the corporative 
principle, in brief, the hegemony of Rome personified by 
"Il Duce ".(2) 
Similarly, National Socialism in Germany did not admit of 
the juxtaposition of local and central authorities. The 
leadership principle implied concentration of all responsibility 
in the executive head of the local unit. The Burgomaster was 
(1) Lainville, Robert : "Le Budget Communal". Paris, 1950. 
Chapman, Brian : "Introduction to French Local 
Government ". London, 1953. 
(2) Anderson, William : op. cit. 
"Italy ", contributed by Steiner, H. Arther. pp.307 -337. 
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thus a nominee answerable to the national government. The 
party delegates in all regions and localities were a further 
manifestation of ultra- unification.(1) 
In the U.S.S.R., the various local soviets; Rayon, 
Oblast, Krai, cities, are merely organs of the State 
apparatus and sheer instruments of the national planning 
machinery. 
- 
(1) Anderson, William : op. cit. 
"Germany ", contributed by Marx, F. Morstein. pp.273 -276. 
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II. FEDERAL COUNTRIES. 
Federalism is a desirable form of government for 
communities which exhibit pronounced differences in race, 
religion or language or simply when the area involved is 
large or geographically dispersed. Illustrations are 
afforded by Canada, comprising French -speaking Roman catholic 
elements, the U.S.A., with their large size and distinct 
southern interests and Switzerland which embraces diverse 
peoples. The federal structure suits better such 
territorially detached countries as Indonesia and the West 
Indies. 
In post -war conditions, federalism assumed increasing 
importance. It was given a strong impetus by various 
political, military and economic considerations.(1) 
There are numerous instances of federations recently 
formed, in gestation or in perspective, generally by 
integration rather than by disintegration.(2) 
ti 
In Europe, there are federations of Western Germany and 
(1) Beloff, Lax : "The Federal Solution in its Application to 
Europe, Asia and Africa". Political Studies. June, 1953. 
p.114. 
(2) Instances of federations by disintegration are the 
U.S.S.R., the Union of India and Brazil. 
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Yougoslavia. The attempts for the economic or military 
integration of Western European countries are conducive to 
political integration. The Schuman Plan, which transferred 
certain sovereign rights to the supra -national High Authority 
in respect of coal and steel, may be a step nearer European 
Federation. (1) The European Defence Community, if ratified 
by the countries concerned, paves the way to economic and 
political integration. The Benelux agreement and the 
suggested Franco -Italian customs union militate in favour of 
the same desideratum. 
In Asia, the federal form is exemplified by the new 
constitutions of India,(2) Burma and Pakistan. 
From time to time, the question of federating the Arab 
countries is raised. Integration may, some day, take shape. 
In Africa, there are Lybia and the Central African 
Federation. The federal form is also envisaged for Nigeria 
(1) Aron, Raymond : "Problems of European Integration ". 
Lloyds Bank Review. April, 1953. p.l. 
Also - "La Federation des Six ". Figaro, 3 and 4 
Decembre, 1952. 
Reuter, Paul : "La Conception du Pouvoir Politique 
dans le Plan Schuman ". 
Revue Francaise de Science Politique. July -Sept. 1951. 
(2) Ghosal, A.K. : "Federalism in The Indian Constitution ". 
The Indian Journal of Political Science. Oct- Dec.1953. p.317 
Banerjea, B.N. : "Le Federalism dans la Constitution 
Indienne ". 
Revue Francaise de Science Politique. July -Sept. 1951. 
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and East Africa. 
In South America, it is noticeable that Brazil reverted 
to the federal form in 1946 after the strong centripetal 
impact of President Vargas' policy. 
The British Caribbean colonies provide a further 
illustration of prospective federation.(1) 
It may also be mentioned that some colonial powers 
advocate federation with their dependencies, for instance 
France and its North African territories, notably Morocco. 
In a federal polity, sovereignty is divided between the 
major and minor governments. The latter are not hierarchical 
in their relations inter se, but have a special status and 
enjoy wide powers guaranteed by a rigid constitution. In 
fact, the federal principle, as defined by Professor Wheare, 
is "The Method of dividing powers so that the general and 
regional governments are each, within a sphere, co- ordinate 
and independent. "(2) 
(1) Bailey, Sidney : "Une Federation des Caraibes Britanniques ". 
Revue Francaise de Science Politique. July- September, 19520 
Birch, A.H. : "A British Caribbean Federation: The Next 
Dominion ?" Parliamentary Affairs. No.1 - 1950. 
(2) Wheare, K.C. "Federal Government." 1951. p.11. 
t is noteworthy that a federal country may be, in 
practice, a quasi -federation (e.g. Weimar Republic, 
Republican Indian Constitution of 1950) or a nominal 
federation (U.S.S.R., Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela). 
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The federal constitution apportions the financial powers 
between overlying and underlying authorities. Some of these 
powers are exclusively federal, some exclusively regional and 
some others are shared between federal and regional taxing 
jurisdictions. A first pattern specifies the powers of the 
federal government and leaves the residue with the constituent 
states, as in the U.S.A. and Australia. In the U.S.A., the 
states can be said to have inherent powers, the federal 
government designated powers and the towns and villages 
delegated powers.(1) A second pattern assigns particular 
powers to the individual members and vests the residue in the 
federal government as in Canada. In practice, however, both 
modes of allocation amount to the same result; namely that 
the junior governments in a federal polity have a more free- 
hand, in the economic field, than in unitary countries. 
In federalism, two constitutional systems and a 
subsequent great number of taxing jurisdictions operate 
fiscalwise upon the nation's resources. Consequently, the 
problem of national -local fiscal relations assumes special 
importance. The minor governments, being pluritaxing, can 
levy not only property taxes but also income taxes, business 
taxes, death taxes and consumption taxes, whether specific or 
general. The para- central borrowing powers are wide. The 
(l') Shultz, W.J. : "American Public Finance and Taxation". 
1st ed. p.250. 
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conditions attached to the grants are more liberal and slack 
than in unitary countries. 
Federalism is, therefore, pregnant with consequences from 
the viewpoint of financial interrelationships. The problems 
ushered in are more intricate than in unitary countries. The 
wild conglomeration of tax laws on the lower level is conducive 
to sundry intra- local, inter -local and central -local fiscal 
inequities and inequalities. The co- existence of multiplex 
and competing taxing jurisdictions inevitably leads to 
horizontal and vertical overlapping and duplicate taxation. 
Furthermore, the regional fiscal powers may have distortionary 
resource allocative effects. The minor governments' taxing, 
borrowing and spending powers may be wielded in such wise as 
to counteract, or even nullify, national economic policies. 
National compensatory fiscal policies can be defeated through 
anachronistic application of local spending powers. 
Federalism magnifies the divergent or disruptive impact of 
the junior authorities not acting in unison either inter se 
or with the national government. 
Various guarantees are sometimes provided by the federal 
constitutions against such incompatibilities. In the U.S.A., 
there are the Due Process of Law Clause, the Welfare Rule, 
the principle of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.(1) These 
(1) Groves, Harold : "Financing Government". New York, 1947. 
p.408. 
Seiko, Daniel : "The Federal Financial System". 
Washington, 1940. 
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provisions, however, fail to cope with the complete fiscal 
implications of federalism, especially in its orthodox or 
classical form. 
On the other hand, the central government, in unitary 
countries, is the single sovereign body. It wields 
untrammelled financial powers, has no "defect of constitutional 
authority" and cannot be accused of 'invading" the local 
financial field. The underlying authorities have a restricted 
field of action (being sometimes only monotaxing as in England) 
and exhibit less fiscal diversities. Consequently, there is 
less room for intergovernmental inequities or overlapping. 
Similarly, horizontal and vertical economic disharmony is less 
marked. 
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III. LOCAL GOVE1:TE NT AND DEETOCRACY 
There is no necessary parallelism between local 
government and democracy. True, local government and central 
government may develop simultaneously along democratic lines. 
Furthermore, in some countries the autocracy of the central 
government may cause local institutions to develop as an anti - 
absolutist reaction thus acquiring a genuine democratic 
character. This occurred in Europe to resist anti - 
constitutional monarchies and is illustrated by post -war 
Germany as a result of the "reeducational" policy of the 
Allies. 
( 1) 
On the other hand, however, local government may not only 
develop together with national government along un- democratic 
lines, but the former may continue as an a- democratic, or even 
anti -democratic force; whilst the national government has 
already evolved into a truly representative and essentially 
democratic regime.(2) 
(1) Gillen, J.F.J. : "State and Local Government in West 
Germany, 1945 -53" (With special Reference to U.S. Zone 
and Bremen). 1953. 
Ziebill, Otto : "The German Towns' Council and the 
Municipal Economic Activity ". in Annals of Collective 
Economy. January-Larch, 1953. p.41. 
(2) Langrod, Georges : "Local Government and Democracy ", in 
public Administration (Journal of the Institute of Public 
Administration). Spring 1953. p.27. 
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The divorce between local government and democracy can be 
illustrated by Austria- Hungary between 1866 and 1918 when 
local bodies were a stronghold of anachronistic prerogatives. 
At the present time, in the Middle East, local councils 
are a replica of the absolutist governments on the central 
level. Local elections, as well as general elections, are 
only a facade. The membership of the local councils is based 
upon material criteria and the councillors are drawn from the 
class of high income -receivers especially the potent local 
landowners. The chairman of the local bodies is generally a 
nominee of the central government, often the administrator of 
the local area. The local pseudo -elective bodies, being 
subordinate to an agent of the central government, enforce the 
policy of the latter. In other terms, the oligarchy on the 
higher administrative level is duplicated and reinforced by a 
further oligarchy on the lower level. 
In the writer's view, the existence of aristocratic 
institutions at the local level, is not only an impediment to 
an all -nation democratic polity, but is also pregnant with 
economic and financial implications involving a further 
violation of the democratic principle. The concept of 
democracy does not solely purport to political freedom, it 
imports economic freedom as well. A socio- political 
disequilibrium, at one or more government layer, generates 
corresponding economic disequilibria at the same level or other 
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strata. If the junior authorities are undemocratic, they will 
impede, through divergent action, the social and 
redistributive financial policies implemented by a national 
democratic administration. Similarly, the local undemocratic 
authorities tend to foster the reactionary economic policies 
of an undemocratic central government. 
In fact, "totalitarian" local governments can, through 
their taxing, borrowing and spending powers, enhance the 
maldistribution of wealth and income and can widen the 
cleavage between the different social strata. 
On the taxation side, the regressive structure of local 
taxation may be made even more regressive and eventually the 
progression of the national tax system as a whole may be 
vitiated. This is especially liable to occur in classical 
regionalism and orthodox federalism, where territorial fiscal 
powers are wide, or when, in under- developed countries, the 
minor authorities make extensive use of property taxation, the 
latter being an important element of the fiscal system. The 
same distorting impact on progressiveness easily manifests 
itself when central taxation carries only mildly graduated 
rates as was often the case before the Second World War in 
both unitary and federal countries. 
On the expenditure side, the minor governments may pursue 
"aggravative ", instead of redistributive, policies imputing 
social welfare to the high- income groups rather than, or 
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relatively more, than, the low- income classes. Furthermore, 
national full employment policies may be frustrated by 
divergent or ill -timed local spending policies. 
To sum up, local government is not necessarily a "school 
of civics" or a "nursery of good statesmen ". It can be just 
the reverse. 
Consequently, it is most important to democratic local 
administrative and financial institutions, especially in 
authoritarian or oligarchic polities, as a first step towards 
an all -inclusive democracy in its full acceptation of political 
as well as socio- economic equity. 
Within the framework of central -local fiscal relations, 
economic democracy implies security and general welfare for 
all members of the society in their capacity of national 
citizens as well as local residents. In their latter capacity, 
similar citizens, who reside in diverse local areas, have the 
right to enjoy the same degree of well -being or fiscal 
treatment (i.e. taxation c»n expenditures) irrespective of 
local availabilities. 
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IV. CEI1TRIPETAL FORCES. 
The evolution, in socio- economic theory, from 
individualism towards interventionism and economic planning, 
carries important implications from the viewpoint of central - 
local fiscal relations. The impact is threefold; quantitative, 
qualitative and allocative. 
The central tenet of classical economy is that full 
employment for labour and other resources is secured through 
the free play of market forces. Supply creates its own 
demand so that a deficiency in aggregate demand is not 
possible. The flexibility of interest rates achieves the 
equality of saving and investment, and the flexibility of 
prices and wages guarantees the absorption of all factors of 
production by private enterprise. Unemployment can thus be 
only frictional. 
In sum, the normal situation, under classical assumptions, 
is stable equilibrium at full employment. The best thing the 
authorities could do, to guarantee full employment was to 
abstain from disturbing the market forces, in other terms, 
"laisser-faire". 
The financial version of the liberal economy can be out 
in a nutshell, "limited and balanced budgets ". Public 
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expenditures encroach on private savings and impair 
investment. Taxation must avoid savings so as not to militate 
against the accumulation of capital. It must let, undisturbed, 
the "equilibrating forces" of the market, and leave, 
unaffected the relative financial positions of the tax- payers. 
Consequently, taxation must hit consumption rather than 
income, and assume a proportional structure rather than a 
progressive scaling. 
Borrowing, solely for productive purposes, must assume 
small proportions, otherwise investment is reduced 
proportionately. Public debt, a real burden, has to be 
cancelled as soon as possible through taxation of current 
consumption. 
These economic and financial postulates of the 
individualistic economy involved limited responsibilities for 
all layers of government, and consequently implied a wider 
scope for autonomy of the junior authorities. 
Gradually, however, various dynamic forces, both 
endogenous and exogenous, induced government intervention in 
the economic and social fields. The "spontaneous equilibrium" 
through the Price mechanism was found to be strewn with 
obstacles and accompanied with much hardship. Full employment 
is not the normal position towards which the community tends. 
Saving and investment can be equal at less than full 
employment level. In fact, saving is a function of income 
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and the propensity to consume. Investment depends on the 
marginal efficiency of capital and the monetary rate of 
interest. Moreover, prices and wages are no more elastic and 
cannot be relied upon to bring about the absorption of all 
the labour forces. Full employment can be only achieved if 
the total volume of effective demand, private and public, on 
both consumption and investment, is kept at a high level. 
Since the consumption function is stable in the short run, the 
authorities have the duty to intervene, through fiscal policy, 
to generate the appropriate volume of effective demand to 
achieve full employment. 
The "Welfare State" does not only aim at high employment 
levels but also at high living standards and provision of 
social services. 
As for the exogenous factors, wars had the most far - 
reaching centralising impact. 
The driving forces, which caused the "Liberal State" to 
evolve into a "Welfare State ", brought about a further stage, 
namely the "Planning State ".(1) Economic planning, of various 
nuances and purposes,(2) involve the mobilisation of the 
(1) For a review of the driving forces see: 
Zweig, Ferdynand : The Planning of Free Societies. 
London, 1942. pp.37 -56. 
(2) The nuances range from simple "programmation" to "dirigism ", 
and the purposes from social ends to sheer megalomany. 
See Hamza, S. Maher : Planification et Investissement 
des Capitaux en Egypte. M.Sc.(econ.) Cairo University. 
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nation's resources and the rationalization of its economy. 
The fact that the national economy becomes subject to central 
control reduces the junior authorities to the role of sheer 
satellites turning in the orbit of the senior government. 
To sum up, interventionism and economic planning, whether 
flexible or rigid, exert a twofold effect on national -local 
finances. They generate an expansion, combined with a 
refinement, of fiscal powers. They also set of ̀ centripetal 
forces difficult to counter. These forces are traceable in 
unitary and federal countries alike. 
Unitary Countries. 
The centralist tread is affecting various forms. The 
traditional local areas grow larger and larger through 
consolidation, co- ordination or co- operation. 
(1) 
The local 
fiscal powers are gradually rising to successively higher 
levels. The proportion of central financial aid in local 
budgets is increasing and the accompanying conditions are 
becoming stricter. 
Similarly, the various functions and services performed 
by junior authorities are in process of integration either 
(1) On the inadequate size of local areas and its economic 
and financial implications, see the present study, Part 
Two, Chapter III, "Revenue Inadequacy ", Section I 
"Local Economic Vulnerability ". 
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through direct transfer to overlying authorities or through 
closer central supervision. In sum, the role played by local 
elective bodies is weakening. 
It is desirable to refer to a specific country to 
illustrate the centripetal forces at work in unitary countries. 
In England, since 1933, various local services were 
gradually controlled or taken over by the national government, 
or were subject to various forms of inter -area co- ordination 
such as the Joint Committee System. The following Acts are 
expressive of the drive towards the "centre "; The Unemployment 
Act in 1934, The Trunk Roads Act, 1936, The Fire Brigades Act, 
1938. 
The development of the area of charge for poor relief is 
interesting to follow and is significant; from parish to 
unions of parishes to counties and county borough councils and 
finally the national government. 
In the war -time and post -war periods, the gravitational 
movement was imparted a fresh impulse. One can only enumerate 
the series of Acts voted since World War II.(1) The Education 
(1) For an outline survey of the centripetal tendencies in 
Great Britain, especially during an after World War II, see: 
Robson, William A. : "Labour and Local Government ", in 
The Political Quarterly. Jannary -1 \larch, 1953. p.39. 
Hill, L.C. "Local Government in England: Changes and 
Challenges ". Social Research, June, 1950. p.332. 
Hill, Frank : "Local Government and the State ", in 
The Fortnightly. July- December, 1949. p.315. 
Hawksworth, J.M. : "Some Developments in Local Government, 
1944 -1948 ". Public Administration. Spring, 1948. p.262. 
Crouch, Winston W. : "Trends in British Local Government ". 
Public Administration Review. Autumn, 1947. p.254. 
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Act of. 1944 transferred some local functions to counties and 
county boroughs. The Trunk Roads Act, in 1946, made the 
Minister of Transport responsible for thousands of miles of 
main highways, and empowered him to bring, by order, any road 
under his control. All hospitals owned by local authorities 
were transferred to the Ministry of Health in 1946. The 
British Transport Commission was authorized, by the Transport 
Act of 1947, to set up regional schemes. The Fire Services 
Act, 1947, transferred the brigades to counties and county 
boroughs. Two main municipal amenities, electricity and gas, 
which were a concern of local bodies, became a national 
responsibility through The Electricity Act in 1947 and The Gas 
Act in 1948. Poor relief followed the same path in 1948 when 
The National Assistance Act was passed. The Local Government 
Act, 1948, is important as it vested assessment and valuation 
for rating in the Inland Revenue.(1) 
A further aspect of the rising influence of Westminster 
is the increasingly important role played by grants -in -aid. 
In England and Wales, the grants increased both in 
(1) There are also, however, different currents. Instances 
are; The Civic Restaurants Act, 1947, The Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1947, The National Parks and 
Access to the Countryside Act, 1949. 
It is noticeable that the policy of the Conservative 
Government is rather centrifugal. See. 
Brooke, Henry : "Conservatives and Local Government ", in; 
The Political Quarterly. April -June, 1953. p.181. 
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absolute amount and proportionately to total local 
expenditures. While in 1913 -14 they amounted to £22.5 millions 
and accounted for 24 per cent of local expenditures, they 
reached, in 1947 -48, £244.5 millions or 45 per cent of local 
expenditures. In 1950 -51 they were £304.1 millions or 50 per 
cent of total local government income. 
Federal Countries 
In modern conditions, the federal countries, more than 
the unitary countries, feel the impact of the divorce between 
the static organisation of government and the dynamic conditions 
of the economy. In fact, there is in process, both an economic 
expansion and an economic integration induced by new socio- 
economic nation -wide objectives. The economic integration 
calls for an administrative integration which would bring the 
political structure more in harmony with the new economic 
structure. The traditional concept of federalism whereby "the 
general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, 
co- ordinate and independent"(1) needs revisions within the 
present socio- economic framework. 
The co- existence of independent regional fiscal powers 
and completely exclusive functions is not only difficult to 
maintain but has become an anomaly. The wide financial powers 
(1) Wheare, K.C. : op. cit. p.11. 
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left to the states and provinces, when the federal 
constitutions were first enacted a long time ago, do not only 
cause distortions to the concept of fiscal equity in its 
various aspects but are also conducive to intergovernmental 
fiscal conflicts. Cohesive national economic policy -framing 
is thus impeded. The minor governments can no more retain 
exclusive powers, especially if these powers are vital for 
the conduct of the national economy on rational lines. 
In other terms, the constitutional apportionment of 
federal -regional fiscal powers must be made compatible with 
the new socio- economic responsibilities thrown on the shoulders 
of modern national governments. 
The contemporary phase of federal development is 
"co- operative federalism". The real issue is not financial 
independence versus autonomy but financial co- ordination. 
It is noteworthy that while the old federations are in 
process of integration, the new federal structures are 
following unorthodox constitutional and economic lines. In 
sum, federalism is acquiring new significance in financial 
terms. The writer fully agrees with Professor G.L. Wood that, 
"Under the economic conditions of the 20th century, much the 
same forces which prompted agreements among separate States to 
federate are now impelling federations towards unification."(1) 
( 1) Wood, G.L. : "The Future of Federal Aid", in; 
The Economic Record. December, 1945. p.197. 
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The centripetal tendencies presently at work find 
expression in both new and established federations. When 
forming new federations, mostly by integration rather than by 
disintegration, much heed is now given to the requirements of 
coherent national economic development and economic 
stabilization. More powers are thus assigned to the federal 
government in respect of both taxing powers, notably income 
taxation, and spending powers. 
In already established federations the centripetal forces 
manifest themselves in two ways, namely; the different spirit 
of interpretation of the federal constitution and /or the 
actual federal invasion of the regional economic, financial 
and social powers. 
As for the first point, the principle of Federal 
Supremacy is given prominence wherever possible notably in 
respect of powers not exclusively vested in any particular 
layer of government. In Canada, the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council declares, in 1932, that, "The two taxations, 
Dominion and Provincial, can stand side by side without 
interfering with each other, but as soon as you come to the 
concomitant privileges of absolute priority they cannot stand 
side by side and must clash; consequently the Dominion must 
prevail." 
A similar shift in the spirit of constitutional 
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interpretation can be trace in the U.S.A.,(1) Australia and 
Switzerland.(2) 
The centralizing tendencies, in connection with socio- 
economic functions generally, may be exemplified by the U.S.A. 
where occurred a great increase in federal responsibilities 
either by extension of existing functions or by addition of 
new functions. The following fields may be noted in this 
connection; promotion of agriculture, conservation of national 
resources, public works whether developmental or counter - 
cyclical, public utility enterprise, regulation and promotion 
of business, housing whether by direct construction or loans 
to local authorities, credit and insurance, regulation of 
labour conditions, specialised education, social security such 
as unemployment compensation, old -age insurance, public 
assistance and public health programs.(3) 
It is possible to distinguish fields where activities are 
purely federal and others whether there are concurrent federal 
(1) Fellman, David : "Ten Years of The Supreme Court: 1937- 
1947, I. Federalism." 
The American Political Science Review. Dec. 1947. p.1142. 
(2) Rappard, W.E. : "De La Centralisation en Suisse". 
Revue Francaise de Science Politique. January -June, 1951. 
p.133. 
However, tradition, geographical and language barriers 
act as a curb to the centralist tread in Switzerland. 
(3) Benson, George C.S. : "The New Centralization ". 
New York, 1941. pp.44 -53. 
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state and /or local powers. 
Instances of purely federal activities are agricultural 
credit (the Farm Credit Administration, the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, the Surplus Commodities Corporation) and the old - 
age and survivors, annuity program. 
In many other respects, however, there is co- operation, 
in varying degrees, between federal, intermediate and lower 
authorities. The Public Works Administration activities 
involve important contractual and co- operative arrangements 
with the states and the local authorities. Housing, a new 
function, and road building are carried out thanks to 
subsidies provided to the secondary and tertiary authorities. 
Inter -state communications, regional development schemes, e.g. 
T.V.A., require central -local co- ordination. The National 
Resources Planning Board works in close co- operation with the 
state planning agencies. The bank -deposit insurance program 
involves co- operation between the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Commission and the state banking agencies. Social security 
occupies an important place in connection with concurrent 
powers, Although education is a state function, the Federal 
Government shows increasing interest in agricultural and 
vocational education. 
The current centripetalism in the U.S.A. may be further 
illustrated by the upward move in state -local relations. 
In 1902, local government expenditures were 7 times as 
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large as state expenditures excluding local grants and shared 
taxes. In 1942, local expenditures were only 1.7 times state 
expenditures; 
"Not only did direct state expenditures increase more 
rapidly than local, but states financed an increased 
proportion of local expenditures through grants and shared 
taxes - 28 per cent in 1942 as against 6 per cent in 1902. "(1) 
We may now turn to another federation. 
In Australia, from 1939 onwards, strong centripetal 
trends were brought about by several factors, chiefly war and 
the expansive policy of the Labour Government. 
While the expansion in state activities consisted mainly 
in the intensification of older functions such as education, 
health, transport and justice, the Commonwealth activities 
developed along new or largely new lines; 
"From thirteen departments in 1939, the number of 
Federal Departments increased to 25 at the peak of war -time 
activities 
Apart from temporary functions, the following fields may 
(1) Fitch, Lyle C. : "Trends in Federal, State and Local 
Government Expenditures Since 1890." 
American Economic Review. May, 1953. p.227. 
(2) Foxcraft E.J.B. : "Changing Balance of Government in 
Austra ia." Journal of the Institute of Public 
Administration, Australian Regional Group. No.4 (New 
Series). Dec. 1946. pp.184 -192. 
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be noted: coal, education, employment, exports, industrial 
welfare, information, fisheries, health and social services, 
housing, mining and mineral resources, 'Primary industry, 
public works, regional planning, secondary industries, 
shipping and shipbuilding, transport and rail unification.(1) 
While there was Federal assumption of some functions,(2) 
there was Federal -state co- operation in others, e.g., land 
settlement, health, housing, education. 
The minor governments were further bound to the chariot 
wheels of the federal governments through the increasing role 
assumed by federal subsidization. Federal aids aim either at 
compensating the states or provinces for the loss,to the 
centre, of certain sources of revenue (e.g. Australia, Canada) 
or aim at fulfilling nation -wide socio- economic objectives. 
The latter guiding principle is gaining more and more weight. 
In the U.S.A., the proportion of federal subventions to 
net state and local expenditures oscillated, during the period 
1920 -33 between 1.3% and 3.3f. During 1934 -42, the proportion 
oscillated between 20% and 40%. (3) 
(1) Davis, Solomon Rufus : Federal-State Co- operation in 
Australia. PH.D.(Econ.) London University, 1950. 
pp.422 -430. 
(2) In September 1946, social insurance, health services 
and family allowances were federalized. 
(3) See Part Three, Chapter VI. 
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The general centripetal forces presently under way in 
federations can be more appreciated by special reference to 
taxing and borrowing powers. 
While the First World War induced the trespass of the 
federal authorities on various regional tax fields, the 
Second World War caused effective or virtual federal tax 
monopolization. In fact, an important repercussion of wars, 
in federal -regional financial relations, is the tremendous 
expansion of federal expenditures, while, simultaneously, 
the productivity of indirect taxation, traditionally reserved 
to the federal governments, is adversely affected. The latter 
are thus inevitably led to invade the domain of direct 
taxation exploited, up till then, by the various territories. 
In the U.S.A., the federal progressive income tax rates 
have become so high since 1938 as to raise an economic barrier 
against this extensive use on the state level.(1) 
(1) For analysis of this limitation to local income taxation 
see the present study; Part Two, Chapter III, "Revenue 
Inadequacy ", Section II, "Limitations to Local Taxation." 
For development of the centripetal tendencies in the 
U.S.A., see: Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations in; "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal 
Relations ", Senate Document No.69, 78th Congress, 1st 
Session. Washington, 1943. 
Graves, W. Brooke : "The Future of the American States." 
in American Political Science Review, Feb. 1936. 
Haig, R. Murray : "The Co- ordination of Federal and 
State Tax Systems ", in, Proceedings of the National 
Tax Association, 1932. 
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In Canada, during World War II, the provincial income 
taxes were raised to the Dominion level.(1) 
Similarly,in Australia, the state income taxing powers 
were appropriated by the Commonwealth Government.(2) 
(1) Rowat, D.C. : "Recent Developments in Canadian Federalism" 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 
February, 1952. pp.1 -16. 
Birch, A.H. : "Federalism and Finance." 
The Manchester School, May, 1949. p.164. 
Eggleston, Wilfrid : "Dominion- Provincial Relations", in; 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. September, 1947. 
(Features of Present -Day Canada). 
Maxwell, James A. : "Recent Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations in Australia and Canada ", in: 
The Bulletin of the National Tax Association, February, 
1945. 
Maxwell, James A. : "Canadian Dominion -Provincial 
Relations" in, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
August, 1941. 
Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion -Provincial 
Relations: Book I; Canada, r867 -1939. 
(2) "Taxing Powers in a Federation. A Study of Australian 
Experience ", in: The Round Table, September, 1953. p.319. 
La Nauze, J.A. : "The Chariot Wheels of the Central 
Government". The Economic Record. 1952. p.237. 
Greenwood, Gordon : "The Future of Australian Federalism." 
Melbourne, 1946. 
Wood, G.L. : "The Future of Federal Aid." 
The Economic Record. December, 1945. p.197. 
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The death taxes were, before World War I, an exclusive 
right of the states and provinces. In the inter -war period, 
they incurred the federal invasion. Instances are afforded 
by Australia and notably the U.S.A. where the American Federal 
Government encroached upon the field in 1916 and substantially 
increased the rates in the thirties (1932, 1934, 1935). 
At the onset of World War II, the tendency was towards 
federalization of taxation at death. This occurred in Canada 
(with the exception of Quebec and Ontario). In the U.S.A., 
the defective and anachronistic credit system, outlined below, 
results in a sort of separation of tax sources by bracxe-us 
whereby the upper ends of the scale are virtually left for 
federal ploughing.(1) 
In the field of borrowing, a gravitational movement is 
similarly traceable. The experience of Australia should prove 
enlightening. In fact, as early as 1937, a "Loan Council" was 
established to replace the independent borrowing powers of 
federal and state governments in order to avoid competition in 
the loan market and to secure more favourable terms. There 
was one representative each of the Commonwealth and of the six 
states. As the Commonwealth had two votes and a casting vote, 
it could obtain a majority simply by getting the support of 
two states. 
(1) See Part One, Chapter I, Section IV. 
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The centripetal tendencies, which characterise neo- 
federalism, can be further exemplified by reference to 
developments in Switzerland, India and Latin America. 
In Switzerland,(1) the federal government during the 
First World War had obtained (temporarily) the right to levy 
direct taxes on income, capital and excess profits, part of 
the yields being paid to the cantons. The same occurred in 
the Second World War with the addition of purchase taxes, the 
cantons sharing in, the receipts in the proportion of 1 /10 to 
1/3. 
In 1920, the taxpayer paid 37.5 per cent of his 
contributions to the federal government, 29.3 per cent to his 
canton and 33.2 per cent to his commune. In 1949, the 
percentages were 48.9, 27.2 and 23.9 per cent respectively. 
The subventions paid by the central government are 
playing a significantly increasing part. They amounted to 
25 million Swiss francs in 1913, 95 m. in 1920, 196 m. in 1938 
and 604 m. in 1948.(2) The fields covered are social services, 
health, education and investment. 
(1) Rappard, W.E. op. cit. p.139. 
(2) Subventions et Parts Legales." 
193e, 213e et 220e fascicules des Statistiques de la 
Suisse. 
Bureau Federal de Statistique. Berne, 1948, 1950. 
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As for expenditures, they increased, between the years 
1900 -1948, in the proportion of 1 to 26 in the case of the 
federal government and 1 to 14.9 in the case of the cantons. 
In India, the following table should also prove 
enlightening: 
INDIA. 
Union and State Revenue. 
Selected Years (Rs.crs.) 
Year Union State and 
Local 
State as % 
of Total 
Income and Profit 
Taxes as % of 
Total 
1938 -39 73.8 83.2 53 11 
1943 -44 193.2 140.8 42 54 
1945 -46 311.4 205.6 39 49 
1948 -49 392.2 211.6 35 30 
1949-50(a) 370.0 234.7 38 24 
a) Revised estimate. 
Turning to Latin America, we find that in Brazil the 
share of the federal government in the total tax receipts, in 
1940 was 57 per cent, and the municipalities' share was 9.1 
(1) United Nations : Public Finance Surveys: India. 
New York, November, 1951. p.39. 
The state revenues do not include the share in the 
federal income tax. It is noticeable that, up to 
1945 -46 some states, now in Pakistan, were included. 
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per cent. By 1946, the percentages were 61.2 and 4.8 
respectively. 
In Colombia, the federal government procured 50 per cent 
of total tax yields in 1940 and 60 per cent in 1948. 
Clearly, the planned economy initiated by President Perón 
in Argentina exerts a strong centralist impact. The one party 
system in Mexico does not militate in favour of regional 
responsibility. Similarly, Haiti and Cuba are on the way 
towards more integration. In the former, besides the control 
of local revenue, a "Reserve for Communal Public Works" was 
created and nurtured with the municipal budget surpluses.(1) 
(1) Johnson, John : "The Latin American Municipality 
Deteriorates." 1951. p.24. 
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,V. THE I\TATIOINAL GOV'±;RNI, NTS' RESPONSIBILITIES. 
Local government, at the present stage of economic 
development and socio- economic philosophy, cannot retain its 
full classical sense of local autonomy implying separate 
economic powers and policy -framing. This view applies to 
unitary countries and even more strongly to federal countries. 
In the writer's view, the national government, in both 
unitary and federal polities, should assume four major 
responsibilities. 
The first major responsibility pertains to the achieve- 
ment of fiscal equity in its various aspects.(l) 
Intra -local unjust taxation must be coped with. It is 
often due to inadequate local resources and /or to rigid 
monotaxing powers of regressive character. The national 
government can increase the local fiscal potential directly 
or indirectly in two ways, namely by addition and by 
redistribution. Addition, which leads to both expansion and 
diversification of local taxable capacity, includes urban 
development, housing schemes, land reclamation, all resulting 
(1) See Part One, Chapter I, "Fiscal Inequities and 
Inequalities." 
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in increased local assets and enhanced site values. Equally 
important is the economic expansion of financially deficient 
areas through investment promotion and attainment of high 
employment levels. 
The granting of subsidies also exerts a beneficial impact 
since, in their absence, the local authorities may be driven 
to resort to additional, and generally, regressive taxation or 
alternatively to provide sub -standard services or abandon 
altogether certain services or relinquish services they can, 
or should perform, to the national government. 
On the distribution side, it is most desirable to correct 
the cumulative concentration of industries, income or 
population in particular areas. There ought to be some 
disperson of resources and some hammering out of inter -area 
discrepancies in income per head whether in the old 
federations or the newly formed federations exhibiting strong 
inter -territorial disparities in wealth or area such as the 
Central African Federation or Nigeria. The consolidation of 
small areas is sometimes advisable. 
Wide inter -local tax differentials, not due to differences 
in per capita service quantums or service standards, should 
not be tolerated on account of the ensuing unfair treatment 
of similarly financially situated taxpayers, individuals or 
firms, residing or operating in diverse localities. The 
present cosmopolitan nature of income, notably corporate 
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income, owing to its diversification and ramification all -over 
the nation's subdivisions, ushers in the intricate problems of 
residence, origin and situs. Horizontal overlapping is often 
difficult to avert even if all taxing localities adopt 
uniform provisions and homogeneous allocation devices or 
allocation formulas. The result of multiplex tax loads is 
detrimental to economic development. 
The national government disposes of three main solutions 
for coping with inter -area fiscal inequalities. It can 
encourage the local units to adopt uniform or less dissimilar 
tax provisions and rates and can induce them to apply similar 
principles for the purpose of inter -local personal income 
allocation (residence or situs) and identical devices for 
inter -local business income allocation. 
The alternative solution is for the national authorities 
to enforce the uniform tax patterns and to impose the 
homogeneous personal income taxation principles and corporate 
income allocation methods or formulas. 
The second line of approach is for the central government 
to enhance inter -local agreements whereby a junior taxing 
jurisdiction grants the taxpayer a credit, on a reciprocal 
basis, for taxes paid to another junior authority on the same 
item, the duplication being due to the co- application of the 
principles of origin and residence. The variants of inter - 
local tax crediting and the inherent complexities, are reviewed. 
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The need for generalising a uniform method is underlined. 
The third line of approach lies in the introduction of 
such schemes as the local supplementation of central taxes 
and /or central -local tax -sharing. The centralisation of tax 
administration and collection are,, in any case, most 
desirable. (1) 
Some of the reforms outlined, whether they are 
implemented through inducement or compulsion, are likely to 
meet with considerable opposition on the part of the minor 
governments, particularly in federalism where the intermediate 
authorities are on strong constitutional ground. 
Further more, some of the solutions militate in favour of 
certain localities and other solutions militate against other 
localities. The basis of residence, for instance, causes 
prejudice to the debtor areas which would rather prefer the 
principle of situs or origin. In connection with inter -local 
credits, the resident -credits (i.e. credits to residents) suit 
the debtor areas while the non -resident credits handicap them. 
Various consequences, some undesirable, are liable to 
follow certain soi u_t _on i of local finance problems. An 
example is provided by the fact that the universalization of 
the principle of residence may induce the high- income 
recipients to migrate to the lowly taxed areas. Other non- 
(1) Part One, Chapters I and II. Part Three, Chapter V. 
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human resources may follow. This impoverishes the highly 
taxed areas, often the under- endowed ones, thus adding to 
their hardships. 
x further aspect of fiscal inequity, namely the central 
plus local repressive tax burden, must not be omitted by the 
supreme taxing authority. If taxpayers, individuala and firms, 
have to pay heavy taxes to more than one government layer, 
there is a possibility that more than a hundred per cent tax 
is ultimately collected. This entails fiscal inequity on the 
part of the same taxpayer and also involves fiscal inequalities 
especially between concerns operating in different areas some 
of which are income -taxing and some others are non- income- 
taxing areas. 
The national government has the responsibility of finding 
a remedy for central -local fiscal inequity and its adverse 
economic impact. It can have recourse to such devices as 
central -local tax crediting and tax deductibility, which are 
particularly helpful in federal countries, or to outright 
centralization with tax- sharing.(1) Tax -crediting reduces the 
tax due to the central government by the amount paid to the 
lower jurisdictions. Deductibility, whether reciprocal or 
unilateral, reduces the tax base by the amount of tax laid by 
(1) See Part Three, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination ", 
Chapter V. 
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the other authority. (1) 
In finding remedies for the problems of fiscal 
inequities, the national government should not overlook the 
further repercussions of the different devices, and their 
variants, on the progression of the central taxes, the local 
taxes and ultimately the scale of the national tax system as a 
whole, that is, central plus local t axation.(1) 
Furthermore, the impact of the devices adopted on the 
revenue collected by both the senior and junior authorities 
ought to be reckoned with. 
Part of the national government's first major 
responsibility of fostering fiscal equity, regards the two 
other aspects of the fiscal process, namely expenditures and 
the spatial scope of equity. 
AS will be expounded later, parallel consideration of both 
taxation and expenditure of the`proceeds is necessary to 
determine the true or effective fiscal burden. Consequently, 
the national government must see that the underlying 
authorities, taken separately, adopt fair taxes combined with 
redistributive spending policies and that the various local 
units, taken together, do not exhibit sharp inequalities inter 
se in the fiscal residua (i.e. the net result of both taxation 
and expenditure) of taxpayers not dissimilar in any relevant 
(1) See Part One, Chapt I, Section II "Local Personal Income 
Taxation." 
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respect, residing in different local areas. The central 
government will have to put into effect some system of 
transfers of funds from the high -capacity areas to the low - 
capacity areas. 
The ideal guiding the national authorities' policy - 
decisions may be that of achieving maximum general welfare for 
the community as a whole, in other terms, increasing the sum 
total of net benefits, that is, the aggregate benefits of 
expenditures less the aggregate sacrifices of taxation, of all 
government layers. 
In this case, the central authorities will have to see 
that the objective is approximated not only within its field 
of action, but also within all local areas without exception. 
The latter point is of especial significance in federal 
countries. All similar financially situated citizens, 
residing in different subordinate units of varying taxable 
ability, must enjoy the same degree of social utility or 
general welfare as engendered by both central and local 
authorities; while incurring similar degrees of sacrifice as 
imposed by both major and minor authorities. 
Assuming that each junior authority taxes according to 
the principle of equi- marginal sacrifice and spends according 
to the principle of equi- marginal social benefit and assuming 
that each locality reaches the optimum point in its revenue/ 
expenditure policy by equalizing marginal sacrifice with 
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marginal benefit, it will be found that the inter -local 
equality in marginal sacrifices and marginal benefits is not 
possible. This is due to the existence of disparities in local 
per capita wealth and income. In wealthy areas the marginal 
sacrifice will be lower and the marginal benefit also lower, 
compared with poorer areas. The consequence is that residents 
of wealthy areas will be more favoured than residents of 
under- privileged areas.(1) 
The national government, having wide fiscal powers and 
being unimpeded by geographical boundaries, will thus have to 
step in with a programme of financial aid (intergovernmental 
transfers) and /or inter -area tax adjustments . (2 ) 
In sum, the central authorities, in unitary and federal 
countries, ought to aim at equalizing the benefit derived from 
the marginal unit of expenditure, central and local, all -over 
the nation's subdivisions, with the sacrifice incurred in 
raising that unit of revenue by both major and minor 
authorities, rich and poor. 
(1) Part Three, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination." 
(2) This is clearly easier to achieve in unitary countries 
than in federal countries. In the former, there are 
also degrees of easiness depending on the strength of 
local government. 
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The second major responsibility of national governments, 
besides the compensatory function, consists in achieving the 
inter -area equalization of the net fiscal pressure at a high 
level of general welfare and not at any level. This does not 
only involve bringing the backward areas up to the standard of 
wealthier areas but also means a higher standard for all the 
territorial subdivisions of the same country. A national 
programme can be drawn for this purpose by providing for 
supplementary subsidies to the various underlying authorities.(l) 
The central aid programme must be rationally comprehensive 
and conditional upon achieving the national service standards. 
The amount of the subventions will be evaluated on the basis 
of local fiscal capacity the best criterion of which is local 
per capita income. 
It is noteworthy that the piecemeal subventions refer to 
individual or occasional services and thus fall short of 
achieving an all- nation socio- economic adjustment. These 
haphazard grants may even accentuate, rather than smooth, the 
inter -area disequilibria. The matching grants assume a 
certain local fiscal potential and consequently militate in 
favour of rich areas and against under- privileged areas. This 
is especially the case in times of slump. Moreover, the 
constant -ratio grants do not account for the regional 
(1) Part Three, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination ", 
especially Chapt IV. 
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differences in costs of services. As for the special- formula 
grants, they are often based on unsatisfactory means 
particularly if these means become stilted through lack of 
modification to conform to new conditions. 
The third major responsibility, which has to be assumed 
by the national governments, is to cope with the problem of 
the inadequacy of local revenue. The underlying authorities 
should be given as wide a fiscal basis as is compatible with 
two desiderata, on the one hand the development of local 
responsibility and "political education in democracy" and, 
on the other hand, the requirements of "fundamental central 
controls. "(1) 
Various courses of action can be taken. There are 
notably the correction of local economic vulnerability, the 
mitigation of various unnecessary limitations to local 
taxation, the search for new sources of local revenue and 
meeting the problem of multiplex small units.(2) 
Local economic capacity, the basis of local fiscal 
potential, can be enhanced through a better inter -area 
redistribution of economic resources, including manpower and 
(1) Hicks, U.I. : "The Proposed Fiscal System for the 
Central African Federation." 
Oxford, November, 1952. p.1 -2. 
(2) Part Two, Chapter III, "Revenue Inadequacy." 
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their diversification within the locality. The latter fact is 
of especial importance in pluritaxing localities and proves 
particularly helpful during economic fluctuations. 
It is noticeable that the factors of production and hence 
the financial resources, move more readily from locality to 
locality than from country to country.(1) This is sometimes 
generated by inter -local competition whereby, some authorities, 
especially in federal countries, strive to entice away taxable 
resources from tneir neighbours with the bait of lower tax 
rateE,, under- assessment, exemptions, cash payments, non- 
interest loans, offer of premises and other concessions. 
The national government must clearly prevent such practices 
from being carried too far owing to their detrimental impact 
not only on the under- privileged localities but also on the 
utilization of resources along the lines drawn by the "central" 
policy-makers. 
As for the limitations to local taxation, it is 
sometimes desirable to introduce more flexibility to already 
existing taxes. The receipts from the local property tax, for 
instance, may be adversely affected by rigid ceilings, too 
many exemptions (e.g. U.S.A., Egypt), or under- assessment 
(e.g. U.S.A., England). The costs of collection and compliance 
of other taxes may be high and could therefore be reduced 
(1) Part Two, Chapter.III, Section I, "Local Economic 
Vulnerability ." 
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through the centralization of administration, tax sharing or 
local supplementation of central taxes. This is often the 
case with local income and business taxes and local consumption 
taxes, specific or general, owing to overlapping and /or 
evasion. ( 1) 
There is scope for adding to local revenue without the 
undesirable inequities. The central government could play a 
useful role by deciding or suggesting new sources or 
relinquishing to the underlying authorities certain levies of 
local character. Illustrations are afforded by the taxes on 
site values, entertainments, motor- vehicle, petrol, hotel 
rooms, restaurants, drinks and some selective commodity taxes. 
There is also ground for providing the lower authorities with 
extra powers in emergencies. 
As regards the size of the local areas, it is noteworthy 
that the small unit has a fragile financial position and a high 
per capita cost of service.(2) There is a definite need for 
wider areas more in line with modern conditions. The 
responsibility falls on the national government which, being 
the supreme authority, can consolidate or redraw the 
boundaries, enhance inter -local co- operation through regional 
boards and generally further inter- governmental fiscal 
co- ordination. 
(1) On the limitations of various sorts on local taxing 
powers, see : - Part Two, Chapter III, Section II 
"Limitations to Local Taxation." 
(2) Part Two, Chapter III, Section I. 
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Municipalities should be enabled to absorb easily the 
peripheral areas instead of being discouraged and sometimes 
even precluded by legislation from doing so as in many states 
in the U.S.A. 
(1) The process of suburban development,which 
wreaks havoc with local revenue, calls for drastic reforms. 
However, insurmountable difficulties may be encountered in the 
case of federal countries where the fringe areas lie in other 
states. 
The fourth major responsibility with which must be 
saddled the national governments in unitary and federal 
countries alike, is the achievement of intergovernmental fiscal 
harmony in both policies and tiring. The central authorities 
must sufficient finances 
must enjoy enough flexibility not only to pursue a Policy of 
economic stabilization and to counteract fluctuations in given 
localities (owing to their over -sensitivity) but also to 
achieve full employment and high investment levels. The latter 
objectives require the co- ordination of central and local 
policy -framing. Indeed, national full employment programmes, 
full -scale investment promotion and comprehensive social 
services schemes necessitate the co- operation of both junior 
(1) This is especially the case in New England, Middle 
Atlantic and the Midwestern states where the state laws 
require the approval of the electorate or property 
owners of the area to be annexed by the municipality. 
See Sigaboos, Robert "The Urban -Rural Fringe Population 
Problem and Effects on Municipal Finance" in Current 
Economic Comment. November, 1952. 
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and senior authorities and an all. -tier harmonizing taxing, 
borrowing and spending powers. The underlying authorities 
must respond to the nation -wide economic and social policies 
underwritten by the central government. 
Various methods have been suggested for the 
co- ordination of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In the 
absence of such attempts, sundry central -local or inter -local 
contradictions make their appearance not only in the field of 
fiscal equity but also in connection with economic policies.(1) 
In fact, the interjurisdictional fiscal frictions, in the 
economic sphere, affect two main aspects, namely; conflicting 
effects and lack of synchronism.(2) 
The distortionary or disruptive impact of the divergent 
application of local fiscal powers finds expression in the 
fields of investment, consumption (quantity and quality), the 
price system, industrial location, the inter -area distribution 
of labour, the distribution of income by brackets and type and 
even inter -local and foreign trade. These interjurisdictional 
horizontal and vertical conflicts are ushered in by local 
property taxation, local income taxation, local outlay taxes 
(1) It is sometimes difficult to conciliate local financial 
responsibility and the need for central control, e.g. 
the central -local sharing of income taxation according 
to rigid proportions fixed by the constitution. 




especially the local specific and general commodity taxes. 
Similarly, the local spending powers not only can have 
misallocative effects on resources but can also adversely 
affect the dual tenet of fiscal equity viz. fair taxation and 
redistributive spending. 
As for the lack of intergovernmental synchronism in 
taxing, borrowing and spending powers, it carries vital 
implications within the framework of national -local fiscal 
relations. 
In boom, local taxation may be alleviated (especially if 
local bodies are dominated by special -interest groups), or the 
local councils may launch extensive capital works thus 
aggravating, through ill- timing, the inflationary spiralling 
of prices. 
The underlying authorities can thus intensify the violence 
of economic convulsions by following the swings of the cycles 
rather than counterpoising them in conjunction with overlying 
authorities. 
Consequently, it clearly emerges that the national 
governments, in unitary and federal countries, have the duty 
to mitigate both intergovernmental fiscal antagonism and 
intergovernmental fiscal anachronism. 
In conclusion, modern local government must be of a 
co- operative character. Major and minor authorities should 
become "co -operative partners" rather than "antagonistic 
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partners." This applies to unitary as well as federal 
countries. The neo- federalism advocated must be substituted 
for paleo -federalism involving parallel or competing 
financial functions. 
There is no inherent conflict between the concept of 
local government propounded here and the desirability for some 
local government responsibility. Responsibility is simply not 
to be construed in an egotistic sense and cannot be confined 
to the local community but must have a double import; the 
welfare of the local community within the framework of 
national welfare. 
Minor governments can be no more fully sovereign within 
their assigned sphere of activity. The traditional conception 
of local autonomy is an historical anachronism in present -day 
conditions. It suited times when political freedom was still 
questioned and economic individualism reigned supreme. 
The present study tackles, in Part Three, the means to 
co- ordinate central -local and inter -local fiscal relations in 
unitary and federal countries. 
No panacea can be pointed out as the cure for all 
maladies in all countries. Political, social and economic 
conditions vary. The solutions propounded, therefore, differ 
from country to country, and within the same country may have 
to be modified from time to time. 
Therefore, a general discussion of the principles under - 





FISCAL INEQUITIES AND INEOJT .LITIES 
55. 
PRELUDE. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF FISCAL EQUITY 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL -LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS. 
Fiscal equity is not an easily definable concept. It is 
greatly relative to the particular socio- political, economic 
and cultural conditions prevailing. Equity is therefore both 
historical and relative. However, it is desirable, for the 
purpose of our present study, to proceed to some simplication 
of the concept. The central tenet of equity may be taken as 
the equal treatment for persons dissimilar in no relevant 
respect or "equal treatment for equals." 
As Professor Pigou puts it, "Different persons should be 
treated similarly unless they are dissimilar in some relevant 
respect." (1) 
This definition of fiscal equity is generally construed 
with reference to the burden of taxation alone. It is 
however possible to extend it to the expenditure side. In fact, 
taxation is a dual operation which implies subtraction or 
(1) Pigou, A.C. : "A Study in Public Finance." London, 1928. p9 
Prof. Sidgwick also states that: "Similar and similarly 
situated persons ought to be treated similarly." 
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sacrifice as well as addition or social benefit. There are 
constant actions and reactions on the people from both 
taxation and expenditures. It is, therefore, necessary, to 
consider the relative post -taxation as well as post- expenditure 
positions of the citizens.(l) 
This comprehensive conception of fiscal equity is more 
appropriate, even essential, in the modern economic conditions 
of the Uelfare State where redistributive finance supersedes 
neutral finance. Full fiscal equity carries important 
implications both per se and within the framework of central - 
local fiscal relations. 
(1) The concept of "social or general welfare" is not the old 
individual- benefit principle or quid pro quo, based on 
cost of service or protection theories. Benefit, in an 
ethical -collective connotation, is what we mean here 
when we refer to the spending side of the fiscal process. 
See; 
Wagner, Adolph : Finanzwissenschaft. Leipzig, 1890, II 
pp.431 -442. 
Wicksell, Knut : Finanztheorie Untersuchungen. Tuna, 1896. 
p.82. 
Adarkar, B.P. : The Principles and Problems of Federal 
Finance. 1- 5Edon, 1933. pp.187 -211. 
Barna, Tibor : Redistribution of Income Through Public 
Finance in 1937. London, 1945. p.3. 
Hicks, U.K. : Public Finance. Cambridge, 1947. p.281. 
See also H.M. Groves, W.T. Shultz, C. Heer and others. 
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As the apportionment of the fiscal burden is affected by 
both taxation and expenditure, the progressive structure of 
the tax system is fostered, or rendered less regressive, 
through sound redistributive spending.(1) 
On the other hand, the tax proceeds may be spent in such 
away as to advantage the high- income receivers as often 
occurs in a- democratic countries. The aggravative effect of 
expenditures then counteracts or negatives the progressive 
structure of the tax system or renders it more regressive if 
it is already so. 
When, however, expenditures follow, in their benefit - 
distributive effects, the same lines as the tax rate structure, 
no divergent action is generated. 
In sum, the tax variables and the expenditure variables 
must be both taken into consideration before a proper 
estimation is made of the effective scale of graduation of the 
taxes. What has really to count is the final fiscal pressure 
of both taxation and outlay. The fiscal residium ought to be 
the right criterion of progression or regression. 
From the viewpoint of intergovernmental relations, the 
over -all fiscal system, central and local, together should 
(1) Buchanan, J.M. : "The Pure Theory of Government Finance, 
A Suggested Approach." 
The Journal of Political Economy. Dec. 1949. p.496. 
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provide for equal treatment to equals residing in any local 
unit within the national boundaries. Local residence per se 
must not justify varying fiscal treatment (i.e. taxation plus 
social benefit) . °' 
Consequently, fiscal equity should not solely purport 
separately to central or local taxation, or even to both but 
must refer to central and local taxation /expenditure 
concomitantly. 
To sum up, the re t fiscal burden or fiscal residuum 
(whether positive or negative) must, by pertaining to taxation 
cum expenditure, involve all tiers of taxing authorities and 
spending authorities. 
In other words, the whole hierarchical structure of 
taxing jurisdictions, particularly in a federal polity, has 
its part to play in achieving fiscal equity. The dual fiscal 
process considered has to take into account both taxation and 
expenditure of senior or junior authorities combined. The net 
effect on local residents of all these sets of taxes and 
expenditures determine the fiscal residua. 
We may now enumerate the major factors which affect the 
apportionment of the final fiscal burden of central plus local 
Ír vC G-14 
"An individual should have the assurance that wherever 
he 
should desire to reside in the nation, the over -all fiscal 
treatment which he receives will be approximately the 
same." 
See Buchanan, J.M.: "Federalism and Fiscal Equity." 
The American Economic Review, Sept. 1950, P. 589. 
Compare Johnson, Byron in a similar definition quoted 
below (Part Three, Chap. V, Sect. I). 
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aspects, on account of one or more of the following factors 
1. The Central Tax Scale : 
The progressiveness of the central tax system may have 
been made to affect mainly the higher income brackets rather 
than the low income brackets. If the central taxes are only 
mildly scaled while the low income- receivers are subjected to 
heavy local levies, the ultimate structure of the national tax 
system, that is central plus local taxation, will be clearly 
unfair. 
The same result obtains if the central tax system, 
t 
although covering all the income ranges, is not distinctly 
An illustration is afforded by the U.S.A. in 1938 when the 
federal tax was a little less regressive in the lower groups 
than the state and local taxes. The federal tax rates were 
low and progression mild. During and after World War II the 
situation clearly changed. Under the pressure of expanding 
expenditures, the federal tax rates went up and became strongly 
progressive. 
To sum up, it is necessary not only to have a distinctly 
progressive central tax system, but also the majority of the 
populatión must be brought within the graduated scale of 
central taxation. ( 1) 
(1) Colin and Tarasov : Who Pays The Taxes? 
Temporary National Economic Committee. Monograph No.3, 
1940. 
Facing The Tax Problem, Twentieth Century Fund. 
New York, 1937. p.237. 
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2. The Local Tax Scale : 
The local taxes may be proportional or regressive in their 
formal or effective incidence, owing to the imposition of 
levies regressive by nature, e.g. the property taxes and the 
local outlay taxes, or because of the regressive structure of 
local taxes not necessarily regressive by nature, e.g. the 
local income taxes. 
If local taxation is important and its regressiveness 
serious, the progression of the national tax system as a whole 
will be vitiated. 
3. The Local Taxing Policy : 
The local units ought to proceed in taxation according to 
the principle of equi- marginal sacrifice. In this case, the 
under- privileged areas, having a low per capita income, will 
have a higher marginal sacrifice than that prevailing in 
wealthier areas which, owing to their high per capita income, 
will have a comparatively lower marginal sacrifice. 
The outcome of inter -area inequalities in marginal 
sacrificces is inter -area disparities in the tax burden 
falling on similarly situated persons residing in different local 
areas. 
4. Central Spending Regressiveness : 
The central authorities may apply the proceeds of their 
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taxes to regressive spending or to spending which benefits the 
high -income groups. The latter fact is conducive to less 
progressive or, eventually to regressive taxation. This often 
occurs within an undemocratic or an anti -democratic national 
government especially as aristocratic one. 
It is noteworthy that "aggravative" expenditures may also 
affect the form of "detaxation ", or tax relief benefitting the 
upper- income recipients, made possible by the tax proceeds 
secured from the low income- earners. 
5. Local Spending Regressiveness : 
The junior authorities may formulate non -redistributive 
tax /expenditure policies by providing social benefit according 
to the quid pro quo principle(1) or dispensing it equally 
among all local tax -payers, high as well as low income- groups. 
The minor governments, especially when undemocratic, may also 
make use of the tax proceeds to the advantage of the high - 
income groups by conferring relatively more benefits to them. 
In all these cases, local taxation maintains the 
(regressive) status quo and tends to be regressive if it is 
(1) The individual -benefit principle accepts as "natural ", 
the existing property and income distribution. Aa the 
latter may not be sound, the local tax system as a 
whole (i.e. taxation in conjunction with spending) 
will not be equalitarian. 
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proportional or progressive. It also tends to be more 
regressive if it is already so. 
6. Local Spending Policy : 
The local units ought to proceed, in the field of 
expenditure, according to the principle of equi- marginal 
social benefits. 
If this is the objective, the poorer areas, suffering 
from inadequate resources and having greater needs, will have 
higher marginal benefits than wealthy areas which, enjoying 
high per capita wealth and income, will have lower marginal 
benefits. 
Consequently, as in the well -off areas equi- marginal 
sacrifice is lower and equi- marginal social benefit is also 
lower, the optimum in the finances of the prosperous locality 
will be reached at a lower level than in the case of the low 
capacity localities. 
Therefore, fiscal treatment, that is, taxation in 
conjunction with social welfare, will exhibit inter -area 
inequalities. 
7. Central Subsidization 
The national government, feeling its responsibility for 
territorial equalization of social utility, may undertake a 
system of transfer of funds between high capacity and low 
63. 
capacity areas. 
If the central aid programmes does not follow rational 
lines of inter -local overall adjustment but assumes, instead, 
the form of piecemeal or haphazard Payments, disequilibria 
are most likely to ensue. Indeed, the matching grants and 
sundry specific and special formula subventions often favour 
the already prosperous areas and accentuate disparities in 
wealth. 
Furthermore, the grants may discourage the local 
authorities from making the best use of their resources. 
Local reduction of taxation, benefiting the high- income 
classes, and /or extravagant spending may result from 
incoherent and unconditional subventions. 
In fact, the guiding principle of subsidization should 
not be merely local budgetary equilibrium but over -all socio- 
economic equilibrium. 
The latter basis is, however, absent at present time from 
central aid programmes in both unitary and federal countries. 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that, although parallel 
consideration of tax apportionment and expenditure allocation, 
should not be omitted in any proper evaluation of the fiscal 
burden, it is possible, for the purposes of analysis, to 
envisage the process of taxation and expenditure separately. 
Consequently, the concept of fiscal equity, discussed in 
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the present chapter and in the next chapter, refers only to 
the taxation sicle. 
The impact of the expenditure side on tax justice is 
considered in course of the fourth chapter on Intergovern- 
mental Fiscal Policy Conflicts and in course of Part Three 
dealing with Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination. 
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II. THE ASPECTS OF FISCAL INEQUITY 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL - 
LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS. 
Fiscal inequities and inequalities assume three major 
aspects within the framework of national -local fiscal 
relations, namely; intra- local, inter -local and central -local 
fiscal inequities . 
These forms of unfair tax treatment affect local 
residents and local business. In the former case, we may 
distinguish forms of personal, inter -personal and inter -social, 
or inter- class, fiscal inequities and inequalities. In the 
latter, we may distinguish business and inter -business fiscal 
inequities and inequalities. 
Clearly, all aspects of inequities may, eventually, 
overlap. 
1. Intra -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
This concept, used throughout the thesis, pertains to 
the various aspects of tax injustice generated within the 
confines of the one and the same local unit. This may be 
attributed to four major factors; the imposition of taxes 
regressive by nature, the structure of the local tax, the 
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It is noteworthy that the scope for intra -local fiscal 
inequity is more serious in pluritaxing junior authorities 
than within the monotaxing authorities. Consequently, intra- 
local fiscal inequity assumes more substantial proportions in 
a federal polity than in a unitary one. 
Furthermore, the smaller the taxing unit, of pluritaxing 
capacity, the heavier local inequity is likely to become. 
It ought also to be mentioned that the local revenue 
deficiencies, aggravated by the rise in expenditures and the 
fall in the value of money, are conducive to a deepening of 
regression in monotaxing authorities and /or a widening of its 
scope in pluritaxing authorities. 
The various forms of intra -local inequity may be now 
reviewed. 
The local taxation of real property is clearly regressive 
since it is not directly connected with ability to pay. 
Fiscal inequity, in the case of local income taxation, is 
likely to stem from the problem of interjurisdictional incomes 
and income partition. In other terms, the responsible factors 
are the co- application of residence and situs and income dis- 
414 tilt 
memberment by region and by typelfor the purpose of local 
fiscal treatment. In fact, schedular income taxation is 
rL w !u rl LA,L, á w L., 1.. - :- 
irrational, especially when there is no central income tax. 
Proper progression can only apply to the person's total 
earnings of whatever type and from whichever region. 
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Progression, when adopted locally, is infringed or defeated 
through the partition of ability to pay, that is, when the 
local scale of graduation applies only to slices or fragments 
of income as determined by region or by type. The 
fragmentation by region would be caused by the local taxation 
on the basis of situs and not residence. The fragmentation by 
type is represented by the local taxation of only some flow, 
or flows, of income to the exclusion of the others. 
Furthermore, the splitting up of personal income and its 
subjection to schedular local income taxation, whether by the 
same local unit or by diverse local units, may lead to the 
multiplication of exemption limits and allowances for the 
benefit of the same income- receiver. 
It is noteworthy that if the local income taxes are 
substantial and assume a proportional o -I mss re form and 
if there is a central income tax system only mildly progressive, 
the progressiveness of the latter, and hence of the national 
tax system as a whole (i.e. central plus local), will be 
impaired and may even become regressive. 
Fiscal inequity, in its intra -local connotation, may also 
affect local business and loca1 industry by falling unfairly 
on a given concern or through discrimination between similar 
concerns operating within the same locality. The junior 
taxing jurisdiction may invoke the theories of Social 
Expediency, Social Control or General Welfare to justify a host 
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of regressive and repressive imposts, on local activities, 
little connected or unconnected with impersonal ability to pay 
or net corporate income, but based on such items as gross 
earnings, capital stock or net value output. The regression 
also manifests itself if the effective incidence of these 
taxes falls on the consumers. 
The intra -local unfair fiscal treatment may be also 
generated by sundry outlay taxes, imposed by the.unior 
authorities, notably selective and general commodity taxes. 
2. Inter -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
This term expresses the various aspects of horizontal 
fiscal inequalities or inter -territorial tax differentials 
not due to differences in local service standards. 
Economic as well as fiscal factors are responsible for 
such disparities. 
From the economic viewpoint, the main reason is the 
differences in local wealth as measured by local per capita 
wealth or income. 
The discrepancies in wealth may be caused either by the 
natural inter -area distribution of resources or by such 
structural and organisational factors as industrialisation, 
specialisation and integration. 
Furthermore, economic changes or fluctuations hit the 
various areas in varying degrees. A normally prosperous 
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district may be so adversely affected as to suffer pronounced 
fiscal inequities compared with normally less well -off areas. 
The general rigidity of the local tax systems has its part to 
play in this connection. 
The inter -area disparities in the tax burden may be also 
due to purely fiscal considerations. 
In the field of personal income taxation, the relative 
inequalities may be induced by the problems of residence and 
situs. When no agreement prevails between the various junior 
taxing jurisdictions as to the criterion, either residence or 
situs, duplicate taxation arises (unless inter -local tax 
credits are provided for). Consequently, some uniform basis 
ought to be adopted. 
Furthermore, there may exist inter -local differences in 
rates, exemption limits, amounts of allowances and other 
provisions. 
Similar considerations lie at the basis of the inter -local 
inequities in the field of local death taxation. 
As for business taxation, the horizontal fiscal 
inequalities are ascribable to various factors. 
In non -income taxation of business, there may be not only 
disparate local "bundles" of imposts, little connected or 
unconnected with impersonal ability to pay (as measured by net 
corporate income) but there may be also inter -local differences 
in tax provisions with respect to any given levy. 
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In the case of local corporate- income taxation, there is 
the problem of pan -locality or cosmopolitan income. If within 
the same country, some localities base taxation on situs of 
business regardless of jurisdictional source; while the other 
localities tax on the basis of the origin of business income 
(i.e. income originating within their respective spheres 
irrespective of situs) multiple taxation ensues. 
If the local units, in an attempt to apportion 
cosmopolitan business income, adopt the devices of allocation 
formulas or separate accounting or the ratio of local to total 
expenses, identical processes must be applied otherwise 
duplicate taxation will still persist. 
It is to be mentioned that the creditor and debtor 
localities will not easily agree to the same device as their 
interests are not reconcilable especially if the local interest 
groups are strong. Even if all localities agree on a universal 
formula, different interpretations and varying emphasis may be 
attached to the same components. 
Clearly, the problem of inter -local fiscal inequities and 
inequalities cecomes more intricate when prevail multiplex 
local tax systems involving income taxes and /or outlay taxes 
as is the case in a federal polity. 
Furthermore, it is to be mentioned that the heavier the 
general burden of local taxation, the greater will be the 
absolute disparities in inter -area tax liability. 
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3. Central -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
Vertical fiscal inequity is due to various factors 
notably the mode of local taxation and the combined burden of 
central plus local taxation. 
Concerning the mode of taxation, it is to be mentioned 
that the scope for central -local inequities will be wider if 
the local taxes derive from the same sources as the central 
taxes than if they are completely separate from the central 
taxes, unless local taxation affects the form of supplements 
or percentages on national taxes. The scope for inequities 
will be also narrower if there is some sort of separation "by 
brackets" according to which the low- income groups are left 
for exploitation by the junior authorities while the higher - 
income groups are kept for the senior or central authorities. 
Similarly, tax sharing militates in favour of more 
vertical equity. 
Clearly, the centralisation or federalisation of 
administration and collection of secondary and tertiary 
taxation, e.g. property taxation (valiintion), income taxation, 
mitigate the various inequities and inequalities. 
Central -local repressive taxation is likely to be the 
outcome of manifold tax layers. It assumes more serious 
Proportions in federal countries than in unitary countries and 
is accentuated by the new tides of welfare economics, planned 
economics, hot -war or cold -war economics which bring about 
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serious increases in tax rates and substantial widening of the 
fiscal field. 
Vertical fiscal inequity, notable in income taxation, is 
mitigated by agreements between localities or between the local 
and central authorities oroviding for tax credits or tax 
deductibility, mutual or unilateral. However, there are cases 
when the devices do not prove satisfactory. 
It is important to point out that the plurality of tax 
layers is liable to exert a detrimental impact on the 
progression of the national tax system, as a whole, especially 
1 when central progression is mild whether the secondary and 
tertiary taxes are proportional or progressive and, a fortiori, 
when they are regressive. 
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SECTION I. 
LOCAL PROPERTY TAXATION. 
I. PROPERTY TAXATION AND ABILITY TO PAY. 
A study of the development of fiscal theories reveals 
that real property was, in origin, taxed on the ground of 
ability to pay and not benefit. The early Greek and Roman 
philosophers pointed to the connection between just taxation 
and ability as measured by real property. Real property was 
then the only or the most important form of wealth. On the 
other hand, the early governments were not with 
benefits or welfare and the best thing that could be expected 
from them was to leave the people alone. 
Professor Cannan states about medieval England: 
"It seems to be quite clear that in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth century the accepted view was that each inhabitant 
should pay according to his ability or substance, for in those 
days ability and substance meant much the same thing: the man 
who has a large income without having a large capital is a 
product of modern civilisation.,r(l) 
(1) Cannan, Edwin : The History of Local Rates in England." 
1927, 2nd edition. p.22. 
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Similarly, in the U.S.A., the property taxes were 
originally based on ability. An Ordinance of Iviassachusetts 
Bay Colony, in 1634, speaks of taxing everybody "according to 
his estate and with consideration to all other abilityes 
whatsoever." 
Gradually, the scope of government activities widened. 
xn increasing range of services began to be provided for. 
The expansion of trade and the development of urban centres 
called forth such services as roads, water, and other 
municipal utilities and amenities. Police and fire 
protection had to keep pace with new conditions. Health and 
education were also added to the list. The result was an 
increasing burden of to be met through an 
increasing burden of taxation. The property owners were 
naturally the most liable to contribute. Some of the services 
benefited them and other services did not. 
The reluctance of the property owners to pay for others 
or to have to contribute at all to public funds, while other 
income -earners did not, induced them to invoke the quid pro quo 
principle which thus "proved to be only a detour, an effort on 
the part of property holders to circumvent the movement for 
expansion of the social responsibilities of government." ( 1) 
(1) Simpson, Herbert D. : "The Changing Theory of Property 
Taxation." in The American Economic Review. 
September, 1939. p.453. 
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Legal history, either in Britain or the U.S.A., reveals 
how the property owners were keen to claim the benefit 
principle in a desperate attempt to defend themselves and how 
the legal decisions faithfully reflected this view. An 
expressive instance, inter alia, may be quoted. The Supreme 
Court of Michigan finds that: 
"Every species of taxation in every mode is in theory and 
principle based upon an idea of compensation, benefit or 
advantage to the person or property taxed. Taxation, not based 
upon any idea of benefit to the person taxed, would be grossly 
unjust, tyrannical and oppressive and might well be 
characterised as public robbery." (1) 
It is noteworthy that the "contract theory" provides the 
philosophical background to the quid pro quo principle. The 
fiscal counterpart of the concept of social contract is "a give - 
and- take" basis; rights entail duties and services justify 
counterservices. 
Several reasons account for the waning of the benefit 
theory both as a protection theory (or cost -of- service theory) 
and a value-of-service theory (or interest principle).(2) 
With economic expansion, sundry forms of wealth developed 
(1) Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Michigan 560 (1853). 
(2) Seligman: Edwin R.A. : 
Studies in Public Finance. New York, 1925. pp.185 -186. 
Essays in Taxation. 10th ed. 1925. p.337 et sega 
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which cannot be overlooked. If in an agrarian community, 
real property is the main form of wealth, in a trading and 
industrial community it is a form inter alia. 
Furthermore, not all services can now be viewed as "land 
services ". An increasing proportion is rather personal in 
character and does not accrue to the property per se. Gas, 
electricity, sewage disposal do not exclusively benefit real 
property but are also performed for reasons of public hygiene 
or public security. Roads, cleansing, barks, clubs and other 
amenities can hardly be said to relate to property. In the 
Welfare State, the non -property owners are likely to derive 
more benefit than the Property owners either on the central 
level or the local ( 1) 
Various socio- economic and political considerations 
induced corresponding changes, of fundamental character, in the 
philosophy of taxation. The "Interventionist State ", the 
"Planning State" and the "Welfare State" involve varying 
degrees of rationalization and mobilization of human and 
economic resources for the sake of definite ideologies. 
These more organic theories of the State call for a more 
appropriate theory of taxation, more equitable and more 
malleable as an instrument of policy. Ability to pay is the 
answer. 
(1) Wagner, Adolph : Finanzwissenschaft. Leipzig, 1890, II. 
pp .4:31 -442 . 
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II FISCAL EQUITY AND LOCAL PROPERTY TAXATION 
ON RENTAL VALUE . 
1. Intra -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
1. Regression: Reasons: 
1) 
Owner and Occupier: In a rational fiscal system, real 
property would be subject to taxation on the income it 
actually yields, not as a distinct flow but as part of the 
stream of income flows which accrue to the individual. The 
segregation of property, or income from property, for the 
purpose of separate fiscal treatment either on the central 
level or on the local level, is fraught with distortions of 
the ability principle and fiscal equity. 
When a local tax is imposed on property, on the basis of 
rental value, it may be payable either by the owner or the 
occupier. 
If the local tax falls on the owner and if there is a 
graduated central income tax system not including income from 
property, the result is that the property- income -earner may be 
ultimately either under -taxed or over -taxed. If his income 
from property is an element in his total income , his position 
(1) In the present section, property taxation refers to 
residential property and land. Business property is 
discussed in the next section. 
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in the scale of graduation of national income taxation is 
unjustifiably lowered. The fiscal burden is thus 
unnecessarily mitigated. 
Conversely, if the owner's property income is the only 
income he earns or forms the largest element in his total 
earnings, he may still be below or at subsistence level. 
Taxing him then, on either the central or local levels, 
involves fiscal inequity. The justification, in this case, 
that the property derives benefits through local expenditure 
on services, is not wholly tenable as already expounded. 
Furthermore, when income from property is included in the 
central income tax system and when, on the local level, 
property or income from property, is also taxed, we have a 
case of multiple taxation if the tax is payable by the owner. 
It is noteworthy that in many under- developed countries, 
where investment prospects are limited, people tend to invest 
in real property, land or buildings, From the viewpoint of 
ideal fiscal equity, these income -earners ought to be taxed 
(by any authority) on that portion of income, derived from 
immovable property, which exceeds their personal and family 
requirements, according to a graduated scale, otherwise there 
is unfair treatment. 
The most flagrant case of fiscal inequity, in connection 
with the local taxation of property, arises when the tax is 
imposed on the occupier instead of the owner as in England 
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where such taxes are called "rates ".(1) In fact there is no 
link between the rent paid and the true taxpaying capacity of 
the occupier. The low- income receivers spend proportionately 
more of their income on rent than the high -income receivers. 
The levy is thus akin to an outlay tax and acquires the same 
regressive character. Moreover, housing is a necessary 
expenditure. The house tax is thus a levy on shelter and 
conflicts with the modern concept of the Welfare State whereby 
the latter strives to promote the living conditions of the 
masses. The expenditure on houses, unlike those on drinks or 
tobacco, should be encouraged and made part of any "progressive 
social system. "(2) 
Regressiveness exists not only between the social classes, 
that is, "inter -class fiscal inequity ", but also between 
individuals within the same class, that is "inter- personal 
fiscal inequity". In fact the amount of rent paid out of a 
given amount of income varies according to various "personal" 
considerations. The assessed value of a large house is no 
criterion of taxpaying capacity of the occupier with a large 
family. Furthermore, the renter -occupier may be forced to 
reside near his place of work although he might have preferred 
(1) In Scotland, the liability is divided between landlord 
and tenant. 
(2) Hicks T.R. Hicks U.K. and Leser C.E.V. : 
e 'ro em o a ua ion or 'a ing.. ccasional Papers 
VII. National Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
Cambridge, 1944. p.6. 
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to move to some other premises more in accordance with his 
income capacity or ability to pay. Needless to say, the 
richer occupier can more easily shift to lowly rated rates or 
to smaller houses or lodgings. Similarly, unemployment and 
old age, involving absence of personal earning ability, are 
not taken into consideration in the pattern of local property 
taxation under discussion. Indeed, ability to pay can only be 
reckoned in terms of income and not property. 
Valuation: It ought to be mentioned that an important cause 
of severance between income from property and ability to pay 
is represented by the problem of valuation. Valuation is 
generally based, not on the actual rental value of the 
property but on a rent which a hypothetical tenant would be 
prepared to pay in a free market. This is understandable 
since the property may be occupied by a relative of the owner 
or the owner himself. However, valuation is undertaken only 
periodically. It is a costly and arduous operation which 
cannot be carried out annually. Mrs. Hicks asserts that; 
"Valuation is a skilled job, and a thorough revaluation 
requires the service of expensive personnel for a considerable 
period. Consequently valuations tend to be scamped or post- 
poned, until with the passage of time they become quite out 
of line with each other and with the facts." (1) 
(1) Hicks, U.K. : Public Finance. Cambridge, 1947. p.275. 
also, 
Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser : op. cit. p.76. 
It is worthy of note that some Dublin valuations 
date back to 1850: 
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In a dynamic economy, rent is liable to change. Its 
fluctuations are generated by economic and other factors. The 
tax burden will, eventually, lose tough with taxpaying 
capacity. In depression, the rent of lands and buildings may 
be adversely affected by a deficiency in effective demand of 
private consumers including their demand for durable goods. 
If valuation does not correspond to the new situation the 
outcome will be a cq.se of over- taxation. Conversely, in 
periods of prosperity or inflation, rents rise whilst 
valuation does not keep pace with them. This is conducive to 
under- taxation. 
Besides the stickiness of valuation, it is noticeable 
that the true rateable or assessment value may not be wholly 
adopted as the basis for taxation. It may be artificially 
reduced by different proportions for various purposes outlined 
later.(1) This under- assessment is an additional factor 
making of valuation not only a source of intra -local fiscal 
inequity but also a cause of inter -local fiscal inequalities 
tackled below with special reference to England. Under- 
assessment is, also resorted to in the U.S.A. and is discussed 
in due course. 
(1) See Part Two, Chapter III "Revenue Inadequacy ", and 
Chapter IV "Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Conflicts ", 
Section I. 
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fleratin : The regressiveness, inherent in the English local 
rates, has been further accentuated by the process of derating 
of agricultural and industrial hereditaments.(1) Local 
expenditures and notably the increase in them (due to the 
expansion of services or simply inflation) has thus to be 
borne by residential property and small shops. 
The direct consequence of derating was the lowering of 
rateable values and the yield of a penny rate by some 12 per 
cent. Any further increase in the rates had to be 12 per cent 
higher than before derating. In industrial areas the effect 
was more pronounced. In Durham, for instance, just after 
derating, a penny rate brought in 29 per cent less than 
before.(2) Similarly, in expanding industrial areas, e.g. 
outside London and the Midlands, the expansion in services 
induced by developing activities (lighting, roads, housing, 
fire brigade...) led to a heavier burden on residential 
property. 
In 1939 roughly 55 per cent of the rates were paid by 
occupiers of dwellings, but less than 5 per cent came from 
(1) The derating of agricultural land began as early as 1896 
(Agricultural Rates Act) until in 1929 it was completely 
exempted. As for industry, most kinds of machinery were 
derated in 1925. In 1929 the rateable value of 
factories, railways and mines was reduced by 75 per cent. 
(2) Local Government News Service - October 1931. 
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houses with a rateable value above £50. More striking is the 
fact that the occupiers of small residential shops contributed 
relatively more than the whole of industry and railways (5 
per cent and 4 per cent respectively of the local rates).(1) 
Uniform Valuation and Regression: To undertake in England a 
revaluation on a uniform basis, such as was proposed in 1938, 
is conducive to accentuation of the regressive impact of the 
local rates. In fact, the poorer houses tended to be 
relatively more undervalued than the better houses. 
Consequently, the increased burden of the rates would fall on 
the low- income groups and the modest owner -occupiers who were 
purchasing their houses on mortgages which do not take account 
of the changes in rateable values.(2) 
Furthermore, proper valuation is liable to induce a 
regressive shift of incidence on account of the relative 
shortage of supply of the smaller houses whose uncontrolled 
rents and consequently gross values would increase relatively 
more than the larger dwellings. 
(1) Local Government News Service, July 1939. 
Labour Research Department. 
(2) "Rates and Values". in; 
The Times. May 20, 1953. p.9. 
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2. Regression: Evaluation: 
The burden of any tax can be best ascertained by 
referring it to income. This applies to central as well as 
local taxation. In the case of England, which is chosen to 
illustrate the regressiveness of local property taxation based 
on rental value, the same method must be resorted to. In 
other terms, we ought to compute the proportion of the rates 
to the income of the ratepayers. 
Taking the rate poundages as a criterion of regression is 
not a satisfactory procedure not only because the connection 
between rates and income is absent but also on account of the 
general stickiness of valuation and of deliberate under- 
assessment. The nominal rateable value is thus different from 
the true rateable value and the nominal rate poundages are 
misleading. 
To put things differently the percentage of rates to 
income, that is, the true burden of the local rates, is not 
necessarily reflected in the level of rate poundages 
especially the nominal poundages. In fact the nominal rate 
poundages may not be high while the burden of the rates is 
actually high owing to a high level of assessment. This can 
be exemplified (before the War) by the northern and southern 
areas, the former having a heavier burden of rates (i.e. 
rate /income proportion) but not very high rate poundages. 
Conversely, the rate poundages may be high while the 
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burden of the rates is low owing to a low level of assessment 
(underassessment). 
It is thus significant that while the average rate 
poundage increased much since 1938 -39, the proportion of rates 
to income decreased owing to the increase in national income. 
In fact the average rate poundage was 12/4 in the pound in 
1938 -39, 19/4 in 1951 -52, about 20/- in 1952 -53 and may exceed 
22/- in 1953 -54. However, the proportion of rates to national 
income was less than 3 per cent in 1950 as against over 4 per 
cent in 1938.(1) 
To sum up, the real burden of local property taxation in 
England is represented by the connection between the rates and 
income. This depends on two things, namely; the proportion 
between gross rent, including rates, and income, national or 
local, and depends also on the proportion of rates and net 
rent within the gross rent. (2) 
We may now exemplify the general and local regressiveness 
of the "rates" in England and Wales using income. 
A. General Regression: 
Regressiveness is here measured, for the various income 
(1) Chester, D.N. : "Local Finance". 
Lloyds Bar-IR.-Review. July, 1951. p.34. 
(2) Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser, C.E.V. : op.cit. p.2 
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groups, for the country as a whole. 
The following table discloses the percentages and totals 
of the rates, referred to total income after income tax for 
the year 1937 -38.(1) The results are of appreciative value. 
Regression of the Rates. 





Paid in Rates 
Total Sum Paid 
in Rates 
£ millions 
Under £250 2676 3.8 101 
£ 250 - 500 578 3.4 19 
£ 500 - 1000 311 3.0 9 
£1000 - 2000 224 2.0 4.5 
£2000 - 340 1.0 3.5 
4129 3.3 137 
(average) 
It is interesting to note the regressiveness among the 
working class and middle class, whether renters or owners. 
For the manual workers- renters the average burden was 2.7% and 
for the home -owners of the same class probably 3%. 
(1) Hicks, S.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser C.E.V. : 
The Incidence of Local Rates in Great Britain. 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
Cambridge, 1945. p.46. 
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Among the middle class renters the burden was 3.8% for 
income of £350, 3.5% for income of £400, 3.1% for income of 
£450. Among the home -owners within the same class, the rate - 
income function was 4.8% for income of £360 and 4% for income 
of £450. 
B, Local Regression: 
The burden of the local rates can be also estimated, 
within each local unit, by referring the rates to local 
income. This throws light on the real inter -area fiscal 
inequalities in a country like England where such divergencies 
are obscured by the rate poundages as will be seen below. 
It is noteworthy that the income tax statistics in 
England do afford sound basis as is not always 
taxed where it is earned. The computation of local income is 
thus fraught with difficulties. Some estimates were made for 
Bristol(1) and more recently for Oxford.(2) Better estimates 
are being made for Cambridge. An attempt to compute local 
income by regions was also undertaken oy Miss P.M. Dean of 
the Department of Applied Economics in the University of 
Cambridge. It is to be hoped that further research will be 
carried out in this connection.(3) 
(1) Ellis, A.W.T. : "Rents, Rates and Incomes in Bristol ". 
The Review of Economic Studies. No.2, 1944. p.99. 
(2) Lydallt H.F. "Personal Incomes in 0Iford ". 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics. 
November and December, 1951. p.379. 
(3) Utting, J.L.G. : "Income Estimates for Small Areas" in 
Local Government Finance, Journal of the Institute of 
Municipal Treasurers and Accountants. June, 1953. 
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It is however possible, for England and Wales, to relate 
the rates to income in an indirect way through expenditures. 
This is a tenable assumption for the low- income earners as 
their propensity to consume is high. 
The method was resorted to by Mrs. Hicks who computed the 
regressiveness of the rates for the working class in the 
different regions. The calculations are based on an October's 
week in 1937. 
A general idea of intra -local regression can be given by 
the following table for some regions. 
Gross and Net Rents and Rates as Percentage of 
Average Expenditures of all Households in the 























Under 10s. 20.3 14.8 5.1 16.1 12.1 3.6 17.5 10.8 6.0 
lOs. - 20s. 18.8 13.7 4.8 15.2 11.5 3.4 14.2 8.8 4.9 
20s. - 30s. 16.7 12.2 4.3 14.3 11.0 3.1 11.9 7.4 4.1 
30s. and over 14.2 10.4 3.6 12.1 9.1 2.7 8.4 5.2 2.9 
All Households 15.9 11.4 4.1 13.7 10.3 3.0 11.6 7.2 4.0 
(1) Hicks, J.R. - Hicks U.K. and Leser C.E.V. : 
The Incidence of local Rates. Op.cit. p.24. 
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3. bocal Property Taxation and Progression: 
A.Property Taxation and the Progression of the National Tax 
Srsem. 
An important fact must now be brought to light. The 
regressive structure of the imposts, including property taxes, 
of the lower tiers of government can exert an adverse effect 
()lathe progressive structure of the national tax system, 
especially when the minor taxes are substantial. The over -all 
tax system can thus be made less progressive, or even rendered 
regressive, for some or all income groups. In a federal 
polity this "induced national fiscal inequity" is more liable 
to occur and can be of importance (e.g. the U.S.A. before the 
Second World War) . 
An illustration is afforded, for Great Britain, by the 
following table for 1934 -35 (which also discloses the 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Tax Incidence as a Percentage of Income in 
Various Income Groups 1934 -35. Income all earned. 
Married person with 3 children. (1) 





surtax) - - - - 1.2 5.7 9.8 13.0 17.2 36.1 
Indirect 
Taxes. 9.9 9.8 9.5 7.6 5.2 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.2 
Rates. 7.2 6.8 5.3 4.4 4.5 4.3 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.5 1.8 
Total 
Burden 17.1 16.6 14.8 12.0 9.7 9.1 12.4 15.4 17.7 21.4 39.1 
N.B. : The indirect taxes comprise alcohol, tobacco, tea, 
miscellaneous food, sugar, entertainments. The rates 
are calculated in London, Southampton and Sheffield. 
The rates are assumed to be borne by the occupier and 
not shifted. This is justified by the relatively 
inelastic supply of houses during that period. 
The table shows that the graduated scale of the central 
taxes feels the impact of the regressive local and outlay taxes. 
The outcome is a mitigated rate of progression in the national 
(1) Hicks, U.K. : The Finance of British Government, 1920 -1936 
London, 1938. p.277. 
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tax system which at some income- groups becomes openly 
regressive, as at the income groups 150, 225, 335 and 500.(1) 
B. Progressive Property Taxation: 
The principle of progression is not applicable, from the 
theoretical viewpoint, in the case of local property taxation 
whether the property taxes are based on rental value or 
capital value and whether they are payable by the owner or the 
occupier. As already pointed out, graduation can really only 
apply to total individual net income otherwise it leads to 
distortions of over -all fiscal equity. 
In underdeveloped countries, however, progressive 
property taxation could eventually be justified on the ground 
that income from property is overwhelmingly important. 
Illustrations of graduated property tax rates are 
afforded by some Swiss cantons,(2) and the Argentine provinces 
as will be expounded, in some detail, below. In Egypt, the land 
tax has been more or less "personalised" for the small 
property-owners. (3 ) 
(1) For the same point under discussion, see also: 
Simon, Shena D. : Local Rates and Postwar Housing. 
London, 1943. p.22. 
(2) Buehler) Alfred G. : Public Finance. New York, 1948. 
p.340. 
(3) In Australia and New Zealand there is an additional 
graduated tax imposed on the owners when the holdings 
exceed a specific exemption. See, Gilbert, James H.: 
The Tax Systems of Australasia. Eugene, Oregon 
University, 1943. 
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In England, it is interesting to refer to the fact that 
some writers advocate the resort to progression in local 
property taxation. Mr. Sullivan states that: 
"The rating system began long before the principle of 
progressive taxation - namely, that the rich should pay a 
larger proportion of their incomes in taxes than the poor - 
had become an integral part of our fiscal system, as it did on 
the introduction of income tax and death duties in the 
nineteenth century. There is no reason why the rating system 
should not be transformed into a progressive tax in the same 
way." (1) 
It may be said that the present system in England 
actually bears some form of graduation. In fact the "gross 
value" is reduced by various percentages which vary inversely 
with the amount of "gross value" as shown in the following table: 
Gross Value £ Deduction Allowed for Net Value 
Under £10 per an. 40 per cent. 
10 - 20 331/3 per cent (or £4 whichever is 
greater).. 
20 - 40 25 per cent or £7. 
40 -100 20 per cent or £10. 
Over £100 £20 pigs 162/3 per cent of gross 
value in excess of £100 
(1) Sullivan, John : The Reform of the Rating System. 
(Foreword by W.A. Robson). Fabian Society, 1939. p.25. 
93. 
Mr. Sullivan suggests a widening of the present system 
of percentage deductions from gross value. The rateable value 
would thus be reduced in inverse proportion to the gross value 
or size of the house. 
Other proposals have been put forward such as relating 
the aforementioned deductions to the income -tax assessement of 
the ratepayer, the lower the latter the higher would be the 
rate of deduction. Another proposal consists in varying the 
poundage rate according to the rent per head (excluding 
servants) in direct proportion. The higher the latter the 
higher would be the rate poundage. Furthermore, it is 
suggested to relate the rate poundage to the size of the house 
or the income -tax assessment of the ratepayer.(1) 
These devices of differential rating, in so far as they 
are attempts to introduce an element of progression in the 
rates, fail to reach the core of the problem, namely the 
inherent regressiveness of local property taxation. 
Moreover, it is the writer's opinion that if these 
attempts are pushed too far, more prejudice than good may be 
done to the rational progressive structure of the all - 
inclusive tax system. 
O. The Argentine Experiment: 
The developments in Argentine provincial property taxation 
(1) Silver, A.N. : The Reform of Local Government Finance. 
London, 1945. p.54. 
94, 
during the last thirty years, provides considerablewith 
regard to "personalisation" in general and graduation in 
particular. 
(1) 
The reforms pertain to the application of progressive tax 
ratesland additional rates for absentee owners.(2) Recharges 
or penalties may be also imposed on large holdings. Further 
distinctions, in the level of the rates or the scale of 
graduation, may be made between urban and rural property, 
between occupied, partly -occupied and unoccupied properties, 
between individual and corporate property or between small 
and large areas. Homestead exemptions, total or partial, and 
exemption of improvements are sometimes provided for. 
These new features are noticeable, in varying degrees and 
different combinations in many provinces such as Cordoba, 
Salte, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Buenos Aires and others. Some 
illustrations could be given. 
In the Province of Cordoba, rural property is taxed at 
per 1,000 pesos valuation for properties up to 5,000 pesos 
and reaches to 20% per 1,000 pesos for properties valued over 
3,000,000 pesos. The additional tax for absenteeism ranges 
(1) Patterson, Ernest F. : "Argentine Provincial Tax Systems ". 
Inter - American Economic Affairs. Winter, 1953. p.37. 
(2) The Argentine property tax rates are expressed as a 
per cent per 1,000 pesos valuation. 
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from 1% to 6% per 1,000 pesos valuation according to different 
classifications of property values. 
If urban property is subject in Cordoba, to a 
proportional rate of 7% per 1,000 pesos valuation, in the 
Province of Salta the rates begin at 2% per 1,000 pesos 
valuation for properties valued at 10,000 pesos or less and 
reach to 20% per 1,000 pesos for properties valued over 
10,000,000 pesos. 
The Provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Rios take into 
consideration the area of rural properties for which additional 
bates are provided varying according to categories of hectares. 
In the Province of Entre Rios, therefore, the basic rates begin 
at 4% per 1,000 pesos valuation for properties up to 13,000 
pesos and attain 25% when the value of the property is above 
1,950,000 pesos. The additional tax rates, affecting a 
progressive scale, begin at 2% per 1,000 pesos valuation for 
areas between 1,000 and 2,000 hectares and reach to 15% for 
areas above 20,000 hectares . ( 1) 
4. Fiscal Equity and Shifting: 
The "effective incidence" of local property taxes, as 
distinct from their "formal incidence" can result in the tax 
falling on other persons. The effects, as concerns ability to 
paY and fiscal equity, depend on the pattern of the local tax 
(1) Patterson, Ernest F. : op. cit. p.42. 
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and on the direction of shifting whether it is forward or 
backward. (1) 
If the local property tax, based on rental value, falls 
on the owner, the latter may shift an increase in tax forward 
to the renter- occupier in higher rents and /or quantitatively/ 
qualitatively reduced services such as repairs. The shifting 
depends on various factors notably general economic conditions. 
In periods of prosperity and in expanding areas, the shifting 
is easier. The shifting is easier still if the supply of the 
durable consumption goods, or houses, is relatively inelastic 
owing, for instance, to long -term productive investment 
planning or various restrictions on raw materials generated by 
hot or cold war economics. The outcome of forward shifting, in 
this case, militates against fiscal equity. 
Conversely, during recession and within declining areas, 
an increase in the house tax falling on the owner is not 
easily shiftable forward and the result is more in line with 
the ability principle. 
L- 
If the formal incidence of the loca house tax falls on the 
(1) Mrs. Hicks explains "effective incidence" as a comparison 
between two pictures, "one of the economic set -up 
(distribution of consumers' wants and incomes and 
allocation of factors), as it is with the tax in question 
in operation; the other of a similar economic set -up, 
but without the tax." 
Public Finance, London and Cambridge, 1947. p.159. 
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occupier, as is the case in England, an increase in the tax, 
or "rates ", when occurring in depression or declining districts, 
will tend to be shifted backward to the owner. ( 1) Such 
shifting militates in favour of ability to pay. 
Conversely, in periods of expansion or full employment, 
arise in the rates is not susceptible of backward shifting 
and the effective incidence falls on the occupier. The 
regression will be thus still manifest. 
It is noticeable that in tunes of brisk economic 
conditions, a fall in the nominal rates may lead to an increase 
in rents. 
It is also to be mentioned that shifting is not possible 
in some cases especially rent control and the municipally 
subsidized houses. 
Overview: 
Regressiveness is inherent in the local taxation of 
property. It cannot be coped with by rent control or 
municipal subsidization of new buildings. The substitution of 
other taxes for the rates, for instance local income taxation, 
site value taxation, is by no means an easy proposition. 
Various implications, tackled in due course, are not to be 
(1) Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser, C.E.V. : 
The Incidence of Local Rates. 
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overlooked. We feel the duty to underline, here, the 
regressive impact of local property taxation in general and 
the English pattern in particular. 
Professor G.D.H. Cole may be quoted in this connection, 
"Indeed, I should dearly like to be able with a good 
conscience to propose the abolition of local rates and the 
substitution for them of some less inequitable form of local 
taxation." (1) 
Similarly, the supporters of local property taxation, on 
grounds of practicability and inevitability, feel the need for 
reforms. Mrs. Hicks states: 
"We believe that the rating system has to be preserved, 
and therefore ought be reformed, however arduous a matter 
it may be to reform it." (2) 
(1) Cole G.D.H. : Local and Regional Government. 
London, 1947. p.223. 
(2) Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser, C.E.V.: 
The Problem of Valuation for Rating. p.6. 
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2. Inter -Local Fiscal Inequalities. 
An estimation of the extent of the inter -area 
divergencies in the incidence of the rates should be based, not 
on the rate poundages, whether true or nominal, but on the 
relation between the rates (as any tax) and local income. In 
view of the difficulties of computing the latter, it is 
possible to refer to expenditures as an alternative. This 
indirect method is notably reasonable for the low -income 
brackets where savings are not likely to be high. A table 
quoted above illustrates some inter -area differences (before 
the War) . 
In sum, the accurate criterion of the discrepancies in 
the incidence of the rates is the relation rates /income (or 
rates /expenditures) and not the rate poundages. Having borne 
this cardinal fact in mind, we may now proceed to a review of 
the various factors which account for both the true and 
apparent inter -area disparities in the burden or level of the 
rates (which disparities are not due to differences in local 
services) . (1) 
(1) Professor Cannan enumerates various causes for the 
inequalities of rates, inter alfa, the difference in local 
services and their costs, the differences in the return 
from local capital investment, differences in costs of 
poor relief and efficiency of administration. This 
explanation is over- simplified and confusing. It omits 
important factors and includes others which ought to be 
isolated. See, 
Cannant Edwin : "Inequalities of Local Rates and its 
Economic Justification." The Economic Journal, 
March, 1895. p.22. 
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under -privileged areas, with low true rateable value will have 
high true '(as opposed to nominal) rate poundages while the 
richer local units with high true rateable value will have 
low true rate poundages . 
(1) 
In the poor areas, another reason for the high rate 
poundages, besides the low rateable value, is the relatively 
higher costs of the same amount of services. While the rise 
in rate poundages due to general changes affect all the local 
units uniformly, this is not the case when the increase in 
rate poundages is brought about by the general expansion in 
local services since the latter may not only be unequally 
distributed interlocally(2) but will also have varying local 
implications regarding costs. 
2. Valuation: 
Valuation, in England, is a source of inter -local 
differences in rate poundages. Two points may be mentioned in 
this connection, namely, the stickiness of valuation and under- 
(1) The ratio, within a given locality, between the actual 
amount of rates paid and the true rateable value of the 
house gives the true poundage. If the nominal rateable 
value is substituted for the true rateable value we get 
the nominal poundage. See: 
Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.K. and Leser, C.E.V.: 
The Problem of Valuation for Rating. p.49. 
(2) In general, expenditures are more pressing in poor areas 
than in more prosperous ones (however they rise more in 
the most wealthy areas). 
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valuation. 
The general slackness in valuation based on rental value 
has been already pointed out. It is accentuated by increases 
in income and prices as happened in 1914 -20. If the degree of 
stickiness were uniform all -over the local units this factor 
would not be responsible for the inter -local disparities in 
rates. However, the operation of valuation is not centralized. 
Moreover, prices and actual rents may increase in certain areas 
relatively more than in others. This is noticeable in 
expanding areas as opposed to stagnant or less developing 
local communities. Similarly, the control of rents results in 
lower levels of assessment in wealthy localities owing to the 
quicker development of oonstruction there. 
As for undervaluation, it is causative of rate 
disparities in so far as it is practised in a non -uniform way. 
It ought first to be noticed that there was a general 
tendency for undervaluation in expanding areas for both old 
and "new" houses. In other words, "the degree of under- 
valuation of all houses, whether old or new, was smallest in 
the poorer areas and largest in the wealthier." (1) 
In fact, underassessment is expensive and cannot be 
afforded by under- endowed localities. 
(1) "Rates and Values ", in, The Times. May 20, 1953. p.9. 
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The special underassessment of "new" houses (built after 
World War I) is a further cause of disparities in poundages. 
The percentage of "new" houses is, indeed, smaller in 000r or 
contracting localities and larger in more prosperous areas. 
To sum up, the low level of assessment(1) is a feature of 
wealthy areas which have a high rateable value (per house) and 
low rate poundages. Conversely, the high assessment level 
characterizes poorer local communities with low rateable value 
and high rate poundages. 
These reasons account for the fact that the uniformisation 
of valuation is likely to increase, rather than mitigate, the 
disparities in rate poundages. 
The effect of the variability in valuation practices can 
be appreciated by a comparison, considering a number of 
districts, wealthy and poor, between the dispersion of the 
nominal rate poundages and the dispersion of the true rate 
poundages; both categories of poundages being expressed as 
ratios to the average (nominal or true) poundage for the 
totality of the areas under consideration. 
It will be found that the dispersion of the true 
poundages is wider. 
Another method, conducive to the same result, consists in 
computing, in the various areas, the specific average nominal 
(1) The level of assessment is the ratio between nominal and 
true rateable value (or nominal and true poundage). 
104. 
and true poundages expressed as a percentage of the general 
average, nominal and true respectively.(1) 
The Dispersion of Nominal and True Rate Poundages 
in a Certain Number of Areas, 1938. (2) 
(The Average for nominal poundage was 12s.11d. and for true 
poundage was 8s.9d.) 
No. of Districts 
' «Iith Nominal 
Poundage 
No. of Districts 
With True 
Poundage 
60-40% Below Average 1 4 
40 -20% " 'f 33 36 
Less than 20% Below Average 81 74 
Less than 20% Above Average 56 37 
20-40% Above Average 20 24 
40 -60% " It 12 11 
60 -80% " t? 5 6 
80 -100% " It 6 6 
100 -120% " " 4 3 
120 -140% " " - 9 
140 -160% " It - 3 
160 -180% " If 1 
180 -200% " If - 1 
200 -220% " ,r i 
220 -240% " If - 2 
218 218 
Hicks, J.R. - Hicks, U.Y. and Leser, 
The Problem of Valuation for Rating. 






The total exemption of agricultural hereditaments and the 
partial exemption of industrial I reditaments in 1929 cannot 
be overlooked as a source of tax differentials since the 
proportion of both these tax subjects to residential property 
and small shops, that is, the residual tax subject, varies 
between localities of the same category. 
The rateable value, and hence the rate poundages, thus 
necessarily undergo changes in varying proportions between the 
local units of the same class. 
Clearly, the derating of agricultural, industrial and 
transport hereditaments involves discrimination against 
residential buildings, commerce and service trades(1) which is 
not desirable from the fiscal equity viewpoint and is not 
agreed to by the writer who recommends rerating for further 
reasons. (2 ) 
(1) Commercial properties, at present time, form the 
following proportions of rateable value; L.C.C. 37.1 %, 
County Boroughs 23.2%, Counties (excluding London) 
average 12.7% or 14.7% in urban areas and 6% in rural 
areas. See, 
Chester, D.N. : "Analysis of Rateable Value of England 
and Wales, 1st April, 1952." 
Local Government finance. Jan., 1954. p.14. 
(2) See Chapter III on "Revenue Inadequacy." 
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III Fiscal Equity and Local Property Taxation 
On Capital Value 
1. Inequities and Inequalities: 
In some countries, the lower tiers of government tax 
property on the basis of its capital value instead of its 
annual rental value. The reason is often one of historical 
development. Where land was scarce, as in Europe, it was 
seldom sold and its yield focussed attention more than its 
market value. ';here land was abundant, as in America, it was 
more freely bought and sold and its capital value was its 
prominent feature. 
We saw that there is little connection between property 
and ability to pay. To tax the property owner on the capital 
value of his property instead of its annual rental value is no 
better solution.(1) Real property is only an item in one's 
wealth and can only be brought within the scope of the tax 
system as an element of total net income. Moreover, serious 
fiscal inequity arises if real property is taxed in one 
locality according to situs and in another according to the 
(1) Heer, Clarence : The Property Tax as a Measure of 
Ability, in Viewpoints on Public Finance, edited by 
Harold Groves. New York, 1947. p.50. 
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residence of the owner. Clearly inter -personal injustice 
arises unless both the resident owner and the non -resident 
owner are taxed on both the objective basis and the ownership 
basis. 
If the local property tax is not confined to lands and 
buildings but is extended to personal property as well, fiscal 
inequity becomes even more flagrant. Such a tax disregards the 
differences in the earning power of property. If farms and 
machines have an earning power, household furniture has none. 
Farms, forests, manufacturing machinery, merchandise have 
widely varying degrees of earning power. 
If the property tax is further extended to intangible 
property, tax injustice assumes more serious proportions. 
In spite of the fact that intangibles (e.g. bonds, stocks, 
mortgages, bank deposits) are largely owned by the high 
income -receivers, their taxation cannot be justified on 
grounds of ability. They have no separate ability from the 
wealth they stand for. They represent wealth already taxed 
and lead to multiple taxation. Moreover, intangibles vary in 
their income yielding capacity. Some yield income, some do 
not. They fluctuate much in their yields from year to year 
according to endogeneous or exogeneous factors. 
(1) Girard, Richard A. : The Scope forUniformity in State 
Tax Systems. Special Report of the State Tax Commission 
No.8. New York, 1935. p.57. 
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The possible duplicity of tax burden can be illustrated 
by an example from the United States. A buy *s a property 
with a cash payment. B buys another property of equal value 
and net annual income, part in cash and part with a mortgage. 
Both property owners will be subject to tax on the full 
original value of the property. If the rate of the tax is 
flat and is equal on tangibles and intangibles, the second 
property owner will pay more than the tax paid by the first 
as the income which B derives from his property pays the full 
tax on his property and the tax paid by the holder of the 
mortgage (the latter pays tax out of income derived from B's 
property) . (1) 
Real Estate Intangibles Total Property 
Tax (at 3) Tax (at 3%) Tax 
A $ 300 - $ 300 
B y$ 300 - ) 
Ct s mortgage ) $ 450 
on B's ) 
property. - $ 150 ) 
Obviously the way out of this duplication lies in either 
simple cancellation of the tax on intangible property, or the 
(1) Taylor, Philip, E. : The Economics of Public Finance. 
New York, 1948. p.358. 
See also: 
Jensen Jens P. : Concepts of Taxable Property. in 
Viewpoints on Public Finance. Edited by Harold Groves. 
New York, 1947. p.40. 
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extension of the latter to all rights to wealth whether 





This can be illustrated by the following 
Real Estate Intangibles Total 
Tax. 1,45120 Tax. 12% Property Tax 
A's farm ,$ 150 
y$ 300 
A's equity in his 
farm $ 150 
B's farm $ 150 
B's equity in his 
farm $ 75 $ 300 
C's mortgage $ 75 
If the inclusion of intangibles in a comprehensive system 
of property taxation leads to multiple taxation, it may also 
open the door to evasion and hence inter -personal fiscal 
inequalitjes . Intangibles may be subject to different tax 
burdens in different localities. They may be taxed in a 
locality and exempted in another. Consequently, they can be 
moved from a local unit to another. More simply still, they 
can be concealed. The latter problem is particularly acute in 
the U.S.A. Prof. Jensen reveals that, 'Intangible property is 
declared for taxation by those who are exclusively honest, by 
(1) Taylor, P.E. : op. cit. p.359 
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time who are temporarily or permanently ignorant, and by those 
ti-t. 
who (like the tradition ef widow and orphan) are unfortunate 
enough to have their property publicly recorded."(1) 
This fact is expressively rendered by the statement of 
the Mississippi Legislative Committee of 1918 that property 
tends "to impose burdens with reference to inability to 
escape, rather than in proportion to ability to pay." 
Clearly, the outcome of evasion is that the taxation of 
intangibles, which form a high percentage of the wealth of the 
high income- receivers, leads to regressiveness. 
Another important source of fiscal inequity stems from 
the assessment of property, whether real or intangible. A 
discrepancy will emerge, in a dynamic economy, between the 
true market value and the assessed value of the property, 
especially if the valuation is undertaken sporadically or is 
sheerly conventional, that is carried out by non -experts. 
In the U.S.A. about 90 per cent of the assessors are 
popularly elected and are often local politicians with no 
qualifications. 
Assessment, as a source of fiscal inequality and inequity, 
can be better studied with reference to a specific country. 
Let us take the U.S.A. where the problem is particularly 
(1) Jensen, Jens P. : "Survey of Colorado State Tax System" 
(Denver Chamber of Commerce) 1930. p.81. 
entangled. 
There are three bases of valuation: capitalisation of 
current income, appraisal of the present value of anticipated 
future income and the market prices at which similar 
properties are the object of transactions. In a static 
economy these three values can be identical. In a dynamic 
economy they diverge. 
From the legal point of view, property in the U.S.A. is 
assessed according to its fair market value. Clearly, 
divergencies make their appearance between the capitalisation 
of current income and the present fair market value or the 
prospective income. This often occurs on the fringe of 
expanding cities. Prof. Groves gives the following example. ( 1) 
A rents a piece of vacant land for $ 15 a year. The 
capitalisation of current income at 5% gives a value of $ 300. 
However, the land may be subject to property tax on the basis 
of a value of $ 20,000 on the ground that the owner could get 
that price now if he sold his property for business or 
residential purposes. 
If over- assessment is considered by some as the main 
source of fiscal inequity,(2) under- assessment is another 
(1) Groves, Harold M. : Financing Government. 
New York, 1945. p.67. 
(2) Shipley, Federic B. : "Is Real Estate Taxed Excessively 
and Inequitably." in Current Problems in Public Finance. 
New York University, 1933. p.73. 
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source not to be neglected. As the true value of property 
cannot be easily reached, it is often safer for the assessor 
to guess a lower value in order to avoid litigation. The 
elected assessor may be trying to gain favour. The taxing 
jurisdiction may be trying to compete with another. 
Competitive under- assessment is an important factor in small 
assessment districts. If the township assessments are the 
basis of county levies, the assessors in the former may resort 
to under- assessment in order to reduce the taxes which his 
constituents will be called to pay to the county or state.(1) 
Owing to the disparity between property ownership and 
ability to pay some attempts have been made to classify the 
various types of property, of varying earning power, and to 
subject each class to an appropriate treatment. The 
differentiation is based on either the application of 
different tax rates or some deliberate under- assessment. 
Now, the main problem about under- assessment, as far as 
fiscal equity is concerned, is the fact that it is not carried 
out uniformly. Some property is assessed at 40 per cent of its 
"fairttvalue, some at 60 per cent, some at 100 per cent. In 
fact, if all property were assessed at full market value, the 
capacities to pay per dollar of assessed value of all property 
(l) Snider, Clyde F. : American State and Local Government. 
New York, 1950. 
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would be equal. (1) 
In connection with assessment, it is noticeable that, in 
the U.S.A., property of a small value is often assessed at a 
higher proportion of its "true" value in comparison with 
properties of great value. The reason is probably that smaller 
property is better known or because the wealthy owners can use 
their influence. (2) The result is, clearly, more regression 
and less fiscal equity. 
This fact has been ascertained in many American states. 
Silverherz gives figures for Maryland :(3) 
Value of Property R u r a l U r b a n 
Number of Average Number of Average 
properties assessment properties assessment 
ratio ratio 
Under 0 1,000 522 92.1 1,195 76.2 
01,000 - 5,000 1,675 76.4 1,897 61.2 
Over $ 5,000 705 56.7 
L 
289 54.5 
(1) Buehler, Alfred G. : Public Finance. New York, 1948. 
p.350. 
Taylor, P.E. : op. cit. p346 & 352. 
(2) Groves, Harold : Financing Government. New York, 1954. 
p.69. 
(3) Silverherz, Joseph D. The Assessment of Real Property 
in the United States. 
Special Report of the State Tax Commission No.10, State 
of New York. 1936. p.69. 
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Although regressiveness of this nature was found mild in 
a few states e.g., Indiana and Iowa, the author concludes, 
"But the majority of the tests coincided in their finding that 
there was a definite and pronounced tendency for the average 
assessment ratio to decline as the value of the property (or 
value per acre, when this was used as the basis of 
»(1) 
classification) increased. 
Rigidity of assessment in the U.S.A. is a source of 
further inequality. Oftentimes, the assessment is either 
copied from the previous year without any change or uniform 
percentages of increase or decrease are adopted with no 
regard to inter -personal or inter -group value fluctuations. 
To sum up, assessment in the U.S.A. leads to various 
types of inequalities . (2 ) 
1. Inequalities Among Individual Properties: In fact the 
differences in the treatment of individual properties, is the 
essence of the problem. The average degree of this kind of 
inequality is measured by the coefficient of dispersion. The 
following table shows how pronounced the inequality is in the 
case of Florida anong other states. 
(1) Silverherz. op. cit. p.213 









Pennsylvania 35.53 32.2 
Virginia 44.43 44.26 
Florida 69.60 58.92 
Texas 48 49 
Oregon 50.26 48.00 
2. Inequalities Among Group verages: This arises amongst 
average assessment ratios of various types of properties,( -) 
for instance rural and urban, resident and non -resident owned 
property, land and improvement, inter- district or inter -class. 
State Year Rural Urban 
New York 1915 -25 49.1 63.6 
Pennsylvania 1923 -25 49.8 40.3 
Maryland 1927 -32 91.5 66.8 
Arkansas 1921 -25 35.0 56.0 
(1) Silverherz defines "assessment ratio" as a percentage 
figure which represents the relationship between the 
value of a property and its assessed valuation. If the 
property is worth 10,uuu and assessment is 7,000 the 
assessment ratio equals 70 per cent. 
The "average assessment ratio" is an average of the 
assessment ratios of a number of properties. 
op. cit. p.16 -17. 
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3. InterArea Inequalities: The following table discloses 
the inequalities between local units.(1) 















Massachusetts 8 towns 12 - - 
New Jersey 16 
counties 
16 - - 
Maryland 6 " 9 6 counties 7 
Florida 10 " 51 10 " 43 
Washington 39 " 21 39 " 17 
Missouri 39 " 16 39 it 13 
Texas 8 " 29 7 " 12 
It is noticeable that Florida exhibits glaring inter -area 
inequalities. Important inequalities are also found in the 
case of Washington and Texas. 
(1) Silverherz, J.D. : op.cit. p.212 
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2. Degree of Regression of the American Residential Property Tax: 
The American tax is no more a "General Property Tax ". It 
is more confined to real property. Intangibles are less and 
less taxed. The same occurs with personal property, tangible 
or intangible. This is a most fortunate tendency as it helps 
to mitigate the glaring effects of a tat on the capital value 
of property as a whole. 
It is noticeable that residential property now accounts 
fora high percentage of the American property tax.4 In 
Wisconsin, one of the few states having accurate statistical 
evidence, the assessed value of residential property amounted 
to 45.1 per cent of the assessed value of all local property. 
In the majority of states, the tax rates have been 
increasing since World War I (with the exception of the Great 
Depression period) . 
Jesse V. Burkhead computed the regressiveness of the 
Mterican residential property taxe) He chose samples of 
families living in owned and rented houses in six areas : 
(11 Especi4ly after so many ex Mptions have been provided for 
homspéad and private prop ty, for cparitable 
ed4eational or4 eligioug` purposes. 
(1) Burkhead, Jesse V. "Property Tax as a Burden on Shelter" 
Article published in: The Journal of Land and Public 
Utility Economics (University of Wisconsin) August, 1944 
p.255. 
See also: 
Morton, Walter A. : "General Property Taxes Found Very 
Regressive." in The Municipality (Wisconsin League of 
Municipalities) February, 1940. 
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Chicago, Illinois 
Providence, Rhode Island 
Columbus, Ohio 
Omaha, Nebraska and Council Bluffs, Iowa 
Three middle -sized cities in the East Central Area 
Five small cities in the East Central Area. 
Burkhead relates the tax burden to family- income classes 
(and not individual income) . The tax is assumed to be fully 
borne by the occupants (i.e. the owners or renters, in the 
latter case the tax being fully shifted by the landlord to the 
tenant) . 
The first table below clearly shows how regressive the 
tax is on the low income- receivers. 
The second table is more expressive in that it compares 
the regression of the property tax on residence with the 
regression of the sales tax, and also in that it expresses 
the regression by indexes. 
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(1) 
Burden of Property Taxes on Residences by Income Classes 1935 -36 
















Owned Rented Owned Rented Owned ±tented owned Rented owned Rented Owned Rented 
9 _ _ - - - - - - 12.05 6.01 11.83 5.11 
9 11.23 5.89 - 4.94 5.75 3.30 3.85 4.44 6.65 4.25 5.91 3.95 
9 4.92 4.99 5.19 4.42 4.79 2.77 5.16 3.78 5.85 3.66 5.06 3.28 
249 6.85 4.21 4.84 4.05 3.44 2.42 4.26 3.52 5.15 3.51 4.69 3.04 
499 4.92 4.22 5.66 3.52 3.14 2.17 3.59 3.06 4.57 3.06 3.60 2.66 

























499 3.77 3.51 4.35 3.02 2.27 1.85 3.04 2.91 2.94 2.94 2.66 2.26 
1999 3.82 3.46 3.73 3.10 2.09 1.61 3.01 2.50 3.41 2.90 2.70 2.33 
(b) (b) 
Ì499 2.69 3.12 4.23 3.00 2.12 1.56 2.92 2.71 3.31 2.56 2.39 1,75 
f999 3.02 3.13 3.28 2.80 2.22 1.45 2.59 2.19 3.08 2.69 - - 
1999 2.45 2.82 4.81 2.79 1.98 1.50 2.63 2.55 2.78 2.23 - - 















1.1 - - - - 
1.Over 2,12 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Ñotes: (a) 'Mite families. (b) Income Class O 3,000 and over. 
(c) Income Class $ 5,000 and over. 
(d) Income Class It 7,000 and over. 
(1) Burkhead1 Jesse : op. cit. p.257. 
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Regression of the Property Tax (on Residences) and Sales Tax 
1935 -1936. (1) 
Three ì ,fiddle -Sized :Nast Central Cities 
(all taxes assumed to fall on the occupant) 
`Index of Regressivity 
Owned. Homes Rented. Homes Average per cent of income = 100 
Taxes Per cent Taxes Per cent Taxes on Taxes on Sales Tax 
Paid. of Paid of Owned Rented. 
Income Income Houses Houses 








50 -1499 1,364 
0 -1749 1,608 
50 -1999 1,870 
0-2249 2,120 





0 & over 6,732 
52.40 12.05 26.16 6.01 265 189 160 
44.50 6.65 28.41 4.25 146 134 126 
52.40 5.85 32.73 3.66 129 115 122 
58.40 5.15 39.78 3.51 113 110 112 
62.40 4.57 41.70 3.06 101 96 109 
67.60 4.20 47.68 2.97 93 93 104 
65.20 3.49 55.49 2.97 77 93 97 
73.20 3.45 62.15 2.93 76 92 97 
69.80 2.94 69.74 2.94 65 92 92 
93.30 3.41 79.51 2.90 75 91 86 
106.60 3.31 82.26 2.56 73 81 82 
11 4 .00 3.08 99,47 2.69 68 85 80 
122.80 2.78 98.42 2.23 61 70 73 
180.10 2.68 123.46 1.83 59 58 57 
Notes: (a) includes non -money incomes from owned houses. 
(1) Burkhead, Jesse : op. cit. p.259 
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3. Ability, Progression and Local Property Taxation on Capital 
Value: 
The principle of progression cannot be generally resorted 
to in property taxation, especially when the latter is based 
on capital value. 
In the U.S.A., where exist/the prototype of the latter 
of property taxes, the rates are mostly proportional and 
are uniform within the same local unit. 
It is not possible to speak of "the" American property 
tax because there are almost as many property taxes as there 
are states. The main thing is that they are levied at rates 
which are uniform for the same property within the same area. 
The different minor jurisdictions may tax at different rates.-) 
The proportional structure may be affected by valuation, 
exemptions or classifications of property. However, the tax 
rates assume the form of percentages. 
There have been attempts in Oklahoma and the Great Plains 
to impose a graduated land tax. The purpose was generally to 
break up big estates. However, other measures could be adopted 
to attain this objective. 
(1) Buehler, Alfred G. : 
Public Finance. New York, 1948. p.340. 
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SECTION II. 
Local Personal Income Taxation. 
Introduction 
Fiscal equity, in the framework of central -local 
relations, can be adversely affected by the subjection of 
personal income to taxation, on the local level. Whether in 
unitary or federal countries local income taxes have been in 
use, or are still applied, by junior authorities. 
The local income tax the main source of revenue 
the communes in Holland before 1930. They are also resorted 
to in Scandinavian countries and Finland. In Norway, in 1937, 
local income taxes amounted to 78 per cent of all taxation in 
the towns and 82 per cent in the rural districts. 
In England, some writers advocate the application of local 
or regional income taxation in order to avoid the anomalies of 
the rates and to meet the increasing requirements of the local 
bodies. ( 1) 
As for the federal countries, the local income tax 
(1) Cole G.D.H. : 
Local and Regional Government. London, 1947. p.225 
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assumed, or still plays, an important role. In Gerrflmny, before 
1919 it was a substantial local source of revenue especially in 
wealthy and densely populated states such as Saxony and also in 
many municipalities where it sometimes formed 90 per cent of 
their tax revenue. (1) 
At present time, the income and corporation taxes form 
the principal source of revenue of the Lander. The latter 
share, with the Federal Government, 62% of these taxes (60% in 
the estimates for the budget of 1954 -55) . 
In the Union of South Africa, the provino es made an 
extensive use of local income taxes from 1922 to 1925. 
(2) 
Similarly, the Swiss cantons, enjoying great autonomy, 
resort to local income taxes. 
In Canada, while only three provinces levied income taxes 
in 1930 (Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, British Columbia), by 
1939 seven provinces were levying them.(3) 
Owing to constitutional obstacles, in the U.S.A., the 
state personal income tax was not known before 1911. Moreover, 
there was no pressing need for it. State income taxation, 
(1) Newcomer, Mabel : Central and Local Finance in Germany 
and England. New York, 1937. pp.28 -30. 
(2) Adarkar, B.P. : The Principles and Problems of Federal 
Finance. London, 1937. p.163. 
(3) Perry, Harvey : Taxation in Canada. Toronto, 1951. p.26 
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however, gained ground. Two waves are discernible, namely 
during 1911 -1921 and after 1928. The American municipalities 
were also induced to adopt the same mode of taxation owing to 
the expansion of services and increase in costs. 
Philadelphia was pioneer in 1940.(1) 
The fiscal inequities and inequalities, involved in local 
income taxation, assume increasing proportions when the junior 
non -taxing jurisdictions adopt income taxes or when the income - 
axing jurisdictions, presseo_ by expanding expenditures, widen 
the scope of their taxes, or apply a graduated scale instead 
of proportional taxation or intensify the scale of local 
graduation. 
The latter tendencies may be exemplified by the U.S.A. 
About ten years ago the maximum rate in the states was 5 per 
cent. At present, more than half of the states have maxima 
above 5 per cent. In North Dakota, the rate may now reach 15 
per cent on income above $ 15,000. Furthermore, progression is 
more and more extended to higher income brackets. It often 
reaches the $ 10,000 level and in one state reaches even the 
0250,000 level. ( 2 ) 
(1) See next Chapter on "Overlapping and Multiplicity", 
Section I and Section III. 
(2) Blakey Roy G. and Johnson, Violet : State Income Taxes. 
New Yortk, 1942. p.33. 
State personal income taxation yielded 233 millions in 
1941, 418 m. in 1947 and 499 m. in 1948. See: 
Kimmel, Lewis H. : Taxes and Economic Incentives. 
The Brookings Institution. Washington, 1950. 
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I. Intra -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
The fiscal inequities, generated within the same local 
unit, may be due to the imposition of regressive or repressive 
taxation or to some unfair local definition of income. The 
taxation of gross income or the absence of personal and family 
allowances in certain cases militate against fiscal equity as 
one should not pay tax on income whose marginal utility is 
infinite. ( 1) The exemption from taxation of certain flows of 
income may also conduce to inequities between local residents 
such as the exclusion of the instrumentalities of the central 
government especially in federal countries (e.g. U.S.A. before 
the Public Salary Act of 1939) . 
Two major sources of inequities may be outlined here. 
They are connected with interjurisdictional incomes and the 
partition of ability to pay. 
,Interjurisdictional Incomes, or Residence Versus Situs: 
The junior taxing jurisdiction may adopt one of three 
courses in the taxation of income. It may adopt the basis of 
situa, or origin of income, according to which it taxes all 
Persons, whether residents or non -residents, on income deriving 
within the local unit. The minor authority may prefer the 
basis of residence according to which all persons, residing 
(1) In the U.S.A. the state of Tennessee as well as the 
municipalities do not provide for allowances. See: 
Snider, Clyde F. : American State and Local Government, 
1950. p.567 
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within the local area, will be taxed on all individual income 
from whatever source. The underlying authority may also 
combine both bases and tax residents on all individual income 
and also the income originating locally and accruing to non- 
residents . 
The co- application, on the local level, of the 
principles of residence and situs is conducive to fiscal 
inequities either intra -local or inter -loéa. We are concerned 
here with the former which may be exemplified in various ways. 
If the locality proceeds to taxation according to origin 
or situs, the local residents owning domestic income will be 
subject to taxation while their neighbours, living within the 
same local unit, owning property in another non -taxing locality, 
escape local taxation altogether. The same result obtains if 
the other localities tax according to residence instead of 
situs. Discrimination is thus noticeable.(1) 
On the other hand, in the case of a residence -taxing 
locality, inter -personal fiscal inequity, in its intra -local 
aspect, may manifest itself if some local residents derive all 
their income within their taxing jurisdiction while their co- 
residents derive part of their income inside and part outside 
the locality, the outside taxing locality or localities 
applying the basis of situs. The co- resident income-receiver 
(1) In the U.S.A., instances of non- personal -income taxing 
states are Florida, New Jersey, Ohio. 
See Kimmel, Lewis H. : op.cit. 
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(in the residence- taxing locality) is thus victim of a heavier 
fiscal burden due to multiple taxation. 
If the junior authority taxes its residents on all 
income but not the non -residents on income originating within 
its boundaries, the non -residents escape taxation if their 
locality of residence is a non -taxing one. There is intra- 
local discrimination in the residence- taxing -locality, in the 
sense that some local income is subject to taxation because the 
income -receiver is living there while some other local income 
of the same nature, originating within the same boundaries, is 
not subject to taxation owing to the fact that the income - 
earner is residing elsewhere. 
The local authority may tax residents and, in addition, 
the non -residents on income originating internally. In this 
case, inter -personal disparities in taxation appear, within 
the same local unit, between non- residents. Indeed, non- 
resident IA' may have to pay another tax to his locality of 
residence; while non -resident 'Bt, whose locality of residence 
is a non -taxing jurisdiction, will go scot -free. 
2. Partition of Ability to Pay: 
It wqs already pointed out that the principle of 
Progression can only be sound if applying to total individual 
(net) income of whatever type and from whichever area. 
Consequently, the taxation of personal income, on the local 
level, can adversely affect sound progressiveness on account 
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of the dismemberment of income either by type or by region.(1) 
1. Income Partition by Region: 
The basis of local income taxation, compatible with the 
principle of progression, is that of residence, not situs. 
Residence brings all income, accruing to the same individual, 
Pef 
under the fiscal action ofi one and the same junior authority. 
However, many underlying authorities, especially the 
debtor ones, may not find the basis of residence suitable to 
them either for technical or for economic and financial 
considerations. In fact, localizing income is not always easy 
as in the case of dividends and certain wages and salaries 
paid to "commuters" (e.g. transport undertakings). Clearly, 
the debtor areas stand to lose by adopting residence. 
Furthermore, if there are large inter -area tax differentials, 
or taxing localities co- existing with non -taxing localities, 
the local wealthy residents may tend to out -migrate to lowly 
taxed or to tax-free, areas. 
Therefore, the basis of situs will be preferred by certain 
minor taxing jurisdictions. However, situs involves the 
geographical dismemberment of personal income and consequently 
militates against, or defeats, the application of a graduated 
scale on the local level. 
(1) The writer does not favour the application of progression 
on the local level and prefers proportionality. However, 
in some cases, mild progression could be adopted, e.g. 
more or less agricultural countries (with little inter - 
jurisdictional income) and wide areas, provided the 
basis of residence is resorted to. 
See, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Co- ordination." 
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2. Income Partition by Type: 
The local taxation of certain flows of income, to the 
exclusion of others, or the imposition of schedular taxes 
independent from one another, are two cases conducive to the 
divisibility of ability to pay. This may be exemplified by 
the introduction, on the local level, of an exclusive or 
partial tax on wages and salaries, either originating within 
the locality wherever is the recipient or accruing to the local 
residents from whatever source. 
The partition of income by type hampers the principle of 
progression, adopted by some territories, progression being 
inapplicable to separate partial flows of income. The 
beneficial distinction between earned and unearned income may 
be also obscured. Furthermore, the type -dismemberment of 
income is conducive to multiplicity of allowances either to 
residents or non -residents. 
Concerning the du.olication of allowances to residents, it 
is to be noticed that allowances can only be soundly granted 
on the basis of total individual income and not on slices of 
income. 
As for the case of non -residents, it is a moot question 
whether they should enjoy allowances. If the non -residents 
are accorded the same allowances as residents, the former may 
enjoy more allowances than residents deriving all their income 
within the local boundaries. On the other hand, if the non- 
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residents are not granted allowances they may be discriminated 
against. 
Various solutions may be applied. Partial allowances 
could be granted to non -residents. Some states in the U.S.A. 
vary the allowances according to the proportion of the non- 
resident taxpayer's gross income earned in the state. Net 
income could, however, be taken instead of gross income. 
Moreover, non -residents could be granted allowances in 
proportion to the number of years passed within the local area. 
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H. Inter -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
Inter -local fiscal inequities and inequalities may be due 
to two main factors; the problem of interjurisdictional income 
and the tax differentials due to the inter -local disparities 
in the fiscal burden. 
The former factor has been already referred to in 
connection with intra -local fiscal inequity. The analysis 
can be construed in its inter -local aspect. Moreover, the 
unfair tax treatment, due to overlapping and multiple 
taxation, is discussed more fully in the next chapter.-) 
Vie may thus concentrate here on the second factor. 
The inter -local tax differentials mny be due to 
differences in the definition of taxable income, differences 
in the provision of allowances and disparities in the tax 
structure or tax rates of the diverse junior taxing 
jurisdictions. Clearly, the co- existence of taxing and non - 
taxing localities is to be added. 
The outcome of fiscal discrepancies between the various 
areas is that the income -receivers, residing in these areas 
find themselves treated in dissimilar ways. This involves a 
violation of the central tenet of fiscal equity which consists 
in the equal treatment of persons dissimilar in no relevant 
respect. 
(1) See "Overlapping and Multiplicity ", Section III, "Local 
Personal Income Taxation." 
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It is noteworthy that the inter -area fiscal inequalities, 
due to the causes outlined above, assume more substantial 
proportions in a federal polity than in a unitary country. 
The U.S.A. may be referred to for illustration. 
J., Disparities in The Concept of Taxable Income: 
The personal ability to pay may not be conceived 
identically in all the localities of a given country. Some 
disparities are conducive to inter -personal and inter -area 
fiscal inequalities. We may analyse some significant items of 
income. 
Dividends may not be treated in all subordinate units in 
the same way. They may be subject to taxation at ordinary 
rates or at additional rates or be dropped altogether. The 
varying local practices with respect to dividends especially 
lead to inequalities if the dividends constitute a large 
proportion of taxable income and if the regional income tax 
is graduated. In the later case, it is clear that the 
inclusion or exclusion of share profits affects the position 
of the taxpayer in the scale of regional graduation. 
Residence in connection with dividends and interest is 
also a source of trouble. Non -residents receiving such sums 
from a local business may be dissimilarly treated by the 
various localities in the country; some may tax them and some 
may not. 
It is helpful to refer to the U.S.A. for concrete 
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illustrations of inter -area disparities. 
The American states pursue different policies in the 
taxation of dividends. Some keep them aside by exclusion, 
deduction or the credit system. Some subject them to ordinary 
taxation and some to a surtax. Fight states exclude the 
dividends to the extent that they are paid out of corporate 
income which they already tax. Iowa, South Dakota and 
Missouri allow a credit equal to the corporation tax on 
dividends. In seventeen states, dividends are subject to the 
full local income tax. Oregon and Colorado impose surtax 
besides the ordinary tax. 
Non -residents getting dividends or interest from local 
corporations are sometimes taxed and sometimes not.(1) 
The problem of inter -area differences in dividend 
taxation is especially important in the U.S.A. as the state 
income taxes are often progressive and dividends form 5.23 
per cent of incomes below $ 5000 (reported to the Federal 
Government on 1937 income), 12.95 per cent of incomes between 
$ 5000 and $ 10,000 and 68.36 per cent of incomes from 
$ 500,000 to 
í$ 1,000,000.(2) 
As for securities, there is also much scope for 
heterogeneity in their local fiscal treatment. It is noticeable 
(1) Blakey and Johnson : op. cit. p.8 
(2) Bureau of Internal Revenue, Statistics of Income. 
1937. Part I. 
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that there are four orders of securities liable to variations, 
the "central securities" issued by the national government, 
the "local securities" issued by the local governments, the 
"sub -local securities" issued by the hierarchical subdivisions 
of the same locality or those of the other localities in the 
same country, and the co -local securities" issued by the other 
local units within the same country. 
The interest on all these securities may be exempt or 
taxed with subsequent effects on personal fiscal burden and 
inter -local tax differentials. 
Reference to the U.S.A. again can be fruitful. If all 
states, at the present time, exempt interest on obligations of 
the Federal Government and of other co- states and their 
hierarchical subdivisions, heterogeneity prevails in the case 
of interest on home (state) securities. There are also 
variations in connection with local securities. Some states 
tax their own securities; whilst others do not. The interest 
on securities of the political subdivisions of the taxing 
state are also either included in personal income or not taxed 
at all. 
2. Disparities in Personal and Family Allowances: 
Inter -area and inter -personal fiscal inequity can stem 
from disparities between the lower taxing units in the 
Provision for personal and family charges. The differentials 
in tax liability depend on the amount of such allowances (or 
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absence of any allowance), and the relative changes in the 
position occupied by the local taxpayers in the regional scales 
of graduation. 
The methods of allowing for personal charges may not be 
uniform all over the localities. Some units may adopt the form 
of deductions, some others may resort to a system of "tax 
credits" against tax of a certain amount.(1) The income tax 
liability varies in these two cases if the regional income tax 
is progressive. The application of the tax credit system 
results in a somewhat larger liability for a net income of a 
given size than in the ordinary way of granting the allowances. 
In the former case the tax rates are applied before the tax 
credits are granted, while in the latter case the rates are 
applied after stated allowances have been deducted from net 
income. 
It is worthy of note that the problem of residence and 
non -residence is a source of confusion and disagreement between 
local bodies. 
All states in U.S.A. grant exemptions (or allowances) 
except Tennessee. There are variations in the extent and 
devices of these allowances with subsequent inter- personal and 
inter -state inequalities. 
(1) These tax credits are not to be confused with the tax 
credits connected with central -local and inter -local 
fiscal relations, referred to in due course. 
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Until before World War II, most of the states provided 
for exemptions either equal to or lower than the federal level 
of $ 1000 for a single and $ 2,500 for married persons. 
After the War, there prevailed relatively more differences. 
The exemptions now range from $ 200 in New Hampshire to $ 850 in 
Oklahoma. Some states grant $ 1,500.(1) 
The allowances affect two main forms; deductions or tax 
credits. The latter method is used in five states: Arizona, 
Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota and ':yisconsin. 
Some states distinguish between residents and non -residents. 
Georgia grants an exemption of $ 1000 for single residents and 
$ 2,500 for married residents plus $ 400 for each dependent. 
However the non -resident in that state, gets only $ 1000 
whether he is married or not, with children or not.(2) 
3. Disparities in The Local Tax Structure: 
Various aspects of inter -area dissimilarities can be 
noticed in this field. The subsequent inequalities clearly 
stem from the fact that similarly situated persons are 
dissimilarly treated just because they happen to reside in one 
regional area rather than another. 
The tax rates and the steepness of the graduation may be 
(1) Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. 
78th Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document No.69. 
Washington, 1943. p.423. 
(2) Blakey and Johnson : op.cit. p.78. 
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different from locality to locality. The form of the 
graduation may not be the same as there are so many devices of 
progression notably graduation by total income and graduation 
by brackets. i, distinction may or may not be drawn between 
earned and unearned income in the computation of the local tax. 
If we turn to the U.S.A. for illuminating examples, we 
encounter inter -state differences in tax structures involving 
fiscal inequalities between persons residing in different 
states. 
The tax rates range from 1 per cent to 6 or '7 per cent. 
Ina few cases they are even higher reaching 15 per cent on 
taxable incomes of ,$ 15,000 in North Dakota and incomes of 
0250,000 in California. 
The progression is fairly steep. In about half the states 
it terminates however at $ 10,000 although in other cases it 
may continue further. 
Unearned income is either subject to high rates or receive 
favourable treatment. Massachusetts, Maryland, Vermont tax 
intangibles at a higher rate. Many states reserve favourable 
treatment to dividends, interest on government securities and 
capital gains. Conversely, some states discriminate against 
unearned income such as Colorado and Oregon by levying a 
surtax on income from intangibles. 
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III. Central -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
The combined burden of central -local taxes may militate 
against the sound progression of the total fiscal burden and 
may also result in a repressive and unfair final load. 
These breaches to fiscal equity and the subsequent 
propensity to avoid the taxes can be coped with thanks to two 
devices, namely; tax crediting and deductibility. (1) Their 
implications may be reviewed. 
1. Tax Crediting. 
This process consists in reducing the tax due to the 
central government by an amount equal to all or part of the 
tax payable to the underlying tiers of government.(2) 
The tax credits can thus be comprehensive or partial. 
Although tax crediting is akin to tax sharing in its 
objectives, yet it is different in concept as each taxing 
authority retains its jurisdiction to tax independeñtly. 
(1) See also Part Three, Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Co- ordination. 
(2) "The tax- credit device allows a taxpayer to meet part 
of his tax liability to the National Government by 
receipts for a similar tax paid a constituent State. 
It is simply a tax 'umbrella' put up by the central 
government, which 'encourages' every State to adopt 
that specific tax." : 
Johnson, Byron L. 
The Principle of Equalization Applied to the Allocation 
of Grants -In -Aid. 
Federal Security Agency - Social Security Administration. 
Bureau Memorandum, No.66. Washington, 1947. p.25. 
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1. Effects on Fiscal Equity: 
The provision of tax credits, in central -local fiscal 
relations, results in mitigating the combined burden of 
central plus local taxation which may be heavy or crushing 
particularly within a federal polity in the new post -war 
conditions. 
If the tax credit is comprehensive of the whole local 
levy, it clearly sets the central tax as a maximum,(1) 
From the viewpoint of progressive taxation, central -local 
tax- crediting has an advantage over local autonomous taxation 
and over the local supplementation of central taxes in that it 
(i.e. tax crediting) does not damage the graduation of the 
national tax system as a whole, that is, central plus local. 
Over -all progression is safeguarded if already existing. 
The same result occurs if the crediting is partial and 
affects the form of high percentages of the local taxes for the 
low- income groups and low percentages of the local taxes for 
the high- income groups. However, if the scale of percentages 
is reversed, or if the credits affect the form of a fixed 
amount, total progressiveness may be affected especially if 
central graduation is mild. 
As for the local tax systems, they may still (after 
crediting) exhibit, in their relations inter se and apart from 
(1) Groves, Harold : The Scope of State Income Taxation Under 
Present Conditions. National Tax Association, 
Proceedings, 1935. 
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central taxation, some tax differentials if they impose 
varying burdens of taxation or if the credits are partial and 
provide for low percentage reductions on the low income 
brackets and high percentage reductions on the high income 
brackets since the low- income receivers prevail in the under - 
endowed areas and the high- income receivers in the wealthy 
areas. 
From the point of view of inter -local fiscal inequalities, 
tax crediting may exert a remedial effect in so far as it 
induces the non -taxing units to resort to income taxation. 
However, it must not be overlooked that the more the junior 
taxing jurisdictions the more the overlapping and confusion. 
If the tax credits are partial and bear high percentages 
for the low -income earners and low percentages for the high - 
income earners, as will be soon recommended, a beneficial inter - 
area redistribution of the tax burden will ensue since the 
under- endowed areas have a relatively smaller number of wealthy 
residents. 
2. Effects on Revenue: 
The recourse to tax credits comprehensive of the whole 
local tax may cause prejudice to the central treasury as this 
is tantamount to relinquishing part of the proceeds to the 
junior authorities. The detrimental financial impact from the 
central standpoint is the greater the heavier the local levies 
and/or the lighter the central taxes. However, in so far as 
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the taxpayers are protected from fiscal overburden or near - 
confiscation, resulting from central plus local taxation, the 
ultimate financial benefits may prove worthwhile. 
The writer advocates, as an alternative to comprehensive 
tax crediting, the resort to partial credits bearing high 
percentages on the lower income brackets and low percentages 
on the high income brackets. This device serves the interests 
of the national treasury and falls in line with the current 
centripetal tendencies referred to above. In fact, a kind of 
separation of tax sources "by brackets" takes place whereby the 
high income brackets, potentially more productive, are reserved 
for the central government. 
From the local point of view, the proposed modified tax 
credit system militates in favour of the under- privileged 
areas which contain proportionately more low -income earners 
than the well -off areas. 
It is noteworthy that the granting of tax credits in form 
of flat percentages will not be very advantageous to the 
subordinate government units if their income taxes carry very 
low scales of graduation while the central income tax carries 
sharply graduated rates on the higher brackets. Consequently, 
the junior taxing authorities might be induced in this case to 
adopt steeply progressive taxes, a tendency to be strongly 
deprecated by reason of its detrimental character to the 
rational progressiveness of the national tax system as a whole. 
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Overview: 
In the writer's opinion, it is necessary, when applying 
tax crediting in central -local relations (or in inter -local 
relations(1)) to make use of an all -localities uniform device. 
The opposite practice may usher in inter -local fiscal 
inequalities. 
In connection with the latter point, central -local tax 
crediting could be utilized by the central authorities as a 
bargaining power to foster inter -area uniformity in tax 
provisions so beneficial from the fiscal equity standpoint. 
The device could be introduced on this condition. 
2. Tax Deductibility. 
The joint central -local fiscal load can be mitigated by 
means of another device, namely tax deductibility. This 
consists in subtracting, from the tax base, the tax imposed by 
the other authority. By alleviating the total burden of two 
similar levies, deductibility avoids confiscation which cannot 
occur so long as no one tax alone is confiscatory (i.e. exceeds 
100 per cent), whether the rates are effective rates or apply 
only to higher brackets. 
Deductibility is thus a mild form of tax crediting. 
Deductibility may be unilateral or reciprocal. In the 
former case it can be conceded by the central jurisdiction 
(1) See Chapter II, Section III. 
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alone or by the local unit alone. 
It is also to be mentioned that deductibility may be 
partial (limited) or total; one tax being partially or totally 
deducted from the base of the other tax. 
The most usual applicable forms are either mutual 
deductibility or the deductibility of the local tax by the 
central authorities. 
1. Deductibility and Taxpayers' Differentials: 
The device under discussion does not only contribute to 
mitigation of repressive central -local tax load but it also 
reduces the inter -area tax differentials generally and 
notably the aiiierentials between taxing and non taxing 
localities. 
It is worthy of note that mutual deductibility leads to a 
situation very near the case where the subordinate units of 
government have no tax. 
Reciprocal deductibility, however, reduces the effective 
local rate on the higher income groups more than on the lower 
ones. The device is in fact most effective throughout the 
scale when one tax burden is heavy and the other is light. 
It may be stated that when the central tax rates are high, 
in the case of reciprocal deductibility, the combined central - 
local effective tax rate will not very much exceed the position 
where central taxation does not give heed to local t axes. 
If the size of the differential is expressed in the form 
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of an e ffective percentage rate on income, it is found that, 
under reciprocal deductibility, it is smaller than under 
unilateral deductibility. The differentials also vary in 
inverse proportion with the central tax rates. :'Then the latter 
increase, the size of the differential becomes smaller 
especially from the point where the local tax progression 
ceases. 
Clearly, the effective rate of the differentials 
decreases in absolute magnitude if the rate of decline of the 
differential is greater than the rate of increase of (net) 
income. 
2. Deductibility and Progression: 
Unlike tax crediting, the system of deductibility affects 
the scale of graduation of the local taxes, the central taxes 
and the national tax system as a whole, that is, central plus 
local. Indeed the tax basis itself is reduced by varying 
amounts. The effects depend on the form and extent of the 
deductions. 
In the case of unilateral deductibility, by the junior 
authorities, of the central (progressive) tax, the progression 
of the local tax, when graduation is locally applied, will be 
adversely affected and may turn regressive. 
In unilateral deductibility, by the central taxing 
jurisdiction, of the taxes imposed by the underlying taxing 
jurisdictions, some milder form of central tax progressiveness 
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may ensue especially when central graduation is not strong. 
Reciprocal deductibility, mitigates the scale of 
graduation of the national tax system as a whole, that is, 
central plus local. 
3. Computation: 
In the opinion of the writer, the deductions must be 
based on the same year's income and not on that of the previous 
year (as in the U.S.A.) The latter case may lead, under 
certain assumptions, to considerable personal fiscal inequity 
and to accentuation of inter -personal fiscal inequity i.e. 
inequity between two individuals in identical financial 
positions residing in the same locality. 
Suppose A and B have the same taxable income in a given 
year. A's income was subject to a great change relatively to 
the previous year while that of B remained the same or did not 
change much. A's income in the previous year may have been so 
small as to be exempt or A may have been residing in a non - 
taxing locality and then moved to a taxing locality or he may 
have incurred a loss. On the following year, A will not enjoy 
any deduction, while B, who earns on that year the same income, 
gets the benefit of deductibility. 
The outcome may be, not only more inter -personal fiscal 
inequity, but possibly a confiscatory burden on A who will bear 
both local and central income taxes added together. In post - 
war conditions of heavy central taxation, required by economic 
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control or cold -war, the burden on A is likely to be 
confiscatory. 
4. Economic Effects: 
The adoption of the device of deductibility constitutes an 
inducement to non -income taxing localities to tax income. 
This will have a favourable impact on the inter -local 
distribution of resources as the bidding for taxable resources 
will then affect the form, not of taxation versus exemption, 
but of deductibility versus non -deductibility. The former 
situation is a stronger contributory factor in inter -area 
discrepancies in per capita wealth and income and hence in 
fiscal burden. 
Furthermore, the procedure of deductibility, by curbing 
tax avoidance, reduces the baneful efflux of taxable resources. 
5. Effects on Revenue: 
Local revenue, of an income- taxing locality, will be 
adversely affected through the application of reciprocal 
deductibility and deductibility of the central tax. 
As for central revenue, it is liable to be affected under 
reciprocal deductibility and that of the deductibility of the 
local tax. 
Moreover, as the central government will collect less 
revenue on the same income in an income taxing locality than in 
anon- income taxing locality, the generalisation of 
deductibility, by inducing the non -taxing localities to resort 
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to income taxes, causes prejudice to the central treasury. 
On the other hand, as reciprocal deductibility reduces 
the effective local rate on the higher income brackets more 
than on the lower brackets, this is tantamount to some type of 
beneficial separation of revenue sources "by brackets" whereby 
the central government is left, for the purposes of revenue 
exploitation, with the higher income groups potentially more 
productive and the subordinate authorities are left with the 
lower groups. 
6. Limitations to Deductibility: 
Despite its merits, the device under discussion is not as 
far- reaching as tax crediting. Furthermore, deductibility 
exerts no remedial effects on the diversity of the local taxes 
unless it is deliberately wielded as a tool for this end. 
It may even be mentioned that deductibility has the 
disadvantage of promoting income taxation on the local level 
and hence gives rise to fiscal inequities and conflicts. 
There is little doubt, however, th'at the device of 
deductibility, as used in central -local relations, is a shield 
against confiscatory taxation through joint central -local 
fiscal pressure which may occur under contemporary economic 
conditions. 
The writer advocates the resort to either reciprocal 
deductibility or the unilateral deduction, by the central 
authorities, of the taxes on the local level. 
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Moreover, these devices could be used as instruments to 
achieve or foster central -local uniformity in taxation. They 
can be made conditional on fulfillment of certain desiderata. 
7. Deductibility and Experience: 
The method is applicable and applied when there are 
multiplex and conflicting taxing jurisdictions, notably within 
a federal structure. 
In the U.S.A. 33 states impose corporate net income taxes; 
22 states grant unlimited federal tax deductibility, 2 limit 
the deduction and 9 deny it completely. ( 1) 
While New York and California do not allow deductibility, 
Asconsin limits it to 10% of net corporate income and 
Massachusetts does not extend it intangibles. 
It is noticeable that Oregon and Vermont allow deduction to 
individuals but not corporations and that ;Iisconsin confines it 
to 3 per cent of non -corporate net income. 
In Canada, the Dominion income tax did not allow 
deductibility of provincial taxes. 
As for the provinces, only three allowed the deduction of 
the Dominion income tax. The inter -provincial tax differentials 
were therefore glaring . ( 2 ) 
(1) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations ". 
op.cit. p.438. 
(2) See the table below. 
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It must be added that the high tax rates of the Dominion 
income tax after Torld Velar II would have confiscated nearly or 
completely the income above certain brackets if the Dominion - 
provincial agreements had not been reached. 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government allowed, before 
the War, the deduction of state tax. As for the states, New 
(1) 
South Wales and Victoria did not allow it. 
There were substantial tax differentials between residents 
in the various federating states. 
During the war, as already pointed out, the state taxes 
were transferred to the Commonwealth level, against 
compensation. 
(1) Barkmeier, Joseph H. : "Income and Excess Profits Taxes 
in Australia." N.S. Dept of Commerce, International 
Reference Service. vol.1, No.41. July, 1941. p.5. 
1. 
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U. S. A. 
Percentages of Taxable Income Taken by Hypothetical 
Federal and State Income Taxes Under Various Assumptions. 



















(2) State tax 68.0 15.0 83.0 36.0 10.0 46.0 
deductible in 
calculating 
Federal tax but 
not vice versa. 
(3) Federal tax 80.0 3.0 83.0 40.0 6.0 46.0 
deductible in 
calculating 
state tax but 
not vice versa. 




(5) States have no 80.0 - 80.0 40.0 - 40.0 
tax. 
(6) State tax credited 65.0 15.0 80.0 30.0 10.0 40.0 
on Federal tax. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































U. S. A. 
2. Federal and State Income Tax Liability as a Percent 
of Net Income at 1941 rates. ( y' ) 
Under Different Assumptions of Deductibility 
Net Income California ¡ New York 
0 Per Cent Per Cent 
(1) No Deductibility. 
3,000 4.8 4.9 
5,000 8.0 8.8 
20,000 25.1 28.0 
100,000 60.4 59.3 
1,900,000 87.3 80.2 
5,000,000 93.3 85.5 
(2) Unilateral (Federal) 
Deductibility. 
3,000 4.8 4.9 
5,000 7.9 8.6 
20,000 24.2 26.0 
100000 55.2 54.8 
1,000,000 76.3 74.8 
5,000,000 81.3 79.8 
(3) Reciprocal Deductibility. 
3,000 4.7 4.8 
5,000 7.8 8.4 
20,000 23.7 25.0 
100,000 53.2 53.7 
1,000,000 74.0 73.7 
5,000,000 79.1 78.8 
Note: The taxpayer is a married man and has no dependents. 




Provincial Income Tax - Proportion of Gross Income 
Married man with no dependents - Prior to September 1939 
Dominion income tax increase. 
Income British Columbia Alberta Ontario 
0 
100,000 23% 26% 7.4% 
500,000 27% 29% 7.8% 
1,000,000 27% 30% 7.7% , 
The gross inter -provincial tax differentials are due to 
the fact that in British Columbia and Alberta the income tax 
paid to the Dominion Government was not allowed as an 
exemption while it was deductible in the case of Ontario.(1) 
(1) Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion -Provincial 
Relations. 
Book II, Recommendations. Ottawa, 1940. p.158. 
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SECTION III 
Local Business Taxation 
INTRODUCTION. 
Before the implications of the problem are discussed with 
reference to unitary and federal countries, two points are 
worthy of note regarding the nature and scope of business 
fiscal inequity and inequalities in both polities. 
The lower layers of government, in unitary countries, do 
not generally resort to the taxation of business as collective 
organic units, on net income or gross receipts. The local 
taxes are often levied on some other indexes which are no 
expression of taxpaying capacity such as premises occupied, 
fixed capital or nominal capital stock. The burden falling on 
local business may be so manifestly unfair that it could 
scarcely be justified by any theory of taxation other than the 
Social -Expediency Theory. The local taxation of business in 
unitary countries thus involves a "basic fiscal inequity". 
Within a federal polity, the minor governments enjoy 
Wider financial powers. They levy taxes both unrelated to 
impersonal ability to pay and related to it (i.e. on corporate 
net income). In the former case, the minor governments are 
responsible for "basic fiscal inequity". In the latter case, 
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they generate an "induced fiscal inequity". In fact, owing to 
the problem of inter -local business income, the local taxation 
of corporate income is beset with considerable technical and 
practical difficulties which ultimately lead to some type or 
another of inequity (overlapping, multiplicity, evasion...) 
If a local unit taxes the whole income of the local 
business, irrespective of its jurisdictional source, multiple 
taxation is liable to arise since the other local units might 
tax the corporate income originating within their respective 
boundaries. 
If the local taxing jurisdictions resort to different 
devices for the purpose of apportioning cosmopolitan business 
income, duplicate taxation arises on account of the 
dissimilarity of methods applied. The same result is brought 
about by the varying significance attached to the components 
of the same criterium. (1) 
Furthermore, the regional corporate income taxes may 
elthibit diversities as regards the structure of the rates, 
their level and central -local deductibility. 
The lower strata in federalism, having a more free -hand, 
are also bent on levying a diversity of complex and arbitrary 
(1) Overlapping and multiplicity are tackled with more detail 
in Chapter II. We are here concerned with their intra- 
local implications, not with their inter -local aspect. 
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imposts which, through pyramiding, result in a repressive tax 
burden on local business activities. 
The unfair burden in local business taxation can also 
stem from forward shifting to the consumers. The regressivity 
is thus present in the effective incidence as well as in the 
formal incidence. 
Besides regressiveness and repressiveness, the costs of 
tax compliance involved in stratiform business taxes may be 
very high. In the U.S.A. they may reach 10.5 per cent. 
( 1) 
(1) Haig, Robert Murray : "The Cost to Business Concerns 
of Compliance with Tax Laws," in: The Management Review. 
November, 1935. p.328. 
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I. Unitary Countries. 
Apart from a profusion of fers and tolls there are some 
local taxes which deal more specifically with business. It 
is interesting to examine one example; namely the British 
system. 
The British local rates on industrial and business 
hereditaments are unfair in their formal and effective 
incidence alike. The rates are assessed on premises on the 
basis of their annual rental value. The amount of profits 
has little or no connection with the buildings occupied. A 
lucrative business may occupy little or no space and vice 
versa. The true gauge of the remunerative nature of the 
enterprise is the net profit actually realised. If the turn- 
over or total sales or capital stock have little link with 
business profit, the space occupied has none. 
The regressive character of the rates on business has 
' been further accentuated by the derating process which relived 
mines, factories and railways of 75 per cent of their burden 
and completely exempted agricultural hereditaments in 1929. 
The occupiers of small shops and offices came to bear a 
relatively heavier burden than the rest of economic activities 
e.g. agriculture and industry. 
In 1939 they were paying 5 per cent while the rest of 
industry and railways was paying 4 per cent. a) 
(a) Local Government News Service. July, 1939. 
Y Ï Ciz I-. 4 c ,, ,,,.c a tppt l`z veaLQJdY wi.dowl z e-1 
E 
w+ et XAA- 'Lk 
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The core of the inequity is that the subsequent increases 
in the rates, responding to expanding local expenditures, were 
bound to generate more regressiveness. Grants were paid by 
the Exchequer but they were inelastic being fixed at £22 
million. 
The following table shows that the rates formed nearly 
the same percentage of an increasing local revenue (i.e. from 
rates plus grants) in 1939. In fact, after derating the share 
of rates in local income gradually increased and the share of 
grants gradually decreased as is suggested by the table. 
Between 1929 -30 and 1938 -39 there was an increase of 16.7% per 
cent in the average amount collected per head which passed 
from £3. 18s. lld. to £4. 12s. 2d. The average rate in the 
pound (in England and Wales) increased from 11 /6ád to 12/2d 
over the same period . (1) 
Year Rates 
Percentage of Total 
Income 
Grants 











It is noticeable that the judicial interpretation of the 
(1) Silver, A.N. : The Reform of Local Government Finance. 
London, 1945. p.10 -11. 
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berating Act caused further inequalities. The Act derated all 
productive industries. However, it is difficult to establish 
clear demarcation lines between productive and non -productive 
processes. Consequently, anomalies made their appearance. 
Rag -picking was derated, while cold storage was not: (1) 
Prof. Cole, referring to the Derating Act, says; 
"De- rating, in spite of the compensating grants paid out of the 
Exchequer, has acted to the detriment of small householders and 
of shopkeepers, and has reduced the rating system to the last 
absurdity of unfair incidence." (2) 
The regressiveness of the local rates on business is also 
remarkable in their effective incidence. Although in the short 
run they are generally borne by business yet in the long run, 
the rates, or the increase in them, tend "to be incorporated in 
the selling price of the product as is the case with outlay 
taxes. Thus ultimately the rates fall on the consumers.(3) 
Sometimes, backward shifting occurs instead of forward 
shifting, and the final consumers thus escape the incidence. 
This occurs,for instance, in the case of leaseholders who are 
Protected from increasing rentals caused by increases in the 
(1) Silver, A.N. : op.cit. p.10 (footnote). 
(2) Cole G.D.H. : Local and Regional Government. 
p.223. Lond n, 1947. 
(3) Hicks, U.K. : Public Finance. Cambridge, 1947. p.198. 
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rates and more generally whenever the occupiers can pass the 
(1) 
increase to the owners of the premises. 
Moreover, the consumers residing in areas where prices 
have increased through forward shifting, may avert the 
additional burden by buying in other areas (e.g. postal 
shopping) where rates have not increased or where chain stores 
or more efficient businesses are able to absorb the higher 
rates or to offset the high rates in an area by the lower 
rates of another where they also operate.(2) The same results 
to the consumers may obtain through substitution. 
(1) Sykes, Joseph : A study in English Local Authority 
Finance. London, 1939. p.82. 
(2) Sykes: op.cit. p.83. 
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H. Federal Countries. 
The business fiscal inequities and inequalities assume 
greater importance within a federal polity in view of the 
stratiform structure of taxing authorities and the diversity 
exhibited between areas. Business taxation, may be resorted 
to, not only by the regional governments, such as the states 
and provinces, but also by tertiary authorities. The latter 
may even adopt taxes on net corporate income as the District 
of Columbia, in the U.S.A. or they may consider net income as 
a measure such as Ohio, Toledo, Springfield and Dayton. We 
may now discuss corporate income taxation and non -corporate 
income taxation. 
Corporate Income Taxation: 
The secondary governments., within a federation, may 
subject corporate income to taxation. This criterion of 
business taxpaying capacity is equitable. 
However, the resort, on the regional or local levels, to 
corporate income taxation is fraught with violations of fiscal 
equity for various reasons. We may turn to the U.S.A. for 
illustration. 
1, InterArea Diversity: 
The lower -tier taxes on business income will not be 
necessarily homogeneous. The various areas are likely to 
exhibit disparities in rate structure, the level of the rates 
and other divergencies, for instance in connection with tax 
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deductibility. Furthermore, there may co -exist taxing and non - 
taxing authorities. 
In the U.S.A., 32 states tax corporate income on their 
net income, 26 states have flat rates and 6 states have 
graduated rates. 
The level of the rates also vary. It may be 3% or 8% as 
in Oregon (now 7%). The highest graduated scale is in Idaho 
with 1.5% on the first 0 1,000 to 8% on the excess over 
$ 5,000.(1) 
Furthermore, the practice concerning federal -state 
deductibility is not uniform. In 1949, 17 states allowed it, 
others did not. Wisconsin allowed limited deductibility. 
The table below gives some idea of inter -area disparities. 
(1) Kimmel, Lewis H. : Taxes and Economic Incentives. 
Washington, 1950. p.44. 
It is noteworthy that progression in business taxation 
is a moot question even on the central level. 
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U. S. A. 
The Diversity of State Corporate Income Taxes, Examples, 
Dec. 1949. (1) 








3 per cent. 
7 per cent. 
Graduated: 1-i per cent on 
first $ 1,000 to 8 per cent 
on excess over 0 5,000. 
5 - -,i per cent; minimum tax, 
$ 25. 
4 per cent. 
Graduated: 2 per cent on first 
$ 1,000 to 6 per cent on excess 
over $ 6,000 plus surtax of 
16 -2/3 per cent of computed tax 











of 10 per 
cent of net 
income. 
2. Interjurisdictional Incomes: 
The unfair treatment, in this connection, stems from the 
inherent overlapping causative of multiple taatation on inter - 
area firms. Separate accounting would cope with the problem. 
However, it is beset with difficulties.(2) Other devices may 
(1) Kimmel, Lewis H. : op. cit. p.202. 
(2) See next chapter on "Overlapping and Multiplicity ", 
Section IV. 
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be resorted to'f or the purpose of inter -area income apportion- 
ment, such as the ratio of local to total expenses of the 
business or the application of some allocation formula. 
We may now discuss the latter device on the light of 
fiscal equity. 
The construction of the allocation formula, which will 
have to be based on certain criteria, may not militate in 
favour of fiscal equity. Two points may be mentioned. First, 
the criteria on which the formula is based may not represent 
adequately the portions of income realised within each local 
area. Second, heterogeneous formulas may be in application by 
the diverse taxing jurisdictions. The outcome may be a final 
fiscal load of more than l00;ó of the total income of the inter - 
area concern, which will be thus discriminated against. 
Furthermore, the formulas, even if homogeneous, may be 
interpreted differently by the minor authorities to their own 
financial advantage. 
The American states, in an attempt to determine the 
domestic share of pan -state (i.e. interjurisdictional) 
corporate net income, resort to one or more of the following 
factors as allocation fractions:(1) gross receipts or sales, 
(1) The allocation fraction is obtainedby relating the factor 
adopted within the state to the total or full expression 
of the same factor, e.g. the allocation factor of payroll 
is, 
Payroll within the state 
Total Payroll See: 
Hansen, Alvin H. and Perloff, Harvey: State and Local 
Finance in the National Economy. New York, 1944. p.44. 
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tangible property, payroll, manufacturing costs, purchases of 
goods and materials etc., the cost value of capital assets, 
accounts receivable, net sales costs, stock of other 
corporations. 
In order to compute the portion of domestic income, the 
allocation fraction is multiplied by the total net income of 
the business. 
The formula can however be complicated in many ways. The 
allocation fraction may be composed of several factors or 
elements combined together. Some form of weighting may be 
adopted. The formulae may affect intricate algebraic forms. 
Those of New York and North Dakota are of this sort. ( 1) 
The further complications introduced do not always make 
the apportionment of income sounder. The opposite is often 
the case. Some formulas represent local dominating group 
interests. Averaging opens the door to more fiscal inequity; 
each state choosing the most advattageous to itself. Where 
distributing prevails more weight is given to sales. Where 
manufacturing predominates there is a propension to give more 
weight to tangible property and wage factors.(2) The diversity 
of the averaging methods adopted in the different states result 
(1) Blake Ro and Johnson Violet : "State Income Taxes." 
ew Yor , 942. p.65 -66. 
(2) Long Henri F. : Interstate Reciprocity in Connection 
with Corporate and Personal Income Taxation: Tax 
Relations Among Government Units. Tax Policy League, 
New York, 1938. p.77. 
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Dia final unfair burden on inter -local business. 
The Diversity in Averaging as a Source of Fiscal Inequity 




A $ 800 $ 500 5/12 250 8/12 400 
B 300 1,500 3/8 225 1/2 300 
0 100 200 3/40 45 1/15 40 
D - 800 2/15 80 4/15 160 
0 1,200 0 3,000 $ 600 . $ 900 
The table shows that a corporation, with a net income of 
$ 600 and whose property and gross receipts are spread over 
several states, pays tax on more than its actual income when 
each of the states adopts the most favorable averaging to 
itself. (1) 
It may be argued that the three -factor Massachusetts 
formula is used in an increasing number of states and that this 
militates in favour of uniformity and fairness . (2) Yet the 
formula cannot spread everywhere and for all businesses because 
(1) Maxwell James : The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the 
United States. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. p.276. 
(2) The Massachusetts formula is an average of three ratios: 
the value of tangible property within the state to total 
tangible property, the value of sales within the state 
to total sales (or gross receipts), value of payroll 
within the state to total payroll. 
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because of the differing local investment conditions. Even if 
the formula is largely adopted it is subject to different 
interpretations as regards its constituent elements, for 
instance sales. 
Furthermore, a state may adopt different formulas for 
different enterprises (commercial, manufacturing...) . Even 
when a formula is adopted, it may be modified whether it is 
introduced by regulation or by statute. In fact, in the latter 
case, the administration is generally left with some latitude 
to review the formula. (1) 
2. Non -Corporate -Income Taxation: 
A host of secondary and tertiary taxes on business are 
not connected with impersonal ability to pay and therefore are 
less equitable than corporate income taxes. 
The tax on gross receipts is connected with the consumers 
rather than with business since it is based on the amount of 
sales and adds to the variable costs of production and 
distribution. (2) In fact, the tax accumulates as a wholesale 
tax and finally burdens the consumers . (3 ) 
Capital -stock may be also subject to taxation on the state 
(1) Blakey and Johnson : op.cit. p.65. 
(2) Taylor, Philip : The Economics of Public Finance. 
New York, 1948. p.528. 
(3) Groves, Harold M. : Financing Government. 
New York, I945. p.255. 
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level, in the U.S.A. However, nominal capital does not reflect 
the real capital of the corporation for various reasons. 
There are the bonds and other debts. Working capital or 
invested capital are preferable, but their computation 
encounters many difficulties, for instance the apportionment 
of the reserves between the different states according to the 
share of each state in their formation. Besides, the ratio 
between net corporate income and capital oscillates widely and 
more than the ratio between net and gross incomes. 
The occupation taxes, probably the most regressive of all, 
are based on such factors as occupation, equipment, the amount 
or kind of production, the number of employees or payroll, the 
area covered by the businesses activities, the population 
residing in the different local areas.(1) Alabama had in 1942, 
130 occupation taxes. One of the taxes ranges from ,$ 5 to 
$50 according to the size of the municipal population. 
Mississippi taxes cotton enterprises according to the main 
processing operation e.g. bales compressed or knitting machines. 
By 1946 the occupation taxes had invaded all states. They 
should be seriously reviewed especially that their yield is so 
small.(2) 
(1) Groves, Harold M. : "Financing Government." p.256. 
See also: 
Arant, Roscoe : "Business Taxation in the Southern States" 
in The Tax Magazine, Vol.XVI No.7, July, 1938. p.463. 
(2) In 1946, the receipts were less than .25 of 1% (= 13.4 
million dollars). 
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A diversity of other taxes, on the state and local levels, 
impose a further burden on business such as the franchise taxes, 
severance taxes, property taxes, sales taxes. The latter are 
more fully examined in the next chapter. 
The property tax, to the extent that it falls on business, 
is also a source of unfair burden whether in its tangible or in 
intangible forms. The assessment of inventories (manufacturers, 
merchants) is an important factor. Choosing an "assessment 
day ", as is generally the case in the U.S.A., is a far cry from 
tax justice. Apart from the fact that property can be 
concealed on that day, this method discriminates against 
businesses with a slow turnover but high inventories. The 
method applied by some states, of taking the average value of 
inventories suffers the same defect. The valuation of total 
yearly inventory does not account for such vital factors as 
the rate of profits and its variations. (1) 
The irrational property tax on intangibles clearly 
results in multiple taxation. Stocks and bonds represent real 
Property already taxed.(2) Moreover, it implies discrimination 
against corporate business or limited companies. 
In conclusion, it may be appropriate here to quote 
(1) Buehler, Alfred : "Public Finance." New York, 1948. p.342. 
(2) Taylor, Philip : op. cit. p.359. 
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Professor Hansen and Professor Perloff, commenting on the 
regressive and repressive impact of the secondary and tertiary 
American taxes on business. 
"Business taxes in the states are a conglomeration of 
heterogeneous taxes imposed for different purposes, on 
different bases, under many forms of rate schedules and with 
many types of administrative machinery. They are 
characterised, in general, by arbitrariness, complexity and 
lack of co- ordination." ( 
1) 
(1) Hansen and Perloff : op.cit. p.44. 
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UNITED STATES 
State Business Taxes, 1942. (1) 







1. General Corporation Net Income 
Tax. 
2. Taxes on Specific Businesses. 
a. Insurance Companies. 
b. Public utilities. 
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(1) Allen, Edward and Brownlee, 0.H. "Economics of Public 
Finance". New York, 1947. p.303. 
In 1948, the state corporate income taxes yielded 585 
millions, in 1947 they yielded 451 m. The local 
governments share a certain portion. 
See Kimmel, Lewis H. : op. cit. p.43. 
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I Other Federations: Canada and Argentine. 
Canada: 
The incompatibility between local taxation of business 
and fiscal equity is also noticeable in Canada. The Royal 
Commission on Dominion -Provincial Relations, in a report in 
1941 says; "The present complexity is beyond belief. The most 
important item is the corporation income tax, levied by the 
Dominion and most of the Provincial Governments. There are, 
in addition, taxes levied by one or more governments, on 
various bases such as capital stock, number of business places, 
gross revenue, physical volume of output, period of operation, 
mileage of tract or wire, mileage operated, note circulation, 
Insurance premiums, investments, volume of deposits. They 
have grown up in a completely unplanned and unco-ordinated 
way, and violate every canon of sound taxation. As a result 
investments in the same forms of business are taxed at 
different rates in the same Province; investments in the same 
kind of business are taxed at different rates in different 
Provinces; investments in business operating on a national 
scale are double or triple -taxed with no relation to earning 
power; certain forms of business can be and are singled out 
for discriminatory taxation." ( 1) 
Although, by 1951, the war centripetal forces had 
(1) Report Book II, p.113. 
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confined the personal income tax to the Dominion level alone, 
the corporation and business taxes continued to be imposed on 
the local level by provinces (notably Ontario and Quebec) and 
municipalities. Besides the tax on profits, there are taxes 
on paid -up capital, business premises, insurance premiums, 
railway mileage, and so on. The municipalities resort chiefly 
to imposts on gross receipts or on business premises based on 
capital value, rental value or floor space. (1) They also make 
use of taxes on stock -in -trade (Maritime Provinces, Manitoba, 
Alberta) which are especially unfair and business licences 
which are unfortunately increasingly used, not as a means of 
regulation and control as before, but as a source of revenue. (2) 
Argentine: 
The Argentine provinces impose taxes on profitable 
activities, or "impuestos a las actividades lucrativas", in 
the form of proportional rates on annual gross receipts. These 
taxes are, in fact, a transformation, under pressure of 
financial need of the previous provincial license taxes, or 
" impuesto de patentes" (i.e. fixed fees for the "privilege" of 
(1) Perry Harvey J. : "Taxation in Canada ". 
Toronto, 1951. p.33. 
(2) Brittain, Horace : "Local Government in Canada". 
Toronto, 1951. p.98. 
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doing business). The latter sometimes also co -exist with the 
former as in the Province of Corrientes . 
(1) 
In the latter province, therefore, there is a business 
tax, affecting a progressive structure, ranging from 0.04% to 
3% on gross receipts ranging from 5,000 pesos to 50,000 pesos. 
In addition, there is a fixed license payable by all 
provincial concerns, based on the value of commodities owned at 
the time of payment. The tax rates range from 50 pesos for 
businesses with commodities valued at less than 1,000 pesos, 
to6,200 pesos when the value of the commodities is between 
950,000 pesos and 1,000,000 pesos. A supplementary tax of 
2 %per 1,000 pesos is levied when the commodities are worth 
more than a million pesos . (2 ) 
In the Province of Buenos Aires, a profitable activities 
tax is imposed. The law of 1948 provides for a basic tax of 
4%per 1,000 pesos of gross receipts. Gross receipts below 
10,000 pesos are exempt. Manual, intellectual and other 
salaried labour, as well as agriculture, are excluded from the 
scope of the tax. Deductions, ranging from 10 per cent to 80 
per cent are allowed, on the basic rates, to some activities, 
(1) The definition of "license tax" may be still in use, 
misleadingly, to denote the new taxes as, for instance, 
in the Province of Tucuman. 
(2) Patterson, Ernest F. : "Argentine Provincial Tax 
Systems". Tnter-American Economic Affairs. 
Winter, 1953. p.57. 
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e.g. the manufacturing of agricultural machinery, wholesale 
dealers in food and cereals. On the other hand, recharges are 
sometimes imposed, for instance, in the case of banks, 
commercial advertising, auction sales, and various 
commissioners aid intermediaries and pawnbrokers. 
The city of Buenos Hires recently resorted to a similar 
tax. This was conducive to a great deal of interjurisdictional 
overlapping which will be referred to, in some detail, in due 
course. 
(1) 
(1) See Chapter Two on "Overlapping and multiplicity", 
Section IV, "Local Business Taxation". 
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SECTION IV 
Local Death Taxation 
Introduction 
The modern history of death taxes does not go back very 
far. When they were first resorted to in unitary countries 
they were confined to the central level as occurred in Britain 
in 1894. However, in federal countries the opposite 
development took place. In fact, the traditional pattern of 
federal constitutions used to empower the lower layers to levy 
direct taxes, whilst the indirect taxes were left to the 
federal government. The pressure of financial need forced the 
subordinate units to adopt new forms of direct taxation 
besides real estate taxation, such as corporate and personal 
income taxes and death taxes. 
Two types of transfer taxes are discernible; the "estate 
tax" and the "inheritance or succession tax". The former is 
imposed upon the entire estate before distribution. The latter 
is based on the share accruing to the individual successor.(1) 
0.) The two taxes amount sometimes to the same thing as when 
the deceased leaves specified sums to particular 
beneficiaries. The balance of the estate thus pays the 
inheritance tax together with the estate tax and the final 
incidence falls on the residual beneficiaries who are 
often close relatives. The succession tax actually falls 
on the beneficiary if the testator leaves certain 
proportions to his beneficiaries instead of specified 
amounts. The succession tax thus becomes distinguishable 
from the estate tax. 
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The estate and inheritance taxes, as used by lower 
authorities, are now mainly found in federal countries.(1) 
In the U.S.A., the death taxes were adopted by the states 
especially before World War I and notably between 1892 -1916. 
The Federal Government, which used them only in emergencies,(2) 
definitely adopted them in 1916. At the onset of World Ward II 
(in 1941) there were 47 states in the field accounting for 
about 23 per cent of total federal -state revenue of 529 millions 
The present situation can be summarized in that the estate tax 
is used on the federal level and sometimes on the state level 
as an independent or differential levy, besides or in place of 
the inheritance tax. The latter is, however, the most used by 
the states. 
In Canada, the death taxes were never a source of federal 
revenue until 1941. The "succession duties" were in fact first 
levied in 1892 by Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia 
and other provinces followed suit. The confusion and injustice 
which ensued were intolerable. The post -war agreements which 
federalized these taxes, still left Quebec and Ontario in the 
field.(3) 
(1) In England, after the repeal of the legacy duty in 1948, 
there remained only the estate tax on the central level. 
(2) The emergencies are 1797 -1802, 1862 -1870, 1898 -1902. 
(3) Perry, Harvey : Taxation in Canada. Toronto, 1951. p.29 
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The Canadian death taxes are a hybrid combination of the 
British estate tax and the American state inheritance taxes. 
They are, in principle, succession duties levied according to 
the amount of the individual succession and the relationship 
of the beneficiary to the deceased but they also take into 
consideration the size of the total estate. ( 
1) 
In Australia, the estate duties are imposed by both the 
Commonwealth government and the state governments. 
In Argentina, inheritance taxes and gift taxes are levied 
by the provinces since their very existence. 
Brazil and other federations could be also mentioned. 
The resort to death taxation by both junior and senior 
authorities, is conducive to various forms of intra- local, 
inter -local and central -local fiscal inequities and 
inequalities which are referred to below. 
(1) Perry., Harvey : op. cit. p.103. 
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I, Intra -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
In the writerts view, the death taxes of both types 
(estate and inheritance taxes) are justifiable, when used on 
the central level, on grounds of ability to pay. The 
principles of "benefit", "state partnership" or "back -tax" are 
not satisfactory. 
The benefit principle, according to which the government 
must be paid for services rendered in guaranteeing the 
distribution of estates to the heirs, can only motivate probate 
fees. The second principle falls short of explaining the 
exemption of small estates or the progression in the taxes. 
The third principle is a crude method of coping with, or 
oyn .in1Wflf ze&art:al 
penalizing, evasioni. As for the theory of wealth 
redistribution, it is not inherently compatible with the theory 
of ability to contribute. (1) 
Progression is generally used in the estate taxes 
according to the size of the estate. It may however be 
questioned. The rich, inheriting the whole of a small bequest 
may receive more, after tax, than poorer successors inheriting 
the same gross amount as a small portion of a large bequest. 
(1) Haensel, Paul : "The Proper Sphere of Death Taxes". in 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. January, 1936. p.86. See also: 
Taylor, Philip : "The Economics of Public Finance ". 
New York, 1948. pp.495 -504. 
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From the fiscal equity point of view, progression is better 
suited for inheritance taxes. A rational graduation in this 
case should however relate to the total ability to pay of the 
heir, in other words his total net income, rather than the 
amount of the share transmitted to him, besides his relation- 
ship to the deceased. 
Now, if the death taxes are adopted on the local level, 
two infringements of fiscal equity take place. The progression, 
which the subordinate units most probably use, will be 
distorted either in the case of the estate tax or the 
inheritance tax. In the former case, for instance, the 
progression would not be justifiable unless it applies to the 
total value of the estate, but the taxing locality may not be 
able to tax real or personal property or intangibles located in 
other local areas. 
The second source of injustice stems from the fact that 
real property, intangibles or other items of a bequest, may be 
dispersed over diverse localities and can thus be subject more 
than once to taxation. This is a case of overlapping leading 
toover- taxation which will be more fully expounded later. 
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IT . Inter -Local Fiscal, Inequity: 
The lack of inter -area uniformity in definitions, 
exemptions and rates may usher in various sorts of inequalities 
within the same country. Indeed, all local units (especially 
in federations) may not adopt the same patterns of death taxes. 
Some may levy estate "bates, some may levy inheritance taxes, 
some may combine both and some others may abstain, for one 
reason or another, from levying any kind of taxation at 
death.(1) Exemptions for direct and collateral heirs may vary 
from locality to locality. Inter -area differences in rates may 
exist; the rates being low or high, proportional or 
progressive. 
In the U.S.A. there are many inter -state differences in 
the tax burden. Some states levy inheritance taxes, some have 
estate taxes, others combine both(2) and others still have none 
(one state at present). The state gift taxes seem to be 
gaining momentum since they were first enacted by Wisconsin 
and Oregon in 1933. By 1942, twelve states levied gift taxes.(3) 
(1) For instance, to encourage the flow of high incomes and 
high income -receivers into the locality 
(2) After the introduction of the federal credit of 80% in 
1926, several states try to get the full benefit of the 
credit by using the estate tax as a "deficiency levy" to 
take up the part of the credit left unabsorbed by the 
state's inheritance tax. See: 
Maxwell, James : "The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the 
United States." Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. p.343. 
(3) Gift taxes, whether on the federal or state level, should 
be integrated with death taxes since they duplicate 
exemptions and allow the estate owner to escape the upper 
brackets rates of taxation. 
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U.S.A. 
Types of State Transfer Taxes, January 1942. 
Types of Transfer Taxes State 
(1) Inheritance Tax Only. 
(2) Estate Tax based on 
Federal Levy. 
(3) Inheritance and 
Differential Estate Tax. 
(4) Inheritance and Differential 
Estate Tax; also Gift 
Tax. 
(5) Inheritance and 
Independent Estate Tax; 
Also Gift Tax. 
(6) Independent Estate Tax. 
(7) Independent and Differential, 
Estate Tax; also Gift Tax 
(8) Inheritance, Independent 
& Differential Estate 
Tax. 
(9) No TransferT ax. 
Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, 
South Dakota, West Virginia, 
Alaska, Wyoming. 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
New York. 
Connecticut, Delaware, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Iviissouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii. 
California, Colorado, 









(1) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations" 
78th Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document No.69 
Washington, 1943. p.473. 
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As for the exemptions, the direct heirs are dissimilarly 
treated being either totally exempt (e.g. New Hampshire) or 
enjoy varying degrees of exemption. The collateral heirs, too, 
are in unequal positions as regards exemptions. If in some 
states they get a small exemption, in others they get none. 
The variations in exemptions, sometimes allowed to them, range 
from ß 100 or $ 200 or í$ 500 to $ 1,000 or $ 5,000. The rates 
of taxation also exhibit differences from state to state. In 
the case of direct héirs, they range from 1% to 16%. As for 
collaterals , they range from 2% or 4% to 40%. 
(1) 
The effective state death tax rates on an estate of $ 1,000,000 
varied, in 1937 from 3.24 per cent in Pennsylvania to 11.05 per 
cent in North Dakota. 
Íl) Lutz Harley Leist : "Public Finance" New York, 1936. 
p.661. See also: 
Buehler, Alfred : "Public Finance". New York, 1948. p.396 
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Diversity of State Death Taxes in U.S.A.(1) 




Inheritance Taxes Only: 41 13 7 
1- Flat rate on collaterals 2 0 0 
2- Flat rate on collateral and 
direct heirs. 
3 2 2 
3- Flat rate on direct and 
progressive rates on 
collateral heirs. 
1 o 0 
4- Progressive rates on direct 
and flat rates on collateral 
heirs. 
1 0 0 
5- Progressive rates on both 
direct and collateral heirs. 34 11 5 
.Estate and inheritance Taxes Used 
Jointly with ihheritance taxes 3 27 33 
of the f oll6 ing varieties: 
1- Flat rates on collaterals. 0 2 1 
2- Flat rates on collateral and 
direct heirs. 
1 1 2 
3- Flat rates on direct, and 
progressive rates on 
collateral heirs. 
0 1 1 
4- Progressive rates on direct 
and flat rates on collateral 
heirs. 
0 1 1 
5- Progressive rates on collaterals 0 1 1 
6- Progressive rates on direct and 
collateral heirs. 
2 21 27 
Estate Tax Only. 2 7 8 
No Tax. 3 2 1 
Grand Total 49 49 49 
(1) Oakes, Eugene : "The Federal Offset and the American Death 
Tax System ". in The quarterly Journal of Economics. 
August, 1940. p.576. 
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U. S. A. 










































Kentucky 1.53 2.63 5.17 6.30 7.90 11.80 13.51 15.48 
Montana 1.90 2.65 4.72 6.11 8.01 10.56 10.88 14.92 
North Dakota .80 2,28 5.93 7.77 11.05 20.25 21.63 22.73 
New York .25 .55 1.42 2.29 3.88 9.68 13.27 18.65 
Oregon 1.85 2.88 5.84 7.51 10.75 17.55 18.53 19.31 
Pennsylvania 3.22 3.23 3.24 3.24 3.24 7.74 10.62 14.92 
Utah 3.40 4.95 8.15 8.89 9.45 9.89 9.94 9.99 
West Virginia 2.51 3.42 3.92 4.38 5.41 9.09 10.82 13.09 
Wisconsin 1.98 2.69 4.73 5.12 8.01 11.56 10.62 14.92 
(1) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations". 
op. cit. p.490. 
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III. Central -Local Fiscal Inequity. 
The inequity of local death taxes may stem from another 
source, namely a duplication of the same taxes on the central 
level. Injustice assumes more importance as the burden of 
such taxes increases on both levels of taxing jurisdiction. 
This has been noticeably the case after World War I. 
The U.S.A. afford an illustration. The states were alone 
in the field before 1916. The invasion by the Federal 
Government meant of course an additional burden. However, at 
the beginning the dual burden was light. Indeed the rates 
were low and the exemption limits were high in state and 
federal taxation alike.(1) Moreover, the states used to 
compete to attract wealthy residents by emulative lightening 
of the burden or its total abolition as occurred in Florida and 
(1) The states levied only inheritance taxes. The latter hit 
collateral heirs, rather than direct heirs, and the 
property received by non -residents. The rates were flat 
till the beginning of the present century, and the 
exemption limits were high. 
The Federal estate tax of 1916 was graduated from 1 to 10 
per cent on net estates above $ 50,000, the mmximum rate 
applying to estates in excess of $ 5,000,000. The 
subsequent rises of 1917, 1918 and 1924 were not intense 
especially that a credit device was introduced in 1924 and 
1926. It is the act of 1932 and those of 1934 and 1935 
which really increased the burden not only because the 
rates were increased, but also because the credits were 
not available against these new supplementary federal 
estate taxes as will be seen later. The Second World War 
caused further increases. See: 
Lutz, Harley Leist : "Public Finance ". op.cit. pp.665 -667. 
Buehler, Alfred : "Public Finance ". op.cit. p.390 & p.395 
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Nevada which had both passed constitutional amendments in 1924 
and 1925 respectively forbidding the enactment of inheritance 
taxes ») (1)
At the present time, the situation is different. The 
federal exemption limits were lowered and the rates put up. 
In 1946 the exemption was 0 60,000 and the rates were 
graduated from 3% on the first $ 5,000 of taxable estate up 
to 77% on the excess of taxable estate above $ 10,000,000.(2) 
Furthermore, to avoid evasion, a federal gift tax was grafted 
on the estate taxes (from 1924 -26 and again beginning in 1932). 
The rates in 1946 were three -fourths as large as those ruling 
in the estate tax. 
Similar tendencies are noticeable in state taxation. 
It is however possible to avert the dual national -local 
burden by deducting from the national tax an amount equivalent 
to the local levy. The advantage is to make possible that the 
maximum burden of death taxes will be the one imposed by the 
central government whatever the local levies are. 
The tax credits may be comprehensive or partial. They may 
absorb all or part of the local transfer tax. In the latter 
(1) Maxwell, James : op.cit. p.333. 
(2) Allen Edward and Brownlee , 0.H. : 
Finance." ew or c p.o 
',Economics of Public 
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case, they may affect the form of lump sums, fixed or 
graduated, or affect the form of proportions computed on the 
basis of the central or the local taxes. 
Apart from the revenue advantages of the tax credits to 
the subordinate units, they militate in favour of personal 
fiscal equity and of inter -local fiscal equity by mitigating 
the combined central local tax burden. Clearly, the 
comprehensive tax credit Performs that role best. 
Local death tax progression can however be adversely 
affected by the formula of the credit. This occurs if the tax 
credit takes the form of a fixed amount or is a fixed 
proportion of a central tax with wide brackets whilst the 
brackets in the local transfer tax are narrow as they 
generally tend to be especially in the lower groups. 
In some countries a peculiar disfiguring of the tax credit 
may lead to a distortion of local and central -local progression 
combined,(1) as will be expounded further. 
In the U.S.A. , to which we may refer for clarification, 
the federal -state tax burden was actually alleviated in 1924 
through a credit granted up to 25 per cent of federal estate 
tax liability, for the payment of any state death tax. In 
1926 the credit was raised to 80% thus reducing the federal 
death tax yield by the same extent. 
(1) Maxwell; J.A. : op.cit. p.351. 
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It is noticeable that the mitigation of the total tax 
burden was palpable as long as the federal taxes were low and 
the state taxes were high and as long as the credits were 
applicable to the current federal estate tax provisions and not 
to outdated ones. However, this was no more the case when the 
federal taxes soared (notably since 1932 and World ;':'ar II) and 
when the state taxes' percentages of the total federa -state 
burden decreased and especially after the credit device was 
distorted as will be seen in next point. 
Federal and State Revenue from Death Duties 
Percentages (1) 
Year Percentages Year Percentages 
Federal State Federal State 
1924 55 45 1929 29 71 
1925 53 48 1930 26 74 
1926 55 45 1932 25 75 
1927 47 53 1 1937 
1 
73 27 
1928 31 69 1938 74 26 
1941 77 23 
(1) Combined from Oakes, Eugen "The Federal Offset and The 
American Death Tax System." op.cit. p.574 and 
Maxwell, clams, op.cit. p340. 
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IV. Fiscal Inequities and_erience. 
It The U.S. Crediting Device 
The credit device of 1926 aimed at redressing the fiscal 
inequity inherent in a dual tax burden (federal and states) 
and inter -state heterogeneity in death taxation. In fact it 
was thought that the states, in an attempt to absorb the whole 
credit, would shift from inheritance taxation to estate 
taxation, in conformity with the federal government, and would 
adopt the same definitions as the latter with regard to 
domicile, situs and other provisions. The states, it was hoped 
would cease competing for wealthy residents. The non -taxing 
states would be induced to levy transfer taxes. In sura, inter- 
state uniformity would be established. 
These objectives did not materialise. The crediting 
device fell short of coping with the problems of central -local 
and inter -local fiscal inequities. First, the credits do not 
include the whole state taxes. The Federal Government in 1926 
decided to share its tax in the ratio of 1 to 4 (i.e. 80%). (1) 
Second, this ratio applies now, not to the current Federal 
estate tax, but to a tax structure no more existing. Indeed, 
(1) Strictly speaking, the Federal Government does not share 
the tax with the states, but allows the credits to the 
taxpayers. It is up to the states to impose and collect 
their own transfer taxes. 
For a lucid exposition of the crediting device see: 
Oakes, Eugene : "The Federal Offset and The American 
Death Tax System" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
August 1940. pp.566 -598. 
Maxwell, James : op. cit. pp.337 -353 
Groves, Harold : "Viewpoints on Public Finance". 
New York, 1945. p.42. 
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in 1932, 1934, 1935 and in World War II the Federal tax was 
increased substantially. The exemption limit was brought from 
$ 100,000 to $ 50,000 then to 0 40,000 (in 1942 the exemption 
was 0 60,000 as already mentioned but the exclusion of $ 40,000 
for insurance was cancelled). The rates were raised. 


















10,000 1.0 5.0 400.0 500,000 3.5 29.1 732.6 
25,000 1.0 9.2 820.0 1,000,000 4.9 32.6 571.5 
50,000 1.0 14.0 1,300.0 5,000,000 10.7 49.4 390.2 
100,000 1.5 20.7 1,280.0 10,000,000 13.5 60.9 349.8 
250,000 2.6 26.3 911.0 50,000,000 18.7 73.8 294.4 
In spite of the change in the Federal tax structure, the 
credits still applied to the light tax of 1926 thus denying to 
the state the benefits of the more remunerative Federal so- 
called "supplementary tax". The Federal gift tax of 1932, by 
encouraging the distribution of wealth inter -vivos was a 
further cause of weakening of the yielding capacity of the 
0.) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations ". 
op.cit. 485. 
The specific exemption was $ 100,000 in 1926 and 
0 40,000 in 1941. 
191. 
death taxes to the states. 
The outcome of the new position is that no credits are 
allowed for net estates of O 100,000 and less which form the 
bulk of the estates. Moreover, as the Federal rate increases 
affect the higher brackets more than the lower brackets, the 
relative share of state transfer taxes enjoying credit 
decreases steadily with the increase in the value of the 
estates. In other terms, the states are deprived of the 
credit at the lower and upper ends of the scale. 
Maximum Federal Credit Under 1926 Act as Percentage 
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33,200 . 10.7 
280,400 15.5 
1,067,600 17.6 
The arithmetic average of the tax credit is thus about 11 
percent instead of the original 80 per cent. 
(1) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations" 
0p.cit. 487. 
Also, Maxwell, James : op.cit. p.344 (marginal notes and 
table. 
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Important inferences can now be made in connection with 
fiscal equity in U.S. state death taxation:- 
1- Personal Fiscal Inequity: The lower brackets or smaller 
estates either do not benefits from the tax credit at all 
($100,000 or less) or benefit proportionately less than 
larger estates. This militates against the progression of the 
combined federal -state tax burden. The credits- should be 
graduated in such wise as to give larger percentage credits on 
small estates and smaller percentages on larger estates.(1) 
2- Inter -State Fiscal Inequity: In the general scramble for 
revenue, the states absorbed the whole credit, and even 
exceeded it. In doing so they did not follow a uniform pattern 
as was expected. Instead of copying the Federal estate tax' 
and adopting its provisions as concerns domicile and situs, 
they increased the confusion. Some enacted a differential 
estate tax, grafted on their inheritance tax. Some resorted to 
an independent estate tax, sometimes in addition to their 
inheritance tax. Other states simply intensified the latter. 
State gift taxes were also added to the picture. Furthermore, 
there were inter -area differences in exemptions and rates. As 
a matter of fact, inter -state fiscal inequalities were 
accentuated. ( 2 ) 
(1) "Conflicting Taxation", 1935 Progress Report of the 
Interstate Commission on Conflicting Taxation. 
Council of State Governments, Chicago, 1935. pp.114 -118. 
(2) Oakes, Eugene : "The Federal Offset and The American 
Death Tax System ". op.cit. pp.577 -580. 
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U.S.li. : Inter -State Fiscal Inequalities. (1) 
Example 1 - Estates Passing to j!lidow. 
pa. 
Size of Estate Mean Rate (Percent) Standard Deviat ion Percent 
















Example 2 - Estates Passing to a Stranger. 
Size of Estate 
0 
Mean Rate (Percent) Standard Deviation (Percent) 
1925 1939 1925 1939 
50,000 7.0 7.0 3.7 - 4.2 
200,000 10.4 9.9 5.5 6.7 
1,000,000 13.8 13.9 8.4 9.6 
(1) Oakes, Eugene : "The Federal Offset and The American 
Death Tax System." op.cit. p.579. 
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3_ Federal -State Fiscal Inequity: The combined Federal -State 
tax burden tend to be repressive because both layers co -exist 
and because the crediting device is quite unsatisfactory. The 
latter can give partial relief or total relief according to 
whether it offsets part of, or all, the taxes payable to the 
subordinate jurisdictions. However, the credits, as they are 
now, make no sense since they apply to an outdated federal tax 
structure. 
Combined State and Federal Tax as Percentage of 
Net Estates (Before Specific Exemptions) (1) 
State $50,000 $100,000 State $50,000 
e 
$100,000 
Kentucky 2.53 12.13 Oregon 2.85 12.38 
Montana 2.90 12.15 Utah 4.40 14.45 
N.Dakota 1.80 11.78 Wisconsin 2.98 12.19 
Oklahoma 1.90 11.70 
The combined federal -state burden can be better 
appreciated if this table is compared with a previous table 
giving the effective death tax rates in selected (the same) 
states. 
(1) The state taxes are based on data of 1937. The Federal 
tax is computed at 1941 rates and with specific exemption 
of $40,000. See:- 
"Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations." 
p.486. 
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Canadian Provincial Death Taxes. 
In Canada, there were marked inter -provincial fiscal 
inequalities before World War II when death taxes were the most 
important source of provincial revenue. 
After the War, Dominion- provincial Tax Rental Agreements 
were reached resulting in the appropriation of the death taxes 
by the Dominion government and their repeal in the provinces, 
save however for the two wealthiest ones, viz: Quebec and 
Ontario. According to the agreements lasting till Larch 1952, 
the Dominion government allows a credit up to one -half of the 
federal tax liability against taxes paid to the Province, thus 
alleviating the central -local fiscal burden. (1) 
Inter -area fiscal inequalities still however exist at the 
present time between the two important provinces of ,uebec and 
Ontario which resort to separate transfer taxes besides those 
imposed by the Dominion. There are disparities between the two 
provinces in exemption limits and rates for all classes. The 
existence of a double -deck tax burden (Dominion and provincial) 
on transfers in these provinces leads forcibly to a relatively 
heavier fiscal inequity in them besides the fiscal inequalities 
between them. (2 ) 
(1) Perry Harvey : Taxation in Canada. 
Toronto, 1951. p.29, p.188. 




I. Inter -Provincial Differences in Rates. 
(Widow Only) (1) 
- cCuebec Ontario 
aggregate Net 
Value 
' Federal Duty Provincial Duty Provincial Duty 
s % % 
20,000 - 2.80 - 
25,000 - 3.00 w 
50,000 - 4.00 - 
60,000 10.60 5.60 4.60 
100,000 14.70 8.00 7.50 
300,000 26.70 12.00 10.00 
500,000 32.70 15.50 12.50 
1,000,000 38.70 23.00 18.00 
(1) Perry, Harvey : op.cit. Appendix, tables XVIII and XIX 
p.363 & p.364, 
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H. Inter -Provincial Differences in Combined 
Dominion- Provincial Tax Burden (Widow Only).(1) 
The Effect of Tax Credits Taken Into Account. 
Aggregate Net 
Value 
Dominion + Quebec Dominion + Ontario 
0 $ 0 
20,000 560 - 
25,000 750 - 
50,000 2,000 - 
60,000 7,140 5,294 
100,000 13,880 14,505 
300,000 74,760 74,760 
'500,000 156,960 156,960 
1,000,000 419,630 396,630 
(1) Perry, Harvey op.cit. Appendix, tables XVIII and XIX 
p.363 & p.364. 
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*Argentine Provincial Death Taxes: 
The tax rates for the different values of legacies and 
different degrees of relationship to the deceased, vary from 
province to province. 
In the Province of Buenos Aires, the rates are much higher 
than in other provinces with the exception of Tucumán and 
Salta. ( l) 
If the rates in Tucuman are lower than those of Buenos 
Aires for the first class of beneficiaries they are slightly 
higher for the last classification. 
The rates of Salta are the same as Buenos Aires but 
somewhat lower in the case of parents, spouses and children. 
In all other provinces, the tax rates are considerably 
lower. The provinces are Jujuy, Mendoza, Santa Fe, Cordoba 
and Corrientes. Inter -provincial disparities in rates exist 
in certain categories of beneficiaries. ( 2 ) 
General Appraisal: 
Our Analysis suggests that the transfer taxes should be 
confined to the central level and refused to the underlying 
units. The problems involved in local death taxation are so 
(1) Patterson, Ernest F. : "Argentine Provincial Tax Systems". 
inter- American Economic Affairs. Winter, 1953, No.3. 
pp.59 -60. 
(2) Anales de Legislación Argentina, Vol.IX -B, 1949 and 
A-rio XI, No.39, December 14, 1951. 
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acute that they amply justify this course. Commenting on the 
iLmerican situation, two authorities stated that; "Among major 
state taxes none is more poorly administered than the death tax 
whether judged by principles of organisation, by equity of 
application or by available quantitative measures. "(1) 
In the writer's view, the administration of the death 
taxes should be definitely centralized. Some form of tax 
sharing may be adopted. However, this is the subject- matter 
of a concluding chapter. 
Suffice it to point out here to the flagrant inadequacy of 
the American crediting device and the necessity of drastic 
reform in order to enhance inter -state uniformity and achieve 
fiscal equity. The credit should refer to current federal 
death taxation. The subordinate' units must be forced to comply 
with federal definitions of domicile and situs. It was 
proposed to fix the credit at 505 of federal liability on the 
amount of net estate not exceeding $ 100,000 and 25% on amounts 
exceeding 0 100,000. L.1 
(1) Heller Walter and Harris Lowell : "The Administration of 
State death axes ", Iowa Law Review. March, 1941. 
Pp.628 -673. 




Local Outlay Taxes. 
Introduction. 
The underlying units of government, in unitary and 
federal countries, find in the outlay taxes a lucrative source 
of revenue. These minor jurisdictions, are clearly precluded 
from imposing customs duties whose centralisation is a 
prerequisite of economic union, the necessary concomitant of 
the political union achieved. However, other taxes on 
expenditures can be resorted to. In many federal countries the 
secondary governments, states provinces or regions, and often 
the tertiary authorities, can levy a wide assortment of taxes 
on outlay notably sales taxes, whether general or specific.(1) 
Commenting on the recent spread of the sales taxes, 
Professor Haig and Professor Shoup state that: 
"In the history of public finance no other tax, save 
perhaps the one on gasoline, has spread so swiftly over the 
world." (2) 
(1) "Sales taxes" is here a generic term connoting a wide 
variety of general and specific taxes imposed at various 
stages; production, wholesale, retail. 
(2) Haig, Robert Murray and Shoup, Carl : 
The Sales Tax in the American States. New York, 1934. p.5. 
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In the U.S.A., there are general sales taxes on the 
production and merchanting stages. There are also specific 
sales taxes notably on liquor, tobacco, gasoline and motor - 
vehicles. They are imposed by the states, local authorities 
and cities.(1)- 
In Canada, general and specific sales taxes are also 
resorted to. Besides the provincial gasoline and special 
tobacco taxes there are retail sales taxes in provinces, for 
instance quebec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, British Columbia, 
and municipalities such as hontreal, 0 uebec City and other 
cities in the province of Quebec . ( 2 ) 
The local sales taxes are also spreading to some 
European countries after the Second War, e.g. Greece 
1 U. S. A. 
Sales Tax Burden Per Capita in Selected 
States, 1940. (3) 
State Per Capita 
California 14.27 
Níichigan 11.51 
South Dakota 7.03 
Ohio 6.69 
North Carolina 3.43 
(1) See Part One, Chapter II, Section VI. 
(2) Perry, Harvey T. : Taxation in Canada, Toronto,1951. p.33. 
(3) Somers) M. Harold : "Public Finance and National Income." 
















U. S. A. 
The Regressivity of the Sales Tax 
Approximate Amount per $1,000 of 
Income a General Sales Tax Takes 
From Different Income Groups. (1) 
Amount Taken Under 
a 2% Tax. 
and under 12.18 
- 2,000 11.72 
- 3,000 9.88 
- 5,000 8.58 
- 10,000 7.86 
- 25,000 6.34 
- 50,000 4.44 
- 100,000 3.68 
- 150,000 3.10 
- 300,000 2.42 
- 500,000 .84 
- 1,000,000' .50 
and over .20 
202. 
Amount Taken Under 














(1) The Home Owner and The Sales Tax. 
Tax Policy League. New York, 1935. p.6. 
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In India, the sales taxes, which were first resorted to by 
Madras just before World War II (in 1939 -1940) , have now spread 
to all ex- provinces of British India. At first the taxes were 
mild and did not involve food stuffs and other necessities or 
raw materials used in industry. However, in several states, 
these items are now taxed(1) and the tax rates are generally 
rising. 
In 1949, the Federal Government proposed the transfer of 
the sales taxes to the central level, against annual 
compensation, but met with much opposition from the different 
states whose rights to sales taxation have been confirmed in 
the Constitution (the sales tax on newspapers is however 
centralized) 
INDIA 
Revenue from Sales Taxes 
(Rs.crs.) (2) 
State 1946 -47 1949 -50 State 1946 -47 1949 -50 
Madras 7.22 12.45 Bihar .78 3.14 
Bombay 1.60 9.45 Central 
Provinces - 1075 
Bengal 3.60 4.00 ', & Berar. 
United Assam - .20 
Provinces. - 6.00 
Orissa - .57 
Punjab .12 .74 ' 
Total 13.32 38.30 
The same state may differentiate between luxuries and 
necessities, e.g. Bihar and Madras. 
United Nations : Public Finance Surveys, India. 
New York, 1951. p.74. 
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It is noteworthy that the resort to sales taxes on the 
local level is likely to be abused in countries, notably 
underdeveloped, where the politico -social structure is 
feudalistic, aristocratic or oligarchic. It is to be feared 
that the wide adoption of outlay taxes by the intermediate or 
tertiary authorities in the newly formed federations of 
backward areas might conduce to more fiscal inequities and 
inequalities. 
I. Fiscal Inequities and Inequalities: 
The fiscal inequities and inequalities, in their intra 
and inter -local aspects, which inhere in the locale sales taxes, 
can be appreciated with reference to industry, business and 
consumers. 
aIndustry and Business: 
The general sales taxes, on gross receipts of 
manufacturers or wholesalers, bear no relation to the amount of 
net profits. They mean either low or high e ffective rates 
according to the amount of net profits realised. This is due 
to the existence of differences, between the various concerns, 
in capital investments, indebtedness, losses and other factors. 
The tax also discriminates against new and small enterprises 
Which realise low profits relative to sales and are more exposed 
to losses than larE;e and well established concerns. ( 1) 
.(1) 
Buehler,Álfred G. "The Pros and Cons of General Sales 
Taxation." Current Problems in Public Finance. 
New York, 1933. p.244. 
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Similarly, it is noticeable that the local uniform rate 
structure, in the case of the general or retail sales taxes, 
is discriminatory, between concerns, on account of the 
differences in turnover, the varying proportions of gross 
receipts or profits to capital invested, the differences in 
marketing processes and the degree of integration. (1) 
In the case of the selective sales taxes, some local 
industries or businesses will be able to shift the tax forward 
to the consumers, while others may be unable to shift owing to 
the competition of similar or substitute commodities "imported" 
from adjoining non -taxing localities. Demand in the taxing 
area, in this case, becomes relatively elastic, and hinders 
forward shifting. 
It is to be mentioned that the integrated and inter -local 
concerns will be favoured. Multiple- process businesses will be 
at an advantage compared to single- process businesses. 
Integration mitigates the effects of pyramiding. The inter - 
local concerns can compensate the tax paid to a given taxing 
jurisdiction by profits realised within another non -taxing 
jurisdiction. Inter -local businesses can also divert orders 
to extra -local branches. 
The unequal treatment of local industrial and business 
activities can be further exemplified by reference to the 
(1) These points are further developed from another point of 
view in Part Two, Chapter IV, "Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Conflicts;' Section I "Local Taxing Powers". 
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feature of mobility. In fact, while some industries can 
easily move out of the locality, others are not mobile such as 
the extractive industries (farming, forestry, mining). In case 
the adjoining areas are non -taxing, the latter industries, 
being unable to shift the tax forward will have either to bear 
it or to shift it backward. 
As for the inter -local fiscal inequalities, they may be 
due to several factors. Simply, some localities may be taxing 
and the others may be non -taxing. This further involves 
discrimination against intra -local business compared with 
inter -local ones. Moreover, some local units may tax according 
to uniform rates while others apply variable or adjusted rates. 
The latter is more in line with fiscal equity. 
2, Consumers: 
The sales taxes are generally shifted forward to the 
consumers. The degree of shifting depends on various factors 
such as the conditions of costs and the elasticity of demand 
and supply, the degree of monopoly and also the territorial 
coverage of the taxes. (1) If the sales taxes are not levied 
at the merchanting stage (wholesale or retail) they bring 
about ax undue rise in prices through pyramiding. It is note - 
worthy that the shifting, in case the nearby areas are non- 
(1) Due, John F. : "Towards a General Theory of Sales Tax 
Incidence." The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
May, 1953. p.253. 
Hicks U.K. : Public Finance. Cambridge, 1947. 
pp.161 -185. 
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taxing, might affect the form of lower quality goods. 
The local regressive impact of the sales taxes will be 
particularly felt if the commodities taxed are necessities such 
as foodstuffs. The latter are most likely to be taxed in view 
of their lucrative character to the subordinate governments. 
However, the regressive impact will be mitigated if the 
adjoining areas are non -taxing. The demand for the local 
products will thus be relatively elastic and the local consumers, 
especially in the fringe taxing jurisdictions, will be able to 
procure tax- exempt products (or substitutes) either from 
multiple stores, or through outside purchases including postal 
shopping. 
It is clear that tangible inter -local tax differentials 
manifest themselves on account of subsequent unequal rises in 
price levels o4 the co- existence of sales taxing and non -taxing 
localities. Furthermore, the urban and farm communities will 
not be similarly burdened. The former will be relatively more 
hit than the latter which are in a position to escape the taxes 
owing to direct consumption. 
It is to be mentioned that the junior authorities may be 
driven to lay taxes on commodities "imported" from outside, in 
an effort to protect their domestic production and also to safe- 
guard the revenue productivity of their consumption taxes.(1) 
(1) These taxes are actually levied by American states under 
the name of "use taxes". See: 
Jennings, Henrietta C. : "The Development of the Use Tax ". 
American Economic Review. Dec. 1938. p.685. 
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The resort to these compensatory taxes, similar to the old 
tolls, militate against fiscal ecuity not only because outside 
cheaper or better products are precluded from crossing the 
local boundaries but also because the local residents may be 
paying the local compensatory levies in addition to the sales 
taxes impoBed on the same commodities by the other localities; 
unless a sum equivalent to the "foreign" commodity tax is 
deducted from the domestic compensatory tax. 
(1) 
II. Progression and the Sales Taxes. 
Some junior authorities may attempt to alleviate the 
regressive character of their consumption taxes. They would 
have recourse to various devices such as the exemption oT 
foodstuffs, as in some American states, or the distinction 
between luxuries and necessities, as in some Indian states, 
e.g. Bihar and Madras, or the classification of commodities. 
Graduation may be even introduced through a system of 
bracketing according to the value of the sales or the amount 
of purchases during the year. The provision of refunds, to the 
low- income groups, for taxes paid on foodstuffs, could be also 
envisaged. (2) 
(1) Maxwell games A. : The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in 
the United States. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. p.301. 
(2) In this case, however, administration would be very much 
complicated. See: 
Due J.F. : "The Sales Tax as an Anti- inflationary Measure." 
Public isinance. International Quarterly. No.4, 1951. 
p.392. 
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These devices are fraught with conflicts. The exemption 
of necessities or semi -necessities, although desirable from the 
standpoint of equity, prejudices the remunerative character of 
commodity taxation. As for graduation, it is not sound when 
appljed to individual items of expenditure. is progression in 
the income taxes must apply to personal total net income, so is 
thé case with consumption taxes. Graduation, in the latter 
must, logically speaking, apply to total annual personal 
expenditures or total disposable income minus funds not spent 
(after consideration of personal circumstances). However, such 
a tax is no more a sales tax but a direct graduated personal 
spendings tax which could only be properly adopted on the 
central level and would require a revision of the national tax 
system. ( 1) Professor Buehler suggests such a tax to be levied 
besides the normal person income tax, possibly in place of the 
surtax. ( 2) Professor Fisher advocates it in place of the 
income tax. 
Last, but not least, reference ought to be made to the 
fact that the Progression of the national tax system as a whole 
maybe seriously vitiated through substantial secondary and 
tertiary outlay taxes. 
(1) See Part Three, Chapter V, "Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Co- ordination ", Section I, "The Local Taxes." 
(2) Buehler, Alfred : "Taxing Consumer Spending." 
Bulletin of the National Tax lssociation. 
January, 19. p.123. 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
MULTIPLICITY AND OVERLAPPING. 
211. 
PRELUDE. 
Overlapping and multiple taxation, on the local level, 
\ithin the boundaries of any particular country, can affect 
two basic forms; horizontal overlapping and vertical over- 
lapping. Horizontal overlapping is either intra -local or inter - 
local. Vertical overlapping is essentially central- local.(1) 
In other terms, duplicate taxation may occur between the 
local taxes levied by the same locality, or between the local 
taxes levied by the different localities, or between local and 
national taxes. 
Clearly, the amount of overlapping and multiple taxation 
varies in direct proportion to the amount of fiscal powers 
enjoyed by the lower tiers of government. It is less in 
centralised countries, whether over -centralised or under - 
centralised, than in federal countries, whether quasi - 
federations or real federations. Federalism, in fact, implies 
a further layer of government and the regional governments are 
each, within a sphere, co- ordinate and autonomous. In 
Confederations, there may be even more overlapping. 
The intensity of overlapping also depends on the forms 
assumed by local taxation. In case of separate imposts, there 
(1) Vertical overlapping may exist between intermediate and 
lower authorities. 
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is more scope for duplication than in tax -sharing or 
percentages on central taxes. 
Fiscal equity can be seriously hindered by overlapping 
and multiplicity. A distortion of ability to pay may result 
not only from an undue burden laid on the taxpayer but also 
form the possibility of escape from taxation, either through 
loopholes or through income and capital flight to other 
localities where taxation is light or non -existent. Complete 
relief is sometimes an accompaniment of overlapping. 
In modern economic conditions a divorce occurred between 
such elements as situs, residence a:Rq- place of workt dithin 
the boundaries of the same country, there occurred a 
dissociation between "political allegiance" and "economic 
allegiance" to the junior authorities. An income -receiver may 
own real property in a local unit, reside in a second one and 
sell his labour in a third one. If he is participant in a 
business, or owns a business, the case becomes more complex. 
Asa consumer, the local resident can also suffer from 
duplicate taxation. The problem may even appear after onets 
death, particularly in a federal polity. 
If all the underlying taxing jurisdictions, in a unitary 
or federal country, adopt uniform tax provisions, much 
duplication would be averted. However, this is not always 
the case and the lack of fiscal harmony is especially flagrant 
in a federal structure of government. 
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In some countries inter -local double taxation is 
prohibited by the constitution as in Switzerland. The Federal 
Constitution of 1874, the law of 1885 and the Federal Tribunal 
in Switzerland all exert an influence in this direction.(1) 
In the U.S.A. no constitutional provision or direct legal 
enactment dealt with the problem as states have inherent 
powers. However, such clauses as the Due Process of Law can be 
viewed as an indirect remedy. The court decisions afford 
sometimes a protection. Recently the Supreme Court took a long 
step away from judicial responsibility in this connection.(2) 
li) Sack, Alexander : "Double and Multiple Taxation; The Legal 
Phase of the Problem." in 
Current Problems in Public Finance. New York University 
Symposium, 1933. p.287. 
a) State Tax Commission of Utah v. Harkness. April, 1942. 
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SECTION I. 
Overlapping and Experience. 
Central -local tax grabbing assumes increasing proportions 
and portends serious friction. The central F,overnment is more 
and more entrenching upon the field traditionally reserved to 
subordinate units. In unitary countries, land and houses have 
been re -taxed on the central level (on net income) and other 
local sources are duplicated, such as indirect taxes. It is in 
federal countries that overlapping is most acute. At the. early 
stage of federations, a clear demarcation line was drawn 
between federal sources, or indirect taxes, and local sources, 
or direct taxes. However, since the First World War, the 
federal governments have been encroaching upon local fiscal 
powers. 
Income taxation was resorted to by all nine federal 
governments to face their increasing expenditures. This was 
conducive to ineluctable conflict. (1) Death taxes were 
introduced by six more federal governments, making seven in 
total. Much multiplicity arises from the co- existence of local 
and central death duties as in Argentina, the U.S.A., Canada and 
.i e46 /IC 
Australia. G r'1y, his is e when the tax is 
(1) The extent of the conflict depends also on the nature of 
the local income taxing powers which may be unlimited as 
in the states in U.S.A., or definitely limited, as in 
the provinces in the Union of South Africa. 
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exclusively local as in Brazil and Switzerland, or exclusively 
federal as in Germany and the Union of South Africa, or when it 
is shared as in Mexico. 
As for the property tax, three more federal governments 
invaded the field bringing 'the total to six. There is some- 
times duplication as in Australia, Switzerland, Mexico and 
Argentina. 
Federal governments seeped also into the general and 
specific sales taxes and gasoline taxes thus increasing the 
opportunities for confusion. 
Various attempts were made to combate subsequent over- 
lapping and chaos. World War II witnessed a great change in 
this connection as it exerted a centripetal effect. 
The devices adopted differ in nature and degree of 
success. They feel the impact of historical development and 
central -local fiscal relations. 
Separation of sources was applied in Brazil under the 
Constitution of 1937. 
Tax sharing was adopted in Germany in 1919. Argentina in 
1934 followed suit. 
Australia was especially successful with the device of 
joint Federal -state administration before the Second World War.(1) 
l Whether the administration lied in the hands of the 
Federal government as with Western Australia, or lied 
in the hands of the constituent states. Complete 
centralisation took place in 1942 as will be seen later. 
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some Canadian provinces agreed to the same compromise before 
1941. 
It is worthy of note that efforts towards central -local 
co- ordination met with quite a meagre success in a vast 
country like the U.S .A. comprising a great number of states 
fiscally potent. 
We now give a few details on some countries. 
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I. The United States. 
Overlapping and duplicate taxation in the U.S.A. made 
their appearance after World War I. Prior to that war there 
was not much ground for tax confusion for two chief reasons: 
1- The tax system on the Federal} state or local levels, was 
very simple. 
2- Each layer of government had its well delineated taxes. 
In fact, the main source of Federal revenue was the customs 
duties, and the states were not allowed to make use of them. 
The main source of state revenue was the general property tax 
which was protected from Federal encroachment by the Federal 
Constitution. 
There were no individual or corporate income taxes, no 
death duties (apart from those used during emergencies, namely 
the Civil War and the Spanish- American War) . 
When the scope of taxation widened, during the First 
World War, overlapping grew greater, horizontally and vertically. 
The exigencies of the Second World War intensified the 
situation. In fact, Corporate and personal income taxes 
constituted the main field of tax grabbing. 
(1) "Current Problems in Public Finance." Symposium. 
New York University. New York 1933. p.276 -286. 
See also: 
Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. " 
78th Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document No.69. 
Washingtin, 1943. p.57 -62. 
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Corporate taxes were first applied on the federal level in 
1909, and on the state level in 1911, Wisconsin being first. 
As for personal income taxation, Wisconsin was first in 1911. 
The other states, spurred by the federal example in 1913, 
followed suit. There was a first surge forward between 1911- 
1921 and another after 1928. The gasoline and motor -vehicle 
taxes were Popular in the states between 1921 -28. 
At present, there is substantial overlapping in 10 taxes 
covering about 62 per cent of Federal, State and local tax 
collections. More precisely, the proportions, in 1941, were 
88.4 per cent of Federal taxes and '75.4 per cent of state taxes 
This is illustrated in the accompanying, charts (ÍÇ) ZZ2 1- 2 z 
On the municipal level, there is overlapping in the 
income taxes, tobacco taxes, corporation and business licences, 
motor -fuel taxes, motor- vehicle taxes and liquor taxes. 
In the field of the property tax, there is no much state - 
local confusion as the tax is becoming more and more local. 
Besides, the assessment and collected are integrated. 
The amount of overlapping and duplicate taxation outpaces 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Use of Overlapping Sources 
by States and Municipalities. (1) 
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o H Á 0 E.5 E Ñ A M 0 4. rn É 
Number of 
States 32 33 47 12 31 17 48 48 6 39 
Total 48 
Extent of 
Municipal (a) (b) (o) (a) (e) 
Overlapping None Some None None Some Some Some None Some 
(a) Philadelphia pioneered in 1940. Others followed. In 
1950 personal income taxes, of one type or another, 
were levied in Louisville, St. Louis, Dayton, Springfield 
and many other cities in Pennsylvania. (2) 
(b) Generally as Licenses. Sometimes as 
Orleans. 
(c) Rather general in cities in Alabama, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia. 
(d) In counties in Alabama, Mississippi 
Florida, Nevada, Missouri. 
(e) Birmingham, Kansas City, St. Louis and many cities in 
Florida. 
excises, e.g. New 
Arkansas, Illinois 
and many cities in 
(1) "Federal, Státe and Local Government Fiscal Relations." 
op.cit. p.59. 
(2) Snider, Clyde F. : "American State and Local Government." 
New York, 1950. p.578. 
221. 
Plurality of Taxing government units in the U.S .A. 
Multiplicity and overlapping are inevitable in a country 
where there are thousands of taxing authorities. 








Incorporated places (cities, villages etc.) 
Towns and Townships 18,998 
School districts 118,308 
Other Units 
Water Control 2,911 
Irrigation and Conservation 712 
Rural Road and Bridge 1,688 
Urban Improvement 227 
Urban Utility 702 
Rousing Authorities 525 
Social Conservation Districts 107 
Idscellaneous 1,510 
Total 8,382 
Total Governmental Units 165,049 
(1) Anderson, William : "The Units of Government in the 
United States." Public Administration Service. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL AND STATE TAX REVENUES. 
(1) 
DERIVED FROM OVERLAPPING SOURCES. 
(Fiscal Years Ending in 1941) 
222. 
"Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations" 
op.cit. p.60. 
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There was little overlapping in Canada, before World iJar 
z, In fact, there was virtual separation between the fiscal 
sources of the Dominion and the subordinate governments. The 
British North rsxnerica Act of 1867 specifically allotted direct 
levies to the provincial and municipal authorities and left the 
Dominion government with indirect levies. This was the normal 
pattern of apportionment since indirect taxation was the most 
lucrative. 
Besides real- estate taxation, the provinces and 
municipalities slowly developed other forms of direct taxes 
such as, death taxes, corporation income taxes and personal 
income taxes. The first two were the most important. 
(1) 
However, the pressure of expenditures induced the 
Dominion Government to entrench upon the field of direct 
taxation. There was a tax on gross receipts of certain classes 
of corporations in 1915. A war profits tax was levied in 1916. 
Apersonal income tax was introduced in 1918. By 1921, the 
Dominion Government was getting about one -third of its fiscal 
revenues from personal and corporate taxation. 
It is worthy of note that the provinces in Canada were 
first in the field of corporate and personal income taxation; 
whilst in the U.S.A., the federal government and states were in 
(1) By 1913, one -fifth of provincial tax yields came from 
death taxes, corporate and personal income taxes. 
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competition nearly simultaneously. 
The Canadian tax system developed steadily since World War 
I into a veritable hotch -potch of overlapping imposts by all 
tiers of government, federal, provincial municipal and other 
taxing bodies. There were personal income taxes in all 
provinces, provincial corporate taxes of no homogeneity. The 
death duties, combination of estate and succession duties, 
were imposed by all nine provinces and gave birth to much 
confusion and duplication.(]) In 1937 sales taxes were levied 
by two provinces and the municipalities of a third one. Motor - 
vehicle licences, gasoline taxes were in use in all provinces 
in1937. There were taxes on real estate in both provincial 
and municipal governments.(2) 
The Second World War caused an invasion of the Dominion 
Government. In 1941 it imposed inheritance and gasoline taxes. 
lore important was the relinquishing by the provinces of 
personal and corporation income taxes for the period of the war, 
by virtue of Wartime Tax Agreements extending from 1941 to 1946 
inclusive. 
When in 1947 the agreements lapsed, a renewal was accepted 
(1) The reciprocal agreements sometimes concluded between 
the provinces were rather formal and not effective. 
Moreover, they did not include the two wealthiest: 
Quebec and Ontario. 
(2) Petrie, Richards : "The Taxation of Corporate Income 
in Canada." Toronto, 1952. p.7 -10. 
226. 
by seven of the nine provinces for a further period of five 
pars. 
From the standpoint of overlapping, the abstention of two 
important provinces (Quebec and Ontario) militated against 
homogeneity and orderliness. However, the postwar agreements 
eliminated multiplicity between the consenting territories in 
the field of personal income taxation and corporate income 
taxation. In the latter case, besides the Dominion tax, the 
provinces can levy an additional 5 per cent on profits (7% in 
Quebec and Ontario) . These additions must however be imposed 
under a uniform act and must be administered by the Dorni pion 
Government which turns over the revenue to the provinces. 
Overlapping was also alleviated in the field of the succession 
duties, formerly a source of chaos. Here the Dominion 
Government allows a credit up to half its own duty. uebec 
and Ontario are still, however in the field. 
By the middle of 1951, there was no more overlapping in 
the personal income tax as it was confined to the Dominion 
Government and could no more be resorted to by any province or 
muicipality 
. (1) 
Íl) Perry, Harvey : "Taxation in C n2 da." 
Toronto, 1951. pp.28 -34. 
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III. AUSTRALIA. 
Prior to 1910, the Commonwealth taxes and State taxes were 
virtually separate. Duplication and overlapping emerged when 
the Federal Government entered the field of land, income and 
inheritance taxation. Moreover, the local imposts on land and 
buildings (based on rental value) overlap with federal and 
state taxes. 
Some figures mny be given for illustration. 
In 1912, nearly 80% of state tax revenues derived from 
income, inheritance and land taxes. In 1941, 70% of state 
taxes and 47;.% of federal taxes came from these three sources. 
The income tax is the main common fishing stream; it provides 
58% of state tax revenue and 43; of federal tax revenue. (1) 
However, overlapping in Australia never assumed the same 
complexity as in the U.S.A. 
Early efforts were made to create homogeneity especially 
in income taxes, probate duties and land taxes. The attempts 
in 1916, 1918 and 1919 were not successful. In 1920, the 
administration of the taxes of Western Australia was operated 
by the central government. The latter also administered the 
taxes on inter -state incomes. More inter -state co-ordination 
rias achieved in 1932. 
(1) Davis Solomon Rufus : Federal -State Cooperation in 
Australia. 
Ph.D. (Econ.), London University, 1950. p.332. 
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The Second World War gave the Commonwealth Government the 
monopoly of the income tax. The states were allocated sums 
equal to their previous revenues therefrom. (1) 
In 1946, the Australian Government was intent on pursuing 
the same policy of centralisation and the stated accepted. The 
replacement idea was superseded by an adjusted population basis 
considering both age distribution and density.(2) 
The State Grants (Tax Reimbursement) Act, 1946 thus 
establishes uniform income taxation until 1957.(3) 
(1) ".... it was not the need for reform as such but the more 
immediately pressing needs of war finance which actually 
brought about uniformity:-" 
Laffer: K.1 M. : "Taxation Reform in Australia." 
Economic Record. Dec., 1942. p.172. 
See also: 
Bailey: K.H. : "The Uniform Income Tax Plan (1942) ." 
Economic Record. Dec., 1944. pp.170 -185. 
(2) See Part Three, Chapter VI, Section II. 
(3) "Taxing Powers in a Federation, A Study of Australian 
Experience." 
The Round Table. Sept., 1953. p.325. 
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SECTION II. 
Local Property Taxation. 
There is less room, in local property taxation, for 
overlapping or multiplicity in comparison to other taxes. 
Referring to the local real property tax, Mrs. Hicks says that; 
"it does avoid double taxation between local and other budgets 
so long as upper layers agree to vacate this tax, as they are 
usually prepared to do." 
(1) 
There are, however, systems of local property taxation 
where duplication may arise. This is noticeable in the U.S.A. 
in real property and especially in personal intangible property. 
Concerning real property, there ought to be no duplication 
as long as location, irrespective of the owner's residence, is 
taken as the basis for taxation and as long as the jurisdiction, 
within whose boundaries the owner resides, has no right to tax 
the latter's property if it lies in some other. area. 
In the past, however, real property was sometimes subject 
to taxation at the domicile of the owner, e.g. Texas until 
1840.(2) 
Furthermore, the ownership of real property may be divided; 
the life estate belonging to one party and the remainder to 
(1) Hicks, U.I. : "National and Local Finance." Economic 
o úrñal , 1946. p .619 . 
(2) Miller, E.T. : A Financial History of Texas. 1916. p.38. 
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to another. In this case, there Fire two different assessments 
and both tax liabilities are due to the area of location of 
real property. 
(1) 
A further source of duplication, in the field of real 
property, stems from the assessment of property concernOd with 
communications such as railroads. Railroad allocation is 
fraught with considerable difficulties. It is not easy to 
determine the importance of the local areas (states) where 
traffic begins or terminates and the importance of the S'bridge" 
states. Traffic varies in intensity and the economic structure 
of the states within the country are dissimilar. The choice 
of a formula and the attempts to weight it is an intricate 
question. There are sundry formulas, e.g. the ton - 
and- passenger -miles, the relative all- track -miles, the 
relative gross revenues, the relative depreciated reproduction 
cost. Each state strives to make use of the most favourable 
formula. The outcome is that the assessment value sometimes 
exceeds 100 per cent and may readh 125 or even 150 per cent. 
The same problems arise in connection with air- transport- 
ation which is inter -state by nature and where several formulas 
are available such as route miles, passenger miles flown and 
revenue miles flown. 
(1) Jensen, Jens P. : Property Taxation in the United States. 
p.106. 
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In the case of tangible personal property, some duplicate 
taxation is also to be noticed as in some states the rule of 
situs governs, while other states apply the principle of 
"mobilia personam sequuntur" or "personality follows the 
owner ". The personal property of a non -resident owner could 
thus be taxed twice; once where it is situated and a second 
time by the state of domicile. Eventually evasion may ensue. 
In the writer's view, tangible personal property, 
permanently located outside the state, should not be liable to 
taxation by the state of residence. 
Much overlapping and multiple taxation occur in the case 
of intangible property in the U.S.A. Intangibles may be taxed 
at the owner's domicile (movables follow person) and their 
place of location or the locality where they are used in 
business (i.e. business situs) . (1) 
Moreover, it is clear that the taxation of stocks and 
bonds, issued by corporations and representing physical 
property, involves double taxation. (2) 
(1) Groves, Harold : Financing Government. New York, 1945. 
p.61. 
(2) Mills Mark Carter and Starr George W. : 
Readings in Pu is Finance and Taxation. New York, 1932. 
pp .430 -438 . 
Jensen, Jens P. : 
"The General Property Tax, The Mainstay of Local Fiscal 
Autonomy." 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. January, 1936. p.128. 
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The taxation of mortgages affords a further example of 
duplicate taxation. x farm with a property worth $ 10,000 
and burdened with a mortgage of $ 5,000 pays the property tax 
on the whole value of the real estate and the holder of the 
mortgage pays tax on $ 5,000. 
The tax burden on the mortgaged farm is, therefore, 
heavier than the burden on a non -mortgaged farm as the former 
burden comprises the tax on the farm And the tax on the 
mortgage. (1) 
Another problem, in the taxation of intangibles, is 
connected with evasion which is always possible, especially 
when some subordinate units of government do not tax 
intangible property or when the latter is subject to a 
relatively light burden. 
(1) Carl , Shoup Roy Blough Mabel Newcomer: 
acing e Tax Prob em. 
Twentieth Century Fund. New York, 1937. p.299. 
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SECTION III. 
Local Personal Income Taxation. 
The taxation of personal income, on the local level, 
bristles with technical difficulties and is fraught with 
important defects, notably overlapping. 
Overlapping, or its counterpart evasion, springs from two 
chief sources: 
1- The adoption, by the local taxing units, of dissimilar 
Imes. 
2- The varying interpretations attached, by the different 
local taxing units, to the same basis. 
3- Other causes. 
I. Origin, Residence and Overlapping. 
In the taxation of personal income, the local unit 
disposes of different criteria. It can tax income according to 
location. In other words, it confines taxation to the sources 
of income within the locality to the exclusion of other sources 
of income outside the locality. 
The local unit can also tax income according to residence. 
It thus taxes all income accruing to individuals staying in 
the locality, regardless of origin. ( 
1) 
(l) Maxwell James A. : "The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in 
'the Unified States." Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. pp.260- 
268. 
"Uniformity in State and Local Taxation" in 
in Public Finance. New York, 1933. pp.276- 
286. 






y and Johnson, Violet : "State Income Taxes." 
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Other localities may attempt a combination of both 
principles and tax residents on total net income from whatever 
source and, in addition, tax non -residents on income accruing 
to than from sources within the locality. ( 1) 
The subordinate units of government, whether states, 
provinces or regions are likely to be guided in their choice 
of basis by egoistic considerations. Iost probably, poorer 
areas will prefer the principle of origin. This allows them 
to make full use of their domestic resources and takes into 
account the fact that the under- endowed areas are generally 
unattractive to wealthy residents. 
If all local taxing jurisdictions apply the same basis, 
residence or situs , overlapping could be averted. However, 
the trouble arises when the various minor authorities adopt 
different principles in the same time. The lack of inter -local 
uniformity in this connection is a serious source of multiple 
taxation or alternatively evasion. ( 2) 
Suppose an income- receiver residing in locality A, has 
property and other flows of income in locality B. Such person 
All be taxed twice if the bases adopted are residence and 
origin respectively. If the positions are reversed and the 
(1) Vickrey, William : Agenda for Progressive Taxation. 
New York, 1947. 
Girard, Richard : The Scope for Uniformity in State Tax 
Systems. State Tax Commission, Report No.8. 




income- receiver resides in locality B, and owns property in A, 
he escapes taxation altogether. 
Similarly, the taxation, by the same locality, of 
residents on all individual income and in addition non -residents 
on income within the locality, is conducive to duplicate 
taxation whether the other taxing jurisdictions resort to the 
same practice or tax only according to residence or only 
according to situs . 
On the other hand, if some localities are income -taxing 
and others are non -taxing, cases of exemption manifest them- 
selves. ; Ihen a locality taxes only residents on all income 
but not the non -residents on local income, the latter will be 
exempt if their home locality does not impose any tax. The 
non -residents will consequently enjoy privileged treatment 
vis -a -vis the residents within the taxing locality. 
Similarly, if the taxing locality lays the tax on the 
basis of situs only and if some local residents own property 
or earn income in the non -taxing locality, they will be 
exempt and consequently are put at an advantage vis -a -vis the 
residents of the taxing locality whose property or income 
originate inside the taxing jurisdiction. 
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II. Residence, Domicile and Overlapping. 
The non -uniformity in the interpretation of some concepts 
is a further source of confusion and intermingling. The 
income- taxing local units may hold diverse views on the 
conditions of residence and domi cile. ( 
1) 
Some localities may identify residence with domicile. 
some may include domiciliaries among residents. Some others 
may distinguish between domiciled and residents. rin income - 
receiver may pay taxes to two localities, both taxing residents 
on total net income because each adopts a different set of 
alternative definitions of residence. 
The controversial character of this knotty problem has 
important implications from the fiscal standpoint. It does not 
only militate against a fair distribution of the tax burden but 
it can also adversely affect tax revenues since the questions 
of domicile and residence are of especial importance with 
regard to high- income receivers more than with low- income 
receivers. (2 ) 
The local taxing jurisdiction may choose domicile. 
Domicile is not easily subject to statutory definition. It is 
(1) Groves tHarold : Financing Government. 
New York, 1945. p.208. 
(2) Shaw, Irving L. : Domicile as the Criterion of Liability 
to Personal Income Taxation. 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1920. p.314. 
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acommon law concept. Moreover, domicile depends to a great 
extent on one's intentions and it is possible to allege 
domicile elsewhere especially for the purpose of evasion. 
Local doni- ciliaries, residing elsewhere, cannot be easily 
submitted to taxation. 
In the writer's view, an important demerit of domicile is 
that it is conducive to unsound and arbitrary results. To 
tax the total net income of a person who was not within the 
boundaries of the locality during the year (or for several 
years) simply because he is domiciled therein, and to exempt 
a person actually residing in the subordinate unit, enjoying 
its protection and services for the simple reason that he has 
not the intention of making his home there indefinitely (or 
did not abandon his previous home) does not sound logical at 
In order to cope with this incongruity and other flaws, 
it seems preferable to adopt residence as a basis for local 
income taxation. Residence will have to be defined as 
remaining within the local unit for a specified period of time 
during the taxable year, for example six or seven months. It 
will thus be possible to tax all persons within the local 
boundaries regardless of their intentions concerning the 
(1) Keesling, Frank M. : The Problem of Residence in State 
Taxation of Income. 
California Law Review. September, 1941. p.720. 
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duration of their stay. It is necessary to uniformise and 
generalise the principle in all local taxing jurisdictions. 
However, there are still difficulties which indicate the 
inherent intricate character of the problem of local income 
taxation. The resident may not pass the prescribed period 
within the subordinate unit, whether intentionally or not, and 
so may escape taxation altogether. Inter -personal fiscal 
inequity arises from the fact that two local residents, having 
the same income are not equally treated although they may have 
passed the same lapse of time in the same areas one is taxed 
because his period lies within the taxable year whilst the 
other is untaxed because his period falls partly in one 
taxable year and partly in the succeeding one. Loss of revenue 
maybe also caused to the local taxing jurisdiction through 
frequent change of residence. It is true that, eventually (in 
difficult cases) , a presumption of residence could be taken as 
being the maintenance of a permanent place of abode within the 
locality, or its maintenance for a specified period during the 
taxable year. However, a person may maintain different Places 
of abode in several localities and thus become subject to 
duplicate taxation. 
In any case, it is to be mentioned that what is needed to 
avert overlapping and multiple taxation is just the universal 
adoption, by all underlying authorities, of the one and the 
same principle of taxation, either residence or situs.(1) 
(i) For our suggestions see Part Three, Chapter V, Section I. 
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To sum up, these considerations reveal the complexities 
underlying local income taxation and makes necessary the 
recourse to some fundamental reforms. Inter -local tax credits 
are advisable in case both residence and situs are used 
concomitantly by diverse localities or simultaneously by the 
same locality. The problems which inhere in the credits are 
expounded below. More drastic reforms are advocated such as 
the central -local sharing of centralised income taxation or at 
least the centralisation or federalisation of the administration 
and collection of the locally levied income taxes whether the 
latter affect the form of independent levies, or tax supplements 
on the central tax. 
However, this is the subject -matter of the two last 
(1) 
chapters. 
(1) See Part Three: "Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination." 
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III. Inter -Local Credits and Overlapping. 
If the bases of residence and situs are applied 
simultaneously by different local units within the same country 
or by the same local unit, it is possible to avert multiple 
taxation thanks to the provision of inter -local tax credits. 
However, the problem is complex and account must be taken 
of the basis of taxation applied (residence, situs or both), 
the type of credit provided for (resident credits or non- 
resident credits) and the nature of the credit (conditional or 
unconditional, unilateral or reciprocal). If multiple taxation 
in some cases can be coped with, it is, in other cases, still 
present or, eventually, the taxpayer may enjoy total exemption. 
In case some localities adopt residence and others situs, 
duplicate taxation can be averted as long as all the local 
units without exception agree to granting the one and the same 
type of credit, i.e. either resident credits or non- resident 
credits. It is thus immaterial whether the locality of 
residence provides credits for taxes paid to other localities 
on "extra -territorial" income or the locality of non -residence 
El-yes credits for taxes paid to the locality of residence on 
(1) Credits to non -residents will generally be on a reciprocal 
basis. It is noteworthy that such credits, if widely 
adopted, lead to sacrifice of situs to the advantage of 
residence. The unconditional credits to residents favour 
situs. See: 
Heer, Clarence :, "Reciprocity, A Critical Appraisal of 
its Possibilities," Nátional Tax Association, Proceedings. 
1940. p.350. 
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income earned in the non -resident locality. The important 
thing lies in the universal adoption of either urinciple. 
If both resident credits and non -resident credits are used 
simultaneously by different localities within the same country, 
there will be either duplicate taxation or complete evasion. 
Indeed, if some localities grant residents a credit for taxes 
imposed by other jurisdictions and some provide for non -resident 
credits to compensate for taxes paid to the locality of 
residence, residents of the latter who derive income from the 
former will not obtain credits in any locality. On the other 
hand, if some local units allow residents a credit for taxes 
levied by other localities and some allow non -residents a 
credit for taxes imposed by the locality of residence, residents 
of the former, to whom accrues extra -territorial income from 
the latter, will be in a position to escape local taxation 
altogether. 
(1) 
If both resident and non -resident credits are used 
simultaneously by the same local unit, two credits may be 
claimed by the same person and total exemption ensues. 
In the latter case, and in general, it seems appropriate 
that the local unit uses a bilateral credit system in which 
resident and nonresident credits are applied, discriminately 
Íl) It is noteworthy that the universal and unconditional 
provision of credits to reaiñents, when all localities 
adopt residence, is conducive ultimately to the taxation 
on the basis of situs without its concomitant of income 
partition or the divisibility of ability to pay. 
C 
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according to the attitude of the other taxing jurisdiction. 
In other words, the credit to residents would be confined to 
taxes imposed by other localities which do not allow credit to 
non -residents. This relieves the residents from duplicate 
taxation and the incongruity of both localities of residence 
and non- residence providing for credits to the same person is 
eliminated. 
On the other hand, non- residents would be denied credits 
for taxes imposed by the locality of residence if the locality 
of residence of the non -residents allows an unconditional 
credit to its residents. 
(1) 
It is clear that non -residents would be subject to 
multiplicity if their locality of residence taxes income of 
residents from outside sources and in addition taxes income of 
non -residents from local sources but does not grant credit to 
either residents or non -residents. (2) 
It ought to be mentioned that even if the various local 
units, taxing according to residence and situs, agree on the 
universal application of one type of credit, i.e. either 
resident or non -resident credits, there may still persist some 
Partial duplicate burden not only because the tax paid to the 
(1) See our suggestions concerning inter -local credits in the 
Epilogue or Part Three, "Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Co- ordination." 
The Interstate Commission on Conflicting Taxation. 




locality of residence is likely to be higher than the tax due 
to the locality of situs, notably in the case of local 
progressive taxation, but also on account of the possible 
inter -local tax differentials (caused by tax provisions and 
rate schedules) exhibited by the different local units. 
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IV. Inter -Local Overlapping and Experience. 
The problems outlined above are a pointer to the 
intricacies and difficulties involved in income taxation, of 
persons or business, on the local level, whether in unitary or 
federal countries. The inequities ushered in are a deterrent 
to this mode of local taxation, especially if the subordinate 
units are small and the country as a whole is highly 
industrialised. 
The only acceptable cases may be the new federations 
formed of more or less agricultural areas with little income 
ramifications such as the Central African Federation, 
Pakistan, Lybia or the proposed British Caribbean Federation 
and the East African Federation. Some particular types of 
federatiors are most amenable to regional income taxation. 
We have in mind the proposed four -tier federation of Pakistan 
intercalating one further layer, namely the western and eastern 
regions. 
Highly industrially developed countries like the U.S.A. 
actually suffer, to an appreciable extent) from the same 
maladies already briefly diagnosed. Indeed, we see, in 
application, dissimilar bases in state income taxation. 
Wisconsin adopts situs, Delaware adopts residence, the state of 
New York combines both as it taxes residents on all income and 
non -residents on income derived from sources within the state. 
The heterogeneity of interpretation of residence and domicile 
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is also present between non -situs states. California does not 
tax a domiciliary if he has a residence elsewhere. New York 
exempts domiciliaries who maintain no permanent place of abode 
in the state. However, Delaware and Louisiana interpret 
domicile merely as being citizen of the state. 
As concerns the inter -area tax credits intended to cope 
with overlapping, non -uniformity of practice unfortunately 
exists in the U.S.A. in inter -state relations. The desired 
objective is thus often not reached. In fact, some states 
(about five) allow credits to non -residents; instances being 
provided by Iowa, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and 
West Virginia. Some other states grant credits to residents 
i.e. Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi and Vermont. 
Other states (about six) provide for credits to both residents 
and non -residents; Alabama, California, Kentucky, Maryland, 
New Mexico, Virginia. 
Last, but by no means least, the problems of overlapping 
connected with local income taxation, are the more accentuated 
the smaller the taxing areas. If, besides regions, provinces 
or states, the municipalities enter the field, spurred by 
financial need, we shall be grappling with further complications. 
Before World War II, many municipalities in Canada, 
especially in the Maritime Provinces, used to collect 
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considerable amounts in income tares. (1) These were 
relinquished to the Dominion Government during the war. 
However, in the U.S.A., there is a clear and unfortunate 
tendency, since 1940, toward municipal income taxation. Both 
geographical and coverage extensions are noticeable. 
Philadelphia pioneered in 1940. Toledo followed suit, as well 
as many other cities such as St. Louis, Louisville, the Ohio 
cities of Columbus and more than 40 cities and boroughs in 
(2) 
Pennsylvania. While the Philadelphia tax covered only 
salaries, wages and net profits of unincorporated businesses 
and professions, the Toledo tax extended to corporate profits 
aswell.(3) (All local personal income taxes yielded 44 millions 
in 1948) . 
The dual trend of municipal income taxation, whether in 
the U.S.A. or elsewhere, portends serious obstruction of tax 
justice. 
(1) Brittain, Horace : "Local Government in Canada." Toronto, 
1951. p.97. 
Curtis, C.A. : "Municipal Finance and Provincial Federal 
Relations." The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science. August, 1951. p.297. 
(2) Beck, Liorris : "The Philadelphia Income Tax: A Solution 
to Municipal Financial Difficulties." in Bulletin of 
National Tax Association. Dec. 1947. 
(3) The differences between municipal and state income 
taxation in U.S.A. are that the former allows no personal 
exemption and their rates are low and uniform rather than 
graduated (they range from 1/5 of 1% to 16, but, who knows? 
they may increase in future). See: - 
Snider, Clyde : "?''that can Cities Tax Next ?" in National 
Municipal Review, May 1949. pp.212 -218, and 
"American State and Local Government." New "fork, 1950. 
P.578. 
U.S.A. The Diversity of State Individual Income Taxes, 


























S: $ 8.00 
M: 17.50 
D: 4.00 
Graduated: 14 per cent on 
first $1,000 to 5 per cent 
on excess over $5,000. 
Graduated: 1 per cent on first $10,000 to 6 per 
cent on excess over 
$30 , 000 . 
Graduated: 2 per cent on 
first $1,000 to 7 per cent 
on excess over $9,000. A 
tax credit of 10 per cent 
is currently applicable. 
Graduated: 1 per cent on 
first $1,000 to 7 per cent 
, on excess over $12,000. 
Teachers' retirement 
surtax of 16.23 per cent 
of the normal tax less 
$37,50. 
Additional surtax of 25 
















4 Kimmel, Lewis H. : Taxes and Economic Incentives. 
Washington, 1950. p.204 -205. 
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SECTION IV. 
Local Business Taxation. 
In modern economic conditions of industrial expansion and 
business integration, the ramifications of manufacturing or 
mercantile concerns stretch all over diverse localities within 
the same country. An enterprise may be located in an area, 
buy raw materials in another, stock them in a third, manufacture 
them in a fourth and sell the final products in a fifth area. 
A given stage may even be amenable to further splitting. Sales 
may be contracted in a local unit and actually delivered in 
another. 
On the local level, business may be subject to taxation in 
two ways; taxation according to some indices or taxation on net 
income. Both cases usher in varying amounts of overlapping and 
multiplicity. 
In the case of specific taxes, the same indices may serve 
to lay several taxes under different guises. As for net 
corporate income, it is a sound basis for business taxation on 
the central level. However, when transplanted to the local 
level, it degenerates into a source of substantial overlapping 
tether the local units adopt the "origin tax" pattern or the 
"residence tax" pattern, as will be expounded in due course. 
In the field of local business taxation, duplicate 
taxation affects two forms; "that by competing jurisdictions or 
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authorities, and that by the same jurisdiction or authority." (1) 
Clearly the more the lower tiers of government and the wider 
their fiscal powers, the more the confusion and. intermingling. 
I. Taxes On Other Than Net Income. 
The underlying units of governments, especially in a 
federal polity, have enough latitude to impose a variety of 
taxes on some rough measure of the volume of business. 
Sundry criteria are available such as the capital stock, 
hereditaments, payroll, costs of production, volume of output, 
volume of sales, gross receipts. The trouble is that the 
indices may be used more than once, totally, partially or in 
different combinations by the same taxing authority or by 
competing taxing; authorities. Lioreover, there may be great 
variations in the application of local taxes of the same type. 
It is deemed necessary to refer to some specific instances 
to allow a clear appreciation of the problem. Let us take the 
U.S.A. where the states, especially in the south, make an 
extensive use of specific business taxes, 
There are the arbitrary "occupation taxes" of 
multifarious types of which about 150 exist in Alabama alone. 
These imposts are assessed on items already subject to taxation 
(1) Seligman, Edwin R.A. : Essays in Taxation. New York, 
1928. p.98. 
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of some form or another (either local net corporate income 
taxes or other local specific taxes). These items cover a wide 
range; premises, kind or size of equipment, volume of actual 
production, kind or size of products and so on. (1) There are 
also many Severance Taxes based on the volume or value of 
natural products severed from the ground, e.g. coal, oil, 
The taxation of business physical property and intangibles 
evidently involves duplication. Taxes on gross receipts also 
lead to the same results. 
The "capital stock tax" levied by about two- thirds of the 
lmerican states, is a cause of much duplication. The tax is 
imposed on corporations for the privilege of engaging in 
business in a corporate capacity. They are based either on the 
market value of the stock or on the par value of securities 
issued or authorised. The states have the legal right to tax 
all securities issued by the business they incorporate.(2) 
The overlapping assumes important proportions when the 
states levy also "corporate excess taxes" on the difference 
(1) Hansen, Alvin and Perloff, Harvey : State and Local 
Finance in the National Economy. New York, 1944. p.45. 
(2) Some states, e.g. Lichigan, tax only the portion of 
capital stock employed within their boundaries. 
In fact, capital stock alone is not an accurate picture 
of the capital of the corporation. There are the bonds 
and other indebtedness. 
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between the capital value of the corporations as measured by 
par or market value of their capital stock (and sometimes 
bonds) and the actual or assessed value of their real and 
(1) 
personal property. 
In spite of the great variety of the specific business 
taxes they accounted for only about 11 per cent of total state 
tax revenue. "Their yield certainly does not justify their 
troublesomeness and the high compliance costs they entail." (2) 
II. Taxes on Net Income. 
The core of the problem in this field lies in the 
existence of inter -area business income. Tax grabbing may 
induce the local units to tax the entire net income of the 
"domestic" concerns, regardless of jurisdictional source. 
This naturally results in serious multiplicity as the other 
local units are also entitled to tax flows of income 
originating within their sphere. 
The undesirable consequences inherent in the taxation of 
inter -local corporate income can be obviated by confining the 
local tax to income accruing within the taxing unit alone. In 
(1) Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. 
78th Congress, 1st Session - Senate Document No.69. 
Washington, 1943. p.455. 
(2) Hansen and Perloff : op . cit . p.46. 
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other terms, if cosmopolitan corporate income could be 
apportioned adequately between the various localities 
horizontal overlapping would be averted. 
Various devices for apportionment are open to the taxing 
localities. The main point is to have one universal device. 
The criterion chosen must be also homogeneous and not diversely 
interpreted, otherwise overlapping will still persist. 
We may now review the various devices. 
Separate Accounting: 
From the fiscal equity viewpoint this is probably the most 
desirable device. However, it is beset with difficulties. 
In "separate accounting ", the local concerns keep their 
accounts so as to show the amount of profit realised in each 
local subdivision. In other words, the local branch of an 
enterprise is considered as a separate accounting unit. 
However, the difficulties are numerous. From the 
theoretical point of view, the method is not consistent with 
economic unity. Indeed, it is hardly conceivable to segregate 
the various interdependent or complementary processes of an' 
enterprise or to consider that a profit has been realised at any 
particular stage. 
From the point of view of practicability, an important 
(1) 
(1) Carroll, M.B. : "General Survey of Allocation Methods," 
Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises. League of 
Nations, Geneva, 1932. 
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problem arises from the necessity to price the goods transferred 
from the concern to a subsidiary or associated one. Professor 
T.S. Adams believes in the possibility of building up factory 
prices in case they do not exist and finds the method of 
separate accounting superior to others. 
However, the underlying problems are intricate. The 
appropriate invoice price is not easy to ascertain. The output 
of the manufacturing concern may not be all sold to the trading 
affiliate at the same price or yield the same rate of profit. 
Hcomparison between the concern and other similar ones lacks 
accuracy. Many expenses and receipts, such as overhead, will 
require some form of pro -rating allocation. Moreover, the 
billing price to a branch may be made so high as to restrict 
the profits of the branch. The various charges (interest, 
services , etc.) may be also subject to varying methods of 
calculation. 
It is important to point out with Professor Hatfield that, 
"It is impossible to frame a system of cost accounting 
applicable to establishments of different character."? (l) The 
technical knowledge involved, especially in the case of highly 
integrated concerns may be lacking in the tax commissioners, 
especially on the local level. The expenses caused either to 
fil) Hatfield, H.R. : "Accounting, Its Principles and Problems" 
New York, 19g-8. p.397 and after. 
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business or to the authorities are a further handicap. 
In short, "the testimony of experienced accountants is 
that a system of separate accounts for branches or 
subsidiaries is, in the majority of cases, impracticable." (1) 
In these conditions, it is necessary to search for some 
/1444.141-4 
other alternativelto inter -local business income. 
,Ratio of Local to Total Expenses: 
Some propose to proceed to the allocation of inter -local 
corporate income on the basis of the ratio of expenses 
incurred by the concern within the local unit to total expenses. 
yin important concomitant of the method consists in the 
reduction of fixed capital investment to equivalent annual 
charges. 
The advantage of this device over separate accounting is 
that it comolies with the sound concept that a business is a 
single unit. If it has, as a whole, realised a profit, the 
various local units where the subsidiaries are located will be 
entitled to tax these branches even if any particular one does 
not show a profit. The tax will thus be based on a pro rata 
share of total net income defined by the proportion of local 
annual expenditures of the concern to its total expenditures. 
Conversely, if the business, as a whole, suffers a loss, no 
(1) Report of the Committee on Uniformity and Reciprocity 
in State Tax Legislation. 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1931. p.306. 
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In the writer's opinion, this method is, however, open to 
criticism on two main grounds. From the practical point of 
view a local unit will not easily consent to leave untaxed a 
branch which has produced profits. It may be argued, on the 
other hand, that a locality is empowered to tax an unprofitable 
concern. However, as there is little connection between the 
ratio of local to total expenses and taxpaying capacity, the 
locality may be reluctant to inflict any harm on unprofitable 
local business for fear of depleting a source of revenue. 
Furthermore, the method is discriminatory and dis- 
equalizing between well -off and under- privileged areas. Local 
expenses are variable. Sometimes they are high as in 
manufacturing. Sometimes they are low or too small to give any 
substantial yield as in the case of sales. 
Different accounting problems are also noticeable. The 
translation of capital investment into equivalent annual 
expenses raises the question of property valuation with all its 
intricacies (which basis: original cost? reproduction cost: 
prudent investment? ... ) 
To sum up, the device discussed does not seem to be a 
satisfactory or workable one for the local units to use. 
(1) Howard, M.S. : ''Elimination of Double Taxation of 
Corporate Net Income." The National Tax Magazine , 
Sept. 1930. pp.329 -331. 
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,Allocation Fractions: 
The local business taxing units can proceed to the 
allocation of inter -local income in some rough way instead of 
assigning business income item by item to the locality. A 
criterion for allocation is thus adopted. The allocation 
fraction or formula may be composed of an element or several 
elements according to the views of the locality on the proper 
criterium and according to the dominant character of local 
business. ( l ) 
One may mention a wide range of formulas inwhich not only 
elements change but also the weighting used. A few instances 
can be given. ( 2 ) 
S = sales or gross receipts ratio. 
T . the value of tangible property ratio. 
C = the cost of manufacturing, mining or selling ratio. 
P _ purchases ratio. 
R = payroll ratio. 
OS. Costs of sales ratio. 
G = accounts receivable, bills for sales or services rendered. 
H stock of other corporations. 
(1) Blakey, Roy and Johnson Violet : "State Income Taxes ". 
New York, 1942. p.59 -71. 
Adams, T.S. : "Allocation versus Apportionment." 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1931. p.346. 
(2) See Chapter One: Section III "Fiscal Equity and Local 
Business Taxation." 
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The formulas may or may not be weighted. Here are some 
vreighted formulas which a local unit can adopt: 
s+T+CS S+T+C S+ C S+ T+R S+T ._----- 
3 3 2 3 2 
T+ R + CS T + R + CS T + G + H R + P + S ____----- 
3 3 3 3 
15% T + 15 ó R + 70% S. ) 
The method of apportionment formulas has many advantages. 
It is simple, flexible and, from the administrative point of 
view, economical and efficient. 
However, certain defects and sources of overlapping are 
noticeable. They may be outlined here. 
1- The structure of the allocation formulas: Choosing an 
allocation formula is not an easy thing for the local taxing 
unit to do. Does the situs of taxable income coincide with 
physical property or sales or costs or payroll? How to proceed 
to weighting? What relative importance to give to manufacturing 
or warehousing or distributing? Should the non- business income 
of the corporation for instance from intangibles be considered 
part of total net income for the purpose of applying the 
allocation fraction? 
(1) Bl y and Johnson. : op.cit. Supplement to p.66 
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Whether the allocation fraction is composed of one element 
or more it is essentially arbitrary since it is founded on some 
approximation of taxpaying capacity and not on an accurate 
computation of local income. If the ratio of local physical 
assets to total assets is adopted, the business may be subject 
to local taxation while it did not realise any profit within 
the taxing jurisdiction. 
A further source of trouble stems from the fact that the 
components of the allocation fraction do not adequately respond 
to the multifarious types of businesses carried out within the 
boundaries of the local unit. If a formula based on real 
property or costs suits manufacturing, it does not suit trading. 
The local taxing authority is thus faced with two 
possibilities which both lead to overlapping and multiplicity. 
It may try to widen the basis of the formula by combining a 
certain number of elements and thus open the door to more 
confusion. It may prefer to devise two or more allocation 
formulas for the use of the different local businesses or leave 
to local business itself the option between alternative 
formulas. This might work injustice against local business in 
the way expounded in next point. 
2- Het ó eneity in local allocation formulas; In the writers s 
view the chief source of confusion and overlapping arises from 
the adoption, on the local level, of dissimilar allocation 
fractions. The local units, professing different views on local 
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taxpaying capacity, can put a repressive burden on business and 
tax it at more than 100 per cent of its total income. (1) 
This result occurs whether the local unit uses a single 
fraction or a dual fraction, of the simple type or of the 
composite type. 
Let us consider first the case of the single fraction. 
Locality A bases the fraction on real property. Locality B 
bases it on sales. A concern located in A will be taxed there 
on the assumption that property is the pointer to its income. 
The same concern, transacting the greatest part of its sales in 
B, is liable to tax there on the assumption that sales, and not 
property, are the measure of its income. 
If a business operates in two local units, which each 
applies the dual fraction system (for instance each having a 
fraction for manufacturing besides another for trading) , there 
will clearly be overlapping, even if both couples of formulas 
are similar in the two localities, since the concern may be 
dealing with manufacturing in an area and distributing trade in 
another. 
We can illustrate these facts with reference to the U.S.A. 
The business-income taxing states use about twelve basic 
allocation fractions. Weighting ranges from zero to 100 per 
cent. The variety of formulas is thus wide especially that 
(1) See Part One, Chapter I: Section III "Local Business 
Taxation." 
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different interpretations can be attached to the components of 
the formulas. A corporation claimed to be subject to 30 
formulas. 
c Ford Robert S. : "The Allocation of Corporate Income 
for the- Purpose of State Taxation." State Tax Commission, 
Report No.6. New York, 1933. p.93 and p.100 -106. 
Duplicate Taxation Resulting From The Application 
of Varying Formulas. Li) 
State 
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Example No. I 
Property Gross Allocation Approximate 
Receipts Factors Percentage of 
Taxable 
Income. 
Connecticut $5,000,000 $1,000,000 Property 




$6,000,000 $5,000,000 163.33 
Example No. II 
Property Payroll Gross Allocation Approximate 
Receipts Factors Percentage of 
Taxable 
Income. 
lout ,$5,000,000 $3,000,000 $1,000,000 Property 62.5 
etts 2,000,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 Payroll 33.5 
se 1,000,000 1,000,000 3,000,000 Gross 33.5 
Receipts 
$8,000,000 $5,000,000 $9,000,000 129.5 
(1) Ford, Robert : op.cit. p.103. The examples are of 
informative value. 
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Advantages of the Uniformity in Application of 
a Formula. (1) 
1- The Tennessee Formula: Gross Receipts. 





Connecticut $5,000,000 $3,000,000 $1,000,000 11.11 
Massachusetts 2,000,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 55.55 
Tennessee 1,000,000 1,000,000 3,000,000 33.33 
$8,000,000 $5,000,000 $9,000,000 99.99 
2- The Massachusetts Formula: Property, Payroll 
and Gross Receipts 





Connecticut $5,000,000 $3,000,000 $1,000,000 44.54 
Massachusetts 2,000,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 33.52 
Tennessee 1,000,000 1,000,000 3,000,000 21.94 
$8,000,000 $5,000,000 $9,000,000 100.00 
Q----- 
(1) Ford) Robert : op. cit. p.103. The examples are of 
informative value. 
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In support of our contention that a uniform method for 
income apportionment is most desirable, we may quote the 
Committee of the National Tax Association: 
"From the standpoint of the taxpayer, uniformity between 
states is by all odds the most essential requisite. It might 
make little difference to the taxpayer whether he is taxed on 
seventy -five per cent of his income at the place of manufacture 
and twenty -five per cent at the place of sale, or vice versa, 
so long as he is taxed only on one hundred per cent altogether. 
The fairest apportionment rule conceivable would be of little 
help to the taxpayer if only one state adopted it and the 
others continued to use a different rule.(-) 
As already pointed out, the Massachusetts formula has 
been recommended for general use in the U.S.A. especially by a 
committee of the National Tax Association. ( 
1) 
The formula runs 
as follows: 
Average value of Payroll within state Gross Receipts 
tangible property + within state 
within state 
Average value of Total Payroll Total Gross 
total tangible Receipts 
property 
Uniformity in the use of one formula would hold taxable 
., 3 
(1) Report on "Uniformity and Reciprocity in State Taxing 
Legislation." 1933. 
For g general discussion of this formula see: 
Blakey and Johnson : op.cit. p.65 -76. 
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income to 100 per cent. However, even in this case there may 
still be ground for overlapping as explained in next point. 
3- Conflicting Interpretations of Allocation Fractions: 
Some components of a given allocation fraction may be 
susceptible of different interpretations and thus open the door 
to varying definitions which ultimately generate overlapping 
even between the localities which apply the same formula. 
Certain elements are particularly indefinite in this 
connection such as sales. Sales can be taxed in: 
a- the locality to which payment is made. 
b- the locality from which the commodity is shipped. 
o- the locality to which the commodity sold is shipped. 
d- the locality where the order is accepted or the contract 
sanctioned. 
e- the locality from which the billing is made. 
f- the locality where the products are manufactured. 
More generally, the sales may be construed as the sale of 
goods within the locality wherever manufactured or the 
manufacture of goods within the locality wherever sold.(1) 
In the U.S.A., the Massachusetts formula which is gradually 
spreading, is interpreted differently in the different states, 
as between Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, New Mexico. This fact 
impairs the beneficial effect of uniformity.(2) 
(1) Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. 
op.cit. p.429. 
(2) Blakey and Johnson : op.cit. p.68. 
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III. Argentine Provincial Business Taxes 
and Overlapping. 
In Argentine, the overlapping in provincial business 
taxation, is not only intra-lccal but also inter-local. 
As concerns the first aspect, it is clear that the 
imposition, by the one and the same jurisdiction, of license 
taxes as well as profitable activities taxes, entails multiple 
taxation on provincial businesses. An example, in this respect, 
is afforded by the Province of Corrientes. 
As for the second aspect, namely inter -local overlapping, 
it can be illustrated with reference to the situation in 
Buenos Aires where both the provincial authorities and the 
municipal authority of Buenos Aires levy almost the same sort 
of tax on annual gross receipts since 1949.(1) 
The outcome was clearly a great deal of conflicts and 
confusion. In consequence, the two taxing authorities reached 
an agreement which it would be interesting to reproduce in 
order to reveal the main issues which lie under inter -area 
duplicate taxation; 
(2) 
Article 1 - The profitable activities to which the present 
(1) See Chapter One on "Fiscal Inequities and Inequalities," 
Section III "Local Business Taxation." 
(2) Economia y Finanzas. Buenos Aires. June, 18, 1953. 
p.34. 
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agreement refers are those which are exercised - in one, in 
several, or in all their stages - in both jurisdictions, but 
whose gross receipts, originating through a single process, 
economically inseparable, ought to be attributed jointly to 
the two. 
Article 2 - Save that provided for particular cases in the 
following articles, each Treasury will tax, of the total gross 
receipts originated by the activities that are the object of 
the present agreement, the proportional part of the effected 
expenditures supported in its jurisdiction when any of the 
following circumstances is verified: 
a) the industrialization takes place in one jurisdiction 
and the commercialization in the other, either totally 
or partially. 
b) all the stages of industrialization and 
commercialization take place in one jurisdiction, but 
the direction or administration is exercised in the 
other; 
c) the principal seat of the profitable activity is in 
one jurisdiction and there is effected regular sales 
or purchases in the other through the intermediary of 
agents, branches, etc. The accidental, purchase by 
mail, or in any form that does not amount to a regular 
activity, will not be considered as a taxable 
activity in the jurisdiction in which realized. 
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Article 3 - In the cases of construction companies that have 
head office in one jurisdiction and execute works in another, 
the same criteria as above will be followed, except any amount 
in concept of salaries to engineers, architects, etc. in the 
employ of' the business cannot be deducted from gross receipts. 
Arti cle 4 - In the cases of insurance, capitalization, and 
saving companies that exercise activities in both jurisdictions, 
there will be taxed in each one of them that part of the 
premiums, quotas or contributions that amount to a remuneration 
for their services, the income of securities, and whatever 
other investment of their reserves, in proportion to the 
expenditures supported in it. The income from real estate will 
be taxed in the jurisdiction in which the same is located. 
Article 5 - In the cases of bannf9k whose principal seat is in 
one jurisdiction, but which have branches in another, each 
Treasury will tax the gross receipts of the establishments 
situated in its jurisdiction. 
Article 6 - In the cases of transportation companies that 
exercise their activities in both jurisdictions, each one will 
tax that part of the gross receipts corresponding to the 
Passengers and freight contracted in it. 
Article 7 - In the cases of the liberal professions exercised 
by persons that have their offices in one jurisdiction, and 
exercise activities in the other, each jurisdiction will tax 
one -half of the salaries provided by these activities. 
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Article 8 - In the cases of auctioneers, commissionists, etc., 
that have central office in one jurisdiction and operate in the 
other, each Treasury will tax one -half of the gross receipts of 
these operations. 
Artie 9 - In the cases of mortgage lenders that are not 
organized in form bf businesses, and that have their domicile 
in one jurisdiction and the guarantee is constituted on real 
estate in the other, each jurisdiction will tax one -half of 
the gross receipts originated by these operations. 
Article 10 - The expenditures that are mentioned in Articles 
2, 3 and 4 and that must serve as the base for distributing the 
gross receipts between both jurisdictions, are those that 
originate through the exercise of the activity taxed. Also 
computed as expenses: wages and salaries, fuel, repair and 
conservation, rent, insurance premiums, advertising, interest, 
taxes and the amortizations allowed by the income tax law. 




Local Death Taxation. 
The resort, by junior governments, to taxation at death, 
bristles with inter -area entanglements, and central -local 
duplicate burden. These problems are ushered in by the co- 
existence of the same type of tax at different levels as well 
as by the diversity in tax provisions. 
Various factors are deemed to aggravate the problem in 
modern conditions: 
the expansion and diversification of wealth and income and 
their dispersion all -over the regional areas of the same 
country in an uneven way. This situation is, inevitably, 
conducive to horizontal overlapping owing to the knotty points 
of domicile, residence and situs. 
The scramble for resources, motivated by the new socio- economic 
philosophy, involves the minor authorities in an unhealthy 
competition inter se or with major authorities for appropriation 
of large shares at death. The outcome is a diversity of imposts 
by type (estate taxes, inheritance taxes and other variants) and 
by region, causative of an unfair fiscal burden. 
The entrenchment in federal countries, since the World Wars, of 
federal government upon the death tax field, which was generally 
considered as a right of subordinate authorities. The reason 
for the latter fact, was that the death taxes were viewed as 
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direct taxes and these, in turn, were constitutionally reserved 
to the states or provinces. 
From the standpoint of overlapping and multiplicity, the 
death taxes must be either federal or regional. The federal 
taxes are largely a replica of the state or provincial taxes 
and, as such, constitute a duplication. Clearly, it is highly 
desirable to centralize the death taxes. If, however, they 
continue to be imposed by more than one layer of government, 
there ought to exist an adequate system of tax crediting 
tereby a tax credit is granted against the central (or 
federal) tax for the payment of the regional tax (state or 
provincial). Moreover, inter -regional uniformity in tax 
provisions must be introduced or fostered. If the tax credit 
does not absorb the entire local tax and if the local tax 
provisions exhibit diversities, there will still be scope for 
duplication and overlapping. The practice in the U.S.A. 
provides, in this respect, considerable instruction. The tax 
credits are not only Partial, but are also computable on an 
obsolete tax base. (1) 
1. Inter -1,ocal Overlapping. 
An illustration of the confusion and intermingling which 
accompany territorial death taxes, is afforded by an example. 
(1) See Chapter I, Section IV. 
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A decedent may be a resident of locality A, his heir a 
resident of locality B. The wealth consists of real property 
in locality C, shares or stock (intangibles) deposited in 
locality D. The business's physical assets represented by 
the intangibles are scattered in several localities E, F, G. 
This business sells in many local areas H, I, J', in the 
country under consideration. (1) 
Locality A can have a claim to impose death taxes on the 
basis that the deceased was domiciled there. The tax reaches 
all the decedent's property including movable property existing 
in other areas, according to the principle "mobilia sequuntur 
personam." The thesis of locality A thus assumes that the 
taxable situs of the bequest is in the locality of the 
decedent's residence. Locality B can lay a further claim based 
on the fact that the heir is domiciled within its boundaries. 
Locality C is also entitled to tax since the real property is 
situated there. Locality D has a similar right as regards 
intangibles. (2) 
(1) At the death of a wealthy tobacco manufacturer in the 
U.S.A., some time ago, it was claimed that his wealth 
was formed through the contribution of farmers and 
consumers all over the country and that no one state 
could tax alone just because the deceased happened to 
reside there. 
(2) Groves, Harold : "Financing Government." New York, 1945. 
pp.238 -240. See also: 
Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations" 
78th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No.69, 
Washington, 1943. pp.241 -248. 
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Other localities may claim to tax a proportion of the 
shares equal to the real property they represent when that 
property is located within their confines. This would lead to 
the taxation, by a local unit, of a non -resident on shares in 
business concerns owning physical property in that local unit. 
The basis of this view is that the concern is a legal fiction 
and is merely an agent for its stockholders and that the stock- 
holders are entitled to acquire real assets by winding up the 
company. This source of overlapping actually obtained in the 
U.S.A. in some states but is no more allowed (since it was 
objected to by the Supreme Court in 1939(1) ) . 
In the writer's view, the company and shareholders are 
separate entities. Legal right to all the concern's property 
is vested in the concern itself and not in the shareholders. 
It thus appears that intangible property is an important 
source of inter -area confusion. Local tax grabbing results in 
a tendency to adopt the most suitable (or profitable) basis 
Porthe local budget. Industrialised localities would be 
naturally inclined to adopt residence as a justification for 
taxation since the local residents, capitalists or more 
generally investors, own proportionately more intangibles than 
residents in less industrialised or less populous areas (for 
instance agricultural) . The latter areas, judging that the 
(1) Groves, Harold : "Financing Government." p.239. 
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principle of residence does not suit them , would prefer to 
adopt other bases notably the location of intangibles. 
Such conditions obtain in countries like Canada and U.S.A. 
where some subordinate units are im rkedly more industrialised 
than others. In Canada, the prosperous provinces of ruebec 
and Ontario can be contrasted with other provinces. In U.S.A., 
the eastern states, controlling the bulk of the country's 
capital prefer residence, whilst the western and southern 
states clearly prefer the principle of situs. 
Domicile is a source of considerable confusion and is 
responsible for much overlapping. Domicile rests on intent 
which is a difficult thing to prove. More than one domicile 
may be assigned to the subject- matter of taxation. The inter - 
local differences in the interpretation of domicile also 
result in duplicate taxation. ( 1) 
The general problems outlined so far can be made more 
intricate by the special circumstances prevailing in some 
countries. 
In the U.S.A. the states which granted the corporation's 
charter possess the power to subject its intangibles to 
(1) Committbe on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations - 
Intergovernmental Relations in the Death Tax Field: 
Multiple Taxation, in 
Groves, Harold : Viewpoints on Public Finance. p.233. 
Also: 
Burkhead, Tesse V. : Double Taxation and Jurisdiction to 
Tax: Bulletin, Mational Tax Association No.9. June 1940 
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taxation even though the owner of the intangibles is not a 
resident of the chartering state. Some of these states went so 
far as to tax such shares when transferred from a deceased non- 
resident to a non -resident recipient. Although this practice 
Vas made illegal by the Supreme Court in 1932, it was 
re- instated in 1942, 
(1) 
thus sowing the seeds of more tax 
confusion in future. 
II. Local Reciprocal Agreements and Overlapping. 
Inter -Local multiplicity may be alleviated through 
reciprocal agreements between the local taxing jurisdictions. 
This should be especially resorted to in the case of the 
taxation of intangibles of non- residents which should be 
exempted. Naturally a locality giving such exemption without 
reciprocity is at a disadvantage. 
The remedy suggested is not easy to generalise owing to 
the fact that the less wealthy and less populous local areas 
vhich stand to gain financially more from the taxation of non- 
residents than from that of residents, would be disinclined to 
grant exemption of non -resident's intangibles even with 
(1) Maxwell, J.A. : "The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the 
United States." Cambridge, Elassachusetts, 1946. p.349. 
%) National Tax Association, Proceedings of the National 
Conference on Inheritance and ;state Taxation, 




An interesting complication may arise in some countries. 
intangibles may be bought in connection with a business in a 
state in U.S.A. in order to acquire a business situs there, 
but the state may consider that the basis of taxation is the 
location of intangibles and not the owner's domicile. The 
owner may escape taxation altogether if his intangibles are 
located in a state that gives reciprocity while he is residing 
instill another state. 
Accordingly, some r.merican states, e.g. New York, exclude 
from reciprocity agreements intangibles owned by non -residents 
with an aim to acquire a business situs in the state. 
Chaotic was in too, 
Vor1d War II. Problems, similar to those sketched above, 
assumed great proportions especially in connection with 
intangibles. Professor Harvey Ferry notices that; "there has 
been constant litigation as to the situs of deposits in a 
branch bank, real estate mortgages, negotiable instruments, 
bonds and shares of incorporated companies and simple contract 
debts ." (2 ) 
The transfer taxes were indeed, in Canada, an important 
(1) Report of Committee of the National Tax Association on 
Reciprocity in Inheritance Taxation. 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1927. p.414. 
(2) Perry Harvey : "Taxation in Canada." 
Toronto, 1951. p.193. 
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source of provincial revenue prior to last war and yielded more 
than the corporate and individual income taxes together even in 
1937. The achievements of the agreements, which were reached 
between 1907 -1937, were unsatisfactory as far as overlapping is 
concerned. They were often formal and seldom effective. 
Besides, Q?uebec and Ontario, the richest provinces were 
adamant in refusing to cope with the problem. Cancellations of 
agreements followed in succession after 1937. _lberta notably 
cancelled its arrangements with Ontario, British Columbia and 
New Brunswick. Before *.lorld War II there remained only the 
agreement between New Brunswick and British Columbia. 
Recently, however, much overlapping was mitigated after 
the Dominion -provincial Tax Rental agreements referred to above. 
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SECTION VI. 
Local Outlay Taxes. 
Horizontal and vertical overlapping make their 
appearance in this field if the lower tiers of goverment are 
empowered to lay substantial indirect imposts. The customs 
duties have long been relegated to the central level. The 
excise taxes are now half -way. By far, the most serious 
menace of confusion and intermingling stems from the increasing 
tendency towards local taxation of sales under various forms; 
general, specific, wholesale or retail taxes, single -point or 
multi-point. 
The danger looms large and portends serious duplicity and 
overlapping (or eventually evasion). Two main factors cause 
this situation. 
First: The financial pressure on the local budgets induces 
the junior authorities to resort to a practical, cheap and 
lucrative source of revenue, namely the consumption taxes. 
The rise in living standards, the increasing urbanisation and 
the diversification of consumption militate in favour of this 
tendency. The local expenditure taxes are thus increasing in 
numbers, coverage and rates. The outcome may be an intricate 
maze of heterogeneous imposts eventually conducive to chaos 
especially in a federal polity with manifold taxing jurisdictions, 
(1) Buehler Alfred : Public Finance. New York, 1948. 
pp .428-434. 
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second: The federal governments which, hitherto, generally 
left their minor authorities with this field, now begin to 
entrench upon it. 
A word may now be said, before further development, about 
inter -local commerce. 
Although inter -local transactions in the U.S.A. may not 
be taxed, the courts generally upheld the doctrine that 
"interstate commerce may pay its way." The differences in 
fiscal regulations between the states do not make it possible 
to put inter -state transactions on an equal foot with domestic 
transactions. If both states involved tax inter -state commerce, 
duplicate taxation ensues. On the other hand, if both 
authorities abstain from imposing any tax, in an attempt to 
protect such transactions, complete exemption results.-) 
(1) Newcomer, Mabel : Taxation and Fiscal Policy. 
New York, 1940. p.60. 
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I. Overlapping in Local General Sales Taxes. 
(1) 
Intra -local overlapping may be caused by the co- existence 
of various types of general sales taxes including the taxes on 
gross income or gross receipts. 
Inter -area overlapping is accentuated by a widening and /or 
deepening of the coverage of such imposts. widening is a 
horizontal spreading of the tax embracing a larger number of 
commodities. A deepening is a vertical movement of the tax 
subject from the retail stage to the manufacturing stage. 
A further source of multiplicity could be pointed out. 
The junior taxing authorities may be driven to levy 
compensatory taxes on commodities "imported" from adjoining 
localities in an effort to safeguard their revenue since the 
local residents may make direct purchases especially in the 
non -taxing areas. However, the other localities may also have 
sales taxes or may levy taxes at a later time. Consequently, 
if the former locality does not- provide for credits, to offset 
outside taxes, the local residents, paying the compensatory 
taxes on "imported" commodities, find themselves subject to 
double taxation. 
(1) The general sales taxes comprise a wide range of products 
and are imposed at one or more of the following stages; 
manufacturing, wholesale, retail. The specific sales 
taxes are laid on individual commodities separately. 
(2) Lutz, Harley Leist : Public Finance. 
New York, 1936. p.634. 
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It is noticeable that an unnecessary burden is laid on the 
non -resident, who is momentarily staying in the taxing locality, 
and who buys from the non -taxing locality since the non- 
resident may intend to use, or consume, the commodity in his 
locality of residence. ( 1) 
The local compensatory taxes are akin to the old tolls 
and, as such, constitute a hindrance to inter -local trade if 
pushed too far as will be seen in due course. ( 2) 
In the U.S.A., twenty -seven states, in 1948, had sales 
taxes of sufficient coverage to be considered as general sales 
taxes. Although some applied to manufacturers and wholesalers, 
most referred to retailers . ( 3) In Washington and West Virginia, 
there are both retail sales taxes and gross receipts taxes. 
Few American municipalities had retail sales taxes prior 
to World War II. Examples are New York City, New Orleans, St. 
(1) Loundes : State Taxation of Interstate Sales. 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1934. pp.139 -148. 
Haig and Shoup : The Sales Tax in The American States. 
New York, 1934. p.92. 




See Part Two, Chapter IV "Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy 
Conflicts." 
Snider, Clyde F. : American State and Local Government." 
Yew York, 1950. pp.575 -576. 
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Louis and Kansas City. After the Second World War, the number 
of taxing municipalities increased. In 1948, 50 cities of over 
10,000 population impose retail sales taxes, 42 are in 
California. (1) 
In Canada, there is a Dominion manufacturer's sales tax 
of10 per cent and Provincial retail sales taxes in Quebec, 
New Brunswick, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Saskatchewan. 
There are also retail sales taxes in municipalities, notably 
Lontreal and Quebec City and several other cities in the 
province of Quebec . (2 ) 
As for the compensatory taxes, referred to above, they are 
actually levied in the U.S.A. by most of the states (except 
four) and some municipalities (which have sales taxes) under 
the name of "use taxes". The use taxes are imposed on use, 
consumption or storage of commodities.purchased outside the 
taxing jurisdiction and which, if purchased inside the locality, 
would have paid the local sales tax. Seven states out of the 
states applying use taxes, do not provide a credit and 
consequently open the door to duplication. 
The following tables disclose the increasing role played by 
the sales taxes imposed by the states, municipalities and other 
minor authorities in the U.S.A. 
11) The most usual rate is 0.5 %. Some cities levy 1%. See: 
Kimmel, Lewis H. : Taxes and Economic Incentives. 
Washington, 1950. pp.130 -131. 
(2) Perry, Henry J. : Taxation in Canada. Toronto, 1951. p.33. 
The Dominion manufacturing sales tax is so important that 
it yielded in 1946 9.3 per cent of the national government's 
tax collections. 
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U. S. A. 
1, Relative Importance of State Sales Taxes.(1) 
Percentages 




1931 26.99 16.47 10.07 
1938 48.27 12.13 12.84 
1941 52.41 12.89 12.19 
(a) These cover general sales taxes and various specific taxes 
notably on gasoline, tobacco, liquor and soft drinks. 
2. Sales Tax Yields in Selected Cities. (2) 
City Percentage of City Revenue 
New York City 3.1 
St. Louis 5.4 
Kansas City 2.8 
New Orleans 40.0 
(1) Hansen and Perloff : "State and Local Finance in The 
National Economy." New York, 1944. p.64. 
(2) Somers, Harold : "Public Finance and National Income." 
Toronto, 1948. p.442. 
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3, Sales and Use Taxes as Percentages of Total State 
Tax Collections. 
Selected States - 1947 (i-) 
State Per Cent 
of total 
taxes 
State Per cent 
of total 
taxes 
California 34.5 Missouri 41.7 
Colorado 31.6 North Carolina 18.3 
Illinois 39.4 Ohio 28.9 
Indiana 36.0 Oklahoma 24.1 
Iowa 34.9 South Dakota 32.2 
Kansas 35.2 Utah 30.7 
Louisiana 12.0 Washington 44.3 
ichigan 47.7 West Virginia 53.1 
DI Buehler, Alfred : "Public Finance." New York, 1948. p.346 
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Sales Taxes and Motor- Vehicle Licenses as Percentages 

















1931 43.5 1936 61.2 61.7 
1932 47.0 1937 54.5 60.6 
1933 49.7 1938 48.8 60.4 
1934 57.5 1939 49.8 62.7 
1935 61.1 1940 51.2 64.4 
1941 52.4 65.3 
01 Hansen and Perloff : op. cit. p.37 
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II. Overlapping in Local Specific Sales Taxes. 
Inter -area and central -local overlapping and multiplicity 
may also exist in the case of the specific sales taxes if both 
central and junior authorities levy sales taxes on the same 
individual items. In order to study the implications of this 
case let us take some instances from the U.S.A. where selective 
sales taxes are not only levied by the states but also by 
lower authorities including many municipalities. In 1948 37 
cities levied tobacco taxes, 26 cities had taxes on alcoholic 
beverages and 30 cities had motor fuel taxes. (1) 
Our investigation of overlapping in the field of the 
specific sales taxes covers the triple -deck tobacco, gasoline 
and liquor taxes. 
Importance of Tobacco, Gasoline and Alcoholic Beverages 
Taxes 1939 (Millions of Dollars) (2) 
Tax Federal State Local Total 
Gasoline 207.0 800.1 4.4 1,011.5 
zLlc oho 1ic 
Beverages 587.5 212.1 3.3 803.0 
Tobacco 597.9 58.0 5.1 642.9 
(1) Kimmel, Lewis : op. cit. pp.130 -131. 
(2) Tax Research Foundation, Tax Systems, 8th ed., 
Chicago. 1940. p.314. 
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Tobacco Taxes: Much overlapping, or alternatively evasion, 
occurs as three layers make use of them: the Federal Government, 
thestates(1) and the municipalities.(2) 
The states collect the tax from wholesalers, but some- 
times from retailers in case the latter buy across state 
boundaries. Use taxes are resorted to in case of consumers' 
outside purchases. 
It is worthy of note that much evasion, the counterpart of 
overlapping, occurs in inter -state sales of cigarettes. There 
is probably 20 per cent evasion. The wholesalers can settle 
near the border and obtain direct orders from consumers in the 
neighbouring taxing state. The consumers 
tax through mail purchases. Furthermore, 
difficult to follow the sales along their 
can also escape the 
it is sometimes 
voyage: they may be 
made in one subdivision, shipped in another and billed from a 
third. 
In the writer's view, the tax should be left to the 
Federal Government and some sort of tax sharing should be 
adopted possibly on the basis of local population. 
'Gasoline: : This is an important source of revenue for the 
Federal Government and the minor governments. All states levy 
(1) 
(2) 
The states entrenched increasingly upon this field since 
1921. In 1941 there were 29 taxing states. By the end 
of 1949, there were 40 states. 
Such as St. Louis, 
in Florida. See: 
Tax Policy. vol.9 
Kansas City, Birmingham and many cities 
Tax Institute "Tobacco Taxes ", 
No.l. November, 1941. 
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gasoline taxes and the rates range from 2 cents to 9 cents per 
gailon.(l) The tax is also imposed by many localities and 
municipalities, such as Alabama, Eissouri and New Mexico, and 
afew countiiies. 
AS a source of overlapping, the gasoline taxes afford an 
important example and come after income taxes and payroll taxes. 
The following table discloses the amount of overlapping.(2) 
Yields 1940 % of Total Yields 
Federal % 257,420,000 23 
State 852,674,478 76 
Local 4,500,000 1 
Total 1,114,594,478 100 
There is much tax avoidance in connection with inter -state 
shipments especially as distributors operating in a certain 
amber of states with varying tax rates can pay the lowest rates 
and sell in the state with the highest rates. 
Nearly all states have "use taxes" on purchases outside 
testate. This leads to the problems already discussed.(3) 
(i) In 1948, the state revenues amounted to about 1.3 billions. 
A portion goes to local authorities. See, 
Kimmel, Lewis. op.cit. p.130 
(2) Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. 
Senate Document No.69. Washington, 1943. 
N3) Henry, Thomas P. : "The Motor- Vehicle Tax Problam." in 
Groves, Harold: Viewpoints on Public Finance. New York 
1947. p.376. 
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Tax sharing here would be also preferable. 
Liquor Taxes: Lultiple taxation and overlapping stem from two 
facts. First, all three levels of government make use of 
liquor taxes. Second, they affect various forms and have 
different rates: besides the specific excise taxes, there are 
occupation taxes, license taxes on distilled spirits, wine and 
beer. (1) 
A further point is worthy of notice. According to the 
twenty -first Amendment a state is free tó impose discriminatory 
taxes. Michigan, recently, imposed its own products 4 cents 
(per gallon) as against 50% on outside products. Discrimination 
is thus also practised between state and state and not merely 
against outside products. ";'Tars of Retaliation" and "Border 
wars" naturally ensued. 
III. Sales Taxes and Evasion. 
A certain amount of evasion takes place where intermediate 
and tertiary authorities resort to sales taxes as in the U.S.A. 
and India, especially in the single -point system. A trade 
estimate puts the evasion in the State of Bombay at about 50 
percent and in some markets as high as 70 per cent.(2) 
(1) Groves, Harold : Financing Government. p.303. 
(2) The Economic Weekly. (Indian Periodical) . Tan., 26. 1953, 
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Various incentives induce evasion particularly when 
business is slack and competition is keen. The consumers also 
play their part for their own benefit. 
Apart from the traders' desire to enhance profit -making 
by appropriating the equivalent of the tax, there is the desire 
to cut prices to compete with other traders and the attempt to 
escape income taxation. 
The methods used for sales -tax avoidance, are numerous. 
The following may be mentioned. 
1. Purchasing goods on cash without receipts or selling them 
without book- entries or cash memos. 
2. Obtaining false receipts from private road carriers 
showing that the commodities have been sold outside the taxing 
locality while in fact they are being sold internally tax -free. 
3. Buying outside the taxing area and selling inside without 
reference in the accounts. The outside dealers are under no 
obligation to submit returns to other taxing authorities. 
Trading on bogus registration numbers. Sales tax 
registration numbers could be obtained cheaply in the name of 
bogus firms or they may be acquired from traders going into 
liquidation. The commodities would thus be sold without 
taxation. 1) 
(1) The Economic Weekly. op.cit. 
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In India, meddling in registration numbers has become, in 
some cases, a regular business. 
It is noteworthy that the recourse to the multi -point 
sales tax system would practically eliminate the latter factor. 
Last, but not least, it appears that-evasion is fostered 
by non -efficient administrative machinery, lack of honesty 
among government officers and the inability of the minor 
governments to check inter -area transactions. 
Furthermore, the lack of uniformity in the taxes as 
imposed by the different lower authorities, cannot but militate 
in favour of tax avoidance. 
Clearly, the centralisation of the sales taxes, and the 
distribution of the proceeds according to some criterion, 
would cope with the problem if the assent of the local 






P R E L U D E 
TWO changes, one quantative and the other qualitative, 
exerted major effects on local expenditures. 
WAGNER pointed ot to the tendency for central and 
local expenditures to increase steadily. In his well -known 
lee, he asserts that: 
"Comparison of the past and present situation of 
different countries shows that among progressive peoples, 
with which we are alone concerned, an increase regularly 
takes place in the activity of both the central and local 
governments. This increase is both extensive and intensive; 
the central and local governments constantly undertake 
new functions; while performing both old and new functions 
more efficiently and completely. Public economic activities 
increase at the expense of private economic activities, and 
the collectivistic character of the whole national economy 
becomes in consequence, more pronounced." (1) 
The "Welfare State: as successor to the "Liberal State", 
was further responsible for an upsurge of expenditures to 
cope with new services or promote the standards of already 
performed services. Social services, health, education and 
other aspects of welfare were either created or developed. 
(1) WAGNER, Adolph: "Allgemeine oder theoretische Volks - 
wirtchafts- lehre." 
Vol. I, Grundlegung 1876 P.260. see also 
GROWS, Harold: "Financing Government." New York, 1945. 
PP. 468 -484 
2 Ar 
War and the inflationary price movements have 
a definite impact on central and local expenditures 
by reason of the rise in the costs of administration 
and services, (l) 
The qualitative changes are functional changes. 
Centripetal forces, set off by the new concept of 
economic planning or simply by war, induced structural 
changes in local finances. These centripetal forces 
are two -fold. They involve a transfer of functions 
from the local level to overlying layers or to the 
central level. They also involve a shift of local 
revenue sources to intermediate authorities or to 
the central level. The two. required movements are 
traceable in unitary and federal countries alike. 
To the extent that functions are taken off 
the shoulders of subordinate government units, the 
move towards the centre mitigates the local financial 
burden. However, the transfer of revenue sources 
has an opposite effect since it deprives the local 
budgets of funds. 
The net effect of these two constituent elements 
of the centripetal forces depends on their relative 
strength. 
The result was detrimental to the local treasury 
whether in unitary or federal countries 
(1) SYKES, Joseph: "A Study in English Local Authority 
Finance." London,l939pp 1 -58 
(2) BUCHTRR,Alfred: "Public Finance." New York 1948 p.52 -88 
HANSEN and PERLOFF: "State and Local Finance in the 
National Economy." New York 1944.pp.1 -34 
In federal countries, the entrenchment upon 
the lower governments' taxes was already gaining 
ground before World War II. During and after 
the Second War this tendency made headway. In 
Canada and Australia the lucrative income taxes 
were monopolised by the federal government. 
Although agreements granted compensations to the 
provinces or states, these subordinate units were 
virtually deprived of a potential source of income 
which is irreplacable. 
In unitary countries, some transfer of local 
revenue sources took place. Indeed the wave of 
,rationalisations depleted the local trading profits 
by weakening municipal socialism that was in vogue 
in some countries. The vital factor in the 
embarrassment of the local finaces in unitary 
countries is the inherent inelasticity of the local 
fiscal powers in those countries, further accentuated 
by the inflationary spiraling of prices. 
It is worthy of note that the alleviative 
element of the centripetal forces. viz. the 
centralisation of services is not absolute. New 
responsibilities are constantly added to the local 
authorities. In federal countries, some services 
even reverted to the state level as happened, for 
instance, after the Second World War. 
? elir 
ENGLAND AND WALES 








1875 28.8 1.26 
1880 36.3 1.46 
1885 44.1 1.62 
1890 48.2 1.68 
1895 59.7 1.96 
1900 76.0 2.36 
1905 107.7 3.17 
1910 125.8 3.52 
1915 153.3 4.11 
1920 265.5 7.07 
1925 354.9 9.12 
1930 425.1 10.68 
1937 484.6 11.8 
1942-3 694.3 16.4 
1944-5 729.1 17.0 
1945-6 779.9 - 
(l) FIN.R, Herman: "English Local Government." 
London 1950. p.394 
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1 - Increase in State Expenditure 1890 - 1946 
(Millions of Dollars) (1) 





























2- Increase in Expenditures of Local Governments 
1890 - 1946 
(Millions of Dollars) (1) 
Year Amount Year Amount 
1890 487 1940 5,64o 
1903 913 1941 5,553 
1913 1,783 1942 5,219 
1920 4,035 1943 4,873 
1925 5,196 1944 4,604 
1930 6,071 1945 j,015 
1935 4,583 1946 5,121 
(1) Grants from other governments, trust -fund 
financing and debt retirement are excluded in 
both tables. The amounts for 1946 in the first 
table and 1944 and 1945 in the second are preliminary. 
BUeHLBR,Alfred: P.53 and P.75 
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Increase in Provincial Expenditures 1911 - 1947 (1) 
Year Amount £ f Year Amount £ 
1911-12 2,883,569 1931-32 11,557,257 
1918-19 5,212,710 1935-36 13,835,803 
1920-21 8,417,256 1939-40 16,539,398 




Increase in State Expenditure 1938 -1948 (2) 
( £'000 ) 
,Year Total L Petal-Lead Year Total L Per Head 
1938 -39 128,159 18/10/8 b1946 -47 173,857 23/4/1 
1944 -45 167,238 22/16/9 1947 -48 197,720 25/19/6 
1945 -46 165,588 22/7/5 1948 -49 226,425 29/3/0 
(a) Based on men population of each financial year 
(1) Official Year Book 
Union Office of Census and Statistics, Pretoria. 
No.25 - 1949 P.616 
(2) Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 
No.38 - 1951 P.8O6 
S E C T I O N : I 
LOCAL ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY 
The introduction was a foretaste of the financial 
difficulties which loom in local budgeting. We 
now analyse the factors which account for the inherent 
inadequacy of the local taxing powers. 
The fiscal capacity of a local area is based on 
its economic capacity. A study of the latter thus 
reveals the revnue potentials of the area. 
When the various factors of production are 
considered in connection with the subordinate units of 
government, the following points can be noticed 
T The Uneven Inter -Local Distribution 
of Economic Resources: 
The factors of production, ca-)ital, labour and 
management, are unevenly spread over the local units 
of a given country. Some localities may be endowed 
with rich resources(l) and possess a high revenue 
potential and tax windfalls resulting from the 
existence of investment projects. Other localities 
(1) Such as mineral resources, industrial dquipment, 
good transportation system, accessibility to markets, 
skilled labour.. 
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may suffer from inadequate resources and may lack 
taxable funds. No necessary corollary can be 
expected to exist in a restricted area between needs 
and taxable resources. 
The population is unevenly spread over the 
country's subdivisions. A large proportion may 
be concentrated in one area and the ratio of population 
to natural resources becomes high. In Germany more 
than half of the total population was in Prussia. 
In Au stralia, Canada, the Union of South Africa and 
Argentina more than one- fourth of the population is 
in a sin.4e state. Among the federal countries, the 
U.S.A. and Mexico are the only ones where 10 per cent 
or less of the population is located in the largest 
state (New York and VerACruz respectively).(1) 
In some countries for instance the Middle East, 
some local units may have a nomadic population and 
some others a more settled population. In the former 
case, the taxable resources may not be always easy to 
reach. 
The result is the existence of inter -local 
disparities in per capita wealth and per capita income. 
These increase in direct proportion to the number of 
multiplex and small local units. 
(2) Stateman's Year Book. 
oi 
It is worthy of note that, uná.er perfect 
competition, the population tends to migrate.from 
poor regions to rich ones in such a way as to 
smooth differences in per capita income. Wealthy 
areas would have correspondingly more people to 
support. 
Under conditions of controlled economy, the 
local economic and fiscal capabilities feel the 
impact of national planning. The inter -area 
discrepancies may be either accentuated or mitigated, 
The effect of central planning and full employment 
policies on local taxable capacity will be more 
'appropriately discussed next section. 
The deficiency of local resources and their 
uneven distribution are conducive to inter -local 
competition to acquire or retain taxable resources. 
This strife may lead to economic maladjustments and 
to disharmony in local tax systems. Efforts to 
co- ordinate the latter become difficult. Pressure 
groups and local vested interests constitute a 
hindrance to co- operation. 
Professor Hansen and Professor Perloff remark 
that, "Throughout the country, the existence of 
small local units makes for inequality in tax burdens, 
with some units reaping the gains of unjust enrichments 
while the residents of other anits must bear an unduly 
heavy burden in taxes." (1) 
(l) HANSEN, A. and PERLOFF, H.: "State and Local 
Finance in the National Economy." New York 1944 P085 
The unequal distribution of economic and 
taxable resources carries important implications 
in under- endowed areas which are only monotaxing. 
foam araa 
for semi -monotaxing powers often prevail in unitary 
countries. In such cases, the local authorit0 
deficient in or deprived of the right type of 
taxable resources, find themselves in a vulnerable 
position. 
The situation in a federal polity is different. 
Here the underlying units of government are often 
pluritaxing. They have the choice between a wider 
variety of levies and can adopt those mere in line 
with their natural endowments. However, this 
pluritaxing capacity may be badly exploited. The 
local unit, in its lust for funds may turn to inequitable 
imposts, hardly related or totally unrelatea to ability 
to pay. Local business may be subject to taxes on 
nominal capital, gross receipts and other fees. 
Outlay taxes, especially sales taxes, may be multiplied. 
The simplest canons of taxation will be thus infringed. 
On the expenditure side, the uneven distribution 
of resources may result, in some localities, in higher 
costs for the same service, in sub -standard services 
or in a smaller amount of services per capita. 
TABTRS : I. 
REGIONAL POPULATIONS AND AREAS 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
1. Inter -Area Disparities in Population and Rateable 
(Excludin the County of London) 
Value (1) 
Denomination Population Product of ld Rate 
CA) 
1.Adm.inistrative Counties 
Lar;est 2,186,000 88,143 
Smallest 17,820 466 
2.County Boroughs 
Largest 1,063,000 29,125 
Smallest 23,780 855 
3.Non- County Boroughs. 
Largest. 178,590 7,600 
Smallest 876 12 
4.Urban Districts 
Largest 211,550 8,550 
Smallest 707 16 
5.Rural Districts 
Largest 79,940 1,102 
Smallest 1,200 98 
(1) Snmmurised from: 
Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission, 
For the Yeab 1946 
H.M0S.Oo London, 1947 PP.6 - 7 
- POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 
BETWEEN COUNTIES AND COUNTY BOROUGHS (1) 
(Excluding London) 
Population Range Counties County Boroughs 
Less than - 50,000 5 4 
50,000 - 75,000 5 16 
75,000 - 100,000 3 13 
100,000 - 150,000 6 23 
150,000 - 200,000 4 11 
200,000 - 500,000 24 12 
500,000 - 1,000,000 8 3 
Over 1,000,000 6 1 
61 83 
(1) Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission 
For the Year 1946 Pao 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES (1) DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION in 9 
Country Date Largest State and Smallest State and 
Proportion of Proportion of 
Population Population 
Argentina 1940 Buenos Aires 26.55 La Rioja 0.84 
Australia 1938 New South Wales 59.48 Tasmania .38 
Brazil 1938 Minas Geraes 17.26 Matto Grosso .85 
Canada 1931 Ontario 33.07 Price Ewd Island .85 
Germany 1933 Prussia 61.55 Schaumburg -Lippe .08 
Mexico 1930 Vera Cruz 8.32 Colima .37 
Switzerland 1930 Bern 16.94 Appenzell I -Rh .34 
Union of South Cape of Good Orange Free 
Africa 1937 Hope 36.35 State 7.91 
United States 1940 New York 10.24 Nevada .08 
c - LÜC.L AREAS in 9 FEDERAL COUNTRIES 
Country Number Largest State by Smallest State by 
of States Area Area 
Argentina 14 Buenos Aires 10. 97 Tucuman 0.82 
Australia 6 Western Australia 32. 81 Tasmania .88 
Brazil 21 Amazones 22.33 Sergipe .46 
Canada 
9 Quebec 15.10 Prince 
Ewd Island.06 
Germany 17 Prussia 62.52 Bremen .05 
Mexico 
28 Chihuahua 12.41 Tlaxcala .20 
Switzerland 
22 Graubunden 17.22 Basel -Stadt .09 
Union of South 
Africa 4 
Cape of Good 
Hope 58. 61 Natal 7.68 
United States 48 Texas 8.82 Rhode Island .04 
(1) Statesman's Year Book. (Theterm "state" covers provinces 
and cantons.) 
3 e 
- - - 
Region 
London aa1.1 o ast 464 
Midland 595 
East and West Ridings 303 
SOUt 393 
North 1:L-11-and 392 
Eastern 
Scotland 




Northern Ireland 348 
2 - ANNUAL AVERAGE EARNINGS. (1) 
Region Per Earner Per Capita (Index) 




Midland 320 110 
Northern 316 92 
North iiidlardd 315 100 
Wales 314 82 
North-Western 308 104 
East and West Ridina's 308 102 
Eastern 307 82 
Southern 302 85 
Scotlarid 300 92 
South Western 295 81 
Northern Ireland 249 66 
(1) D7-77i7,1T:1-7, Lit s , "Regional Variations in United Kingdom 
Incomes fryi:i F_.,-._,,77Tient." Paper read before the Royal 
Statistis,1 Jan.1953. Miss Dean, of the Department 
of H-1,27 of Cambrid.Fe University also computed 
the 7able .blished in rin article of: 
UTTING, "Inco. e Estimates For Small Areas." in 
Local G ver=nt Finance, Journal of The Institute of 
Municipal 11:surers and Accountants, June 1953. P.140. See Also 
1.1e_2pt of the. 3'ommissioners of H.M.Iniand Revenue for the year 
ended 31st March 1952. H.M.S.°. (Cmd.8726). The report 
analyses by counties the 1949-50 income census. 
3 01 
U.S.A. (1) 
Per Capita Wealth in Selected Taxing Jurisdictions. 






High to Low 
6 Regions, 1930 $4,519 $1,663 2.7 to 1 
48 States, 1930 7,264 1,298 5.6 to 1 
316 Massachusetts towns, 1935 10,736 407 26.4 to 1 
1,624 Illinois townships, 1938 11,720 365 32.1 to 1 
932 New York towns 1929 15,956 370 43.1 to 1 
11,378 Illinois school disty cts 352,109 357 986.3 to 1 
- Per Capita Income and Per Capita Income Tax Collections 
In Selected Taxing Jurisdictions (1939) 
Jurisdiction High Low Ratio of 
Value Value High to Low 
Per Capita Income 
6 Regions $680 $296 1.3 to 1 
48 States 848 203 4.2 to 1 
77 Oklahoma Counties 
115 Oklahoma Local Divisions 
Per Capita Income Tax 
liability 
$3.34 1 cent 334.0 to 1 
4.66 2 mills 2,330.0 to 1 
(1) Federal State and Local Government Fiscal Relations. 
78th Congress, 1st Session Senate Document No.69 
Washington, 1943. P.190 
3,4 
3 - COMPARISON OF INCOME 
SIX HIGHEST AND SIX LOWEST STATES. (1) 
1940 





Nevada 960 2 
Connecticut 864 4 
New Jersey 852 8 
Delaware 836 18 
California 819 1 
New York 814 6 
Tennessee 325 39 
Georgia 321 WI 
South Carolina 281 46 
Alabama 264 45 
Arkansas 253 47 
Mississippi 195 48 
fil) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations." 
op. cit. P.192 














1929 $ 680 $ 252 ,$ 1,191 
1930 596 191 1,179 
1931 500 143 1,088 
1932 380 125 926 
1933 368 123 806 
1934 420 162 876 
1935 460 177 955 
1936 531 218 1,124 
1937 561 207 1,107 
1938 509 185 1,044 
1939 539 201 1,031 
1940 575 202 1,080 
1941 693 283 1,101 
1942 862 396 1,305 
1943 1,040 483 1,479 
1944 1,133 541 1,519 



































1 Johnson, Byron L. : 
The Principle of Equalization Applied to the Allocation of 
Grant s -In -Aid . 
Federal Security Agency - Social Security Administration. 
Bureau Memorandum No. 66, Washington, 1947, p. 117. 
' 
U. S. K. 
Disparities in State Expenditures Per 'Capita, 19WIW! 
Six Larest and Six Smallest States. (1) 













(1) SOMERS, Harold M.: Public Finance and'National 
Income. Philadelphia, 1949 PP.417 - 418 
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TIE LACK OF DIVERSITY IN LOCAL ECONOMIC RESOURCES: 
The distribution of economic resources between local 
units may be such as to concentrate in one locality a certain 
type of resources. A given area may be specialised in the 
production of a certain crop or the manufacturing of a given 
commodity. Similarly, a local area may be concentrating on 
export trade, another on imports of specific goods. Two 
main ooints of weakness may be pointed out: 
(a) Vulnerability to Economic Vicissitudes: By lacking 
diversity in resources a local unit is exposed to the vagaries 
of economic conditions. A locality relying on export trade 
and selling at competitive prices in world markets is clearly 
more hardly hit by a recession in international trade than a 
locality producing manufactures for home consumption. This 
can be noticed in the U.S.A. where the southern states thrive 
on cotton. In Canada, Ontario will be much affected by a 
decline in its major exports namely pulp and paper.(l) The 
aftermath of the Korean War affords a further illustrations 
The woòl producing states in Australia were relatively more 
affected by the drop in prices of raw materials. 
Structural, frictional and mass unemployment can be 
detrimental to particular areas more than others. Indeed, 
some industries tend to concentrate in certain parts of the 
country for various reasons. Such distressed areas will be 
faced with decreased revenue and on the other hand increased 
expenditures caused by unemployment benefits, health services 
and costs of combating delinquency and other measures. 
(1) IVOR, David: The Principles of Federal Public Finance. 
London, 1947. (PH.De thesis) Pool 
3II, 
Emergencies, especially wars, may have a severer impact 
on certain localities more than others. Apart from the fact 
that an area's physical capital may be more damaged, war 
ushers in vital economic changes. War industries, which 
crystallise the country's efforts, may be shifted to rural 
areas thiis depriving the locality of origin of sources of 
income. The rationalisation of industry and the closing of 
the less efficient plants are not devoid of varying local impact 
The drastic redistribution of manpower by its diversion 
to particular channels or simply the exodus of oopulation 
weakens the finances of some localities more than others. 
In sum, the impact of the vicissitudes of economic life 
is felt more severely when a locality is taken sepaiLely then 
when the country is envisaged as a whole. 
(b) Vulnerability to Central Economic or Financial Policy: 
When a local unit is considered in isolation it may be found 
more susceptible to economic measures and policies of the 
national government owing to the concentration within the 
local boundaries of production factors which are relatively 
more liable to be affected by central policy. 
An illustration is afforded by Australia where a protect- 
ive tariff policy, fostering secondary industries benefited 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland but did not benefit 
Western Australia and South Australia specialising in primary 
production. The latter states often suffered from foreign 
retaliation (1) 
Interventionism and economic planning gave prominence 
to these vulnerable points in local finances. Direction of 
labour, industrial location, nationalisation, wage and price 
policies all affect, in1varying degrees, local revenue and 
expenditures. Central policies regarding exchange control, 
tarriffs and trade agreements, by fostering certain branches 
3i3 
activity and weakening others, induce surpluses or deficits 
in local budgets. 
lat THE MOBII,ITY OF FACTORS OF PRODüCTION 
The factors of production, labour, capital and 
management, move more readily from locality to locality 
within a given country than from country to country. There 
are no inter- local, as there are inter -country, hindrances 
to shifting. There are no local migration laws (as was often 
the case prior to the Industrial Revolution), no local barriers 
to trade or local exchange controls. Race, culture and 
language are the same. 
These facts are of primary importance from the viewpoint 
of local taxation. They set definite limits to the use of 
local fiscal powers. If these powers are wielded unwisely 
or excessively, the taxing locality runs the risk of being 
deprived of factors of production which will tend to migrate 
to other localities thus generating a local impoverishment 
in taxable resources. 
The efflux of one type of taxable resource, for instance 
the local income tax, may cause the loss of other tax revenues 
as well, for example the local property tax. Moreover, 
liabilities of the locality may be increased. 
(1) GREENWOOD, Gordon: "The Future of Australian Federalism." 
Melbourne, 1946. P.106 
JE THE DILEMMA 
The problem of multiplex and restricted local 
units carries important financial implications. In many 
countries the subdivisions were created a long time ago 
when communications were slack and laisser -faire reigned 
supreme with its concomitant of limited central and local 
budgets. The old local boundaries are the fruit of 
confused strife between boroughs and other local communities 
on the one hand and the central authorities on the other 
hand in order to secure more "freedom" from central 
administrative and financial "subjection." However, these 
historical factors are unrelated to economic conditions. 
The latter are liable to constant change and have their 
own laws. The factors of production constantly find 
different combinations and locations. Demographic movements 
occur between the various subordinate units. Tn sum, the 
traditional local boundaries become absolete. (1) 
In England, no review of the boundaries of counties 
took place since the Local Government Act of 1888, which 
also took account of the old boundaries. By the same Act, 
certain "counties of towns" became county boroughs sad` av-1.4) 
populations of 50,000 or more could obtain the same status. 
Although the minimum population was raised in 1926 to 
75,000 and in 1945 to 100,000 no county borough lost its 
status since 1888. 
(1) LIPMAN, V.D.: "Local Government Areas 1834 -1945." 
Oxford 1949 PP.251 -331 
See also the part contributed by the same author in 
"Essays on Local Government," Edited by Wilson, C.H. 
Oxford, 1948 
Vital economic and demographic changes, however, 
took place since 1780. Industrial centres and urban 
concentrationsgreW up together with a demographic migration 
to the north of England. Between 1880 and 1930 the 
countryside was heavily depopulated . At the present 
time, there is a drift of industry and population 
to the south. (1) 
France suffers from similar problems. Its 
"departments," which go back to the French Revolution, 
and its "communes" are deemed too small for modern conditions. 
In U.S.A. the subordinate units date back to the 18th 
century. 
In present day conditions the small unit is confronted 
with a dilemma. The horns of the dilemma are: 
1 - Increasing the tax burden on those already paying 
taxes. This leads to further inequities especially in 
unitary countries (e.g.England) where the local units 
rely on one source or a restricted range of local levies 
2 - Resorting to local borrowin, . however, there are 
economic and legal limiations. The conditions of local 
debts are less favourable and rates of interest higher. 
The borrowing locality might have to resort to certain 
channels as in England or to observe rigid limits as in 
(1) Finer, Herman: "English Local Government." 
London, 1950. PF.57 - 86 
the U.S.A. The latter case can even be more unfavourable 
to local finances. Assessed valuation as a basis for 
debt limits in the U.S.A. (1) is not only unconnected 
with capacity to finance debt, but is also perversely 
elastic: in depression, assessments may decrease thus 
bringing down debt limits at the very time that spending 
should be expanded. Moreover, local borrowing may 
embarrass local finances with high overhead costs. 
3- Seeking subsidies from higher tiers or the central 
government to supplement their revenue. If the grants 
are conditional they bear the seeds of local government 
debility. 
4- Transferring local responsibilities to higher tiers 
of government or to the central government. Local communities 
thus lose their importance. 
5- Curtailing the local social and welfare services. 
Clearly these measures are reactionary, unpopular and 
liable to be resisted. 
Tkc 
6- Ha-vi G-a high per capita cost of service: This stems 
from the fact that a small local unit may be below the "optimu. 
local service unit" (for a specific service) . This concept is 
different from that of "per capita expenditures" which decrease 
the smaller/population sinca limited localities generally 
assume less services and have less functions. (2) 
(1) The limits vary from state to state and slightly between 
localities of the same state. The range of variation 
is from one -fifth to one per cent (Georgia's subdivisions) 
to 40% (Nebraska school districts). 
(2) Hansen and Perloff: op . cit . PP . 70 -74 
THE DEED FOR WIDER AREAS. 
A revision of outmoded boundaries is most needed 
in many countries. The larger areas can have more 
taxable resources. They can achieve economies in money 
and manpower as they will be able to resort to modern 
technique of planning, budgeting or purchasing, and to 
employ specialists without undue rise in the tax burden 
ar waste of experience since the "population catchment" 
area of the services will be more suitable. A material 
reduction in fiscal inequities and inequalities in service 
levels will ensue. Moreover, the widening of the local 
units reduces fringe questions, mitigates overlapping, 
promotes uniformity in administration and fosters co- 
operation and co- ordination. The facts were ably and 
clearly put by Mrs.Hicks, "The progress of public investment 
and the economical operation of trading services would also 
be facilitated by the wider jurisdiction and greater borrowing 
powers of semi- regional councils. And for cyclical policy 
the possibility of securing the co- operation of a few large 
areas might well make all the difference in the speed and 
unanimity of changes in the temp of investment." 
Various devices can be envisaged in order to cope with 
the problem of small areas. They can be set out briefly 
in the following points: (2) 
1- Redrawing of the boundaries. 
2- The creation of regional boards to assume local services 
on a wider basis 
The extension of central administration of local Taxes, 
the yields being either handed over to, or shared with, 
the subordinate units. Standardisation of services 
(2) State -Local Relations: Report of the Committee on State 
Local Relations. The Council of State Governments, 1946 
pp.203 - 204 
control and supervision in some cases would militate 
in four of efficiency and lower costs. (more will be 
said of this point later) . 
4- Intergovernmental functional arrangements. Two 
or more localities can co- operate through optional 
arrangements, conclusion of contracts or other methods. 
All these devices tend to widen the area of local 
units. They are not however easy to apply as many 
obstacles are on the way. They are the local loyalties 
/ 
to old boundaries, the vested interests of a local 
officialdom and the local economic interests which can 
be summarised as "local pressure groups." It goes 
without saying that some units will be relVctant to 
co- operate if they stand to lose. 
These attemps towards co- ordination and inter -local 
collaboration are reflected in unitary and federal 
countries alike. 
In England, various Parliamentary Acts achieved: 
1 - Co- operation on joint bodies: e.g. Town and Country 
Planning Act, 1932 - Public Health Act; 1936 
2 - Appointment of nominees of county district councils 
on committees oáì sub -committees of county councils: e.g. 
Local Government Act, 1929 - Fire Services Act, 1947. 
3 - Co- ordination by county council of work of county 
district councils: e.g. Small Holdings and Allotments 
Act 1908. 
Local Government Act 1929 - Local Government Act, 1933. 
4 - Financial Assistance from county to county district 
councils: e.g. Local Government Act, 1933 - Housing 
3'' 
Act, 1936 - Public Health Act, 1936 - Rural Water 
Supplies and Sewerage Act, 1944 - Housing (Financial 
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1946 
5- Transfer of functions performed by lower units to 
higher units: Sometimes the powers of county councils 
were enlarged, sometimes there was outright centralisation 
The latter trend can be illustrated by the Trunk Roads 
Act, 1946, the National Health Service Act, 1946, the 
National Assistance Act, 1948, and the various Acts 
nationalising certain industries. The Local Government 
Act, 1948, handing assessment and valuation to the 
Inland Revenue, responds to the same tendency. 
The Local Government Boundary Commission, in its 
Report for 1947, was aware of the demerits of small areas. 
It makes a significant statement: (1) 
"We do not think that an authority of a smaller size 
than. 200000 possesses sufficient population or 
resources to secure a reasonable standard for all 
the major services, and we have been greatly 
impressed with the higher standard we have found 
amongst those counties and county boroughs 
fortunate enough to possess at least this 
population." 
(1) Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission, 
For the Year 1947. 
H.M.S.O. London, 1948. P.26 
See also COLE, G.D.H: "The Local Government Boundary 
Commission's Report: A Comment." 
Public Administration, Spring 1948. P.138 
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The Commission sets a rational relation between 
local population and responsibilities. However, by 
assuming that one million is the maximum for proper 
local government, it rejects regionalism. 
The recommendations the Commission made are an 
attempt toward rationalisation and co- ordination. It 
proposes reforms on the following lines: - 
1 - Counties: The two -tier counties are to be based on 
the old ones with, eventually, some modifications, and 
containing a population from 200,000 to 1,000,000. 
One tier counties were also proposed. They are large 
cities or towns with populations from 200,000 to 59000 
2 - County Boroughs: To be composed of middle -sized 
towns of 60,000 to 200,000. They are second -tier 
authorities, looking to the counties for certain services 
such as police and fire, but they also enjoy important 
autonomous functions mainly education, health,are of 
old and disabled and parts of town and country planning 
and highways. (1) 
(1) The Commission, in fact, thought that the present 
allocation of local services no more justifies the 
existence of only two categories of boroughs; all - 
purpose (county boroughs) and minor purpose ones. It 
finds place for a most -purpose authority. SEE ALSO 
BROWNING.N.F.E.: "The Boundary Commission. Notes on the 
problems associated with the areas and functions of-District 
Councils within a two tier system of local government." 
Public Administration. Spring, 1948. P.37 
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3. County Districts. They would cover non- coun.t;y 
boroughs, urban and rural districts. They are to act 
as second -tier authorities eventually performing functions 
delegated by county councils. 
Other reforms, sometimes more far- reaching, are 
also promoted regarding areas and local finances. 
Professor Cole, who may be mentioned in this 
connection, proposes a re- classification into Regional 
Planning Authorities, comprising a county o , more 
(including county boroughs). Major Local Authorities, 
2 
Middling Local Authorities and smaller local authorities. 
Besides the local rates, Professor Cole advocates 
'a regional income tax to be based on some wider areas 
than the regionsfnamed Divisions (North -West, Northern, 
Midland, Western, South East). The Divisional Income 
Tax, administered from the centre, is to be ap_:ortioned 
among the regions in the Division (the regions are also 
to obtain grants). 
(1) COLE, G.D.H. "Local and Regional Government." 
London, 1947. PP.223 - 231 
For Regionalism. See also: 
11iMRegional 
Government (Fabian Research. 
`Series 
No.63) . 
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In the case of France, it is worthy of note 
that the dissatisfaction with the problem of 
administrative areas found expression in the - 
adoption, after defeat, of a system of regional 
administration which can be viewed as an extension 
of the centralist prefectorial systei to wider areas. (l) 
In federal countries, economists are also aware 
of the problems of inadequate resources, overlapping 
and fiscal inequities and inequalities posed by the 
existence of multiple small units. 
In the U.S.A. Professor Anderson counted 165,00 
(1) PANTER- BRICK, Keith: "French Regional 
Administration" 
Public Administration (The journal of the 
Institute of Public Administration). 
Autumn, 1951 P.245 
CHAPMAN, Brian: A Development in French 
Regional Administration." 
Public Administration, Winter 1950 
LIPMAN, V.D. "Recent Trends in French 
Local Administration." 
Public Administration, Spring, 1947, 
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localities in 1942 (1). The Bureau of the Census 
counted 155,067.(2) Some states contain an excessive 
number of localities such as Illinois with 15,854 and 
Kansas with 11,115. Efforts to foster combination and 
co- operation are not spared. In fact a certain decrease 
in the number of areas is noticeable over the decade 1930- 
1940 as shown by the following table. 
Decrease in 
U.S.A. 
of Local Units (3) the Number 
Kind of Unit 1930 -33 1941 Decrease 
Percentage 
Counties 3,053 3,050 3 0.1 
Municipalities 16,366 16,262 104 0.6 
Townships and Towns 20,262 18,998 1,264 6.2 
School Districts 127,108 118,308 8,800 6.9 
Special Districts 8,580 8,382 198 2.3 
175,369 165,000 10,369 5.9 
(1) ANDERSON, William: "The Units of Government in the 
United States." 
Public Administration Service, Chicago,1942.P2 
(20 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: "Governmental Units in the 
United States, 1942." 
Washington, 1944. P.1. 
(3) ANDERSON, W. cit. 1945, Revised Edition. P2 
See also in connection with the problem of areas in the U.S.A 
GRAVES, W.Brooke, "Readjusting Governmental Areas 
T 
and Functions." 
Pói icálsañfd VóciaTeEC- iaRcécademy of 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the 
United States. Philadelphia, January 1940 
ROUTT, Garland C. "Interstate Compacts and 
Administrative Co- Operation." 
The Annals. January, 1940 
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Processor Leland proposes the suppression of 
townships, school districts, road districts, sewer 
districts, mosquito and pest abatement districts; 
he finds that "This type of financial gerrymandering 
has led to extavagant support of functions in some 
districts while ;others there was a lack of financial 
resources." (1) 
Similar proposals have been advanced by many 
other observers and reached by several committees.(2) 
In Canada, the boundaries of local authorities, 
in the extern provinces, have not been subject to 
adequate revision see more than a hundred years e. 
The more recent local boundaries in Western Canada, 
are equally unsatisfactory in present economic and 
social conditions (3) 
(1) LELAND, Simeon E; "The Relations of Federal, State 
and Local Finance." in 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, October 1930 
Columbia, 1931 P.98 
(2) Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Economy 
and Taxtion." Ohio, 1926 P.249 Also; 
The Tax Policy League: "The Extravagant Hinterland 
of Government." in 
Viewpoints on Public Finance Edited by Groves,Harold. 
New York, 1947 P.580 
(3) CALLARD, K.; "The Present System of Local Government 
in Canada: Some Problems of Status, Area, Population 
and Resources." 
The Canadian journal of Economics and Political 
Science, May, 1951 P.204 
3z4 
It is appropriate to reproduce, here, the comment of 
Prof. Callard of McGill University (Montreal) , on Canadian 
local government units: (1) 
"In Canada provincial authority in local government 
has led, not to intelligent experimentation and adaptation 
to local needs, but rather to an immense confusion of units 
and powers and functions and finances; this is so great 
that it is almost impossible to understand the entire 
ramifications of the system of any single province. 
Individual aspects impinge upon the public: the burden of 
taxes, the weakness of particular services, each in relation 
to the particular municipality; accordingly remedies when 
sought are ad hoc, concentrating often upon the symptom not 
the cause. Organised criticism of the system is next to 
impossible for few can understand how it works." ( 2) 
11) The Canadian citizen is subject to three main 
authorities; federal, provincial and municipal. A 
fourth tier exists when the province uses the 
"county" as a unit. Other authorities enter into 
play, e.g. the school districts. 
12) Callard, K. : op. cit. P.206. 
S E C T I O N . II 
LIMITATIONS 'i'0 LOCAL TAXA.'TION 
I. LOCAL PROPERTY TAXATION 
The local taxation of property, whether based on 
rental value or capital value, is inherently inelastic. 
It fails to keep pace with the increasing local 
responsibilities and price inflation. 
We may discern economic and legal limitations. 
I. THE ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS 
tack of Direct Connection with Income: 
Some taxes are especially lucrative namely those 
directly based on income, or those levied on consumption. 
The property taxes, imposed on the local level, by failing 
to respond to income increases, lack elaticity. The 
relation of property tax yield to income may even decline 
especially when the incidence is on the occupier. 
In England and Wales the local rates represented 
more than 4 per cent of national income in 1938 and less 
32_7 
than 3 per cent in 1950. While the national taxes 
increased 327 per cent over the period 1950 - 1938, 
the local rates increased by only 60 per cent. (1) 
The lack of flexibility of local property taxation 
is particularly felt in the case of monotaxing localities 
which cannot resort to other forms of taxation as in 
Britain. The pluritaxing capacity of subordinate units 
in other.countries, especially federal, acts as a 
counterpoise. In the U.S.A., the states have a 
diversified tax system and could leave the property 
tax to their subdivisions. (2) The latter, mostly 
depending on property taxation, can share various yaxes 
with the states, notably gasoline, liquor, general sales 
and public utility taxes. They also share the states 
income and inheritance taxes to a lesser extent. 
Stability is claimed to be a merit of local property 
taxation.(3) It is contended that the smaller the unit 
the more important should be the element of short run 
stability hence the more stable should be its revenue, 
and. the wider the unit the more elatic should be its 
(1) CHESTER, D.N. : "Local Finance." in 
Lloyds Bank Review, July, 1951 P.34 
(2) The only states which still rely heavily on property 
taxes are Minnesota, Nevada and Nebraska. 
(3) HICKS, J.R. - HICKS, U.K -- LESER, C.E. : "The 
Problem of Valuation For Rating" Occasional Papers VII 
Cambridge, 1944 PP.6 - 11 
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taxes which can serve for fiscal policy purposes. (1) 
In depression, the local budgets would be able to meet 
overhead costs and important needs without resort to 
borrowing or subsidies which undermine local government ¡ 
rhe, 04c-ft.- Atn /sai uád 4 t r rnJ td aae ra 
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Inth writer's view, the revenue stability feature, 
claimed as a merit, is not easy to uphold in modern economic 
conditions of controlled economy and full employment policies 
which ushered in two important changes, namely; the more 
limited scope for economic convulsions and the need for 
large funds to launch the national plan on the central as 
well as on the local levels. Thus the stability feature 
seems more of an impediment than of a help and can be 
rather described as stickiness. (2) 
However, inspite of the inherent inequity of property 
taxation and inspite of the economic conflicts it may bring 
about, especially within the framework of a controlled 
economy, the property tax seems to be inevitable as a source 
of local revenue. 
(1) HANSEN and FERLOFF: "State and Local Finance in The 
National Economy." New York 1944. 
P.251 
(2) In fact, the stability of revenue of property taxation 
may be shaken, as in the U.S.A., by such factors as 
speculative purchases and sales or speculative over- 
building affecting property values. 
ENGLAND AND WALES 









1914 105 68 
1920 175 61 
1930 313 50 
1940 445 45 
1949 686 41 
The revenue does not include trading services, with the 
exception of profits transferred to or losses charged 
against the General Rate Fund 
(1) CHESTER, D.N. op.cit, P.39. 
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U.S.A. 
Property Taxes as # Percentage of Total State and 
Local Tax Revenue, 1915 - 1940 (1) 
-ear Property Tax as 
percentage of all 
Local Taxes 
Year Property Tax as 














N.B. The total state and local tax collections exclude 
unemployment compensation taxes. The property taxes 
here are composed of those levied by the local governments 
and the few general ana specific property taxes levied by 
the states. 
-- Local Tax Collections as Percentage of National Income.(1) 












1932 $39.9 11.7. 1938 64.1 6.8 
1933 $42.3 10.0 1939 $ 70.8 6.1 
1934 $49.3 8.4 1940 77.2 5.7 
1935 $55.7 7.7 1941 $ 94.5 5.6 
1936 $64.9 6.6 
1937 $71.5 6.1 
N.B Local Taxes, over this period, are composed of 
more than 90 per cent in property taxes. 
(1) "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations" 
op. cit. P.333 & P.35. 
331 
VALUATION INADEQUACY 
Whether the local property tax is based on annual 
rental value as in Britain, or on "fair" market value 
as in U.S.A., an asse.sment of the property is required. 
Valuation must be undertaken often otherwise it loses 
touch with economic conditions and exerts a restrictive 
effect on local revenue by causing a potential loss in 
tax yields given the same rate of tax. The upswing in 
values, induced by property scarcities, in a dynamic 
sane -b-y, is neutralised. The convential rent does not 
reflect true rent. Market value may fail to reflect 
either the current year's income or the capitalised value 
of future income (1) 
Clearly the tax rates can be raised on the basis 
of the outdated assessments in order to secure more 
revenue. However, the lack of revision is of 
importance in countries where limits are fixed for local 
tax rates as in U.S.A. and Egypt. 
Assessment, especially when entrusted to local 
bodies, is not undertaken at frequent intervals because 
it istechnically hard task involving high costs. It is 
sometimes retarded by emergencies such as war. It is 
than found more expedient to count on the old valuations 
(1) In England, there has been no valuation since 1934 
in spite of a pre -war attempt. In the U.S.A., real 
property is assessed at intervals of up to ten years. 
The annual assessment of personal property is often 
done on the basis of the preceding year. 
It is noticeable that valuations may be directly 
frozen. In Britain the Rent Restrictions Acts adversely 
affected the assessments of most houses at pre -war levels. 
Valuation tends to lag behind the actual rental or 
market values (according to the system in application)9 
Economic expansion or the rye in the value of money _ 
increase the financial burden of local governments and .., 
call for more revenue through readjustment of assessments. 
Deliberate under_ assessment is a further source of 
inadequacy. It is resorted to, for different purposes, 
in unitary and federal countries alike. In Britain, it 
was used for "new" houses built since 1920.0) The extent 
of underasessment, up to 1938, was estimated at 20% and 
the annual rate rebate at 8 - 9 million ponds which are 
equivalent to a subsidy. New houses should be assessed 
at full value and the rebate calculated afterwards, as an 
optional local measure, for a limited number of years and 
not as a perpetual priviledge.() In the writer's view, 
an overt subsidy may well prove more operative and moreover 
averts the confusion caused in the technical computation 
of the tax. 
While prices nearly trebled since 1939 and expenditure 
of local authorities, out of rates, increased by about 75%, total rateable value rose by only 1 N . 
Revaluation could add something like £100m. to rateable value. 
See also next point (Legal Limitations). 
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In the U.S.A. there is a tendency to underassess 
new buildings and industrial premises and to freeze the 
assessments in blighted or old regions where-property 
values are in decline. Systems of property classification, 
partial (especially for intangibles) or comprehensive, are 
in application in nearly two- thirds of the states. The 
aim is to tax different types of property at different 
proportions of their assessment value. Although this 
procedure is justifiable on grounds of equity (property 
is heterogenous) it nonetheless often involves a potential 
loss of revenue. 
The difficulties of valuation are increasingly 
confining the General Property Tax to fixed property.. It 
was also noticed that property values are declining. The 
tendency is particularly burdensome in urban communities 
having extensive responsibilities. Between 1940 - 48, in 
many cities valuations were not affected. In some. others 
they increased only slightly, e.g. New York from $16.5 
billion to $17.6 bil., Philadelphia from $3.3 billion to 
$3.4. billion.(1) Hansen and Perloff are right in 
remarking that, "Whew. we consider the wartime demonstration 
of our national productive capacity, it is ridiculous to 
assume that property values' must continue to decline." (2) 
(l) CAMPBELL, Colin: "Are Property Tax Rates Increasing ?." 
The journaf of Political Economy, October 1951. P.441 
BIRD, L. Frederick: "The Financial Problems of Cities." 
in American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 
December, 1941. P.323 
(z) HANSEN and PERLOFF: op.cit. P.276. 
U. S. A. 
Assessed Valuation of Local Property (1) 
1929 - 38 (Billions of Dollars). 
Amount Year Amount 
1929 167.6 1935 1354 
1930 169.3 1936 136.2 
1931 161.3 1937 139.2 
1932 150.3 1938 139.3 
1933 141.3 
1934 136.6 
N.F. The local property tax here is that levied by 
localities 
Gap Between Property Tax Receipts and Current Expenditures 
For the Ten Largest Cities, 1926 - l939(2)ß 







1926 100 100 100 
1930 129 130 116 
1933 131 114 102 
1936 140 102 112 
1938 152 105 125 
1939 153 (not available) 1221 
(1) HANSEN and PERLOFF: op . cit . P.58 
(2) nFederal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations." 
op. cit. P.405. 
It is highly desirable to reach out for an 
adequate and self -adjusting device for valuation. 
In En`,land the basis should be the actual free rent. 
Only individual houses, with abnormal rents, can be 
excepted. Controlled houses, council houses (which 
are not fully assessed) and owner- occupied houses should 
be valued by analogy with free houses instead of the 
opposite practice. Some keen observers comment that, 
"A system of valuations based upon free rents has the 
supreme advantage that it can be relied upon to go 
on revising itself - to go on bringing itself up to 
date." (1) 
In the U.S.A. there is ample scope for improve- 
ments in valuation. The assessment districts should 
be widened and consolidated. Technical qualifications 
should be possessed by the. assessors who should be 
appointed and not elected and should be full- time 
officials. 
(1) HICKS, J.R. _HICKS M. K, and LESER: op cit. P.76 
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In conclusion, valuation cannot be left to lower 
layers of government. It is an inherently central 
function. From the political standpoint, the local 
assessors are influenced by the locally elected 
councils. This is especially true if the assessor 
is elected and not nominated as in the U.S.A. From 
the economic viewpoint, valuation involves much expenses 
and requires full -time professional assistance which may 
not be available to local bodies. 
In England, the attempt towards uniformity of 
the Rating and Valuation Act of 1925 was not successful. 
The nomination of county valuation officers was not 
compulsory and the Central Valuation Committee was an 
advisory body. In 1948, however, the Local Government 
Act transferred assessment to the Inland Revenue. 
In the U.S.A. it is desirable to hand assessment 
to higher units, preferably the states (this is sometimes 
actually the case), or at least to matropolitan or county 
governments. 
Nobility of Production Factors :. 
The stickiness of valuation and its inability 
to keep pace with increasing expenditures forces 
the local authorities to raise the tax rates. 
Whether this rise is effective or apparent (being 
based on outmoded valuations), the tax basis is 
liable to be affected through shifting. (1) 
In the case of residential property, if the 
tax falls on the occupier, the latter is induced 
to move away from the area in mormal times. Local 
investment in building can be adversely affected 
if the owners Uæar the rise in tax rates through 
shifting or, having to pay the tax (as in some 
countries), cannot shift it to the occupiers. 
If the local property tax burdens industrial 
hereditaments, local investment may be discouraged 
especially in cases where fixed property assumes 
great proportions. Consequently, industry has 
been partially derated in England and in U.S.A. 
so many exemptions are granted to some industries 
especially the new ones. 
Inter -local competition for taxable resources 
can, in fact,to some extent entice away building 
activities and industries from other areas with 
the bait of lower levies or exemptions, partial 
or total 
(1) In the case of "apparent" rises in tax rates 
the effect is psychological. 
In the writer's view, the favourable treatment 
reserved to factories and industrial premises can cause 
much embarrassment to the local authorities if the 
severance is considerable between residential shifting 
and industrial shifting. The local bodies would then 
have to maintain services for local industry (cleaning, 
electricity, fire- protection, sewerage.,) and also for 
its day -time citizens while its revenue from property 
is curtailed. As for intengible property, the attempt 
to include it in a local property tax is doomed to failure 
since it is very mobile. 
It is noticeable that there may be more scope for 
inter -local mobility in case the localities are pluri- 
taxing as some would then prefer to increase the property 
tax rates while others would prefer raising other local 
taxes. Thus the door is open for inter -local disparities 
in the property tax burden. 
Disparities can also occur in or between monotaxing 
authorities (i.e. those relying only on property taxation). 
For instance, municipalities, which incur many responsibilities 
may raise the tax burden and thus drive away the residents 
to peripheral areas with the outcome that the municipal 
taxable resources are depleted while their liabilities 
are not diminished. Attempts to consolidate the whole 
metropolitan area is not an easy matter and can meet 
with the resistence of the suburban residents on the 
ground that they do not enjoy direct benefits. 
33R 
2 - LEGAL LINIITATIONS 
Tax Exemptions: 
It is surprising that, unlike other taxes, 
so many limitations restrict the scope of the local 
property taxes, either in unitary or federal countries. 
The limitations affect the form of exemptions or tax 
ceiling of one sort or another. 
In England, agricultural hereditaments were 
completely derated in 1929. Industrial, railways 
premises, docks and canals were derated by 75 per cent. 
Professor Chester estimates that the abolition, in 
England Find Wales, of agricultural exemption might add 
from 25 to 30 million pounds. The abolition of 
industrial and transportation derating might add from 
30 to 35 million pounds (1) 
It is noteworthy that other forms of derating, 
statutory or not, also take place. In the case of 
the local rates on houses, the gross value is reduced 
by special percentages (assumed to represent insurance 
and repairs) before reaching rateable value. There 
is also the deliberate underassessment of new houses 
built after the First World War and the impact of rent 
restrictions on valuations, the gross values being 
based on controlled rents. 
(1) CHESTER, D.N. : op.cit. P.37 
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In the U.S.A., the field of exemptions is too wide. 
Apart from schools, charitable organisations, agricultural 
societies, veterans and their organisations, there are 
homestead exemptions and exemptions to certain industries. 
The homestead exemptions are given on all or part 
of the assessed value or the full and true value (there 
are generally urban and rural area limitations). Within 
the same state, the number of table units to which 
exemptions are applicable varies. 
U.S.A.: Examples of Homestead 
Exemptions, Dec.1949 (1) 
State Amount of Area Taxable units to 
Exemption Limitation whiccnhleexeemption is 
1LABAMA 
ssé ssg3'Qa9uéf 
FLORIDA (First $5,000 of 
(assessed value 
GEORGIA (First $2,000 of 
(assessed value 
SOUTH DAKOTA (Total Value; 
(limited to $5000 
(for soldier's 
(bonus tax. 
(Homestead may ) State 
(not exceed 160 acres) 
(Rura1,160 acres. a State and 
Urban one -half acre 
) Local 
( State county 
(and schoold-istrid 
Rural, 160 acres) 
Urban, 1 acre ) 
Exemptions are also provided to certain industries especially 
the manufacturing realty. Although these exemptions are 
usually given for temporary periods (average 5 years) and 
although they are usually limited to new plants or the 
expansion of existing capacity, the exéption from taxation 
constitutes a loss of revenue to the underlying authorities 
(while the burden of public services increases) especially 
when the exemptions apply to state as well as local taxes 
instead of applying only to some of the junior authorities 
(1) KIAMEL, Lewis: Taxes and Economic Incentives. 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1950 p.172 
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It is to be noticed that nearly one third of the µmerican 
states allow various exemptions to manufacturing industries. 
In 1942, the assessment value of tax- exempt real property 
amount to 18 per cent of the total assessment of real 
estate (g26 billion against 145 billion). The cities 
suffer most from homestead exemptions. The latter 
amounted to 31% of total assessment in the city of 
De Land (Florida) (1) 
It was estimated that the abolition of exemptions 
(excluding municipally owned property) would cause an 
increase of X350 - 500 million annually. This is 
equivalent to one -sixth of total property tax revenue.(2) 
Tax Rate Limitations: 
Inspite of the restricted tax basis of local property 
taxes, ceilings are sometimes fixed for the tax rates. If 
substantial, these limitations can be a serious curb from 
the revenue point of view. 
Tax limits, if uniform all over the country, or a 
region with its subdivisions, fail to account for the 
inter -local differences in per capita costs of services 
and for such differences between rural and urban communities, 
(i) State - Local Relations: Report Of The Committee on 
State - Local Relations. 
The Council of State Governments, 
PP.99 - 103 
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(2) State - Local Relations: op.cit. P.102 
They are a poor way to achieve an equalisation of the 
tax burden or to cope with the problem of revenue 
deficiency. 
In some undeveloped countries where real property 
is often a criterium of wealth, the limitations may be 
the outcome of pressure groups in local authorities 
dominated by the wealthy as was the case in Egypt where 
the local land tax was limited to a maximum of 11 per 
cent of the central land tax. In advanced countries this 
may also be the case, especially in times of depression 
where the needy localities are tempted to turn to the 
property tax for more revenue. This was the case with 
local governments in the U.S.A. in the thirties. 
The nature of the limitations can be gleaned from 
the following considerations. 
In England there are no legal limits to the rates 
except for the limitations to rateable values (derating, 
under -assessment, the effect of rent restrictions). 
In the U.S.A. the problem assumes substantial 
proportions. Forty states resort to some type of 
limitation. The writer fully agrees that, "Revision 
of existing systems of tax limitation is an urgent task 
facing state and local officials. "1 
1. State - Local Relations: op. cit., p. 104. 
Here are various American devices of legal 
limitations: (1) 
1 - overall rate limitations on a specific type of 
property, 
2 - maximum rates for general purposes on each type 
of governemtn unit 
3 - rate limits based on the purpose of expenditure. 
4 - special limits for certain local units. 
As for the extent of the limits one can find: - 
1 - a range of rates, for instance when the maximum 
varies according to assessment value or local 
population. 
2 - variable rates to yield a fixed sum per capita. 
variable rates to yield a fixed aggregate sum 
4 - rates fixed on the basis of previous year. 
The result aî such restrictions is less revenue 
flexibility and sometimes virtually no flexibility as in 
the case of overall tax limiations when combined with fixed 
rates for the different local units. The overall property 
limiations are already very stringent. 
(1) A single state may adopt several types of limitation. 
see - "State - Local Relations." op.cit. PP.103 - 113 
It is noteworthy that the tax limiations were especially 
adopted in the early thirties as a result of the depression. 
See: Report of the Committee on Property Tax Limitation 
and Homestead Exemption. in, National Tax Association, 
Proceedings, 1938. 
U.S.A. 
Per Cent Per Capita Changes in 
Local Property Tax Revenue (1) 
1932 - 1941 











Connecticut 10.6 Indiana - 22.7 
Delaware - 22.8 Michigan - 21.4 
Maine - a.1 Nevada 8.3 
New Hampshire 20.7 New Mexico - 50.4 
Vermont 35.7 Ohio - 31.9 
Oklahoma - 9.7 
Rhode Island 6.4 
Washington - 25.1 
West Virginia - 48.4 
L:ithmetical Arithmetical 
Average 8.4 Average - 21.6 
(1) Bureau of the Census : 
and Local Governments. 
Washing, 1942 
"Financing Federal, State 
34-5¢ 
5. CENTRAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
The central government, which controls the 
economic background of local taxes, can impair or foster 
the revenue yielding capacity of these taxes. This is 
particularly true in modern conditions of planned economy 
and full employment policies. Clearly monotaxing 
localities are liable to be more affected than pluri- 
taxing ones. 
A national investment and full employment plan, 
whether flexible or rigid, may involve rationing of raw 
materials for investment in durable consumption goods 
so as to foster development and the production 
of capital equipment. This may deprive the local units 
or at least some of them, from an increase in fixed 
property proportionate to the increase incosts of service 
due to the inflationary tendencies which often accompany 
national programmes concentrating on heavy industries to 
the detriment of consumption industries. The natural 
increase in population calls for increasing expenditure 
for which revenue is not forthcoming. The national 
plan may involve such changes in industrial location and 
direction of labour as to enhance hardships and distortions 
in the local taxable resources. These effects may obtain 
even more strongly, in hot -war or cold -war national 
:planning. 
In a peace pla¡; the central authorities may launch 
unto social policies and housing schemes, as in post -war 
34-6 
reconstruction periods or in under -developed countries. 
Government houses let at low rents and law taxes, or 
free from taxation, the deliberate underassessment of 
small houses or the new ones built by the authorities 
all affect, directly or indirectly, (1) the scope for 
local revenue from the taxation of property. Moreover 
the control of rent and the restriction of dealings and 
and speculations in real property constitute hindrances 
to adequate assessments. 
It should not be inferred that local bodies are 
.fee from "central" impact in a free or unplanned economy. 
Inconsiderate exploitation of natural resources, unwise 
use of land and buildings and other wastes can play havoc 
with the basis of local property taxes. This actually 
occurred in the U.S.A. in the 'twenties and 'thirties 
especially in regions in Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
Michigan. An enlightening illustration is afforded 
by Forest County (Wisconsin} -where the tax base was 
reduced by 53 per cent in only ten years, 1927 - 1936.(2) 
(1) For instance, through affecting private investments 
in an adverse way. 
(2) Hansen and Perloff : op.cit. P.101. 
4 - PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
This is a set of factors which the writer c)2.e4%A 
s as psychological because they are not tech- 
nical or strict limitations to the local taxation of 
property. 
We may set out, briefly, the following points. 
1. Fictive and True Tax Rates: As assessment values often 
lag behind changes in economic conditions or are deliber- 
ately reduced (underassessment), the effective tax rates 
will be lower than the nominal tax rates. An illustration 
is afforded by a period of inflation. The local units, 
having to match increasing expenses, may then raise the 
tat rates. Since the rates are based on out -dated valu- 
ations, the true rates may remain unchanged or undergo 
only a slight increase. However, there prevails a general, 
unjustifiable impression that the tax burden has become 
heavier. In a very able study about the property tax 
rates in the U.S.A., Professor Campbell reaches the 
significant conclusion that, "Property tax rates, when 
expressed as a percentage of the true value of property, 
were not higher in 1949 than in the 1920's. The decline 
in true rates during the 1940's indicates that localities 
were using their property tax resources less intensively;l) 
(1) CAMPBELL, Colin: "Are Property Tax Rates Increasing ?'t 
The Journal of Political Economy. October 1951. P. 441. 
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The Form of the tax rates: Some psychological 
effect i _ - - -- may be produced by a 
tax expressed in such a way as to give to the mass 
of the taxpayers the impression that they are being 
asked too much or are being "squeezed." This is the 
case of England where the rate poundage is expressed in 
so much per pound but of rateable value and not of 
personal income. (1) 
The Benefit Principle: People, paying local 
taxes, generally expect some direct advantage for what 
they are paying. In case they do not get such benefits 
they believe that they pay more than is necessary and 
a wave of recriminations is ushered in. 
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II. LOCAL INCuME TAXATION 
It should not be thought that regional income 
taxation is a panacia for the cure of all financial 
maladies and embarrassments of local bodies. Besides 
the various types of fiscal inequities and overlapping 
mentioned above, there are substantial limits to the 
yielding capacity of incomes tax (personal or business) 
when levied on the local level 
J Economic Limitations: 
In modern economic conditions of full employment 
economics, hot -war economics and cold -war economics, 
there is no ground itbbeliev that national governments 
will ever abandon the income tax which Keynesian analysis 
and modern fiscal policy revealed as a potent tool of 
economic and social policy. The federal governments 
have already invaded this field which was up to the 
Second World War constitutionally reserved to their 
subordinate units. The federal governments either 
used the income tax .concurrently with their subdivisions 
as in U.S.A. or took it over altogether as in Australia 
and Canada in World War II. The encroachment was either 
based on constitutional amendment as in U.S.A. in 1913 
or, more easily, on reciprocal agreements as in Australia 
and Canada. 
Once the centralisation of income taxation becomes 
an accomplished fact, a definite economic limit is 
3 
automatically set up to local income taxation. The 6id 
tax on individuals and business cannot in fact exceed 
100 per cent, otherwise it amounts to confiscation ftf 
and one would prefer to live on 
ne 
capital (1). 
The problem is 19±er made even more serious since 
the high level of expenditures, induced by welfare and 
war economics, requires a high level of income taxation, 
and subsequently very high central tax rates. 
If the central government has a right of pre -emption 
in taxation as is the case in unitary countries, the 
local units will be deterred from levying more than a 
low range of rates. In some federations before the 
last war (Australia, Canada) the subordinate units had 
the right of pre- exption when the scope for income 
NIA 
taxation was limited. Now this is mostilikely to 
occur whether in old or newly formed federations. 
Consequently, the central taxing authorities have 
the lion's share while the lower taxing jurisdictions 
are left with only the residue. 
It is noticeable that the principle of deductibility 
allows the central government, especially in federations, 
to wield the income tax as an economic instrument without 
much regard to the present level, or possible changes 
in the level of, local income taxes. 
(1) HICKS, J.R. - :HICKS, U.K. and LESER: op.cit. P.11. 
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Z. FISCO -legal Limitations: 
There are sometimes constitutional, legal and 
judicial barriers to the local taxation of property 
especially in federal countries. This is the case 
in some American states notably Illinois, Michigan 
and Indiana. The income tax passed by Illinois in 
1932 was declared unconstitutional on the ground 
that "income is property" and property must be assessed 
at a "just and uniform rate." The amendment of that 
state's constitution is difficult. 
Moreover, the base of local income taxes is often 
narrow. It may be confined to certain elements of 
income. Various items may be excluded. The exemption 
limits and allowances are generally high and the 
)rogression mild. It is noticeable that the smaller 
the taxing locality the more restricted is the scope 
for _progression. 
Furthermore, the taxation of income, on the local 
level, involves loopholes and offers numerous possibilities 
of evasion, legal or illegal. ihe untaxed elements of 
income are liable to be a resort for taxed elements. 
3.Mobility of Production Factors 
The possibility of efflux and influx of resources 
sets clear- limits to the revenue yielding capacity yo cr 
local income taxes. 
Two aspects may be outlined briefly: 
(a) Inter -Local Disparities in Fiscal Burden: 
There is probably more scope for inter -local 
differences in the field of income taxes than in the 
case of other taxes. The provisions regarding the 
scope of the tax, deductions, allowances, rates and 
also high costs of administration and compliance all 
open the door to disparities in the tax burden. 
The local residents and biisiness7tend to move 
away from heavily taxed areas. Overlapping and 
multiplicity, which may be more serious in particular 
areas owing to a higher proportion of cosmopolitan 
,incomes, are conducive to similar consequences, 
especially when resulting in a burden approximating 
or exceeding 100 per cent of income. 
The efflux of income taxable resources warps uPtJ 
havoc not only with local revenue (through re- action 
on other taxes) but also with local expenditure. 
The outgoing industries and high income -receivers 
leave in their wake overhead costs and other 
irreducible liabilities which have to be matched, 
especially if the locality is left with low income 
receivers whose mobility is generally low. 
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(b) Inter -Local Competition: The various lower 
taxing units may compete to attract wealthy residents, 
industry or specific industries with the bait of lower 
rates or higher exemptions and allowances. The production 
factors are enticed away from one locality to another 
thus causing a loss to other localities not only of 
the income tax base but of property tax base as well 
T44/fit44,502.at 
Uniformity in local taxation is beneficial from 
the standpoint of productivity. It permits the proper 
taxation of resources which, otherwise, would have to be 
coddled for fear of their flight 
4. Debtor Localities. 
The inter -local disparities in per capita wealth 
and income were already pointed out. The under- endowed 
areas will be unable to manipulate the income tax in any 
substantial degree. Moreover, much of their meagre 
income is paid over their borders to creditor localities. 
A local income tax thus tends to be adopted by, and be 
lucrative to, only wealthy localities. The efforts in 
favour of taxation, according to domicile would aggravate 
,n L4A C., t,&aûdn vvat 6 u tea. 34,a f. 
the problem its True, the wealthy localities often shoulder 
more responsibilities but the poorer ones are deterred 
from "pulling themselves up." 
Past experience in some countries can be invoked in 
to- lava 4;4cam, Tlcálivtt 
support of these limitationsp. In Sweden, "After twenty 
yearsW experience it was found that it had mainly been 
used by the wealthy authorities, who had little need for 
further revenue." (1) 
(1) HICKS, J.R. - HICKS, U.K. and LESER: op.cit. P.10 
Central Control Of Economic Basis 
More than in the case of property taxation, the 
economic background of local income taxes is not within 
the control of local authorities, especially in an era 
of controlled economy. 
oad, c 
In an interventionist economy, as -eo_ -o .o a 
planned economy, the central government's measurers 
are often not harmonious. They are not based on an 
overview of the national economy as a whole and are 
often interwoven with contradictions. Pressure groups 
may imbue central economic measures with bias. The 
result is that some branches may be fostered to the 
'detriment of others. The prices of certain groups 
of production factors may be enhanced relatively to 
others. Certain home industries may be harmed by 
customs duties favouring a class of importers. Other 
industries may be adversely affected by the encouragement 
of particular exports. Clearly such measurers, some- 
times conflicting, sometimes reflecting sectional 
interests, have varying implications on local budgets 
according to the pattern of economic activities 
prevailing within the boundaries of the different 
localities. The effects may be beneficial or 
baneful. 
Economic planning, the offspring of intervent- 
ionism, intensified the impact of central economic 
behaviour on local finances. Planning for whatever 
35-4 
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purpose (consumption, industrial equipment, was 
production) aims at rationalising the use of the nation's 
resources and achieving full employment. Keynesian 
economics and concerted fiscal policies imply the 
manipulation of basic factors on the central level 
such as investment,savings, consumption, national 
income, employment, in sum the multiplier and acceleration 
principles. 
In so far as economic planning increases taxable 
resources, reduces distress and irons out fluctuations, 
it exerts a beneficial effect on local finances. 
However, the effect is .detrimental as long as planning 
fosters centralisation of fiscal powers, circumscribes 
local taxable resources - . 
w 
to match local income. 
Local outgo then fails 
6-Administrative and Compliance Costs. 
Both tend to be high in the case of multiplex and 
small taxing jurisdictions and in the case of a messy and 
wild conglomeration of local imposts as is often the case 
in a federal polity. (1) 
Various reasons account for the high costs of 
administration. The scope for local taxation is smaller 
than in central taxation so that a given amount of 
(l) SHOUP, Carl - Blough, Roy and Newcomer Mabel,,_in 
"Facing The Tax Problem.1' Twentiet ̀ C ntury Fund 
New York, 1937 PP.336 - 342 
f6 
expenses yields less revenue. The ratio of expenses to 
acuwzc444.5 
collections is also by overlapping, multiplicity 
and evasion. It goes without saying that local authorities 
often lack efficiency in technique or accounting practices 
so necessary for an "economical" tax. 
The latter classical canon of taxation can be 
similarly infringed by high compliance costs. This is 
most likely to be the case in the several -deck taxation 
of personal and business income and the diversity of taxes 
within the same locality. 
In the U.S.A. attempts were made, notably by 
Professor Haig (1) and Professor Martin (2) to compute 
the compliance costs of state income taxes. Samples 
of corporations were taken. The results point to a high 
level of costs. According to Professor Martin, in a 
recent study, the compliance costs for state corporation 
and individual income taxes were 3.2 cents per $1.00 but 
2.5 cents on the federal level. 
In Canada,the high costs of administration were also 
underlined by the Royal Commission on Dominion- Provincial 
Relations. 
It is necessary to reduce the dual tax administrative 
and compliance costs. The remedy lies in the delegation 
of administration to higher authorities or, at least, joint 
administration and integrated collaboration. 
(1) Haig, Robert Murray: "The Cost to Business Concerns of 
(compliance War-Tax Laws." The Management Review, 
November, 1935. P.323 
(2) Martin, James.W.: "Costs of Tax Administration: Examples 
ofCmp1iance -Expenses . " Bulletin of the National Tax 
Association No.7 April, 1944 PP.194 - 205 
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III Local Outlay Taxes 
The subordinate government units in unitary and 
federal countries are deterred from levying customs 
duties. However, they may resort to other forms of 
indirect levies such as excise duties and sales taxes. 
Sales taxes deserve special attention on account 
of their increasing importance as outlined above (1) 
When imposed on the central level, sales taxes 
are very lucrative. The few limitations, then, seem 
to be their irritating or unpopular character when 
exaggerated (by reason of their regressivity) and the 
inter -relations between competing and complementary 
products. 
When Levied on the local level, the sales taxes 
have, in addition to the forementioned limitations, 
other limitations of me°e serious character which do 
not prevail in the case of central taxation, 
f. Out -of- Locality Purchases : 
The local outlay taxes, being borne by the local 
consumers in the long run, may induce the local residents 
to make their purchases across the boundaries in 
neighbouring localities where there might be low or 
no sales taxes. Buying outside the locality is much 
easier than residential or industrial shifting. 
(1) The Sales taxes are either "general" or "specific" 
(i.e. on certain commodities). In the former case, they 
may be levied at different stages: production, retailing 
or wholesale trade. 
Clearly, the minor taxing authorities, situated on 
the fringe of provinces or states in federal countries, 
are handicapped in view of the greater erne-s.,, 
purchasing of tax- exempt commodities from adjoining 
areas. 
The taxing locality can take one of two courses 
in an effort to project the revenue productivity of 
its taxes. It may confine the levy to commodities 
not easily purchasable "outside" its borders. This 
however limits the yielding capacity and implies 
discrimination against certain local concerns. 
Alternatively, the taxing locality may have to 
'impose a compensatory tax on commodities coming in 
from other local areas. Such imposts, akin to 
customs duties, cannot be remunerative. They are 
merely protective and serve the purpose of preserving 
the revenue productivity of the local consumption 
taxes. 
2. Urban and Rural Communities 
The productivity of the sales taxes is. high, 
the higher is the volume of transactions generally 
and that of necessities or necessary luxuries in 
particular. In rural communities, the population 
is generally sparse and the farmers consume directly 
what they produce. In urban communities, there are 
'' ;- large concentrations of population, 
larger volumes of consumption and higher standards. 
Clearly, in the latter case the sales taxes will be 
more productive. 
Consequently, there is not muchscope for sales 
taxes in agricultural areas or areas with unsettled 
nomadic populations (e.g. the Middle East.) Moreover 
the low living standards prevailing there militate 
against such imposts as their progressive impact will 
be more readily fel.lt 
The local sales taxes seem to be fruitful only 
if adopted by wide regions, within the country, 
(counties, departments, states, provinces) or large 
urban centres. 
3. Mobility of Production Factors: 
When the local outlay taxes are shifted to the 
consumers in higher prices there may emerge inter - 
local disparities in costs of living. The outcome 
can be the emigration of the local residents to areas 
with lower living costs and the subsequent weakening 
of the tax basis. 
Local industrial and business concerns hit by the 
tax, may not be able to shift it, or part of it, as in 
the short run or in the case of new businesses or non- inter- 
area concerns, or when the tax rates are so high as to 
affect total sales. In this case, the following results 
may occur: 
(a) The production of lower quality goods to meet 
the requirements of the taxing locality and high 
quality goods for other localities, thus adding 
to the unattractiveness of inside purchases. 
(b) A decrease of demand for the taxed products, 
causing a decrease in production and rise in 
local per unit costs. The subsequent reduction 
in local industrial activity, impoverishes the 
area and undermines its fiscal capacity. 
(c) The shifting of the local industries to other 
areas, less taxed. 
In short, the local outlay taxes result in quantitative 
and qualitative distortions of production and marketing 
channels in an attempt to by -pass or mitigate the impact 
of high local levies. 
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In the writer's judgement, the retail sales 
taxes seem more appropriate to local taxation, 
Retailing is, in fact, less mobile than manufacturing 
or wholesaling since it must be close to consumers. 
Moreover, the broad base of these taxes make possible 
low rates and large revenue with comparatively less 
menace of diverting local business. 
4.Costs of Administration and Compliance 
These may prove high in the case of modern sales 
taxes, general or specific. This is contrary to the 
general view. The writer quite agrees with Professor 
.Haig and Professor Shoup, that "...the sales tax seems 
to have gained a wholly unwarranted reputation for 
simplicity and ease of administration." (1) 
When used on the local level these taxes are 
likely to involve even more trouble and expenses. 
(1) HAIG, R.N. and SHOUP, C.: "The Sales Tax in 
The American States." New York, 1934. 
PP.105 - 106 
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This is due to the complex structure of the 
taxes and to the various problems outlined above, 
notably the out -of- boundary purchases and the 
mobility of the production factors which are causative 
of loss and evasion. Much vigilance, caution and 
efficiency are needed. The central government 
possesses these qualities and has no boundary 
problems. Furthermore, it can lay the tax at 
such point of the distributive process as to secure 
the most economical administration. 
The lower taxing units can realise reductions 
in administrative costs if they exempt small sales. 
However, by doing so they run the risk of curtailing 
revenue. 
The best course seems to be a combined central - 
local administration, especially in the case of over- 
lapping taxes, and co- operation in other cases. 
U. S. A. 
Comparative Average Cost of Collecting $100 of 
Outlay Taxes, 1941 (1) 















(1) Compiled from: 
"Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations." 
op.cit. P.307 and P.309 




I ï1 a free economy, the consumer reigns 
supreme. The price mechanism is the regulator of 
the economy. The factors of production move to 
where their marginal productivity is higher. 
Under such conditions, the senior as well as 
the junior authorities play a minor role in the 
National economy. Central and local fiscal powers 
are restricted. There is little scope for economic 
or fiscal friction between authorities and individuals 
between junior authorities inter se or between the 
various tiers of authority. 
In an interventionist state, various economic 
measures make their appearance in certain sectors 
and the way is paved for the prima 'y precursory 
signs as tzrs of central -local disharmony. 
At the stage of economic planning, economic 
measures evolve into coherent policies, contrived 
in such a way as to achieve nation -wide objectives 
through a single -minded approach. Co- ordination 
and integration may reach such a point as to produce 
a comprehensive national plan clearly delineated and 
well interwoven. Central -local policy contradictions 





How the central government came to play a moor 
part in the national economy can be briefly sketched. 
The New eo nomics, based on income -expenditure analysis 
places major emphasis on effective demand. Investment 
and savings are equilibrated by the income mechanism. 
However, savings are not necessarily offset by investment 
at full employment level. The private propensity 
to invest is contingent, being dependent on the relation 
between the marginal efficiency of capital and the 
monetary rate of interest. The consumption function 
is not susceptible of much change in the short run 
when the psych institutional complex remains fairly 
constant. 
Consequently, public investment must be increased 
by concerted central government action. Public works 
must be planned in such a way as to generate full 
employment and hammer out or avert cyclical fluctuations. 
The multiplier theory and the acceleration theory explain 
tde process of subsequent expansion in income and 
employment. The income multiplier is the ratio of the 
change in income to the change in investment. The 
acceleration principle is the ratio between a change in 
induced consumption and induced investment. 
The central government must also try to foster the 
marginal propensity to consume by a better distribution 
of income, appropriate wage and social policies and 
easy consumer credits. In certain cases, when invest- 
ment is directed towards capital equipment or war 
production, consumption must be checked /as to bridge the 
inflationary gap. 
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It 4ppears from this outline that compensatory 
fiscal policy is a potent tool in contemporary economic 
philosophy. The central authorities must manipulate 
their fiscal powers in such a way as to support their 
investment - consumption policies. 
An operative fiscal policy requires two important 
things: a widening of the scope of taxation and central 
regulation or control of taxing powers. Central -local 
fiscal relationships have Vitked, in late years, along 
these lines. In unitary ana federal countries, income 
taxes, borrowing powers-and various functions came within 
the purview of the national goverments. 
On the lower level, local finances must be geared 
to the national economy and must respond to the coherent 
programme underwritten by the central government. All 
levels of government within the same country must act 
in unison. Apart from some basic local services, local 
expenditures must dovetail with those of the central 
government, notably on capital account, so as to achieve 
full employment and to iron out economic convulsions. 
In sum, junior fiscal powers must harmonize with senior 
fiscal powers to reach nation -wide objectives. 
However, national policies may be counteracted or 
nullified throughlocal economic or fiscal anachronisms. 
Intergovernmental horizontal and vertical taxing, borrowing 
and spending powers can have distortionary or disruptive 
effects. 
The present chapter is an endeavour to diagnose the 
salient features of interjurisdictional fiscal incompatibility 
3 6r 
in the framework of the national economy. The 
local divergent action covers two fields, namely, 
local taxing powers and local spending powers. 
36$ 
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LOCAL TAXING POWERS 
INTRODüCTIOiv 
Harmonious central -local taxation is a 
desideratum not easy of achievement. Two reasons 
may be invoked. 
1. The Inherent Irresponsiveness Of Local Taxation: 
, Eocal taxation lacks malleability. It is 
hampered by economic and legal limitations. The local 
taxes often have a restricted coverage, inflexible 
ceilings and limited scope for graduation. The 
inherent revenue deficiency is a deterrent to the 
use of local counter -cyclical taxation. The local 
bodies, especially if dominated by special- interest 
groups are inclined to lower taxation in boom and 
embark upon capital works thus accentuating disequilibrium. 
Similarly, local borrowing powers are hindered by 
economic and legal barriers. The local unit, unlike 
the national government, resorts to regressive taxes 
to service debts which may be largely owned by residents 
or institutions outside the local boundaries. A real 
debt burden and a re- actionary income distribution 
may be the consequences of local borrowing. In 
central borrowing, there is no "burden" but a transfer 
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of money from taxpayers to interest -receivers within 
the same country, and the debt is financed from 
progressive taxation. (1) 
The leal impediments affect various forms. 
Local debts may carry ceilings or have to pass through 
specific channels. An illustration is afforded by the 
U.S.A. vAhere local borrowing is based on the assessment 
valuation of local property so there is no elasticity 
in depression when property values shrink. 
2. The inter -local Competition For Taxable Resources: 
Local units, instigated by revenue deficiency, compete 
for taxable resources in such a way as to result in 
incoherent taxes and to wreck inter -local and central - 
local fiscal co- ordination. The lower tiers of góvernment 
are animated, in their rivalry by two motives: 
(1) The facts are, however, not as simple as that. 
The transfer4of purchasing power from taxpayers 
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to stock -holders carry important economic 
implications according to the form of borrowing 
and to the pattern of investment channels. 
(a) Positive motives: An under- endowed locality 
strives to enrich its taxable resources by encouraging 
the establishment of new industries or by enticing 
industries away from other localities. This is 
often the case of urban communities confronted with 
many expenses and able to offer inducements9 
(b) Negative motives: An impoverished locality 
may endeavour to stem the efflux of its taxable 
resources or to retrieve those lost. By conferring 
advantages to local factors of production it averts 
their efflux and the subsequent liabilities which 
would be left on its shoulders. 
We may now pass to a more detailed study of 
individual local taxes. 
L Local Property Taxation 
There is scope, in the local taxation of property, 
for certain quantitative and qualitative effects on 
investment and consumption running counter to national 
economic policies. The points of friction may be 
caused by the form of the tax, its rates or changes 
in them, assessment procedures or exemptions. (1) 
v 
(1) There are also o44 inducements connected with 
real property, such as the provision of site and building 
at nominal rental, or their donation by the local- 
authority. 
7, The Property Tax Structure. 
The form affected by the property tax is not 
without effects. An illustration is afforded by a tax 
on land which does not vary according to the value of 
land so as to leave unaltered its marginal uses, but 
affects the form of a flat rate per acre. In the 
latter case, extensive cultivation will be undermined 
to the advantage of intensive cultivation. (1) This 
causes a waste of arable land and may involve a reduction 
in agricultural output which, though price rises, can 
upset the national price plan, especially when central 
economic policy is laying emphasis on heavy industry. 
In the case of industrial and business property 
taxation, it is to be mentioned that a flat rate is 
discriminatory since the percentage of fixed capital, 
and equipment when taxed, varies between branches of 
industry or trade. 
If a local tax is laid on all property including 
new equipment, the marginal productivity of the latter 
must offset the levy. The tax, by imposing higher 
costs, affects the prospects of new capital equipment. 
Capital development will subsequently feel this adverse 
impact 
CI) HUBBARD, Joshua C.: "Creation of Income By Taxation." 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950. PP.l4 - 15 
Reference ought to be made to some specific illustration. 
The American (U.S.) property tax tends to shift investment 
from fixed improvements to movable and personal property, 
which are relatively lightly taxed, and to intangible property 
which is hardly assessed. The American tax has therefore an 
inhibitive effect on real estate improvement. Residential 
buildings tend to be below standard. 
It is the writer's opinion that appropriate distinctions 
should be made, in property taxation, between the different 
uses; residential, commercial, industrial, liberal professions 
and so on. Certain points, in this connection, are discussed 
below. 
Z. The Level and Changes of Property Tax Rates: 
The burden and changes of local property tax 
rates, whether in the case of residential or industrial 
and business property, has various repercussion on 
investment and involve consistency or inconsistency 
with national developmental policies. 
As concerns residential property, changes in the 
tax rates affect both the quantity and quality of 
housing. Whether the formal incidence is on the 
occupier or owner, a fall in the tax rates, especially 
in expanding regions or good times, fosters new 
building and repair work. Although the promotion 
of investment and employment is beneficial and fits in 
a growing economy, the application of financial, 
natural and human resources to certain uses, such as 
housing, may well clash with national planning putting 
the accent on short -term industrialisation. 
Furthermore, the pressure on resources, of total 
demand of industry plus housing, generates price rises 
and subsequently increases building costs. The 
latter fact may cancel the advantage to investors in 
real property, of lower house tax rates. 
On the other hand, high house taxes, or a rise 
in the tax ,,curbs new construction, especially in 
bad times or declining areas, amd militates against 
the provision of adequate rental housing to the 
detriment of the low -income familikies. When the 
property tax is very high, it often happens that 
dwelling houses are used as industrial and business 
premises, thus accentuating the shortage of housing. 
After emergencies, such as war, when it becomes 
necessary to speed reconstruction and rehabilitation 
works, the high local property taxes represent an 
impediment to privately owned housing development. 
However, the dampening of the incentive to build 
by high tax levels, may cause the national government 
to embark upon public housing schemes. 
It is to be mentioned that in expanding areas 
or in times of prosperity, the effective incidence of 
the tax rise falls on the occupier and real investment 
will be less affected. 
In sum, high house tax rates have significant 
economic and social implications. 
As regards the property tax on industrial and 
business premises, a rise in the tax rate, if likely 
to be charged on profits in the short run, will tend 
to be shifted forward to the consumers in the long 
run. The taxes will be thus considered as an element 
of costs and will be taken inconsideration when 
formulating price policy. 
In the U.S.A., 1,000 manufacturing concerns were 
asked, in an inquiry, whether the property taxes have 
been reflected in the price. Of the replies, 49 per 
cent were in the affirmative. (1) 
(1) KIMMEL, Lewis H. : "Taxes and Economic Incentives." 
The Brookings Instution, Washington, 1950. P.159 
In the writer's opinion, the effects of property 
taxation, in the case of industry and business property, 
can be of importance if there are substantial inter - 
local differences in their burden and notably when 
exemptions are provided for in some localities and 
not in others. Factory and business location is 
affected and the local areas which lose through their 
higher fiscal burden, suffer various financial and 
social consequences. The consumers living in highly 
taxed areas may also bear the differentially greater 
fiscal burden in increased prices. The consnmers 
are however able tole the locally increased prices 
thanks to local retail markets escaping the tax, mail 
purchases, out -of- locality purchases and the multiple 
stores which can offset the high taxes in some localities 
with the low ones in other localities. 
3. Assessment 
The differences in assessment procedures, by type 
of property or by region, is not without repercussions 
owing to the varying effective tax rates. 
In the case of residential property, the under- 
assessment of new houses, which amounts to a lower 
tax burden, enhances investment in building. Such 
tendencies harmonize with post -war national reconstruction 
policies and town- and -country planning. However, the 
diversion of resources towards investment in durable 
consumption goods ill accords with intensive industrial- 
isation programmes by causing a cut in the rate of 
capital development. 
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Central -local lack of harmony may also obtain in 
respect of location. Only the wealthy areas are 
likely to avail themselves of underassessment since 
the latter is a luxury and too costly an expenditure.for 
the weaker local budgets to bear. The fact that the 
wealthy localities are able to wage an unfair war for 
resources, through under- assessment, is uná.esirable. 
Furthermore, disturbances maybe caused to location 
plans, centrally devised, involving reconstruction 
of specific devastated regions or housing development 
in certain blighted areas. 
It is noteworthy that the/stickiness of valuation 
implies overvaluation in declining areas and under- 
valuation in expanding areas. 
The lack of uniformity in assessment procedures 
is also noticeable in the case of industrial and business 
real property. Assessment may be at varying percentages 
of actual value and may differ according to the type of 
activity. 
In the U.S.A., manufacturing realty is often under - 
assessed. Similarly, larger units, whether manufacturing 
or business concerns, tend generally to be under- assessed. 
The result of under -assessment, intentional or not, is 
discrimination against the non -manufacturing units in 
the first case or against the smaller units generally 
in the second case. 
It is to be noted that the homestead exemptions and 
credits (1) also imply discrimination against the 
1 According to the credit device used in Iowa, the 
taxing units do not lose revenue since they are reimbursed 
from the homestead credit fund (fed from state sales and 
income taxes). 
manufacturers' property. 
On the other hand, overassessment may be used 
by some local politicians as an instrument to combat 
big business. 
Clearly, the differences in assessment between 
competitors makes it difficult or impossible for the 
handicapped industries to recover the tax. 
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Exemption from Property Taxation. 
The provision of exemptions from local'property 
taxation has various economic, financial and social 
implications. 
In the case of residential property, exemptions 
may be given to the taxpayer as in the U.S.A. where 
there are homestead exemptions granted on all or 
part of the assessed value or full value. The 
stimulative effect on private investment in construction 
depends on the magnitude of the exemption, the proportion 
of taxable property enjoying it and the percentage of 
home ownership within the local community. 
As in the case of under- assessment, exemption may 
lead to a conflict between central industrialisation 
policies and local housing policies as a consequence of 
the drain on resources represented by increasing new 
building. 
If a distinction is drawn between urban and rural 
residential building development, some remarks can be 
made. A regional government may indeed wish, for 
economic oo, social motives, to develop urban communities 
and thus pro&ides for exemptions (or underassessment) 
to house -owners in its rural districts. If the region 
is agricultural, there is a likelihood that urbanisation 
will occur at the expense of arable land. Such a 
policy enters inFrconflict with a national economic 
plan laying stress on the increase of agricultural 
output and setting targets for further expansion of 
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farm land. The underlying authorities, by under- 
mining these national objectives, contribute to 
raising living costs or hindering exports of cash 
crops. 
Local homestead exemptions may not however be 
so undesirable if they encourage demographic migrational 
movements to virgin or desert lands where urban centres 
would contribute to commercial and industrial development. 
In the writer's opinion, the exemptions to house - 
owners, when the tax is payable by the owner as in the 
U.S.A. and Egypt, are not a reform of property taxation. 
They rather undermine the latter es basis. Moreover, 
the preferential treatment of property owners creates 
a further privileged class or increases the strength 
of real -estate interests already dominating, as in 
under- developed countries. The writer.is thus, in 
principle, opposed to homestead exemptions in under- 
developed countries. 
Owing to the fact that the property tax is the 
residual local tax subject in many cases and in view 
of local revenue deficiency generally, the gap between 
property -owners and non- property -owners will be widened 
by the transfer of the local fiscal load to rental 
residential property and - tax shifting to the 
occupiers who may belong to the low income -groups.. 
Alternatively or simultaneously, the local 
authorities may be driven to obtain compensation for 
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loss of revenue on residential property, by increased 
taxation of business and industrial property including 
in some cases, as in the U.S.A., equipment and stocks. 
In other terms, local productive enterprise will be 
overloaded. 
Exemptions may be also provided for in respect 
of business and industrial property taxation. 
In this case, it may be said that it is not so 
much the exemption per se that has economic effects 
but the inter -local non -uniformity prgctices in this 
connection. In other words, the effects will be 
greater the greater the diversity in inter -local 
exemptions. If the tax concession is universalised, 
its influence on business and factory location is 
neutralized. 
In England, the total exemption of agricultural 
hereditaments and the partial exemption of industrial 
hereditaments are a universal practice all over the 
local units of the country and have consequently, no 
influence on the inter -local distribut i on of 
agricultural or industrial development. 
However, the situation is not the same in other 
countries. In the U.S.A., a wide range of businesses, 
small and large, enjoy varying degrees of state arld 
local preferential treatment. In consequence, business 
and industrial location cannot be left unaffected 
especially in the case of new industries and inter -local 
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concerns which are generally more mobile. 
Factory location as affected by local taxing 
powers is not necessarily in harmony with industrial 
location as induced by the national government. The 
policy -framers, on the central level, may show the way 
to developments along different lines in response to 
technical, economic or strategic considerations. 
The junior taxing jurisdictions, by countering 
such objectives not only defeat national policies 
but also possibly develop diseconomies or cause 
social waste or contribute to the distress of other 
local areas. The establishment of local infant 
industries and unsoud business activities may 
ultimately prove a liability rather than an asset 
to the local authority. 
Local Property Taxation and Consumption. 
The effect of the local property tax on 
consumption and hence on the national economy, depends 
on its effective incidence and the level of the tax 
rates charged. 
If the effective incidence falls on the occupier 
(which notably happens in case of shortage of rental 
Property relatively to demand) the tax tends to reduce 
consumption not only because the demand on housing 
is inelastic but also because the non -property -owners 
can be generally assumed to have a higher propensity 
to consume than the property- owners. 
Similar results follow increases in the land L,x 
which fall on the farmers. 
On the other hand, if the effective incidence 





Local income taxes are, likely to be more 
operative than property taxes in their impact on the 
use of resources and the inter -local and central - 
local allocation of these resources. 
(4) Local Personal Income Taxation. 
The local taxation of personal income has 
different repercussions which can be outlined from 
the viewpoint of their intra -local or inter -local 
aspects as well as from their central -local aspect. 
If the local income tax is based on situs and 
applies only to income stemming within the local unit, 
and if income, accruing from outside the locality, is 
exempted, this amounts to an inducement offered to 
Jut -of- locality investment and enhances the Ufa -e e-iF` 
of local resources. Furthermore, this situation 
gives rise to a local privileged class living on 
investments on "forein" account. The inducement 
to extra -local investment exists even if the other 
localities levj income taxes since the fragmentation 
of income for the purposes of local taxation decreases 
the scale of progression. Moreover the outcome seems 
to be detrimental to the " situs" taxing authority 
since those who proceed to "outside" investments are 
likely to be high income -receivers enterprising and active 
residents. 
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It is noteworthy that thealocal tax differential 
(or better thetcentral plus local - - -- )may 
induce the taxpayers to reside in lowly taxed areas 
in preference to highly taxed areas. Differentials 
in transfer taxes (i.e. death taxes) contribute to 
the same effect. 
Local personal income taxation contributes to 
the various effects of central personal income taxation 
on, inter alia, saving and incentives. The joint 
impact will be accentuated when either central tax 
ev 
rates local tax rates, or both, rise (or the 
exemption limits and allowances lowered). The same 
'result is produced in case there is no provision for 
central -local tax deductibility or tax crediting. 
Since the Second World War, the central tax rates 
soared in many unitary and federal countries. 
The repressive burden of central plus local 
taxation does not militate in favour of an abundant 
supply of equity capital. The dearth in the latter 
might exert an adverse impact on economic expansion 
and national income unless public investment plays an 
important part. 
A further point may be noticed. The over- loaded 
taxpayers will attempt to re- eqalize the marginal 
utilities of their expenditures after payment of 
the taxes, central plus local. Changes will affect 
relative demand and will be reflected on the producers 
in varying degrees thus bringing about a re- allocation 
of resources. 
As concerns incentives, the junior taxing 
jurisdictions may prefer to lay income taxes only on 
specific flows of income instead of total income. 
he element of income most practically amenable to 
local taxation is wages and salaries. These are 
easily traceable locally and can be taxed at source. 
The present growing practice, especially in American 
municipalities is illustrative of this fact. If 
this type of local taxation gains momentum and if 
the central -local fiscal burden on wage- earners 
becomes heavy under the stress of local financial 
need, the incentives to work will be adversely 
affected. 
From the standpoint of national -local relations, 
the local personal income taxation, especially when 
assuming substantial proportions, may entail conflicts 
with national full employment policies and central 
economic control in general. 
In so far as the national government aims at 
achieving a proper balance between savings, investment 
and consumption, an opposite action may be exerted 
by local taxing powers or spending powers as will 
be expounded in due course. 
Whether the junior authorities can, or are. 
ready, to manipulate their income taxes and outlay 
taxes with flexibility, in such a way as to offset 
inflationary and deflationary tendencies, is open 
to doubt in view of the general local revenue deficiency 
characteristic of local finances. 
In connection with inflation and deflation, 
an interesting point may be noted. There may be 
in application, for the purpose of central -local 
fiscal co- ordination, a system of tax sharing 
whereby the national government has to hand over 
to the underlying authorities fixed percentages 
of central tax yields. If the taxes shared are 
important, e.g. the income taxes and if local 
sharing is substantial, the power of control of 
the central authorities will be hampered as the 
latter will not be able to carry out operative 
anti- inflationary or disinflationary policies. 
The "central" measures might well be contradicted 
by divergent measures on the part 'of the underlying 
authorities. The latter, in case of inflation for 
instance, would be left with large funds to spend 
probably as they please. The situation will be 
the more serious the more rigid are the portions 
of tax collections shared by the local authorities 
as when the percentages are inflexibly determined 
caun 
by the constitution. The Iattcr may be, in turn, 
also rigid as is generally.the case in a federal 
polity. 
It is the writer's opinion that full consideration 
be given to this important aspect of intergovernmental 
fiscal policy conflict, whether in countries where it 
actually obtains or in countries where it is proposed 
e.g. the Central African Federation. 
(1) See, for remedi,al proposals ápter IV " .11t - 
r-®rninne.; tat -.S . -Go y crr- - isa- td,.ela,f -- - e-e ti 
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OA) LOCAL BUSINESS INCOME TAXATION 
t Volume of Investment: The local corporate income 
tax system may militate against a national developmental 
plan from the quantitative, qualitative or value 
points of view. 
Clearly, the hodge -podge of local business taxes 
whether connected, little connected or unconnected with 
"impersonal ability to pay" is not liable to enhance 
the propensity to invest and may adversely affect the 
velume of investment especially when the latter is 
essentially non -governmental. 
In federal countries, notably, the junior authorities 
impose not only taxes on net business income but also 
on gross receipts, capital stock and even the "privilege" 
of doing business within the borders of the subordinate 
unit. Some of the non -profit taxes can be interpreted 
as imposts on costs.' 
Generally speaking, the revenue deficiency of 
local authorities is an inducement to the latter, 
especially the pluritaxing ones, to soak local and 
inter -local businesses directly or indirectly. 
It was already emphasized that the complexity and 
diversity of local business taxes and the lack of inter - 
local uniformity in fiscal powers generate overlapping 
and multiple taxation.. The latter facts carry serious 
implications with respect to inter -local concerns which 
will thus be unduly. burdened. Chain stores and mass- 
Producing manufacturing undertakings with pan -local 
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activities and cosmopolitan income, are deterred from 
expanding. They are also put at a competitive 
disadvantage as against intra -local concerns. The 
outcome may be, not only a contraction of investment 
as planned on the central level, but also a rise in 
costs, per unit of output. 
Hardship may well be caused to local firms owing 
to heavy compliance costs .and trouble in paying even 
the tax on net income which involves the application 
of intricate formulas for the purpose of inter -local 
business income allocation. 
In sum , the local corporate taxes accentuate 
the impact of the central corporate taxes whether on 
economic expansion, on capital structure (e.g. the 
proportion of borrowed capital to total capital) or 
on business organisation (e.g. the discrimination 
against the corporate form) . 
As regards economic expansion, the joint load 
of central plus local taxes on profits)by being too 
high (l))represents a drain on liquid working capital 
particularly in times of rising prices. The supply of 
investment funds will be adversely affected. This can 
lead to serious conse:;uences in countries where private 
savings are short and where new capital formation has to 
rely on self- financing. The propensity to expand 
is thus impeded whilst capital development is the focal 
(l) Especially when no provision is made for tax credits 
in inter -local relations or for tax deductibility 
in central -local relations. 
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point of post -war economic policies. 
z. Industrial Location: The inter -local rivalry for 
taxable resources induces some localities to offer 
tax advantages to extra -local businesses. Some 
local jurisdictions may provide for exemptions, others 
for underassessment or other concessions eaueLAS do/are/04 
Ai &tea £uJcg4, ! i it dn_ e, _ bWimo craw, A A . 
It is no'gworthy that the application, by junior 
authorities, of a particular form of tax is less 
significant, with respect to business and factory 
location, than the existence of local tax differentials 
or inter -local differentials in total taxes, that is, 
local plus central. (1) 
The inter -area competition (sometimes keen as in 
the U.S.A.) to entice enterprises away from other 
localities may cause economic and social prejudice to 
the deprived localities and, occasionally, to the 
"attracting" locality itself. Furthermore, national - 
local co- ordination can be damaged. (2) 
(1) If central taxation is very high, the local tax 
differential will make a small difference in the 
inter -area total burden of central plus local 
taxation. 
(2) Certain lines of activity are not likely to be 
materially affected by tax differentials such as 
transport facilities and other basic services 
and retail stores. 
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Various points may be underlined. Industries and 
other concerns may be induced to a less favourable 
habitat and productivity and efficiency thus suffer. 
The efflux and influx of enterprises clearly leave 
in their wake human distress and financial liabilities 
on the local buu< ets. The workers, as low- income 
earners, are not very mobile. 
It is noticeable that the infant industries and 
the parasitic or "hobo" businesses are most liable 
to be lured. Their inter -local mobility, following 
slight tax differentials, is a disturbing factor not 
to be overlooked. 
As the wealthy local snits are better able to 
offer tax concessions, industries may tend to concentrate 
in particular areas. The development of poor and 
"backward" regions can be thus hindered. Furthermore, 
there will ensue an accentuation of inter -local economic 
disparities in per capita income. 
Central -local harmony, with respect to industrial 
location, may not prevail. The "central" policy -makers 
may agree on a certain scheme for factory location 
based on nation -wide economic or strategic considerations. 




The general and local detrimental effects of competitive 
bidding have been emphasized by Many writers. Professor 
Benson, of Michigan University, may be quoted in this 
connection: 
"The migrating firms leave behind them unemployment, 
higher welfare costs, higher taxes on the businesses and 
individuals who remain, more bankruptcies, and the full 
impact of the downward economic cycle. But, in addition, 
even the local benefits are questionable, since the 
practical subsidisation of certain companies tends to 
handicap others which are carrying their fair share of the 
community costs. Moreover, the small town which has 
attracted industries through tax exemption and other 
governmental concessions has more difficulty in maintaining 
adequate educational, health and welfare programs than one 
in which all parts of the community are contributing to the 
revenue. The immediate benefits of increased real -estate 
activity are more than counterbalanced in the long run by 
the decrease in social standards." 
(1) 
(1) Benson) George C.S. : 
The New Centralization. 
New York, 1941. P.38. 
See also: 
Newcomer, Mabel : 
Taxation and Fiscal Policy. 
New York, 1940. PP.56 -63. 
In conclusion, keen competitive bidding is an 
undesirable tendency displayed by secondary authorities 
(e.g. states, provinces) as well as tertiary authorities, 
notably cities and towns. Various illustrations may be 
given. 
In the U.S.A., the state of Mississippi allowed its 
municipalities to "acquire land and construct buildings for 
worth -while plants seeking healthy decentralized units in 
small and friendly towns." 
A further striking illustration is afforded by a town 
in New Hampshire which offered to dismantle and set up a 
shoe factory of another town, together with the offer of a 
large building rent -free and a guarantee of 145,000 against 
labour troubles 
(1) 
In Argentine, instances of competitive bidding are 
provided by such provinces as La Rioja, Mendoza, San Luis 
and Catamarca. 
In La Rioja, exemptions are accorded since 1949 to 
industries expanding by 50%. Recompenses, affecting 
different proportions of invested capital, may be given to 
stimulate new industries. (2) 
(1) Massachusetts Commission on Interstate Cooperation. 
Final Report to the General Court concerning the 
migration of Industrial Establishments. 
Boston, 1939. PP.66 -78. 
(2) Patterson, Ernest F. : "Argentine Provincial Tax 
Systems ". 
Inter- American Economic Affairs. Winter 1953. P.64. 
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The Province of Catamarca, in 1952, issued the Decree 
110.633 providing for tax exemptions to local industries. 
The first article may be reproduced. 
"All industry that is installed in the territory of the 
province before December 31, 1962, with a cash capital 
of not less than 100,000 pesos, that has for its object: 
1) the extraction, elaboration, transformation, or 
manufacture of products that up to now have not been 
industrialized in the province; 
2) the development of activities of similar character 
to others already established in the province, that 
have for object the ends enumerated above, and with 
capital not less than the amount mentioned above. 
3) hotels with capital not less than 100,000 pesos. 
4) all other industry not included in 1), 2) and 3) 
that have a capital of not less than 100,000 pesos 
remain exempt from the following taxes for a period of 
ten years: 
a - property tax on the land and buildings 
exclusively devoted to the industry; 
b - licenses, including vehicles and stamp tax on 
judicial acts inherent in its constitution, 
implantation and activities of exploitation. 
c - municipal fees and taxes that are not fees for 
retribution of services." 
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;. LOCAL OUTLAY TAXES. 
The application, by secondary and tertiary 
taxing jurisdictions, of outlay taxes, whether partial 
or comprehensive, can exert distortionary effects and 
might well cause prejudice to the investment and 
employment policies framed on the basis of nation- 
wide considerations instead of narrow local egoistic 
interests. 
RICE^ 
Tie commodity taxes, general or selective, levied 
by junior authorities on producers, wholesalers or 
retailers, are generally shifted to the consumers. The 
extent of shifting depends on various factors such as 
the territorial scope of the taxes, the elasticity of 
demand and supply, the conditions of cost, the degree 
of monopoly and market conditions. 
Concerning the first point, shifting will be 
more difficult in a locality imposing sales taxes while 
the adjoining areas do not. Demand in the taxing unit 
will be relatively elastic. This is especially so with 
local industries which cannot possibly move out of the 
taxing jurisdiction as in the case of the extractive 
industries, such as farming, mining and forestry in 
which backward shifting, that is, capitalization of 
the tax, is likely to supersede forward shifting. 
It may also be pointed out that, within sales - 
taxing secondary governments (e.g. provinces, states 
or counties) the fringe areas, such as towns and other 
tertiary units, will present increased difficulties 
of shifting for the local producers or dealers. 
The forward shifting of sales taxes will induce 
an undue rise in prices through pyramiding, especially 
at 
if the taxes are not levied an the merchanting stage, 
that is, wholesale or retail. The price rise is also 
accentuated by taxes laid on food stuffs and other 
necessities. The minor governments cannot easily 
resist the temptation of burdening the latter as they 
find the levy in such cases particularly lucrative owing 
to the widespread scope of consumption and the inelasticity 
of demand. 
From the inter -local and national points of view, 
the resort to local commodity taxation is conducive 
to disparities in price levels which may well disturb 
the general price structure and carry other important 
implications dealt with below, 
t. Consumption. 
The commodity, or sales taxes, of general or specific 
character, have a deflationary impact. They reduce the 
propensity to consume of the low- income receivers. With 
the high income groups, it is the savings rather than 
consumption that are likely to be affected. 
The effects on consumption are more important in 
depression than in boom. Clearly, the curtailment of 
purchasing power is also most undesirable in times of 
over- saving4 . J 
The heavier the burden of consumption taxes, of all 
S dirV,it Q2,. itrigl- YLïtitilC97[t 'i,i ru.1 U' -WwtÁ.i 4 ;vYt lU1Æ l!. S ri d t.s.&_ 
;>f 1-.41 tYWAJI. lYvt. !Lei-Ce-r, lEi,la 124ie1ti &KZ I , 'at. rrd Zi44.vJ 
ra 
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types applied by government layers, the more important is 
their impact on consumption. It is possible to estimate the 
burden in relation to national income or disposable income 
and notably to total personal consumption expenditures. In 
the U.S.A., in 1948, the total collections from sales taxes, 
use taxes and gross receipts taxes of all kinds were about 
11.7 billions or approximately 5.5 per cent of national 
income and about 6.5 per cent of disposable income. This 
was again equivalent to as much as 6.8 per cent of all 
personal consumption expenditures. (1) 
From the standpoint of central -local relations, the 
contraction of consumption through local authority action 
falls in line with a national anti -inflationary drive. 
However, if the central authorities fix price ceilings the 
imposition of commodity taxes will either disrupt the price 
control system or result in the production of lower quality 
goods. (2) 
A further point of friction may be pointed out. The 
national government may initiate a full employment policy 
based on an expansion of effective demand with a view to 
offset savings at full employment level. 
(1) Kimmel, Lewis H. : "Taxes and Economic Incentives ". 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1950. p.150. 
(2) A strange fact, in this connection, is that the central 
government in India has been granting subsidies to the 
state governments to keep prices at a low level; while 
the states have been imposing sales taxes. 
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The programme can be counteracted by local commodity 
taxation which has a restrictive effect on the 
propensity to consume. At times of underconsumption 
and oversaving, the central -local fiscal clash needs 
no comment. 
The local divergent action may be attenuated 
if the local authorities spend the revenue so collected 
to increase social consumption. However, the local 
authorities do not always envisage the situation from 
this angle, especially when they are a- democratic in 
structure. They may make use of the tax proceeds to 
alleviate the burden of local taxation, for instance, by 
lowering the property tax rates or providing for more 
homestead exemptions. The lower authorities may also 
prefer to repay their debts. 
3, Volume of Investment: 
From.the local and inter -local points of view, 
local sales taxes may be imposed by some taxing 
jurisdiction but not by others. If the local industry 
is subject, for instance, to a general sales tax, it 
will find it difficult to shift the tax to the consumers 
owing to the competition of tax free commodities coming 
from other localities. If the industry is mobile 
it may move to other localities. The efflbx of 
business will consist either in moving the plants 
or diverting orders to other branches located outside 
the taxing unit. 
Clearly, the exodus of local industries 
hinders local capital development and adversely 
affects local finances. Costs of production 
are likely to rise, the exodus of labour being 
a contributing ¡actor. 
On the other hand, some local industries 
are completely impossible to move such as the 
extrative industries (farming, mining, forestry). 
In this case, the tax, which cannot be shifted forward 
will be capitalized. 
It is noteworthy that both the efflux of local 
firms and the capitalization of sales taxes will 
adversely affect local property values (1) and 
hence reduce local revenue from taxes imposed 
on the ownership of property generally as in the 
U.S.A. 
Clearl, the junior taxing jurisdiction puts 
its own industries and trading concerns at a dis- 
advantage vis -a -vis the extra -local or "outside" 
undertakings (2) operating in non -taxing areas. 
(1) 11ENSEN, Jens P. 
"General versus Selective Taxes." 
Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1929. P.403 
(2) However, compensatory taxes may be imposed on the 
comodities "imported" from across the border. 
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From the national point of view, the increase in 
prices caused by heavy manifold commodity taxes, induces 
a decrease in demand and brings output down whether 
under perfect competition or monopoly, the monopolist 
trying to equalize marginal revenue with marginal 
cost. 
The curtailment oL output clearly does not fit 
in a national plan based on an expansion of production. 
It may be argued that integration and direct 
marketing will be fostered leading to the rationalization 
of production and the decrease in per unit cost. 
However, integration tends to be monopolistic 
and the producers will then restrict output and increase 
prices to the consumers by more than the tax. 
It ouht to be mentioned also that a heavy burden 
of consumption taxes levied by local and central 
authorities, may adversely affect incentives and hence 
productivity. 
Clearly, the general increase in prices is aertylolza.nr- 
d4g-G--i-stre factor of wage increases, which, in turn, puts 
up costs of production and handicaps national investment 
development. Besides the fact that the trade unions 
are powerful /industrial wages are sometimes linked 
directly with the cost of living index as is the case 
in France since the last Pinay Government. Agricultural 
prices may be also linked with other prices as in the 
U.S.A. which applies the "parity formula." 
i.. Maladjustments in Investment: 
From the local and inter -local points of view, 
the sales taxes may involve discrimination between 
industries and businesses caused by the scope of the 
taxes or the pattern of the rate structure, whether 
in the case of general commodity taxes, retail taxes 
or selective taxes. 
The uniform rate structure is particularly 
discriminatory owing to the differences in the turnover 
and the varying proportions of gross receipts or profits 
to capital invested. There are also structural 
differences between industries in the marketing processes 
and the degree of integration. The elasticity of demand 
for the various products and their social desirability 
is not the same. The uniform tax rates will be thus 
pyramided unequally in different industries or concerns. 
It may be Pointed out that the local taxes, based 
on turnover and imposed on manufacturers or traders, may 
affect the pattern of business organisation. Integration 
and the multiple stores will be fostered to the detriment 
of smaller firms and unit shops. 
Reference must be made to the inter -local disparities 
in practice concerning the rate structure. If a locality 
resorts to uniform rates while nearby localities levy 
selective sales taxes at adjusted rates, the industries 
and businesses in the former case will be put at a 
disadvantage vis -avis their counterpart in the latter 
localities. 
oo 
It is the writer's opinion that the selective 
commodity taxes imposed at variable rates are better 
than the general or retail sales taxes applied at 
uniform rates. 
From a general viewpoint, if some commodities 
are taxed and others are not, there will be an increase 
of demand for the non -taxed commodities which induces 
n increase in their prices. Changes in consumption 
patterns bring about changes in investment patterns 
which imply different resource -allocations not 
necessarily in harmony with the targets set by the 
"national" policy- makers. 
S. Local and Inter -local Trade: 
Local business organisation may be affected by the 
burden, the scope or the structure of the taxes. It 
was already pointed out that a tendency towards "big 
business" makes its appearance in order to mitigate 
the tax. Integration and the multiple stores form 
reduce the number of stages at which the levy is due. 
Chain stores and inter -local concerns will also be 
fostered as they are in a position to offset taxes paid 
to a locality by their business in non -taxing localities. 
A further illustration may be given. If a local 
general sales tax is levied at uniform rates, it will 
not be difficult to make wholesale an inter -local 
transaction thereby avoiding the tax, and selling 
in the taxing locality only at retail. This clearly 
affects local wholesale business. 
From the inter -local viewpoint, the application, by the 
local taxing jurisdiction, of some form of "protective duties" 
on commodities "imported" from other localities, is not 
without repercussions. These "duties ", called in the U.S.A. 
"use taxes" are compensatory taxes whose aim is to safeguard 
the competitive powers of local industry and business and 
also to protect the revenue productivity of the local sales 
taxes, especially if adjoining areas are non -taxing. 
However, the local "compensatory taxes" are akin to 
internal customs and as such act as a barrier to inter -local 
trade notably when no credits are provided for sales taxes 
already paid to other jurisdictions on the same commodities. 
Clearly, these hindrances are also conducive to diversions of 
marketing channels. 
It ought to be mentioned that the neo- tolls, affecting 
the country's internal trade, can be made serious if the 
taxing localities are allowed to discriminate against certain 
products "imported" from other local units. An illustration 
is afforded by the U.S.A. where some such right was granted 
to the states with respect to alcoholic beverages, by the 
Twenty -first amendment of the Constitution. ( 1) 
(1) "The Twenty -first Amendment in its attempt to protect the 
dry states in enforcing prohibition, opened the way to 
protective tariffs on liquor. As a result, more than half 
of the states have some form of liquor taxation that 
favors the domestic producer. Some have even gone so far 
as to place embargoes on the liquor of other states." 
Compare the state margarine taxes protecting the dairy 
industry in the north and the cottonseed -oil industry in 
the south. See 
Newcomer, Mabel: Taxation and Fiscal Policy. New York, 
1940. p.8l. 
/, A 
6, Foreign Trade 
The heavy load of commodity taxation, caused or 
fostered by secondary and tertiary authorities, has 
its implications in the field of foreign trade. 
Demand may be diverted from the expensive home 
produced goods to the less expensive imported products. 
The effect will be stronger in case the local sales 
taxes are not levied on the merchanting stage, wholesale 
or retail, but are laid on the production stage as the 
price rise will then be intensified through the process 
of pyramiding. The outome is a leakage in the foreign 
trade multiplier9 
On the other hand, internal in living 
costs and prices of raw materials will cause an increase 
in the country's costs of production, especially -iif the 
taxes are imposed on production goods as well as on 
consumption goods and price pyramiding takes place. 
The competetive capacity of the country will thus be 
weakened on foreign markets. (1) However, if the local 
Ausg4.41 ebb= 
sales taxes are levied on the merchanting stager, the 
central government may be able to offer rebates in 
(1) The attempt by the central governemtn, or any 
intermediate authority (e.g. province or state) to remove 
or reduce a local sales tax should be conditional upon 
price reductions (or compensated by other taxes 0.g. excess - 
profits taxation), otherwise higher profits result especially 
in monopolistic or oligopolistic positions. 
.t_ 
order to stimulate exports. In fact, the outlay taxes 
cannot be easily shifted to foreigners and if shifted, 
they exert an adverse effect on exports and contribute 
to balance of payments disequilibria. 
In conclusion, reference must be made to the fact 
that commodity taxation, central and local, is gaining 
momentum, On the local level, it is caused by the inherent 
revenue deficiencies of the minor governments and the 
invasion, by the central government of local elastic 
sources, e.g. income taxation. The National government 
has, indeed, to face new responsibilities of welfare 
and economic control. Furthermore, the costs of local 
services have gone up forcing the junior authorities to 
devise new ways and means. 
In the writer's opinion it is important that the 
underlying governments be precluded from making extensive 
use of outlay taxes, general or selective, on account 
not only of their regressive impact but also of the in- 
herent national -local economic conflicts. The taxing 
areas should be wide, for instance regions, states, 
provinces or large municipalities. The taxes could be 
laid on the merchanting stage (retail, wholesale) rather 
than on the production stage so as to avoid price pyra- 
miding. The tax rates should vary according to the cis 
of commodities instead of being uniform. Central admini- 
stration and control must be fostered so as to alleviate 
compliance and collection costs. 
zuctait 
It is also desirable to adopt, if -oo-ccible, 
some form of central -local tax - sharing of outlay 
taxes, whether specific or general. 
In any case, inter -local and national -local 
co- operation and co- ordination are essential in 
view of the various internai and external repercussions 
involved. 
SECTION: II . 
LOCAL BORaUWING: AN ALTERNATIVE 10 TAXATION 
The tax revenue deficiency of local authorities 
may induce the latter to resort to borrowing. 
Borrowing,on the local level, however, also 
generates intergovernmental economic conflicts in 
various fields notably investment, consumption, 
prices and income distribution. 
The utilization of money and natural resources, 
on the lower level, through borrowing, is not 
necessarily achieved with an overview of the 
requirements of the national economy as a whole, 
hence the unde rability of leaving unfeterted the 
borrowing powers of the underlying bodies. 
entt 9 gí,5- rnatSe l? 
In so Zar as the local authorities borrow from 
high income- bracket individuals and resort to local 
regressive taxes (whether regressivity is by type 4,i4,:,:we 
or by see) to pay the interest on their bonds, 
there results a maldistribution of income which may 
be accentuated by the issue of tax -free "local" 
bonds. Untaxed local and municipal bonds contribute, 
with "central" untaxed bonds to create a class of 
privile;ed persons and to widen the loophole making 
evasion possible. (1) 
(1) In the U.S.A., though the states generally tax interest 
on federal obligations, they often do not tax the interest 
on theirs. 
Moreover, the expenditure of the proceeds of 
borrowing on consumption projects and municipal 
amenities which mainly benefit the high- income 
earners is conducive to more pronounced income 
maldistribution. A fairer income distribution 
is obtained through spending in such a way as to 
benefit the local community as a whole, for instance 
on health, assistance, slum clearance and various 
other basic services. 
It is to be noticed that if the local authorites 
spend the proceeds, only or mostly, for consumption 
purposes, the servicing of the local debts will require 
further local taxation which is generally of a regressive 
character. This will be causative of more intra -local 
fiscal inequities. (1) 
On the other hand, however, a certain amount of 
local borrowing power may dispense with further 
reqr_essive or repressive taxation. 
Pizafienzbi Za 6 1.47.6 wmc : 
The maldistribution of income, on both taxation 
and expenditure sides, does not only result in less 
social equity but it also adversely a1_ects the propensity 
to consume thus eventually hindering national full 
employment policies. 
When the national g \vernment borrows, it generally 
resorts to progressive taxation to finance its debts. 
Purchasing power is transferred from high- income receivers 
(1) See Sectionill, "Local Spending Powers." 
within the same national borders and the propensity 
to consume may not be seriously affected. 
Local borrowing , however, is serviced through 
generally regressive taxation and involves a transfer 
of purchasing power from low income -receivers, with a 
high propensity to consume, to high -income receivers with 
a low propensity to consume. 
Furthermore, the stockholders of local d.eb may be 
residing outside the borrowing locality, so there will 
occur a "siphoning of income out of' the local area" (1) 
following the payment of interest or reimbursement of 
borrowed funds. The analysis also applies when the local 
authority embarks upon capital works. The initial and 
subsequent increases in income may benefit other localities 
(es will be expounded in due course) í ,Ì r , . : j L L v4 ez-c.t,t 
n Nv+L..aa ) 
(1) HANSEN A, and PERLOFFL H. ; "State and. Locar. Finance 
in the National Economy." New York, l9'-4. P. 196 
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Investment. Maladjustments in investment can 
also make their appearance. The increasing bidding 
for a limited Quantity of savings by both central and 
local authorities raises the interest rates. Besides, 
the junior authorities may attract resources to 
channels not considered desirable from a national 
standpoint or they may promote investment at inopportune 
times thus intensifying the cycle. (2) 
Local borrowing may also result in undermining 
.i4 
the confidence of the private investor if it/used to 
carry out competing or ill -timed investment projects. 
If the central authorities, in a flexibly planned 
economy, prefer to expand private investment in a 
particular sector by inducement, their policy will 
be counteracted 
(2) See Section III 
or even negatived. 
It is noteworthy that the efficiency of local 
government enterprises and municipal undertakings may 
be lower in comparison with those run by private 
enterprise or managed by the central authorities. 
The outoome is a smaller output in goods and services 
obtainable per unit of local expenditure. Clearly, 
this implies a waste of resources and adversely affects 
the national dividend. 
Ippro 
The retirement by local authorities of their 
bonds may involve the country's economy in difficulties 
if it occurs at times of rising prices. The increased 
liquidity of enterprises and individuals bol srs up 
the inflationary tendencies. 
A further point ou`;ht to be mentioned, Many 
local bodies, once allowed to borrow easily, might 
be tempted to increase their liabilities beyond 
their fiscal capacity and so embarrass their own 
finances and run the risk of defaulting on their loans. 
This is especially so since local borrowing is 'generally 
more expensive than central borrowing and is likely 
in under- developed countries to be dead -weight or passive 
debt rather than active debt. The massive insolvency 
of the lower authorities, consequent upon a general slump 
may be causative of much hardship. C' 
The various considerations outlined above induced 
some national governments to bring local borrowing powers 
l7 P riauiC oleic 0-r,.. u 
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under control in respect pf amount, interest rates, 
purposes and çonditions of repayment. This is 
especially the case in planned economies and 
emergencies when it becomes necessary to gear local 
borrowing to national financial policies. 
An illustration is afforded by England where 
borrowing by local authorities is now subject to the 
control of the Public Works Loan. Cornmi ssioners (also 
called the Board), the Capital Issues Committee and 
the Parliament which has been endowed with more 
control over the amount of local borrowing. (1) 
(1) There are minor exceptions to central control 
concerning notably borrowing by mortgage within limits, 
borrowing by overdraft for temporary reasons, reborrowing 
for replacement of stock if the local body had the option 
to redeem. . See: 
SCHULZ, Maureen: "The Control of Local Authority 
Borrowing By the Central Government." in: 
Essays on Local Government. Edited by C.H.Wilson. 
Oxford 1948 P.161 
SECTION: III 
LOCAL SPENDING POWERS. 
The junior governments may not act in concert 
with the central government in outgo as well as intake 
Local fiscal and economic behaviour may be at odds with 
national long -term planning and anti- cyclical policies. 
The local divergent action thus accentuates economic 
fluctuations instead of smoothing them. 
I. Fiscal Equity. 
As was already pointed out, expenditure of the 
proceeds of taxation cannot be overlooked in any accurate 
evaluation of the fiscal burden. Taxation entails 
subtraction, and addition through benefit, in its ethical - 
collective acceptation. The net balance or the fiscal 
residuum is the true criterium of the tax burden. 
The junior authorities can, through expenditure, 
affect the fiscal pressure on taxpayers and consequently 
can influence the fiscal residuum. The local fiscal 
burden or better the total within each locality of local 
plus central taxation can thus be rendered less progressive, 
or even regressive, if local outlays result in benefits 
accruing mainly or solely to the high -income earners. 
It is thus clear that the interlocal disparities 
in the fiscal residuum of similarly situated persons are 
accentuated by the lack of tax uniformity, by tax 
competition between localities and by an uneven inter - 
local development of social welfare. 
The central authorities can however intervene to 
equalize the quantative and qualitative total "bundle 
of services (local plus central) between similar taxpayers 
residing in different subordinate units by means of an 
appropriate grant system as well as through progressive 
taxation. 
In case the aim is to achieve over -all maximisation 
of social benefit, central cum local, the equalizing 
functions in connection with expenditure and taxation, 
will also be the responsibility of the / central authorities. 
r he Eouful,, c , 0,:tirís «m J cavt, Ate . o r j¢= & 
II. Volume of Investment. 
Local taxation and borrowing cause a reduction 
in savings. If the local bodies do not invest 
the monetary funds they recuperate, they exert a 
detrimental effect on the total volume of investment. 
Income and employment levels decrease. If exports 
play an important part in the national economy, and if 
the resources are diverted from the export industries, 
prejudice may be caused to the balance of payments. 
. (Lt. Timing of Investment 
Local capital works, such as housing schemes, 
road building and other projects may be ill- timed and 
nullify the central counter -cyclical measures. Local 
investment may be embarked upon in boom rather than in 
slump, thus intensifying the pressure of demand on 
resources and increasing wages and prices. The costs 
of production go up for central and local investment pur- 
poses and inflationary forces are set off. 
In slump, the junior authorities may contribute 
to a worsening of the situation by curtailing their 
expenditures on new works. (l) 
It must, however, be recognized that proper timing 
of local investment is not always feasible as the local 
services or undertakings may be of dire necessity to the 
local community (e.g. water supply, electricity, sewerage - 
disposal plants). 
.11 Maladjustments in Investment 
Central -local inco -ordination can generate 
distortionary resource -allocation effects. 
(1) In the U.S.A., state and local expenditures on 
capital works, which amounted to an average of $ 2,104 
million between 1925 -29, declined to $707 million in 1933 
end .í$ 616 million in 1935. See: - 
HANSEN and. PERLOFF. op. cit. P. 54 
 E 
In a controlled economy, the national policy - 
makers may have devised a given preference schedule 
imparting first order to capital development or 
exports. However, the junior authorities, es- 
pecially within a feudal or aristocratic polity, 
may go so far in providing welfare and other mun- 
icipal amenities for the high- income groups as to 
generate a serious diversion of demand towards 
luxuries and semi -luxuries thus disrupting the 
national objectives of industrialisation or bal- 
ance of payments equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if the national plan puts 
emphasis on consumption and living standards gener- 
ally, there may be agreement between senior and junior 
authorities. 
More generally, the re- orientation of demand, 
through local action, requires some re- allocation 
of resources. If the central government does not 
respond to this pressure from below or if no central - 




An important fact must now be pointed out. 
A locality may strive to promote or restore its 
economy and may launch a policy of capital works. 
Such a locality will, however, find that the 
successive increases in income and employment are 
likely to benefit neighbouring areas. In fact, 
there is a further serious leakage in the multi- 
plier,, and acceleration principles in inter -local 
relations namely the "geographic leakage" whicho/ 
weaken even the primary effects of local invest- 
ment since capital and raw materials 
may derive from other districts (1) Within the same 
country, the natural and money resources are likely 
to be unevenly distributed. 
The experience of the U.S.A. provides considerable 
instruction in respect of central -local policy disharmony. 
The following passage may be quoted from Hansen and 
Perloff. It contains the gist of the problem; (2) 
"In the past, states and localities have typically 
made large capital outlays in prosperous periods and 
have deferred capital improvements and even maintenance 
when business conditions were depressed. They have 
borrowed heavily when private capital markets were 
expanding and have curtailed their borrowing just 
at the time when new issues were needed to stimulate the 
economy. States and localities have in fact, followed 
the swings of the cycle and have thereby intensified 
the violence of economic fluctuations." 
(1) The usual leakages of the multiplier are price 
inflation, net imports, debt repayment and the 
accumulation of idle cash balances. 
(2) HANSEN and PERLOFF: op. cit. P.199 
Similarly, in Great Britain, local government 
expenditure did not follow anti- cyclical lines. An example 
is afforded by housing which, between the two wars, was the 
main constructional activity. There was no planning for a 
reserve of building to be undertaken in recessions. Two of 
the three major expansion programmes were carried out in 
prosperity, namely, in 1921 and to a smaller extent in 1931. 
In the subsequent unemployment periods, these policies were 
abruptly reversed thus accentuating the cycle. 
"On the whole, it appears that the most hopeful 
objective is the securing of a greater measure of stability 
in the total of local capital expenditure on all services, 
which would itself involve some measure of anti -cyclical 
timing in some services in order to offset inevitably 
cyclical timing in others. The degree of local and central 
planning, which the achievement of this objective would 
imply, would prepare the way for more ambitious attempts to 
secure lare anti- cyclical movements of total expenditure 
and would, in so far as it tended to delay expe 111 i tálre in 




retherion R.F. - Burchardt, L.A. and Rutherford R.5.G.: 
Public rnvestment and t e Trade Cycle in Great tain.. 
Oxford, 1941. P.201. 
See also: 
Hicks, I.K. : Public Finance. Cambridge, 1947. 
PART THREE 
IN'TERGOVERNNENTAL FISCAL CO -ORDINATION 
Chapter Five 
THE LOCAL TAXES 
ec.Gerr I. 
T C-`ci 
T H E various aspects of inequities and 
inadequacies, inherent in junior fiscal powers, 
have been expounded. The analysis reveals the 
dire need for central -local fiscal co- ordination 
in order to achieve the following desiderata: 
The elimination or mitigation of the sources of 
regressive and repressive taxation whether intra- 
local, inter -local or central-local. 
The dissipation or alleviation of the causes of 
horizontal and vertical overlapping and multiple 
taxation which are conducive to unfair treatment, 
higher costs of collection and compliance. 
Coping with the problem of revenue inadequacy 
through devising new local imposts or transferring 
others from higher to lower tiers, totally or 
partially. The underlying government units can 
be also provided with subsidies, both complementary 
and supplementary in order to adapt their revenue 
to needs. 
4. Central -local solidarity in the responsibility 
of securing a national (i.e. central plus local) 
quantative and qualitative minimum of social 
benefits to all members of the community without 
distinction of residence and irrespective of local 
fiscal potential. 
5. Rectifying local fiscal perversity in boom and 
slump so as to produce a coherent national economy 
exempt from intergovernmental conflicts. 
6. The maintenance of a certain degree of local 
responsibility. The current centripetal forces 
must not be allowed to wreck the essence of local 
government. The latter is desirable for political 
and economic motives. 
The problem of achieving these desiderata 
and reconciling them confronts us with an arduous 
task in view of the possible conflicts between the 
different objectives. 
There are two lines of approach; one ideal 
and the other practical. The ideal solution is 
,1.42 a(2ein 
sketched in the present ids --1n. It is not 
a utopia, but both a target and a test. 
The more practical course to follow is ex- 
pounded, in more detail, in s en o,iC (1176-4-W0-. 
tke, Avs " Pa&C ̀ rte , 
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A N "organismic" community, senior or junior, 
must be guided in the conduct of its finances by two 
principles; one pertaining to taxation and the other 
to expenditure. (1) 
4 4 
Buchanan, J.M. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance, 
A Suggested Approach." 
The Journal of Political Economy. December, 1949. P.4 96 
"Federalism and Fiscal Equity ". 
The American Economic Review. September, 1950. P.583 
"A Rejoinder." 
The Journal of Political Economy. August, 1951. P.358 
Bhargava, R.N.: "The Theory of Federal Finance." 
The Economic Journal. March, 1953. P.84 
Jenkins, H.P.: "Fiscal Equity in the Unequal Treatment 
of Unequals. A Suggested Test." 
The Journal Of Political Economy. August 1951. P.353 
Johnson, B.Z.: The Principle of Equalization Applied to 
the Allocation of Grants in Aid. Bureau of Research and 
Statistics. Washington, 1947. 
Scott, A.D.: "A Note on Grants in Federal. Countries." 
Economica. November, 1950. P.416 
"Evaluation of Federal Grants." 
Economica. 1952. 
Taxation must be applied in such a way as to 
equalize the marginal sacrifice of taxpayers. In such 
wise, the aggregate sacrifice for the area as a whole is 
made least 
On the other hand, the allocation of public funds 
between the various items of expenditure must be guided 
by the principle of equi- marginal social benefit. In 
this way aggregate benefit is made maximum. 
The two principles above can be combined, by any 
layer of authority, so as to reach the optimum point in 
its revenue -expenditure policy. The optimum point is 
attained when the benefit derived by the marginal unit 
of expenditure is equal to, or just higher than, the 
sacrifice which the raising of that unit of revenue entails. 
This financial policy secures the maximization of 
social utility or general welfare for given sets of 
taxation and expenditure. (1) 
If a rational economy prefers to follow these 
lines, an advanced community will try, moreover, to promote 
(1) It must be borne in mind that this policy does not 
imply or secure any special level of taxation or expenditure. 
C, 
the standard of its services. 
National and Local Authorities: 
In the case of the national government the principles 
outlined above find adequate applicability. 
The fiscal powers of the central government are not 
impaired by geographical boundaries or circumscribed by 
legal limitations as regards the scope, level or structure 
of taxation. The federal authorities have now come to 
wield direct as well as indirect taxes and it is important 
that they should continue to do so. 
On the other hand, the national government has, at 
its disposal, the whole country's resources and can spend 
in such a way as to equalize marginal benefits and to 
maximize social utility all over the country irrespective 
of local boundaries. 
As for the underlying units of government, they can, 
each within its own sphere, proceed in taxation according 
to the principle of equi -marginal sacrifice and spend accord- 
ing to the principle of equi- marginal social benefit. Each 
junior authority is able, within its sphere, to reach the 
optimum point in its own finances. 
However, if these principles can be successfully 
applied by any given locality, considered separately, they 
are ,distorted when all local units are viewed in their 
inter-relationships. 
In fact, it is not possible for the diverse local 
units, to achieve inter -local equality of marginal 
i 
sacrifices. In wealthier areas the marginal sacrifice will 
be lower than in under -endowed areas because the former 
have a higher per capita income. The outcome will be inter - 
local disparities in the tax burden on similarly situated 
persons residing in different localities. 
If the tax burden can be equitably apportioned from 
the national standpoint, this is not the case on the lower 
level as between junior authorities inter se. 
The same analysis applies to expenditures. In the 
wealthy localities, the level of marginal benefits will be 
lower than in under -endowed areas which, while disposing of 
poorer resources, have to satisfy a stronger need for gen- 
eral welfare. 
In sum, while the optimum of revenue -expenditure policy 
can be reached by the central government for its citizens 
and by each locality for its residents, it cannot be 
achieved for the nationals in their dual capacity of citi- 
zens and local residents unless the national government 
intervenes. 
The Responsibility of the Central Government: 
In the writer's opinion the national government 
should be saddled with a new responsibility in respect of 
fiscal equity. The latter concept should be extended to 
the spatial aspect of the taxation /spending process. 
In the framework of central -local fiscal relations the 
inter -territorial side of fiscal equity carries important 
implications. The central government has the duty to 
equa lize, 
e, I 
between the diverse localities, the merginel secrificee 
of antral plus local taxation. In this way, the diverse 
subordinate euthorities will hnve equal burdens of centrel 
plus local texotion OD eimilerly situeted persons. The 
aggregate secrlfice for the country ae e whole lo etede let. 
The notional government, in order to achieve this 
policy, would have to resort to inter-loci discriminatory 
central texetien. The wealthier locelitiee will be taxed 
eelatively more than poorer locelities. 
The analysis ppli to unitary and federal countries 
aliee. 
Thie propose]. has its counterpart in the field of 
expenditure. The national government muet oesume the 
responsibility of equalizing the morainal eociel benefit 
for the country as o whole, whichever is the locality of 
residence of the beneficieriee. 
The texing/spendine proceee on the national level, in 
order to reach the optimum in public finance for the country 
vs e whole, must thus equalize the benefit derived from the 
marginal unit of expenditure, control. plus local, all-over 
the country's locelitiee, with the eacrifice incurred in 
raising that unit of revenue by both senior and junior 
authorities, rich and poor. 
In other terms, the national government must expend 
ite expenditures in poorer precis and reduce them in 
wealthier areas. In a "social" community, the central 
government will prefer to increase texotion in the high- 
income areas, rather than reducing expenditures there, in 
order to spend more in under-endowed erects. If the 
national government decides to bring social utility in the 
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wealthy areas to a still higher level, it will have 
to increase its outlays in the poorer areas to a 
relatively greater extent. 
To sum up, the central government must provide 
the junior authorities with additional funds which 
may be called subventions, subsidies or grants. These 
payments must serve a double purpose. They must level 
out inter -area discrepancies and also raise the actual 
level of social utility or general welfare. 
In other terms, the subsidies will assume the 
character of complementary as well as supplementary 
payments. 
In conclusion, it seems appropriate here to quote 
the expressive statement of Professor Johnson: 
"In a democratic society, considerations of equity 
demand that governmental programs at each level treat 
all citizens in similar circumstances uniformly." (1) 
(1) Johnson, Byron L. : The Principle of Equalization 
Applied to the Allocation of Grants in Aid." 
Bureau of Research and Statistics, Washington. 1947 
P.88 
Prospects of the Ideal Solution 
df . In4c a ?ì 
The national government's responsibility of 
reaching the optimum point in the dual taxation -outlay 
process for the country as a whole is very practicable 
in unitary countries where the central government is 
supreme. 
In a federal polity, however, the proposal is 
strewn with obstacles. 
In the field of taxation, the inter -local fiscal 
differentiation may be confronted with geographical 
barriers and constitutional impediments. The junior 
governments, being sovereign within their sphere, will 
object to such a policy on the ground that it is incom- 
patible with the constitution and that it involves 
inter- regional discrimination. 
It was already pointed out that the concept of 
fiscal equity must include a territorial interpretation 
and take account of the spending side. In the writer's 
view, modern federal constitutions, which are generally 
rigid and uneasy to amend, ought to be interpreted in 
their financial provisions, with this new spirit. 
Moreover, the member states of a federation must be 
re- educated in thinking along the new lines outlined 





In the past they always objected to inter -area 
differences in the tax burden, but accepted willingly 
differences in per capita expenditures. 
It is most important to be converted to the belief 
that the federal principle requires true and not apparent 
fiscal equality between the component parts of the fed- 
eral polity. 
It may be argued that the proposed policy of 
inter -local equalizing taxation has distortionary effects 
on the allocation of resources owing to a tax illusion. 
In a free economy, resources and labour combine so as to 
equalize the marginal productivity of similar units of 
labour all over the country's local units thus leading to 
production maximization. It is contended that this spontan- 
eous distribution may beg turbed. 
Apart from the fact that in a planned economy, the 
apportionment of resources follows a social scale of 
preferences, the suggested taxation system is not neck - 
essarily resource - distorting in a liberal economy. 
True, the tax illusion of a relative increase of the level 
of national taxation in wealthy areas might prevent labour 
from moving to where its marginal productivity is higher 
and might well induce labour to settle in under- endowed 
areas. However, labour is not all homogeneous and is 
not the only resource. The tax illusion of a lowerrtax 
burden in poorer areas may prevent the efflux of skilled 
labour from such areas. It may also encourage the 
influx of skilled labour, capital and entrepreneurship 
to the right place from the standpoint of maximum 
production. (1) 
The national government's duty to vary expenditures 
between its different subordinate units is not a 
difficult task when there is no substantial degree of 
decentralization. 
However, as soon as de- centralization becomes strong, 
and especially in a federal polity, the underlying gov- 
ernment units find fault with a national aid programme 
on the ground that it adversely affects their autonomy, 
damaged their rights or disrupts local government. 
The writer, however, strongly believes that such 
opposition is not tenable. Inlfirst place, the central 
subsidies do not constitute a charity given to the 
junior governments. They are simply their natural 
(1) Buchanan, J.M.: "Federal Grants and Resource 
Allocation." in the Journal of Political Economy. 
June 1952. P.208 
right since they are based on the requirements of 
an all- nation equilibrium and not merely on limitod meak'W 
etetd 
local iea. The national government, in the welfare 
phase, has the task of securing a national standard of 
services all over its subdivisions instead of merely 
filling the gaps of the local deficit budgets. 
The national government cannot, in modern economic 
conditions, escape the duty of promoting the economic 
and fiscal capacity of the under- endowed areas. Local 
economy can no more be divorced from the national 
economy. Both must dovetail for the sake of national 
economic unity. 
The writer advocates the resort to conditional 
rather than unconditional grants. In fact, the latter 
may be used in a manner inconsistent with the national 
policy or simply to alleviate local taxation. Neverthe- 
less, it should not be impossible for the subordinate 
units to enjoy a certain degree of freedom, within the 
limits of the national interest. They can have separate 
tax sources and share others with overlying units. They 
can perform sundry basic functions without interference 
and carry out others in harmony with upper layers. 
A cursory glance at the historical evolution of 
the present subdivisions of a country reveals that, in 
íTLOrte. 
origin, they enjoyed, and strived for, political 
independence. Gradually, they came to realise that 
their interests, mainly political at the time, had 
much in common and could be better served and promoted 
through unity, federation or confederation. Did the 
subordinate governments then disappear? In fact, they 
continued in existence as cells of one and the same 
body, developing both separately and concomitantly with 
it. They enjoyed political powers within the framework 
of the national polity. They also had an economic free 
hand. . 
Economics, however, assumed more and more importance. 
lecemennixd 
In the Welfare State and Planning State, try came to 
play a major rôle. Soon, a further cleavage occurred, 
namely that between local economy and national economy. 
The new centripetal economic forces, inherent in the 
new phase of economic development, cannot be obstructed 
and must be canalized. The junior authorities must abstain 
from claiming anachronistic "rights" to be wielded in 
conflicting wise. Local economy must be integrated in 
the national economy. 
In sum, the junior governments must be converted 
from their heresy of political or economic autonomy to 
the sound faith of common political and economic interest. 
Local economic freedom as occurred in the political field, 
must be a new type of freedom whereby local interests 
are served locally via those of the nation as a whole. 
By having to renounce unhealthy rivalry, the 
local bodies do not have necessarily to disappear. 
They can live the new life of dignified collaborators, 
rather than that of discredited antagonists. The 
former political phase of development sustains this 
view. 
Our analysis is applicable to unitary and federal 
polities alike. The modern phase of federalism is 
essentially co- operative. 
G. ', 1 
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I. Introduction 
Central -local fiscal co- ordination is not an easy 
task, especially when the proposed reforms are to be 
appraised on the light of given canons or criteria. These 
were set out in the prelude to the present chapter. (l) 
Clearly, there is no perfect device. Each device 
discussed or suggested below has merits and demerits. More- 
over, the same solution cannot be appropriate to all 
countries. The conditions are different between unitary and 
federal countries and between countries of each category. 
A solution suitable at a certain time may not be so at some 
other time in the same country. However, various problems 
and aspects can be discussed with much benefit. The best 
course }^ #ol ew would consist1for each country,in selecting 
(l) The tests can be summarized here as the need to: 
redress fiscal inequities and inequalities, avert overlapping, 
increase tax productivity, secure a minimum national standard 
. 
of social services, integrate local fiscal policy in the 
national economy and preserve a desirable degree of local 
government. 
those reforms which comply with the greatest number 
of desiderata. 
In this introduction, a few points must be 
clarified before proceeding to more detailed analysis. 
Ta& 
/. The Problem of LocallProgression: 
The two main points in this connection concern the 
determination of the tax basis and the form of the 
progressive schedule in local income taxation. 
As for the former problem, two chief solutions 
can be pointed out. As the basis of situs results in 
the dismemberment of income and the distortion of pro - 
gression, local taxation could proceed on the basis of 
residence instead of situs. Taxation on the basis of 
residence will have to be universalized all over the 
country's local areas, otherwise duplicate taxation 
would prevail. Income partition is thus avoided and 
progression becomes sound. However, it must be added 
that the debtor localities will be at a disadvantage. (1) 
(1) See below: Tax Crediting and. Deductibility. 
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The locality of non -residence could be 
compensated (by central grants or part of the income 
tax collections of the other localities) according to 
such factors as the local average income, the import- 
ance of its income taxation and the proportion of its 
absentee property. 
Another solution is to calculate the local tax 
on the entire individual income by both the locality 
of situs and the locality of residence, at the rates of 
each taxing jurisdiction and then allocate some part of 
.,n couse. 
the tax, so reached; according to certain percentages 
to the localities concerned. For the sake of 
simplicity, it should be possible to omit the cases where 
a small or minimum proportion of income originates in the 
(1) 
locality and also the cases of short residence. 
As for the form of the progressive schedule itself, 
it seems preferable to levy the local income tax at 
(1) Vick rey, William: Agenda for Progressive Taxation. 
New York, 194 -7. P.P. 319 -320 
percentage rates or at only mildly progressive rates 
especially when there is overlapping. It may be said 
that the smaller the locality, e.g. municipalities, 
the stronger are the reasons for percentage taxes, and 
the wider the local area, the stronger is the justifi- 
cation for (mild) progression. 
It is to be mentioned that there is scope for local 
spendings taxes. The tax would be levied on residents 
only. This alternative would ease the question of local 
progression. However, there are various difficulties, 
besides those inherent in that mode of taxation. Account 
will have to be taken of the change of residence, residence 
and domicile, residence in different local areas, resi- 
dence and working in different areas. Moreover, a local 
spendings tax militates against the locality where the 
t c Age 
income actually originated, 0 fact w -h may be involving 
(1) 
various charges on the local budget. 
(1) Vickrey, William: Op. cit. PP. 326 -328. 
2. Pluritaxing Capacity: 
A further point ought to be referred to. It seems 
desirable for the local units to have more than one 
source of taxation. Some types and forms are discussed 
or suggested below. Both stability and elasticity 
should be introduced in local revenue. Property taxation, 
in spite of its defects seems inevitable since it pro- 
vides a desirable element of income stability. However, 
it was shown that the property taxes are not flexible in 
yielding capacity. This is especially felt in periods 
of increasing prices and expanding services such as we 
are now witnessing. 
Consequently, pluritaxing authorities seem to fair r -- 
better, as a rule, than monotaxing authorities. Here, 
however, the clash is clear between the two major desid- 
erata of revenue productivity and fiscal equity and one 
must be cautious in the choice of the type and form of 
local non -property taxation. The difficulty is how to 
achieve a happy marriage between both forementioned ends. 
Once a proper balance is reached, it is still necessary 
to know how to make use of the tax sources adopted in 
such a way as to synchronize and harmonize with national 
financial and economic policies. 
Clearly, the junior governments must realise max- 
imum efficiency in local expenditures, otherwise their 
additional taxing powers would not be justifiable. 
3, Centralization of Administration and Collection: 
Two stages in the process of taxation can be 
distinguished, namely; the imposition of the tax and 
its administration and collection. Whatever is the 
tax, or mode of taxation adopted, it is highly desirable 
that the latter stage be, as far as possible, performed 
by the supreme authority or by a senior authority either 
exclusively or jointly with lower units. 
The least that can be done, in this connection, is 
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to foster inter -local exchange of views possibly through 
an inter -local clearing house for information. 
The benefits of unified administration and collection 
are undeniable. It copes with sundry points of friction 
especially in a federal polity where the junior govern- 
ments may adopt personal and corporate income taxes or 
commodity taxes. Fiscal inequities, problems of situs, 
residence, allocation formulas, duplicate taxation are 
mitigated thanks to uniform practices of assessment, 
formulas, tax forms, discriminations and differentiations. 
Unified, or joint administration, also result in 
less evasion, lower collection and compliance costs. 
In pre -war Canada, when the provinces were income- 
taxing, some of them (Ontario, Manitoba, Prince Edward 
Island, Quebec) had entrusted administration to the 
Dominion Government. 
In Australia, the state of Western Australia had 
made use, as early as 1920, of the Commonwealth Govern- 
ment to administer nearly all its revenue system. (1) 
In the U.S.A. the Committee on Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations recommended the creation of a Federal - 
State Fiscal Authority to which the writer fully agrees 
and thinks its powers should be reinforced. The proposed 
Authority is destined to promote joint administration 
for overlapping taxes (especially income and death taxes) 
and inter -state co- operation in various fields such as 
cosmopolitan income. (2) 
As the problem of local finances is more complex 
in federal than in unitary countries, the writer sees 
no reason why the members of a federation should not 
eventually take advantage of a principle conceded by 
federal constitutions, which militates in favour of inter - 
area cooperation, namely that of cvau: .p- es or compacts. 
(1) Haig, R.M. : "Amalgamated Federal -State Tax 
Administration in Australia." 
Proceedings of the National Tax Association, 1937. 
Columbia, 1938. 
(2) "Federal State and Local Fiscal Relations." 
78th Congress. 1st Sessions Senate Document no.69 
Washington, 1943. P.149 
The latter can be formed in U.S.A., Switzerland and 
several Latin- American countries such as Mexico, Argentina 
and Brazil. 
It must be pointed out, however, that these conven= 
tions or compacts suffer from the same points of weakness 
of international agreements in that they are based on 
reciprocal treatment and their enforcement rests on moral 
obligation. 
Nevertheless, these inter -area agreements can still 
serve various useful purposes such as coping with evasion, 
reducing collection and compliance costs. They are likely 
to prove a step nearer1 co- ordination. (1) 
(1) For general discussion of fiscal co- ordination in 
U.S.A. see inter alfa: 
Seli man, E.R.A.: "The Fiscal Outlook and the Coordination 
0 Public Revenues." 
New York University Symposium, Current Problems in Public 
Finance. Chicago, 1933. 
Haig Robert Murray.: "The Co- ordination of the Federal 
and State Tax Systems." 
Proceedings of the National Tax Association, Columbia, 1933. 
P: 220 
Newcomer M.: "Co- ordination of Federal, State and Local 
Tax Systems" in the Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. January, 1936. PP. 39-47. 
Heer, Clarence.: "Co- ordination of American Federal, 
State and Local Finance" in Taxation and. Public Policy, 
edited by Studenski, Paul. New York, 1936. P. 133 
Shoup, Carl - Blough, Roy - Newcomer, Mabel.: 
Facing the Tax Problem: Twentieth Century Fund. New York 
1937. 
Hansen and Perloff.. "State and Local Finance in the 
National Economy." New York, 1944. 
11 Tax Crediting and Deductibility 
Strictly speaking, tax crediting and deductibility 
are not species of central -local fiscal co- ordination 
but are rather 'Jays of alleviating the regressive and 
repressive taxation arising from the co- existence of 
manifold taxing jurisdictions. 
Tax crediting and deductibility can be used for 
both central -local and inter -local relations. In tax 
crediting, a tax paid to an authority is reduced by an- 
other tax paid to another authority. Deductibility, as 
already pointed out, is a milder form since it only con- 
siders the tax imposed by the other authority as an 
expenditure to be deducted from a given tax base.E 
If the two devices mitigate fiscal inequities, they 
do not do much about fiscal inequalities and overlapping 
since they do not cope with the problem of tax uniformity 
unless they are deliberately used as bargaining powers 
(1) For details see Chapter I, Section II, and 
Chapter II, Sectionjll. 
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for this purpose or unless special variants are applied 
as will be seen. In fact, the junior taxing authorities 
could continue to levy independent taxes differing greatly 
in provisions or rate schedules from those imposed by 
the senior authorities. Moreover, the devices in question 
are an inducement to the lower governments to plunge 
into the troubled waters of income taxation. 
Similarly, it is to be mentioned that deductibility 
and tax crediting are no remedy for fiscal perversity.in 
boom and slump. 
As regards local revenue, nothing is done to increase 
it. On the contrary, local revenue deficiency is some- 
times accentuated as in the case of the local deductibil- 
ity of the central tax. Moreover, the two devices are 
liable to advantage the wealthy income- taxing localities 
and do not benefit the non -income taxing ones. 
However, tax crediting and deductibility, by reducing 
the pressure of higher plus lower taxation, may give the 
underlying units the opportunity of ploughing deeper and 
further into the lucrative field of such taxes as the 
income tax. 
Clearly, the latter point is not desirable from the 
standpoint of fiscal equity as well as that of national_ 
local fiscal relations. 
In the writer's opinion, however, if the subordinate 
units enjoy substantial financial rights and if no other 
11 
co- ordinating device is feasible, recourse should be had 
to deductibility, especially reciprocal deductibility, 
and tax crediting. The latter is also recommendable in 
inter -local relationships.(') 
Under central -local tax crediting, local revenue 
is not adversely affected ':7hile it is reduced in the case 
of mutual deductibility and unilateral local deductibility 
of the central tax. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the national govern- 
ment, particularly in a federal polity, may not be much 
inclined to approve of the device of tax crediting which 
is liable to diminish central revenue relatively more 
than deductibility, whether deductibility is reciprocal 
or unilateral. This is true even in case of the most 
advantageous form, to the central treasury, of unilateral 
deductibility, namely; the local deductibility of the 
central tax and not the opposite. 
(1) In the U.S.A., the system of tax credits, in federal - 
state relationships, is confined to death taxation and 
payroll taxes for unemployment insurance. Tax crediting 
could be extended to the income -tax field. See: 
Haig, Robert Murray: "The Co- ordination of the Federal 
and State Tax Systems." 
Proceedings of the National Tax Association, Columbia, 193 
P. 230 
Report of the "Interstate Commission on Conflicting 
Taxation." 1935. 
An interesting variant of central -local tax 
crediting worthy of careful consideration, is the grad- 
uated tax crediting, alloying for the benefit of the lower 
authorities, for high credit percentages on the lower 
brackets and lower credits on the higher bracket. 
Two major merits may be pointed out. The progression 
of the total tax burden, that is, central plus local 
taxation, is safeguarded, contrary to what may happen in 
the case of independent levies or surcharges imposed by 
the secondary and te7tIary governments. Moreover, the 
financial interests of the central treasury will be pro- 
tected. taxing jurisdictions be 
left with the low- income brackets, but will not be able 
to cut in the high -income groups. 
In other terms, the proposal is a kind of central - 
local allocation of taxable resources or a species of 
separate tax sources by "brackets" which is both justifiable 
and practicable. 
Similarly, reciprocal deductibility allowes the 
central government to share a larger portion of the tax 
on high income groups than on the low income groups. 
Now, it may be asked, if the subordinate units are 
allowed tax credits on central taxes and if inter -local 
fiscal uniformity of practice in this connection is 
fostered, as should be done, and if the central authorities 
6 
are entrusted with the administration and collection 
of the taxes considdred, as is recommended above, would 
not this be akin to "tax sharing" whereby the senior 
taxing jurisdiction hands to the junior taxing jurisdiction 
part of the ca-1 tax yield? 
The Tax Credits in InterLocal Relations: 
It was already shown that the local units, in their 
taxation of income, have different alternatives. (1) On 
the basis of situs, they can tax all persons on their in- 
come derived from within the local area (whether the 
person is a resident or non -resident). On the basis of 
residence, they would tax the resident's entire income 
from whatever source. The locality can also tax both its 
residents on their entire income and the income of non- 
residents, originating within its boundaries. 
The central authorities must assume several respon- 
sibilities in this connection which may be pointed out here: 
(1) See Chapter II, Secti onIl. 
G 
1. The national government should urge, or force, all 
the local units without exception to apply either the 
basis of situs or the basis of residence and not both 
simultaneously as then duplicate taxation would arise. 
It may be pointed out that the basis of residence 
seems appropriate. The concept of residence will have 
to be defined clearly, without over -lapping and the 
definition will have to be universally adopted. The 
basis advocated safeguards the principle of progression 
(when the latter is adopted by minor governments for 
instance provinces or states). The basis of situs, on 
the contrary, distorts progression and discriminates 
in favor of inter -area income owing to the partition or 
dismemberment of income. 
However, various difficulties will be encountered. 
Besides the problem of localizing certain flows of income 
(e.g. dividends), the debtor locality will be handicapped 
from the revenue productivity point of view. Moreover, 
the high- income receivers will tend to choose residence 
in lowly taxed areas. The central authorities must pay 
particular attention to the fact that various localities 
may still be tempted to impose taxes on, or to continue 
to tax, the non -residents, especially that the latter 
take no part in local voting or administration. 
2. The national government may have recourse to 
another solution. When some local units adopt situs and 
others residence and also when both bases of residence 
and situs are adopted by the sane locality, the central 
authorities ought to foster or enforce the universal 
application of tax crediting, between the junior taxing 
jurisdictions inter se, for the sake of avoiding horizon- 
tal overlapping and multiple taxation. 
The national government must here be cautious. It 
must universalize only one type of credits; either those 
allowed to non -residents for tax paid to the locality of 
residence, or the credits allowed to residents for tax 
paid to the locality of origin.(1) In fact, if both types 
of credits are in application simultaneously by different 
localities, either duplicate taxation or complete evasion 
will ensue. The national authorities should also not 
tolerate the application of both categories of credits 
simultaneously by the one and same local unit as this 
might well conduce to the claiming of two credits by the 
same person which also amounts to exemption. What the 
resp6nsible authorities could do in this case is to allow 
the local units to adopt a discriminatory bilateral credit 
(1) i.on4 It must be noticed that if 
there are differences between the local units in tax provisions 
and rates, there may still be duplicate burden even when 
credits of the same type are applied. 
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system in which the locality would grant a credit 
to residents only when the locality of origin grants 
no credit to non -residents. The same former locality 
would also grant a credit to non -residents only when 
the other locality does not grant credits to residents. 
It may be underlined that the device of credits 
to residents (for tax paid to locality of origin) is 
simpler and could be generalized or imposed by the 
national government. This device serves the interests 
of the debtor area since it does not affect adversely 
the latter's financial resources as happens in the case 
of credits to non -residents. Furthermore, the credits 
to residents are easier to administrate and offer the 
opportunity of effective auditing since all the credits 
figure in a single return. 
f. Separate Revenue Sources. 
This device has three interpretations or variants: 
1. Complete or pure separation or "Trennsystem "in German 
terminology: (1) the local impost is here autonomous 
and quite different from central taxes. 
2. Segregation: the local and central levies are different 
but they derive from the same source, e.g. rural property. 
3. Territorial division of the same tax source: in this 
variant the lower layers of government exploit the lower 
income brackets and the higher government layers exploit 
the higher income brackets. 
Judged on the light of our six tests, the method 
of local independent revenue sources is more responsive 
to the two desiderata of fiscal equity and less over- 
lapping. These are not, however, totally fulfilled as 
the junior jurisdiction, especially if monotaxing,might 
(2) 
(1) Dhonau.: "Local Government Finance in Germany." 
Public Administration, October 1930. 
(2) Ple_hn.: Proceedings of the National Conference on 
State and Local Taxation. 1915. P.58 
be inclined to soak its sole or chief revenue source. 
The device, moreover, militates in favour of local 
government responsibility. 
In the writer's opinion, the main defects of separate 
revenue sources are their limited applicability and their 
inadequacy to ensure that a satisfactory standard of 
services is attained in local units where per capita 
income is deficient. 
In fact, pure separation cannot meet with wide 
practical application in modern conditions and could only 
be adopted in respect of minor taxes rather than major 
taxes. Time of separation in the latter field (e.g. 
income taxes, death duties) "has gone by," as Professor 
Seligman puts it.1 
The Brazilian Constitution of 1937 is the only 
important federal one which provides for complete separation 
of federal -state revenue sources. 
Instances of taxes, which can be exclusively local, 
are those on immovable property, site value, entertainments, 
restaurants, petrol, motor vehicle, license taxes, general 
and selective sales taxes such as those on liquor or 
tobacco.2 Some of these taxes are lucrative, such as 
1. Seligman: Studies in Public Finance, 1925, p. 174. 
2. Groves, H.: "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations" in 
Viewpoints on Public Finance. New York, 1947, P. 499. 
the entertainments, sales and petrol taxes. They 
are advocated by the writer especially that they 
on. can b c'made. a / it 1,401464 
generally fall/ton the high -income/or on over -subsistence 
income (luxuries, semi -luxuries) thus complying with 
our first desideratum of fiscal equity emphasized 
above. 
The municipalities, especially the rapidly ex- 
panding ones, could resort to site value taxes. These 
taxes are most desirable on several counts. They are 
levied on economic rent and are fair since they bear 
on unearned income. They do not adversely affect the 
supply and hence the prices of goods and services. (1) 
Adam Smith may be quoted in this connection: "Ground 
rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are therefore, 
perhaps the species of revenue which can best bear to 
have a peculiar tax ii,iposed upon them. Ground rents 
seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar 
taxation than even the ordinary rent of land." 
(1) "The Rating of Site Values." Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry. London, 1952. P.6, 
Clearly, the urban centres will find especially 
remunerative certain specific sales taxes, e.g. on 
liquor and tobacco and the taxes on petrol, motor - 
vehicle, and entertainments. 
In England, a group of research workers recommended 
the abolition of agricultural and industrial derating 
and consideration of the taxation of land values and 
the transfer tao the local level of the entertainments 
duty (which can and should continue to be administered 
from the centre) . 
1 
In the U.S.A. it is often suggested to relegate,,5 
the gasoline, motor -vehicle and license taxes to the 
state level. 
1. "The Effect of Local Government Act, 1948" 5th 
Report. Inset in: Local Government Finance, 
Journal of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers 
and Accountants. March, 1953. The writer fully 
agrees with these recommendations. Agriculture 
can be better supported through open subsidies 
which would fall on the nation at large instead of 
embarrassing local finances by derating. 
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As regards the third variant of separation of 
sources, namely leaving the lower income groups to the 
local bodies and the upper income groups to the central 
level, it is equivalent to a tax credit of 100 per cent 
on the lower brackets. Tax crediting would be more in 
line with modern economic conditions of controlled 
con ao-1 
economy, a verequisite of which is central monc&lis3tion 
of the key- taxing powers, here the income -tax. (1) 
(1) The system was advocated for the U.S.A. by 
Professor William J. Schultz. 
L Tax - Sharing 
The device consists in the upper governments 
administering and collecting the tax and sharing the 
proceeds with lower units. (1) It can be adopted in 
unitary and federal countries. In the latter case, it 
can be applied between any two tiers of taxing author- 
ities. (2) 
Evaluated by our tests, tax -sharing has several 
merits. It promotes coordination of central -local 
taxation since it centralizes administration and coll- 
1e4444 
ection and introduces uniformity of tax provisions. 
Various aspects of fiscal inequity and inequality are 
eliminated. The taxpayers, individuals or businesses, 
(1) For. discussion of the general principles of tax- - 
sharing see: 
Groves, Harold: "Financing Government." 
New York, 1945. P. 457 
Buehler, Alfred: "Public Finance." 
New York, 1948. PP. 611 -618. 
Allen, Edward D. and Brownlee, O.H.: "Economics of Public 
Finance." 
New York, 1947. P. 493 
(2) An interesting comparison could be drawn between 
tax- sharing and an old device, assignment. There are 
theoretical differences which may or may not lead to 
practical differences. Assignment puts emphasis on the 
senior authority,while tax -sharing implies some degree 
of local responsbility. Besides, assignment may involve 
the sharing of several, or all of the centrally admin- 
istered and collected taxes. 
are spared the trouble of filing diverse tax returns. 
Personal income can be freed from the repressive 
burden of central plus local contibutions and corpor- 
ate income will be exempt from over -hundred- per -cent 
taxation. Overlapping and multiplicity will thus be 
greatly diminished. Evasion can be coped with. This 
is especially valuable in the case of some present 
commodity taxes as was seen with the tobacco and liquor 
state taxes in the U.S.A. Tax -sharing clearly reduces 
administration and. compliance costsa 
As for local responsibility, it is adversely 
affected by tax -sharing superseding more indpendent 
revenue sources. The junior authorities relinquish, 
neat only the administration and collection, but some- 
times decisions as to imposition and. spending. In 
fact, tax -sharing may involve conditions for the ex- 
penditure of the proceeds and thus resemble conditional 
grants.(1) 
Professor Groves rcoumes the position, expressively, 
in the following terms: 
"The fiscal independence of the local units under 
(1) The question tax- sharing versus grants is 
discussed below. 
sharing is about the same as that of a minor son 
placed upon a revocable allowance by a generous 
father." (1) 
Consequently, it is not easy, in practice, to 
persuade subordinate units enjoying a high degree 
of local home rule, to renounce their separate taxing 
powers in order to come under the thumb of the 
supreme authority or of some senior authority. This 
explains why in the U.S.A., there is no tax- sharing 
in federal -state relationships, while it exists be- 
tween states and local authorities or municipalities.(2) 
Tax -sharing does not comply with some vital 
points in our code of local taxation. It does not 
solve the problem of local revenue deficiency. It 
fails to achieve an all- nation minimum level of social 
benefits owing to an inter -area maldistribution of 
funds, inherent in the system itself. 
(1) Groves, Harold: Op. cit. P. 454 
(2) Buehler, Alfred: Op. cit. P. 613 
Groves, Harold: Op. cita P. 458 
Wealthy localities will have a superfluity of funds 
while under- endowed localities will continue to suffer 
a dearth of revenue, especially if the basis of revenue 
apportionment is that of "distribution according to 
contribution." 
It is noticeable that the instability of tax re- 
deipts is not improved, with the result that local 
finances will still feel the impact of economic convulsions. 
Furthermore, tax -sharing is not a cure for the 
fiscal perversity of junior authorities in boom and. slump. 
The system, on the contrary, tends to accentuate economic 
fluctuations and follow them rather than counterpoise 
them. In boom, the rich areas may engage in extravagant 
spending and thus aggravate the inflationary spiraling 
of prices. In slump, the poorer areas find themselves 
unable to take compensatory fiscal measures. In these 
circumstances, central -local economic co- ordination is 
handicapped. 
It ought to be emphasized that the power of the 
central authorities to use the income tax as an economic 
stabiliser, particularly in inflation, is impeded by the 
resort to central -local tax -sharing according to rigid 
proportions. Any increase in the tax rotes will, in 
fact, augment in an automatic way the revenue accruing 
to the underlying authorities which, through their 
spending powers will accentuate the inflationary tendencies. 
It is therefore important, in the writer's opinion, 
not to fix rigidly the percentages of tax- sharing for 
instance by including them in the constitution. Other 
ways of coping with the present type of central -local 
incompatibility is to except major emergencies (inflation, 
war ...) from the application of the pre -fixed tax 
shares or to specify that any further increases in the 
rates of the tax being shared will not accrue to the 
junior authorities. This idea has been adopted, and 
recently applied, in India by the Union Government in 
the case of the corporate tax. 
It may now be asked, would not a rational 
(conditional) grant system better secure inter -local 
and central -local synchronism and economic harmony? 
Would it not prove more efficient in both normal and 
abnormal times? In other words, would not a central 
aid programme fit better in an integrated national 
economy and reflect more appropriately the new economic 
currents? 
Is not tax - sharing so close to grants especially 
when the allocation of the tax proceeds has to refer 
to some criteria as in present grant systems? 
Would not the gap between shared taxes and 
subsidies become narrower when expenditure of the 
former is governed by conditions which are made a sine 
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qua non to participation in central tax revenue? 
Prorating of the Proceeds: 
The central-local and inter -local allocation of the 
proceeds of the shared taxes is not always an easy task. 
In some cases, clear criteria exist. The local 
units are then provided with sums equivalent to those 
which would have been levied. This obtains in some 
specific consumption taxes such as motor -vehicle and 
motor -fuel taxes, license taxes, where apportionment can 
take place on the basis of the relative number of regi- 
strations or the relative purchases of fuel. The 
entertainments tax can be easily allocated. 
However, some specific sales taxes and 
paLtA 
general taxes present various problems. The determination 
of the local share requires information and book -keeping 
of local sales. The trouble and costs involved may annul 
the benefits of centralized administration. 
As for income taxes, the way is strewn with ob- 
stacles. The prorating of the proceeds among the 
subordinate units encounters the issues of domicile 
versus situs and is taken in the mess of formulas for 
allocation of business income. 
A way out of this impasse is for the central 
government to use its discretion. In this case, if local 
needs are not appropriately evaluated, the senior govern- 
ment's judgement will be arbitrary. Origin is an 
objective criterium which, once abandoned, paves the 
way to political juggling. 
The central jurisdiction may thus prefer to adopt 
certain indices of local requirements such as populat- 
ion, per capita wealth or per capita income or costs 
per unit of service. 
In this case would not tax- sharing have much in 
common with the grant system as already hinted? 
Applicability of Tax- Sharing: 
Tax -sharing is, however, a useful device. It can 
be adopted together with other devices. In the case of 
certain taxes and in some countries it is most helpful. 
The conditions propitious to tax -sharing are, inter 
alia, the existence of clear bases for apportionment of 
the yields, serious overlapping involving inequities and 
high costs of administration and. compliance. 
If local home rule is not well developed, little 
harm will be caused and there will be no serious cam- 
plaint over the "loss of sovereignity." 
Tax- Sharing and Experience: 
The system has ample scope for application in 
federal countries. It can also be adopted in unitary 
countries. 
Germany knew the system between 1919 -1933 when the 
Länder derived as much as 50 to 90 per cent of the revenue 
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of certain taxes, viz; income and inheritance taxes, 
turnover taxes and real property transfers. At present time, 
internal revenue from income and corporate taxes is split 
between the Federal Exchequer and the 9 Federal States. In 
the new fiscal year 1954/55 the proportions will be 40 per 
cent and 60 per cent respectively, as against 38 per cent 
and 62 per cent this year. 
The device of tax - sharing also found application in 
South Africa and Australia. (1) 
In Argentine, the most salient change, since 1930, in 
the provincial tax regimes, is the increasing participation 
in the centrally collected income, sales, capital gains, 
excess profits and unified internal taxes. In 1950, 47% of 
the general revenues of the Province of Córdoba derived from 
partaking in the above national taxes. In the same year, 
65% of the general revenues of the Province of San Luis came 
from the same source. However, the proportion in the -Province 
of Buenos Aires was only 24.7. In 1951, the Province of San 
Juan obtained 49.R% of its financial resources through tax 
sharing. In Tucumán, the proportion, in 1952, was 43.5%. (2) 
(1) Adarkar, B.P. : The Principles and rroblems of Federal 
Finance. London, 1933. pp.229 -230. 
(2) Patterson Ernest F.: "The Tax System of the Argentine 
a Iona overnmen ". National Tax Journal. Sept. 1952. 
pp.267 -274. 
Patterson, Ernest F.: "Argentine Provincial Tax Systems" 
Inter-American Economic Affairs. Winter 1953. pp.38 -39. 
In India, the Niemeyer formula in 1936 provides for 
*11 central- provincial tax sharing in the proportion of 
50/50 per cent. This basis of apportionment was not 
modified in the Constitution of 1947. (1) 
Tax - sharing is found in state -local relations in the 
U.S.A. for gasoline, general sales and public utility taxes. 
The device is applied to a smaller extent in income and 
inheritance taxation according to different bases such as 
origin and population. 
In the writer's opinion, the state tobacco taxes, in 
the U.S.A. are most amenable to tax -sharing. Federal 
administration and collection can do away with sundry 
problems such as overlapping and evasion. The sharing 
(1) Ghosh B.B. : "Indian Economics and Pakistani Economics." 
Calcutta, 1949, p.556. 
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can take place on the basis of state consumption or the 
state's population, either weighted or unweighted. 
It is noticeable that there is no tax -sharing between 
the federal government and the states as the latter are 
jealous of their "rights" and are not ready to lose their 
financial autonomy. Several observers and bodies, however, 
advocate state sharing in the proceeds of federal income 
and death taxes. (1) 
(1) See, inter alia, the report of the "Interstate 
Commission on Conflicting Taxation." 1935. 
jr..- Local Supplements. 
In this method the underlying units of government 
can levy surcharges on some central taxes, whether the 
surcharges are flat or progressive, with or without 
limitations. 
The system has many merits. The taxes are admini- 
stered and collected by the central authorities. This 
entails uiformity in tax provisions and eliminates various 
aspects of fiscal inequity due to overlapping. Costs 
of administration and compliance are reduced. 
Great elasticity of revenue is obtained as the 
local units are given access to the lucrative progressive 
income taxes. Moreover, the localities can levy the 
percentages they think necessary to meet their needs. 
As for local government, it is not damaged since 
there is no element of compulsion or subjection in the 
device. The local authorities can take the initiative 
and have the discretion to fix the tax rates and spend . 
the proceeds. 
In spite of these clear advantages, the supplemen- 
tation of central taxes has still serious defects to 
count with. Fiscal inequity is not necessarily coped 
with unless both junior and senior authorities give due 
heed to the total burden and progression of central plus 
local taxation. This is especially the case when the 
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local percentages are not flat but progressives. 
Total progression v1 be even more distorted if no 
limits are put on the local subcharges. 
The idea of progressive local supplementation 
has been proposed for the Central African Federation, 
without limitation in respect of Federal personal in- 
come taxation but with a ceiling of one -fifth of 
Federal rates in respect of the profits tax. The threat 
to over -all progression, Federal plus territorial, is 
clear. 
Furthermore, the minor authorities, in the case 
of local percentages, are not necessarily deterred from 
modifying the tax provisions thus hindering central - 
local and inter -local uniformity. The inter -area 
Min, ca}u; üc 
disparities in economic structure and /income may be 
among the responsible factors. 
From the viewpoint of revenue productivity, there 
is the risk that the central government may change, 
reduce or annul, the tax subject to local supplementa- 
tion. Moreoever, the local units will still be victims 
of the vicissitudes of tax receipts in boom and slump. 
A major objective is still not attained, namely: 
central -local fiscal policy co- ordination. 
The system of local surcharges, despite the 
above criticisms is very useful and practical. It has 
been advocated by many prominent economists notably 
Professor Seligman.(1) It should be recommended to 
countries where there is a high degree of local self - 
government, and where the local units could not easily 
concede what they consider the manifestations of 
autonomy. 
The present tendency of municipalities in some 
countries, notably the U.S.A. to levy independent (though 
cau.eif 
sectional) income taxes is condemnable and shed assume 
the form of surcharges. (2) 
Local Supplements and Experience: 
The system has been much in use in European countries, 
notably France, under the name of "centimes additionnels." 
In France after the tax reform of 1917, they were based 
on a "principal fictif" which is no more than the Four 
Old Wives, abolished between 1890 -1917, viz. the land 
(1) Seligman, E.R.A.: "The Fiscal Outlook and the 
Coordination of Public Revenues." 
New York University Symposium: Current 
Problems in Public Finance, Chicago, 1933. 
Also: Essays in Taxation. (10th Edition) P.668 
(2) Sly, F. John.: "Tax Supplements for Municipalities." 





and building tax/or patente, the property tax and 
the door and 7iind ova tax. 
The "centimes additior_nels" also c-r to 
other countries such as Latin America (e.g. Mexico) 
and the Middle East. (e.g. Egypt.) 
The system never gained a foothold in the U.S.A. 
One or tv7o states attempted to add surcharges on the 
Acres 
federal income tax but see abandoned the idea. The 
only instances that can be given are the state supple - 
mentatation, in some cases, of locally administered 
general property taxes. Certain levies on public 
utility are akin to local surcharges. 
Many observers in the U.S.A. believe in the 
desirability of resort to state supplementation of the 
federal income and death taxes. Would the device be 
accepted by the states even if "approached by degrees" 
as Professor Groves suggests? (1) 
(1) Groves, Harold.: Op. cit. P. 458 
0 Realignment of Functions. 
From the theoretical viewpoint, it is possible 
to apportion the various functions and services between 
the different layers of government in such a way as to 
saddle each tier with just enough responsibilities to 
counterbalance the revenue at its disposal. 
Clearly, this course of action, as a means to 
achieve our six desiderata, is subject to limitations. 
True, it bridges or narrows the gap between local needs 
and means (1) and is more in harmony with present 
centripetal tendencies of the Welfare State and Planning 
State. 
However, the transfer of functions to higher 
levels clashes with our sixth test of the desirability 
of maintaining some degree of local home rule. There 
are several basic functions (such as water -supply, 
cleaning, sewage disposal systems, municipal amenities ..) 
(1) In England, the transfer of education to the 
central level would cause a reduction in local rates 
o#about a third, and in grants of nearly a half. 
which can be better performed by the local units. 
Other functions can be carried out in co- operation 
with sister localities, or intermediate authorities 
or in full accord with the supreme authority. 
The integration of local revenue and functions 
in the national system, in varying degrees, does not 
necessarily entail the disruption of local government. 
The new phase of local government, unlike its prede- 
cessor, is essentially co- operative, as already shown. 
It is noteworthy, that taking existing respons- 
ibilities off the shoulders of local bodies, does not 
forcibly cope with the problem of local revenue def- 
iciency. The effect can be nullified by such factors 
as the decrease in the value of money, inducing a rise 
in costs, or simply through the assumption by the local 
authorities, of other functions, whether new or caused 
by the expansions in services already performed. 
Chapter Six 
THE GRANTS: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
11( 
SEC'l'ION T 
The Grants: (2. +fr¢c )) fe 
I. Introduction 
It was already pointed out, ii the..::-preìud.e to 
the -re rrt-t -er, that a central -local aid pro- 
gramme must be based on the concept of an all- nation 
socio- economic equilibrium, equalizing the opportunities 
of diverse local areas possessing varying degrees of 
economic capacity and fiscal potential. 
Grants are a double -edged weapon. If wielded 
in the way already suggested, or in some approximate 
manner, they prove beneficial indeed. If inadequately 
devised or improperly utilized, the subsidies can be 
actually damaging. They can aggravate, instead of 
mitigating, inter -area fiscal inequalities and quantums 
of social benefits. They can accentuate the divisive 
elements in federalism. 
In fact, piecemeal and haphazard subventions have 
been too often used and the outcome was a disequilibr- 
stin_g rather than an equilibrating impact. 
The defects of such aids is that they do not have 
a wide coverage and are not based on the concept of 
securing, at least, a minimum and uniform standard of 
social benefits all -over the nation's subdivisions. 
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Such subsidies may be imparted to promote no 
more than existing services or to meet certain indiv- 
idual services %.1hich are not interwoven into any nation- 
wide rational scheme. 
The grants may be also provided unconditionally. 
The recipient localities are thus enabled to indulge in 
services which do not foster inter -local social and 
economic adjustment. Moreover, making payments without 
imposing definite responsibilities is an invitation to 
local negligence or extravagance. 
The local authorities may also spend the funds on 
various amenies benefiting the high income -receivers 
and thus accentuate the maldistribution of income. 
They may simply use the unconditional subventions to 
reduce local taxation. 
The fact that a local authority is dominated by 
an oligarchy or is a reflection of an autocratic central 
government assumes, in the circumstances, great import- 
ance. Expendi ture will be likely to benefit a local 
privileged social class rather than the mass of the 
local community. The reduction in local taxes, as an 
alternative use of the unconditional grants, will be 
of the kind benefiting the local "ruling class' rather 
than the low- income brackets. The outcome is clearly 
a fiscal pressure or a fiscal residuum, more regressive 
or less progressive in character. 
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It is now possible to give a cursory glance at 
various piecemeal aid devices to see to what extent they 
are responsible for inter -local socio- economic 
disequilibria. 
The matching grants, in general, imply a certain 
local fiscal potential as they require local supplementation 
of central aid. If we consider the uniform -ratio or 
constant -ratio payments, it will be found that they 
militate in favour of rich areas with high economic 
capacity. The under- endowed areas, being unable to match 
the central grants, will get no or little financial help. 
Since the latter areas contribute to the national tax 
system, this means that the poorer areas pay for the 
wealthy ones. Clearly, this entails an accentuation of 
inter -local fiscal inequalities, (1) 
It is noticeable that the fixed percentage grants 
involve further inequalities enhanced by economic 
fluctuations. In slump, the wealthy locality can take 
(1) Blough, Roy.: "Federal and State Grants -in- Aid," in 
Viewpoints on Public Finance, edited by Groves, H. 
New York, 1947. P.602 
advantage of central subsidies with comparative 
ease, contrary to poorer localities. 
Moreover, the percentage grants fail to account 
for the inter -regional differences in the cost of 
services. 
Certain special formula grants are based on 
unsatisfactory means such as local population. In 
application, such payments militate against sparsely 
populated regions which may be deficient ib resources 
and in need of development, while densely populated 
regions, better endowed, are favorably treated. 
The variable -ratio grants have a definite advan- 
tage over constant -ratio grants in that they gratify 
under-endowed areas with relatively more funds than 
fortunate areas, for the purpose of performing a 
given service or set of services. The amount of the 
subsidy is in inverse relation to the local fiscal 
potential measured in some way or another (more of this 
point will be said later.) The wealthy areas, with 
high fiscal capacity, may not get any kind of help. (1) 
(1) Maxwell, James A.: "The Fiscal Impact of 
Federalism in the United States." 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. PP. 391 -396 
The variable -ratio grants are more compatible 
with our fore -mentioned desiderata. Inter -local 
fiscal inequity is mitigated. Local revenue deficiency 
is more or less remedied making possible a certain 
minimum local service standard in particular fields. 
However, the variable -ratio grants, by referring 
to individual services or a limited range of services, 
fail to achieve an all- nation socio- economic readjust- 
ment. 
I I . THE EQUAL IZAT ION GRANTS . 
The national aid programme, based on over -all socio- 
economic equilibrium, may be approximated through a system 
of equalization subsidies. Territorially discriminatory 
central taxation can be set aside. The equalizing grants 
advocated led to the desired objective of readjusting 
opportunities among individuals and local areas. 
The general outlines of our proposal may now be 
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expounded. 
First of all, a national minimum standard of services 
must be chosen. The determination of the national standard, 
by no means an easy task, may take place at different levels. 
It may be equal to the average of non -central expenditures 
or may be higher. 
1. Any comprehensive study of the equalization grants is not 
possible here as it would take us too far afield. This 
could be the subject- matter of a further separate study 
On the principles and practice of equalization grants, 
see, inter alia: 
h JonsonaLpiron L. 
The Principle of Equalization Applied to the Allocation 
of Grants-in-Aid. 
Federal Security Agency - Social Security Adminis- 
tration. Bureau Memorandum, No. 66, Washington, 
1947. 
Maxwell, James A. 
The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the United States. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. 
Studenski, Paul. 
Measurement of Variations in State Economic and Fiscal 
Capacity. 
Bureau of Research and Statistics, Washington, 1943. 
Wueller, Paul H. 
Some Aspects of Problem Equalization. 
National Tax Association, Proceedings, 1940. 
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The principle of equalization itself is susceptible 
of different interpretations. The well -off areas, above 
the support level, may or may not be allowed to sustain 
higher service standards than the national minimum adopted. 
However, ideal equalization requires the disappearance of 
all inter -local divergencies on both taxation and expenditure 
sides.1 
We need not dwell on these i r444- eia,s. What interests 
us most, in this study, are the two following points which 
ought to be emphasized: 
1. The determination of a decent national standard of 
services per capita, acceptable from the viewpoint of 
the new socio- economic criterions of the Welfare State. 
2. The provision, for the local units, of central financial 
aid in direct relation with needs and in inverse relation 
with local fiscal ability. To put things differently, 
the recipient locality is to contribute directly in 
proportion to its fiscal potential and inversely in 
accordance with need. 
1. Referring to the U.S.A., Mr. Johnson says: 
"Full equalization exists if Federal aid plus the amount 
each State could raise through expending a uniform er- 
centage of its total fiscal ability (uniform effort) would 
together permit each State to spend a total amount that 
would provide a program equal to that in every other State, 
or, ignoring minor cost -of- living differences for sim- 
plicity's sake, a uniform amount per program unit - that 
is, per person served." 
Johnson, B,yrón Z.: op. cit., p. 92. 
We therefore require two things. On the one hand, an 
estimation, in respect of each locality, of the welfare 
service costs, central plus local, per capita in order to 
pave the way for an equalized level of services. 
On the other hand, it is important to proceed to an 
evaluation of local economic capacity, the basis of local 
fiscal potential, so as to establish an adequate foundation 
for a national equalizing supplementation. 
It is necessary to underline the need for periodical 
revision and readjustment of both measurements of local 
needs and relative fiscal capacity. This would account 
not only for changing local conditions but also for changes 
in the value of money or disturbances caused by emergencies 
and economic fluctuations. 
Having evaluated local need for social benefits together 
with local fiscal ability, it is possible to obtain a sound 
system of grants which would vary according to both 
datums. 
It is the writer's opinion that the subsidies be awarded 
to the junior governments as a right and not out of charity. 
The denominations of grant, subvention or subsidy are mis- 
leading and conducive to a misconception of the true central - 
local fiscal relationship within the framework of a modern 
national economy. "Adjustment or compensatory payments" 
seem more appropriate terms until better ones can be found. 
The subsidies ought to be conditional upon achievement, 
at the local level, of the national service standards. 
The payments must be conceived as a co- ordinated whole and 



















The Notional Standard 
C 
A 
Low Average High 
Fiscal Capacity. 
AB = Negative Equalization. 
CB m Zero Equalization. 
DB = Full Equalisation. 
1. There are j,}zany devices of equalization grants. 
cannot be° referred to. 
They & 
It is to be noticed that the differences among these 
alternatives is not in total cost to the national government. 
The significant point lies in that equalization can be 
achieved with the same amount of funds differently apportioned. 
Measuring Local Need: 
It is necessary to determine the relative need of the 
various local units the welfare services after consideration 
of central expenditure per capita on the same services. 
The local per capita social welfare cost is to be fixed 
either for individual services or for related series of 
services. Examples of the former are roads, housing, sewerage, 
telephones, the welfare of the blind or the aged. The services 
placed in related groups are exemplified by public health, 
social welfare or education. 
1 
The computation of the local residents' shares in the 
services may be based on general or special measures. The 
task confronting us may be easy, as in the case of child health 
payments, or arduous, as in the welfare aids. 
It is worthy of note that the inter -local discrepancies 
in the costs of performance may be also accounted for.2 
1. As under -endowed areas have a higher marginal social benefit 
than richer areas some weighting may be resorted to in favour 
of the former, at least at the beginning. 
2. The reasons for the eventual regional disparities in service 
costs are, inter alla, the co- existence of rural and urban 
areas, industrialised and non -industrialised districts, 
variation in population density. If demographic concen- 
trations tend to lower costs per person served, it is to be 
mentioned that congestion may have an opposite effect as the 
law of diminishing returns makes itself felt. 
It is not our purpose to enlarge upon the complicated 
problems which beset the measurement of local needs. Suffice 
it to stress that adjustments in the subsidies will have to 
be made for differences in local fiscal ability. 
Measuring Local Fiscal Ability: 
The assessment of local fiscal pòtential can be reached 
through the estimation of local economic capacity on which 
1 
ultimately rests the local fiscal capacity. 
The aim is to measure not only absolute fiscal ability 
but particularly the relative fiscal capacities of the different 
local units in order to establish the basis of a sound equali- 
zation system. 
When property was the prevailing form of wealth and 
formed the mainstay of local taxation, it was possible to rely 
on assessed valuation per capita on condition that valuation 
be uniform all -over the local areas. 
In present conditions, the best criterion of local wealth 
is local per capita income.2 
I. Fiscal capacity is, of course, a segment of economic capacity. 
2. In England, it is possible to take, for the time being, the 
rateable value per head as criterion for relative wealth. 
This basis should be extended to all types of local authorities, 
not only counties and county boroughs, but also county dis- 
tricts (see below). 
Clearly, the process of property valuation must first be 
improved. .Actual rent would be taken as the rule rather than 
the exception. Valuation must also be made uniform all -over 
the country, a result which can be achieved through centrali- 
sation of valuation. In the absence of uniform valuation, 
underassessed areas benefit relatively more. The fact that 
underassessment is often found in wealthy areas further,`'et6 
spi.pples the equalization purposes of the grants. 
Local income can be computed either by the method of 
income payments accruing to the local residents or the method 
of income produced locally.1 
In case local income taxation is resorted to by the minor 
governments (e.g. the American States) the former approach 
seems more convenient because it refers to ability -to -pay of 
the local residents more closely.2 
There are arguments in favour of a combined measure 
composed of income- produced series and income -received series 
with possible weighting in favour of the latter. 
In the writer's opinion, the method of income payments is 
more appropriate. It could include income in kind such as 
farmers' real incomes and house rental value to the owner - 
occupier. The inclusion of the former mitigates the discre- 
pancies between areas where farmers produce only cash crops 
and areas where they also produce their own requirements. 
The inclusion of residential rental value ftnd- -eese 
is fair to localities where dwelling houses are predominantly 
rental as opposed to localities where they are predominantly 
owner -occupied. 
1. Clearly, it is meaningless to deduct local taxes paid. 
Income payments must include these taxes since the aim is 
to measure local ability to pay the latter. There is an 
opposite view favouring a "Disposable Income Series" 
corrected for all taxes paid so as to measure income available 
for private consumption and investment as distinct from 
governmental ones. 
2. In the U.S.A., the Department of Commerce series on state 
income payments are not unacceptable. 
No income -produced series have yet been computed. 
It is noteworthy that income- payments series can be made 
more acceptable, for equalization purposes, by proceeding to 
adjustments for central taxes paid. 
Consideration could be also taken, in measuring relative 
fiscal abilities, of the local distribution of income by 
brackets (and possibly by origin).1 
Reference can be made to the proposal, put forward by 
certain observers, based on assuming a local model tax system. 
The latter would not be a mere reflection of the central tax 
system but would take into consideration local conditions.2 
The relative local fiscal capacities would be measured by 
applying such a system hypothetically and computing the amount 
of revenue which could be obtained thereby with uniform rates. 
However, this procedure is subjective and rather arbitrary.3 
Needless to say, all the methods outlined require a great deal 
1. Some writers propose the resort to the method they call 
"Supernumerary Income" to determine central financial 
participation. In brief, the device consists in elimina- 
ting a subsistence amount for each local resident and 
consequently excluding, in the calculation of local per 
capita income, of all local persons whose income lie below 
the subsistence line. 
Apart from the difficulty of determining subsistence 
line, this procedure tends to accentuate the inter -local 
disparities in fiscal capacity especially in under -developed 
countries where the rich tend to concentrate in certain 
areas. Moreover, equalization grants on this basis are 
less acceptable to the wealthy areas. 
2. Such a model was framed in the U.S.A. in 1932-33, comprising 
income, property and outlay taxes. 
3. Newcomer, Mabel: 
An Index of the Tax- Paying Ability of State and Local 
Governments. 
New York, 1935. 
Blough, Roy: op. cit., p. 604. 
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of statistics which, although national in nature, must speci- 
fically refer to the local areas. This is by no means an 
easy task. 
Equalization Grants and Tertiary Authorities: 
The central equalization grants, as already outlined, 
ought to be extended to all subordinate units of government 
and not restricted to a certain category of local units. 
This fact is of especial significance in a federal polity 
where the equalization principles must find application in 
state -local relations as well as federal -state relations: 
As the Federal Government adopts equalization 
formulas in its own aids, it has every reason to 
urge that the States do likewise to help assure 
that the basic purpose of the equalization 
principle is served all the way down to the local 
units, where the program gets translated from 
dollars and paper into services to the public. 
Federal -aid acts embodying equalization processes 
for Federal grants should, therefore, place upon 
States the responsibility for securing equalization 
within their own confines.1» 
In the U.S.A., the state -local subsidies are, at present, 
based on the value of property as reflected in assessments. 
Although this is not a satisfactory basis for local (as distinct 
from state) taxable ability (income- payments could be here also 
G adopted) it is most important to . The 
latter ought to be carried out at least at state level and 
should not be left to the local authorities and to elected 
(not maeed), inexperienced assessors. 
1. Johnson, B.Z.: op. cit., p. 206. 
ttA6 
an The Fisco Economic Implications 
of Equalizing Grants 
Judged on the light of our set of desiderata 
for fiscal coordination, the proposed equalizing 
grants of the ideal or proximate types, have the 
following merits: 
1. They mitigate local revenue deficiencies thus allowing 
less local reliance on regressive taxation by type or 
by bracket. 
2. They alleviate the problems of overlapping and multi- 
ple taxation by softening the general scramble for 
revenue, notably the inter -local tax rivalry. 
3. The central progressive taxation, made necessary to 
provide the financial aid to local authorities, leads 
to an inter -local redistribution of wealth. 
4. Social equity is devoid of sense unless supported. by 
economic equity. The equalizing grants, by making 
possible, a national minimum standard of health, edu- 
cation and other social benefits, leads to an income 
class redistribution of wealth and to effective 
`tt 
social equity, now recognized as a right to all 
citizens irrespective of their place of residence, 
5. It is sometimes contended that central supplementation 
of local outlay in under- endowed areas, especially 
if destined to finance purely local benefits, imposes 
an undue burden on wealthy areas. It is also thought 
that the whole procedure has resource -distorting effects 
as labour and capital must 'be left to combine in such 
a way as to maximize production. 
However, the modern concept of full employment 
policies emphasizes the need to promote effective de- 
mand at the central as well as at the local levels. 
Local outlay must be allowed to reach such a standard 
as to be a contributing factor in maintaining a nation- 
wide satisfactory volume of investment and. consumption. 
Weak localities must not be allowed to undermine such 
objectives. The low propensity to consume in "backward" 
areas is a hindrance to investment promotion and must 
be raised. The equalizing grants, by promoting local 
social services, are a step in the right direction. 
Furthermore, local outlay in all areas, whether 
wealthy or poor, must proceed in such a way as to 
hammer out economic fluctuations. Providing an under- 
endowed area with funds enables it to perform its share 
of compensatory public works and compensatory finance 
generally in the framework of the national policy. 
It is worthy of note that the equalizing grants, 
by fostering the economic capacity of poorer localities, 
develop their fiscal capacity and ultimately reduce 
the need for equalizing grants. 
4a 
From the social point of view, it cannot be 
overlooked that depressed areas, with their plight of 
unemployment and misery, are a source of danger to the 
nation and cannot be tolerated within the "Welfare 
State." 
Last, but not least', the writer deems appropriate 
to make an expressive quotation from the Report of the 
RoYal Commission on Dominion -Provincial Relations 
(Canada). (1) The Commission deprecates the mainten- 
ance of inter -area economic discrepancies: 
"The investors in other provinces will suffer 
in the case of public or private insolvency among their 
neighbours. The producers in other provinces will 
suffer if markets are destroyed. Migrants must be 
admitted from depressed provinces and it is not merely 
a nuisance and an expense but a positive danger to the 
more prosperous provinces if these migrants are ill- 
iterate or diseased, or under -nourished, Nor is the 
(1) Book II. 
danger of competition from substantial labour in a 
distressed province a peril which can be disregarded. 
More important than all these considerations taken to- 
gether is the danger to national unity if the citizens 
of distressed provinces come to feel that their 
interests are completely disregarded by their more 
prosperous neighbours and that those who have been 
their full partners in better times now tell them they 
must get along as best they can and accept inferior 
educational and social services. 
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S E C T I O N II 
The Grants : F,Lacltce. 
I. The United Kingdom 
Before 1948, the grant system consisted of two 
elements, namely: specific percentage or unit grants 
and a general fixed grant. Where were subsidies for 
police, education, and housing besides the Block 
Grant of 1929. 
The whole system was very unsatisfactory when 
judged on the light of our desiderata. The percentage 
grants, especially the fixed -ratio variety, do not only 
omit to take proper consideration of the special con- 
ditions of the various local authorities and the 
disparities in costs, but they also assume a certain 
local fiscal potential. Moreover, they sometimes 
induce extravagance in spending. 
The constant -ratio subsidies do not necessarily 
ensure a minimum standard of services in all localities 
and in bad times as well as good times. They also do 
not mitigate the inter -area tax differentials. (1) 
(1) Drummond, J.M.: "The Finance of Local Government." 
London, 1952. PP. 89 -111 
Chester, D.N.: "Central and Local Government." 
London, 1951. Chapters V and VIII 
The unit grants, as in housing, have various 
demerits. There are inter -area differences in costs. 
In periods of price instability, as in post -war 
conditions, a periodical revision of the estimates 
of costs must be undertaken otherwise the subvention 
loses touch with the actual needs of the local area. 
Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to 
find a satisfactory unit. 
The Block Grant of 1929 was intended to meet 
local expenditures on services generally. It was 
distributéd to counties and county boroughs on a per 
capita basis after weighting their actual populations. 
Allowance was made for child population under five 
years of age, for low rateable value per head of 
population, for the proportion of unemployed and for 
sparsity in rural areas (in counties only other than 
London.) 
The Block Grant failed to correct the dispersion 
in rate poundages and fell short of ensuring an all - 
nation average standard of services. 
The basis of weighting was subsequently shattered. 
The ageing of the population weakened the child 
population factor. The 'transfer of public assistance 
to the central level had a smilar result in respect 
of the unemployment weight. As for the low rateable 
value ceiling, the increase in rates caused it to 
have an inter -area disequalizing impact. (1) 
According to Mrs. Hicks, "The whole formula with 
the eception of the rural sparsity weight, has thus 
more or less collapsed as a result of external forces. (2) 
It is noteworthy that the absence of any negative 
weight was also a factor in limiting the rate equal- 
izing effect of the formula. 
Professor Chester finds that the actual unweighted 
population was an important element in the sum 
apportionable according to the formula, forming around 
40 per cent of it. Ad in highly rated localities, 
expenditure per head on basic services is higher and 
rateable resources per head lower comparatively to 
wealthier localities, the rest of the formula- distri- 
butable amount will have first to counterbalance these 
effectsand then exert its inter -local equalizing impactC3) 
(1) Hicks., U.K.: "The Grant Provisions of the Local 
Government Bill." 
Bulletin of the Oxford. University Institute of 
Statistics. February, 1948. P.33 
Hicks, J.R. and Hicks, U.K.: "The Beveridge Plan 
and Local Government Finance," in 
The Review of Economic Studies, 1943. P.1 
(2) Hicks, U.K.: Op. cit. P.39 
(3) Chester, D.N0: Op. cit. P.267 
OeiQ 
It must o be mentioned that the Block Grant 
was only part of the total financial help to local 
authorities. lkoteerrer,compensation had to be pro- 
vided first for losses caused by derating and cessation 
of previous grants. Thus only part of the general 
grant was to be distributed according to the formula. 
This meant 34 percent in the first and second periods 
(1930 -193?) and 56 per cent in the third period. 
The central aid system was an inducement to 
economy and did not respond to the increase in local 
expenditures which, combined with national expenditures, 
would have raised the standard of services, enjoyed by 
the citizens in any locality, to an agreed l national 
minimum. In fact, the block grant was not only based 
on a stilted formula but was also revisable each five 
years thus leaking o responsiveness to actual local 
requirements. The increase in the general subsidy 
always lagged behind the increase in expenditures of 
underlying authorities. 
The Exchequer Equalization Grant took, in 1948, 
the place of the Block Grant. Itco- exists with some . 
other specific grants notably for education, health, 
housing, highways and police. 
The amount of the Equalization Grant, which is 
payable to counties and county boroughs1is equal to 
the sum produced by the rate poundage which. would be 
necessary to cover the local authority's expenditures if a 
certain "credited" or additional rateable value existed 
in fact. This "credited" rateable value is based on 
the deficiency in rateable value per head of the local 
weighted population compared with the average for 
England and Wales, the difference being multiplied by 
the local weighted population. The weighting considers 
qumnMA,va..1 
the children under 15 and in certain counties, the mile- 
age of roads. In_ other words, the Exchequer accepts 
to be ratepayer to the locality in so far as there is 
a deficiency in the la tter' s rateable v-e per head 
relatively to the average for the whole country. The 
authorities above the average are not entitled to be 
grant- aided. 
A necessary corollary of the scheme is to have a 
uniform valuation of property all over the various 
areas, oterwise localities with low rate valuations, and 
those resorting to deliberate under- assessment, will 
secure more subventions. Consequently, the Inland Rev- 
enue was made responsible for valuation by the Local 
Government Act of 1948. 
From the point of view of fiscal inequalities, the 
Equalization Grant achieved much rate equalization, by 
narrowing the difference between the two extremes and 
the spread about the average. It is probabty more 
I itj'rq 
frrwh 
appropriate to say that the grant equalizes the 
rating resources rather than the rates levied, or that 
it attempts to achieve the proportionality of rate 
poundages rather than the equalization of rate pound - 
ages. The latter objective would require the national 
government to subsidize the underlying authorities up 
to 100 per cent of local spending of any size above 
(1) 
the standard rate level adopted for equalization purposes. 
The following table discloses the differences, in 
rate equalizing effects between the two systems of gen- 
eral grants: The Block Grant and the Equalization Grants 
(1) The Effect of the Local Government Act 1948 and 
Other Recent Legislation on the Finances of Local 
Authorities. Fifth Report. 
A study by a Research Group. Inset in 
Local Government Finance. March, 1953. 
(Journal of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers.) 
Inter -Local Fiscal Inequalities 
County Boroughs 









between 2 and 3 
Differences 
between 4 and 5 
s. d. s. d. 
14 6 14 e 
16 6 16 0 
12 0 11 6 
29 0 27 6 
7 1 7 10 
4 6 4 6 









s. d. s. d. s. d. s.. d. 
15 6 16 11 18 1 18 3 
17 10 18 10 19 8 20 0 
13 6 14 10 17 0 17 0 
29 0 30 0 24 6 25 0 
9 0 10 0 11 6 11 6 
4 4 4 0 2 8 3 0 
20 0 20 0 13 0 13 6 
(1) Chester, D.N. Op. cit. P. 275 
From the viewpoint of revenue productivity, the 
system assumes great elasticity not only because it is 
calculated annually but especially because it links the 
grant with actual local expenditures or with local 
propensity to spend. Mrs. Hicks rightly described the 
grant as "Earn -As- You -Pay." (1) 
As for the objective, set down below, of attaining 
a minimum national local service standard within all 
localities, it has been fostered through the various 
specific and general subsidies and the promotion, at the 
central level, of certain vital social services. 
It is however the opinion of the writer that there 
is no merit in fixing a national average for the datum 
line. All junior authorities must participate in the aid 
programme. The latter should not be confined to a cer- 
tain category of sub -standard authorities. In the 
present device, the average rateable value will have to 
be raised, from time to time, so that the total amount 
of financial support does not fall below the level of 
1948 /1949. 
(1) Hicks, U.K. Op. cit. P.42 
Local Financial Structure 
England and Wales (1) 
1950 - 1951 
Million L Million 
Local Taxation 
Rates including transport and elec- rcity. 
Fees, rents7trading profits trans- 
ferred in aid of rates and other 
recoupments. 
All Local Sources. 
Government Grants 
Specific: 
Education L million 152 
Health 16.5. 
Housing 22 
Highways & Bridges 13 
Police 25.5 
Other grants, none 26 













(1) Local Government Financial Statistics, England. and Wales. 
1950 -1951. 
The United States 
There is no coherent American grant system. The 
federal -state grants are piecemeal and defy, to a con- 
siderable extent, our six desiderata set down below, and 
a fortiori defy the concept of economic equilibrium 
already outlined. 
Before 1930, the federal subventions amounted to 
about $100 million only, of which the highways formed 
about four- fifths. 
The subsidies assumed more important proportions 
since 1935 when the Social Security Act provided for 
further aid in respect of old age, maternity and child 
welfare, and unemployment. (1) 
(1) Shere,Louis : "Some General Comments on Federal 
Grants." Bulletin of the National Tax Association. 
December, 1946. 
Harris, Joseph P.. "The Future of Federal Grants -in- Aid. "in 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, "Intergovernmental Relations in the 
United States." Philadelphia, 1940 P. 14 
Bittermann, Henry J.: "State and Federal Grants-in-Aid." 
New York, 1938. 
The percentage of federal grants in net state 
and local expenditures thus rose very much. During the 
period 1920 -1933 it oscillated between 1.3 per cent and. 
3.3 per cent. Between 1934 -1942 the percentage reached 
20 -40 per cent. 
During the Second World War the federal grants de- 
clined in absolute amount as well as proportionately 
to net state and local expenditures. The percentage 
was as low as 9 in 1946. 
The post -war trend, however, discloses a rise. 
American Federal Grants 
(millions of dollars) (1) 
Year Total Federal Grants Grants as % of net 
state and local ex- 
penditures. 
1920 76 2.0 
1925 114 1.8 
1930 113 1.3 
1935 2,277 35.6 
1940 2,401 32.0 
1942 1,827 20.5 
1943 1,293 14.4 
1946 901 9.0 
1947 1,678 12.4 
1948 1,629 103 
(1) Maxwell, James A: "Federal Grants and the Business 
Cycle." 
National Bureau of Economic Reseatch. New York, 1952. 
P. 18. 
Appraisal. 
The American federal grants fail to account for 
state fiscal capacity and do not ensure the achievement 
of a national quantitative and qualitative minimum of 
services all over the different states, rich and. poor. 
1. State Fiscal Ca acit : The matching basis, so pre- 
dominant in the regular federal grants, militate) 
against the inter -state equalization of the fiscal 
-s or of social utility (general welfare.) In 
fact, the uniform -ratio basis presupposes a certain 
economic and fiscal capacity. The upshot is that the 
under -endowed states are not able to benefit to the 
same extent as the wealthier states* 
The grants should be based on some indifee of state 
. 
fiscal potential, notably state per capita income. 
Subventions should thus vary in inverse proportion to 
state per capita income. If this relation is in the 
right direction in some states; it is in the wrong 
direction in many others. Subsidies are high while per 
capita income is high in Washington, Oregon, Nevada, 
Colorado, California. Subsidies are low when per capita 
income is low as in Mississippi, Louisiana, North Carol- 
ina, Alabama, Kentucky, 
The American aid programme is thus far from being 
equalizing. 
Professor Maxwell measures the correlation between 
itecdWle and by Spearman's formula: 
Total Federal aid. + .31 
Employment security .89 
Public assistance + .41 
Education + .01 
Highway s - .11 
Health - .39 
It appears that only, the subsidies for public 
health can be considered as equalizing. Those for edu- 
cation are distorting. As for the public assistance 
grants, they are high for the high income states and are 
thus most disequalizing. The trouble is that the latter 
item in federal aid is the most important,being approx- 
imately half the total. 
2. National Minimum Service Standard: This requirement 
is not fulfilled as the grants do not have a wide cov- 
erage and give disproportionate weight to the various 
services. 
(1) Maxwell, James. A.: "The Fiscal Impact of 
Federalism in the United States." 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. PP.397- 
403 
The federal subsidies do not link federal -state 
and state -local expenditures in a rational scheme 
aiming at securing everywhere a minimum volume and 
standard of services. 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Contradictions: The 
principles governing the grants, especially the 
matching basis, do not militate in favour of counter - 
cyclical policy- framing on the state level. The states 
most adversely affected will not secure more benefit 
from the federal grant system relatively to the states 
less or least hit. 
lit Canada 
The Dominion grants, in their development, fall 
far short of achieving an all- provincial socio- economic 
equilibrium. This fact assumes great importance as 
Canada is constituted of wealthy industrial provinces 
beside* poor agricultural provinces. The population 
and natural resources are unevenly distributed. The 
subsidies were, from the beginning, the fruit of dom- 
inion- provincial bargaining and inter -provincial strife.(1) 
Apart from the early grants given in compensation 
for the loss of customs and excises, various conditional 
payments were made in 1913 for agricultural instruction. 
These were later extended to technical education on high- 
ways in 1919, old -age in 1928 and relief in 1930. 
These grants, however, failed to achieve equaliza- 
tion of resources or to secure a minimum level of services 
all over the Dominion's provinces. The grants were 
limited in scope, intermittent in nature and based on the 
matching principle which presupposes a certain provincial 
(1) Keirstead, W1C. : "The Bases of Provincial 
Subsidies." 
Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association. May, 1934. 
Carrothers, W.A. "Problems of the Canadian Federation." 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 
February, 1935. P.26 
fiscal potential. As conditional grants they failed 
because dominion control was resented. While the 
conditions could not be enforced the financial help 
could not be withdrawn. 
The Royal Commission on Dominion -Provincial 
Relations recommended the achievement of an average 
level of public services at average tax rates. It 
advocated the resort to a national adjustment grant 
periodically revisable.(1) 
The Second World War induced changes, not in 
conformity with the Commission's recommendations but 
in response to the needs of the war.. 
Compensation was given for the loss of personal and 
corporate income taxes to the provinces. They were based 
either on the provincial tax collections of 1940 or the 
difference between the cost of the province's debt ser- 
vice and the yield of its inheritance tax. The latter 
basis was selected by provinces which had no well devel- 
oped income taxes such as Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island. 
(1) Royal Commission on Dominion -Provincial Relations. 
Book II. Recommendations. See also 
Maxwell, J.A. "Canadian Dominion -Provincial Relations." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. August, 1941. 
la Australia. 
The transfer payments from the Commonwealth Gov- 
ernment to the various states fall under two main 
categories. In the first category, there is the relief 
provided to primary producers adversely affected by 
national economic and tariff policies. Besides, there 
are the payments for social services made to individ- 
uals in the different states. 
The second category comprises the central finan- 
cial assistance properly known as grants. (l) 
(1) Moffat? Robert E.: "Financial Relations Between 
The Australian Commonwealth and the Australian States." 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 
February, 1947. P.465 
Greenwood, Gordon: "The Future of Australian Federalism." 
Melbourne, 1946. 
Wood G.L. : "The Future of Federal Aid." 
The Economic Record. December, 1945. 
The Third. Report of the Commonwealth Grants Commission. 
Copland? D.B.: "Problems of Federal Finance and. Federal 
(wants in Australia." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1937. 
Copland, D.B. : "Financial Relations of the States and 
the Commonwealth of Australia," 
Economic Journal, 1927. 
It is possible to distinguish three categories 
of central subsidies; they are connected with the 
Australian Loan Council, the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission and the compensation for state income tax- 
ation after their transfer to the national level. (1) 
The Australian Loan Council was created in 1923 
to control the public loans of both states and 
Commonwealth. According to the Financial Agreement of 
1927, per capita fixed payments were made in contri- 
bution towards the interest on states' borrowing. In 
addition, contributions of varying proportions were 
made to the states' sinking funds. 
It is to be noticed that the Loan Council should 
not provide loans on a competitive basis but ought to 
take in consideration the requirements of long -term 
national developmental programmes, counter- cyclical 
policies and the volume and conditions of the federal 
grants. 
(1) Between 1901 -1910 the Commonwealth used to distri- 
bute 75% of the revenue from customs and excise and any 
surplus accruing on a per capita basis. From 1910 -11 
to 1927, there was a per capita payment of 25s. Moreover 
the federal government had to give financial assistance 
to states in extreme need which was actually the case 
with Western Australia since 1910 and Tasmania since 1912. 
A further stream of financial help accrued to 
the states through the Commonwealth Grants Commission. 
This body, created in 1933, was intended to alleviate 
the impact of the Great Deprbssion on the weaker states. 
It soon evolved into a "court of conciliation and 
arbitration." in financial matters, making annual 
"recommendations" for subsidies 
The Commission decided to provide grants on the 
basis of needs. The latter concept was interpreted in 
two different ways which are both unsatisfactory. 
Until 1940 -41, the subventions paid were those 
necessary to reduce the budget deficit per capita, in 
the under- endowed states, to the average deficit per 
capita in the wealthier states. The deficit had to be 
a "reasonable" one and the claimant states had to show 
that they levied "reasonably heavy tares" and that they 
were "spending carefully." (1) Clearly, the over - 
standard states were not entitled to any assistance. 
(1) See the Reports of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission. 
Apart from the elaborate mathematical calculation 
involved, the subsidies were thus destined to prevent 
the bankruptcy of the states rather than to ensure a 
national minimum service standard or to cope with the 
marked inter -state discrepancies in financial resources. 
The concept of "budgetary deficit" was later 
-.Q;9_, 
modified for,, better. The grants now available are those 
"necessary to give standard budget position." They are 
further adjusted according to two bases,namely the burden 
of taxation within the applicant state and the level of 
that state's social services. 
In other terms, the grant is higher in case the 
claimant state has a heavier fiscal burden than the aver- 
age or when the state has a standard. of social services 
which is lower compratively to the average standard, 
The formula, in its latest shape, marks an interesting 
improvement since it introduces some degree of fleibility 
in the amount of the grants and more balance in the level 
of taxation and social service expenditures between the 
under- endowed (or claimant) states and the wealthier 
(or non -claimant) states. Equally noticeable is the fur- 
ther adjustment made according to ''the efficiency of state 
administration and the wisdom of state expenditure." This 
feature, especially useful with unconditional grants, 
should. prove an inducement to the applicant states when 
framing their financial policies, to be more responsive 
-;I 
to the principles laid down by the Commission . 
However, the system is not geared to a national 
policy. A "standard budget position" may be anything 
between a classical balanced budget and a full employ- 
ment budget. All states, without exception, should be 
entitled to financial aid, not only according to their 
relative needs, so as to exhibit less discrepancies, 
but also in so far as their economic capacity or stan- 
dard of services are not4n line, quantitatively or 
qualitatively, with national developmental policies. 
We may now turn to the subsidies paid in compen- 
sation for income taxation, individual or corporate, 
relinquished by the states. 
According to the first agreement of 1942, the 
states were paid on the basis of the average revenue 
from their own former income taxation. 
In 1946, the States Grants (Tax Reimbursement) 
Act renewed the previous agreement without time limit.(1) 
(1) At the end of seven years, revision is possible . 
if requested by either the Commonwealth Government or 
the States. 
During the two first years (1946/47 and 1947 -48), 
the total compensation was fixed at DI-0 million. 
This guaranteed minimum was, in subsequent years, 
to be raised with the rise in the total population 
(six states) and further augmented by one -half of the 
percentage rise in average wages per person employed 
compared to the average wages in 1947. 
More flexibility in the volume of federal aid 
is thus introduced. 
The most interesting feature concerns the 
apportionment of the subventions between the various 
states. Between 1948 -57 the distribution is to take 
place on the basis of 1946 -47 to the extent of only 
90 per cent of the total grant in the period 1948 -49, 
and only 80 per cent in 1949 -50 and so on till in 
1956 -57 the proportion of total grant apportionable 
according to the 1946 -47 basis reaches only 10 per 
cent. 
The remainder of the tamil federal subvention 
is to be allocated in proportion to the adjusted 
population of the states. This adjusted population 
is obtained by adding to the actual population four 
times the number of the child population between five 
and fifteen and multiplying the result by a certain 
fraction. This fraction is high if the proportion of 
the residents of the aided state, living in sparsely 
populated areas, is high. The fraction is lower if 
a higher proportion of the state's residents is living 
in urban centres. 
After 1957, the whole Commonwealth grant for the 
purposes of income tax compensation will be payable 
according to adjusted population.(1) 
In other terms, the concept of compensation for 
revenue ceded will have disappeared by 1957 and replaced 
by a per capita ba.s. 
In conclusion, the whole system of Australian 
Federal aid is essentially one of ad hoc payments, non - 
comprehensive in spatial or service coverage. True, if 
we consider the three sets of grants combined, it will 
be found that the per capita payments to the poorer or 
claimant states is higher than in the case of wealthier 
states. (2) 
(1) It is to be noticed that the compensation to 
any state is not to fall below the level of 1946 -47. 
(2) Moffat, R.E. ; Op. cit. 
However, the per capita grants, the fixed annual 
grants, the unconditional grants and other forms 
of un- coordinated assistance are all devices which 
clearly do not comply with the concept of _pan- 
mAi 4 n 7o 44cm u. a mats ennui riimtirmott amide td ./4&4 .6 owll lru 
territorial socio- economic equilibrium : - Such aids 
lack coherence and, as they are not integrated in any 
comprehensive logical scheme, they are incompatible 
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